524 Phil. 204
AZCUNA, J.:
After an objective evaluation of the pleading, including the documentary evidence adduced by the parties, we are of the opinion that the complainant was dismissed for a just cause.Respondent appealed the above decision to the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) arguing that the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City acquitted him and his co-accused in the aforementioned criminal case filed against them by petitioner PLDT for insufficiency of evidence. He added that being a driver who was merely assigned to drive the group of Buenaventura that day, he was not responsible for making a report and should not be held accountable for any recovered cable.[8]
It appears that on September 1, 1992, the complainant was assigned by Coordinator Antonio Calderon to go with the group of Foreman Victor Buenaventura to recover cable wires in Tipaz, Taguig, Metro Manila. Complainant was the driver of their vehicle (Fleet No. 1949). About 457 feet of cable wires were recovered by the group which were cut into three (3) rolls. Except for the rolled 250 (254.3) feet cable wires, which found its way into the house of Edwina Flores, the rest were delivered by the group to the PLDT warehouse. As to why the 250 feet cable wires were unloaded from their service vehicle and stored in the house of Edwina Flores, the explanations of the complainant are at variance. Complainant along with his companion[s], Rommel Cruz and Wilfredo Barroga, explained on October 29, 1992 that their service vehicle sustained sliding clutch (Annex "4", respondent's position paper). Then on December 5, 1992, complainant together with Rommel Cruz and Wilfredo Barroga claimed that "due to heavy load, the vehicle (Ford Fiera) cannot contain the cables (Annex "3", Ibid).
Considering this glaring inconsistency and contradiction, we find the declaration of the complainant that the 250 cable feet wires [was] unloaded from their service vehicle for safekeeping in the house of Edwina Flores to be self-serving. As such, it has no probative value.
There is no doubt that the defect on the service vehicle is only on the muffler. This can be gleaned from the Vehicle Trouble Repair Report No. 69537 dated September 2, 1992 prepared by Wilfredo Barroga himself (Annex "5", Ibid). Certainly, such defect will not incapacitate the service vehicle from transporting the 250 feet cable wires to the PLDT warehouse. This explain(s) why the complainant and his group even proceeded to Ortigas Extension, Taytay, Rizal on the same day aboard the same service vehicle to recover messenger wires and was able to return to the office aboard the said vehicle. As driver of the said vehicle, complainant must be aware that the 250 feet cable wires can be transported directly to the warehouse without need of dropping them to the house of Edwina Flores. If complainant is really innocent as he professes to be, he should have defied the instruction of Foreman Buenaventura to bring the cables to the house of Edwina Flores and insist that the cables be brought directly to the warehouse.
The complainant even went to the extent of misleading this Office by alleging that Foreman Buenaventura made a report on the 250 feet cables found in the house of Edwina Flores. Records tend to show that he (complainant) already knew as early as October 24, 1992 that Foreman Buenaventura did not make a report on the said cables. Thus, the complainant alleged, among others, in their "Pinagsanib na Sinumpaang Salaysay" (Annex "4", Ibid.) that: "5. Na kung hindi ini-report ni Foreman Buenaventura (ang) pagkakaiwan ng kableng iyon sa bahay ni Edwina Flores o kung wala siyang hakbang na ginagawa upang kunin ang nasabing kable, siya na po ang dapat managot or mag-explain at hindi namin alam kung ano ang nasa kanyang isipan."
Even Foreman Buenaventura himself rebuked the complainant by declaring categorically that he did not make a report on the cables left in the house of Edwina Flores. Thus, Foreman Buenaventura declared on September 5, 1992, that: "Gusto ko lang po idagdag kaya po hindi nabalikan ang nasabing cable dahil wala po akong sasakyan at hindi ko na rin naireport na may iniwan akong kable sa bahay nila Mrs. Edwina Flores sa aking supervisor na si Mr. Expedito Gudawen dahil naghahanap ako ng sasakyan na mahihiram." (Annex "1-A", No. 13, Reply to the position paper of the complainant).
On the other hand, the evidence submitted by the respondent substantially proves that the complainant is involved in [the] pilferage of the 250 feet cable wires. He (complainant) was one of those who unloaded the cable wires from their service vehicle and then stored them in the house of Edwina Flores. This was borne out (sic) by the statement of his companion, Mr. Rommel Cruz (Annex "2", No. 6, Reply of the respondent) and by the memorandum of Prosecutor Leodegario Quilatan recommending that a criminal information for Qualified Theft be filed against complainant Imperial and his companion, namely: Victor Buenaventura, Rommel Cruz, Wilfredo Barroga and Francisco Flores (Annex "7," respondent's position paper). The cable wires remained in the house of Edwina Flores until it was retrieved therein by operatives of the PLDT Security Department and Taguig Police Force on September 11, 1992.
In a desperate attempt to conceal his liability, the complainant presented Cable Recovery No. 40726 (Annex "B-1," Affidavit of the complainant) which shows that Foreman Buenaventura allegedly turned over to the warehouse 250 feet cables on September 4, 1992. However, we found the Cable Recovery No. 40726 to be questionable. As correctly pointed out by the respondent, "How then can foreman Buenaventura return the questioned cables to the warehouse on September 4, 1992 when in fact it was still in the house of the spouses Flores and was only recovered therefrom by the police on September 11, 1992?"
WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered dismissing the instant complaint for lack of merit.[7]
Maintaining that a motion for reconsideration of the above resolution was unnecessary as the issues that would have been raised therein will only be a reiteration of the matters that had been passed upon and concluded in the NLRC, Imperial filed a Petition for Certiorari with the Court of Appeals alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of the NLRC.x x x
Complainant therefore, cannot solely rely on the reasonable doubt which led to his acquittal in the aforesaid criminal case and pray that because of the existence of such doubt, this complaint shall be resolved in his favor. Such proposition cannot be applied in this jurisdiction. As correctly found by the Labor Arbiter, there is on record substantial evidence sufficient to warrant complainant's valid dismissal. And as defined by the Supreme Court, substantial evidence is such amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion.
Moreover, the High Tribunal [as] aptly observed that "the Labor arbiter, as trier of facts in the arbitral proceedings below, is at a vantage position offering him the first-hand opportunity to come out with credible factual findings x x x." Hence, the findings of the Labor Arbiter should be respected and left undisturbed there being substantial evidence to support them.
WHEREFORE, all the foregoing premises considered, the appealed decision is hereby AFFIRMED and the appeal DISMISSED for lack of merit.[9]
Petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the above decision was denied by the Court of Appeals in its resolution issued on December 8, 2001.x x x
[T]his court is convinced that petitioner merely acted according to the instructions of BUENAVENTURA. Petitioner's act of helping the other members of the group in unloading the cables is but logical and natural for him to do, especially that the same was done upon orders of his Foreman at that time, BUENAVENTURA, and that act of helping is by itself does not prove that petitioner had conspired with BUENAVENTURA or any members of the team. Accordingly, the statement of private respondent that he helped in unloading the cables cannot be relied upon to establish the alleged dishonesty of petitioner.x x x
More importantly, We rule that the case of BLTB Co. vs. NLRC (166 SCRA 721) cited by private respondent has no application in the case at bar. The person who has the duty to report to his immediate supervisor of the recovery of the cables in question was not petitioner but BUENAVENTURA. To repeat, the fact that petitioner helped in unloading the cables to the house of Mrs. Flores is no evidence to support that herein petitioner is in connivance with BUENAVENTURA to steal the cables. What is clear, however, is the fact that petitioner was merely acting based on orders of his superior BUENAVENTURA who was the Foreman of the group at that time. In fact, it was Coordinator Antonio Calderon who instructed petitioner to drive the vehicle for the group of BUENAVENTURA. With the foregoing explanation, it cannot be said that petitioner's failure to disobey the orders of BUENAVENTURA constitute loss of trust. For loss of trust and confidence to be a valid ground for an employee's dismissal must be clearly established (Labor vs. NLRC, 248 SCRA 183).
x x x
In the instant petition, the act of petitioner is not enough ground for his termination. Hence, We hold that the proofs presented by private respondent are insufficient to show dishonesty on the part of petitioner and that the latter was dismissed without just cause. Private respondent is deemed to have acted arbitrarily when it dismissed petitioner based on loss of confidence.x x x
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision of public respondent NLRC dated December 29, 1999 is REVERSED AND SET ASIDE for having been rendered with grave abuse of discretion. In view of Our ruling that petitioner was unjustifiably dismissed, private respondent is hereby ORDERED to reinstate petitioner to his former position or one reasonably equivalent thereto without loss of seniority rights, and to pay his backwages plus the regular monthly increase or yearly increase and benefits, if any, computed from the time of his dismissal, March 25, 1993, until his actual reinstatement. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.[11]
Briefly, the issues to be determined are whether, under the circumstances: 1) the findings of facts of the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC are subject to judicial review; and, 2) the failure to file a motion for reconsideration of the NLRC resolution is a fatal procedural defect.ITHE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED, CONTRARY TO LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE, IN REVERSING THE NLRC'S AND THE LABOR ARBITER'S FINDINGS OF FACT, WHICH WERE AMPLY SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE. AS HELD BY THIS HONORABLE COURT IN A LONG LINE OF CASES, IN THE ABSENCE OF A DESPOTIC ABUSE OF ITS DISCRETION BY THE NLRC, THE NLRC'S FINDINGS OF FACT ARE NOT SUBJECT TO JUDICIAL REVIEW EVEN IF THERE BE A SIMPLE ERROR IN JUDGMENT - WHICH ERROR WAS NOT COMMITTED IN THIS CASE.IITHE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED, CONTRARY TO LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE, AND LIKEWISE ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN REINSTATING THE PETITION FOR CERTIORARI BEFORE IT, DESPITE RESPONDENT'S UNJUSTIFIABLE EXCUSE IN NOT MOVING FOR THE RECONSIDERATION OF THE NLRC'S ADVERSE RESOLUTION IN VIOLATION OF THE DOCTRINE OF EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the government.The Court of Appeals, in view of its expanded jurisdiction over labor cases elevated to it through a petition for certiorari such as in this case, may look into the records of the case and re-examine the questioned findings if it considers the same to be necessary to arrive at a just decision.[14]
x x x Ever since appeals from the NLRC to the Supreme Court were eliminated, the legislative intendment was that the special civil action of certiorari was and still is the proper judicial review of decisions of the NLRC.Based on the foregoing, for want of substantial basis, in fact or in law, the factual findings of an administrative agency,[18] such as the NLRC, cannot be given the stamp of finality and conclusiveness normally accorded to it, as even decisions of administrative agencies which are declared "final" by law are not exempt form judicial review when so warranted.[19] Contrary to petitioner's assertion, therefore, the Court of Appeals, under the circumstances, may review the findings of fact made by the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC. Thus, this Court sees no error on the part of the Court of Appeals when it made a new determination of the case and, upon this, reversed the ruling of the NLRC.x x x
While we do not wish to intrude into the Congressional sphere on the matter of the wisdom of a law, on this score we add the further observation that there is a growing number of labor cases being elevated to this Court, which, not being a trier of fact, has at times been constrained to remand the case to the NLRC for resolution of unclear or ambiguous factual findings; that the Court of Appeals is procedurally equipped for that purpose, aside from the increased number of its component divisions; and that there is undeniably an imperative need for expeditious action on labor cases as a major aspect of constitutional protection to labor.
Therefore all references in the amended Section 9 of B.P No. 129 to supposed appeals from the NLRC to the Supreme Court are interpreted and hereby declared to mean and refer to petitions for certiorari under Rule 65. Consequently, all such petitions should henceforth be initially filed in the Court of Appeals in strict observance of the doctrine on the hierarchy of courts as the appropriate forum for the relief desired."
Thus, the law no longer provides for an appeal from the decisions of the Labor Arbiter or from the NLRC. The mode of review from said decisions is the special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court in the Court of Appeals.
Further, when the circumstances so warrant, the Court of Appeals can disregard the factual findings of the NLRC. While as a rule, factual findings of agencies exercising quasi-judicial functions such as the NLRC are accorded not only respect but even finality, [16] and that judicial review of labor cases does not go so far as to evaluate the sufficiency of evidence on which the labor officials' findings rest; more so when both the labor arbiter and the NLRC share the same findings, such as in the present case, the Court cannot affirm the decision of the NLRC when its findings of fact on which the conclusion was based are not supported by substantial evidence. By substantial evidence, we mean the amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify the conclusion.[17]
Petitioners now come before us assailing the decision of the NLRC, without filing any motion for reconsideration. While a motion for reconsideration under the Rules of Court is required before a petition for certiorari is filed, the rules admit of certain exceptions, among which is the finding that under the circumstances of the case, a motion for reconsideration would be useless.In addition, in exceptional cases and for compelling reasons, this Court has disregarded procedural defects in order to correct a patent injustice. A writ of certiorari is a prerogative writ, not demandable as a matter of right, but issued in the exercise of judicial discretion. [25]
In this case, the NLRC had reversed the decision of the Labor Arbiter and no new issues were raised in this appeal. We find it quite impossible for the NLRC to reverse itself under the foregoing facts and so, a motion for reconsideration will be deemed useless. Hence, by reason of justice and equity, we resolve to settle the issues on the merits in order to avoid further delay."
Likewise, we have ruled that with regard to procedural errors committed by a party to a case, fundamental consideration of substantial justice persuades us to decide the case on the merits rather than to dismiss it on a technicality. In so doing, we exercise our prerogative in labor cases that no undue sympathy is to be accorded to any claim of procedural misstep, the idea being that our power must be exercised according to justice and equity and substantial merits of the controversy.[24]