521 Phil. 606
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Evaluating, with utmost caution, both parties' contrasting factual version, supporting proofs, related legal excerpts and applicable jurisprudential citations, we discern that, under the Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) dated December 26, 1998, the 61 regularized employees are not entitled to their claims for the P60.00 per day salary increase, mid-year gratuity pay of P5,000.00, one sack of rice, and overtime and thirteenth month differentials effective December 1, 1998 onward.Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied in a resolution dated 24 September 2001, thus on 22 November 2001 petitioner filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals, which was disposed by the appellate court in this wise:
Initially, under the MOA, only the employees who were regular on July 1998 and continued being such upon the signing of the MOA on December 26, 1998 deserve retroactive payment of the MOA benefits amounting to a lump sum of P35,000.00.
This entitlement springs from the following pertinent provisions of the MOA:"All covered employees who were regular as of July 1, 1998 and upon the signing of this Agreement shall each be entitled to a lump sum in the amount of THIRTY FIVE THOUSAND PESOS (P35,000.00) which shall, subject to the ratification of the employees within the bargaining unit, be released on or before 31 December 1998.In the case at bar, since the 61 regularized employees were regularized only on May 1, 1999 and October 1, 1999, as the case may be, they therefore have no right whatsoever to claim entitlement to the MOA benefits.
"The aforesaid amount shall be in lieu of the wage increase as well as THE Operation Performances Incentive DESCRIBED UNDER Item 11(B) hereof, all premium pay, the 13th month and 14th month pay differentials, sick leave and vacation leave credits for the period July 1, 1998 to December 31, 1999." Underscoring supplied)
Moreover, CFW Local 245's insistence that the 61 regularized employees became regular on December 1, 1998 is non sequitor. It merely flows from its specious interpretation of the MOA provisions. The MOA does not provide that non-regular employees who would be deployed to fill up vacant plantilla positions covered by the 1998 and 1999 manpower budget of CCBPC should be automatically considered regular effective December 1, 1998. What the MOA stipulates are that: 1) effective December 1, 1998, non-regular employees who have been occupying the position to be filled up for at least one year shall be given priority in filling up the positions; and 2) that in that case, they will not undergo the company's regular recruitment procedures, like interviews and qualifying examinations.
The only importance of the date of December 1, 1998 is its being the reckoning date from which the one year employment requirement should be computed. Consequently, under the MOA, only the non-regular employees who had worked with the company for at least a year counted retroactively from December 1, 1998 should be given priority in the filling up of vacant plantilla positions.
Anyway, even assuming ex gratia argumenti that the 61 regularized employees were regularized effective December 1, 1998, they, still, are not entitled to the MOA benefits. As discussed above, only employees who were regular on July 1, 1998 and were still so until the signing of the MOA on December 26, 1998 could be covered by the retroactivity clause.
Furthermore, entitling the 61 regularized employees to the MOA benefits would certainly infringe the well-entrenched principle of "no-work-no-pay". Since such employees started becoming regular only on May 1, 1999 and October 1, 1999, as the case may be, it would thus be most unfair to require CCBPI to pay them for their unworked period, for they would certainly, be unjustly enriched at the expense of CCBPI.
We also hold that the allegedly redundant six hundred thirty-nine (639) employees were not illegally dismissed.
Initially, there was just cause for the employees' dismissal.
It bears to stress that, aimed at 1) attaining efficiency and cost effectiveness, 2) maximizing its production capacity and 3) ensuring that its customers obtain products manufactured only under the most stringent quality standards of CCBPI's modern, technologically advanced production plants, CCBPI conducted an extensive study on the operational mechanics of its Manila and Antipolo plants.
From this study, it was established that there was inadequate water supply at CCBPI's Manila and Antipolo plants. As a consequence, the company was constrained to transport water from several sources to its production line in Manila in 1998 and 1999. Worse, it was discovered that the quality of water supply was fast deteriorating due to the rise of its salt level. This reality prompted the company to reduce its production capacity. Moreover, the bottling process of treating this water of decadent quality resulted in higher production costs. Under these twin conditions, the company could not thus efficiently continue on with its operations.
The study also reveals the decadent state of the production equipment of CCBPI's Manila and Antipolo Plants. Their production lines were among the oldest and hence, had very low line efficiency. In comparison with the line efficiency of 71.18% of the company's other plants, the Manila and Antipolo Plants had only efficiency ratings of 61.09% and 58.39%, respectively. Whereas the other production lines had an average wastage rating of 1.01%, the twin plants had a higher average wastage ratings of 2.05% and 1.77%, respectively. The company's production studies in 1998 and 1999 likewise reveal substantial issues on Good Manufacturing Practice (GMP) and process control for such plants.
From this study, the impracticability of rehabilitating the twin plants was also found out. Although the problems cited may be remedied by way of a major reconstruction, this would, however, entail an investment of huge capital. Further, the congestion of the twin plants' sites would render impracticable such a major reconstruction. Besides, there was utter lack of effective solution to the retrograding water supply.
The foregoing significant facts are substantially evidenced by the Technical Evaluation of Production Requirements, Annex "20", CCBPI's Rejoinder; Affidavit of its Operations Manager dated 3 March 2000, Annex "1", its Position Paper dated 20 July 2000; and Certification dated May 21, 2001 of Mr. Bruce A. Herbert, its Sur-Rejoinder.
To solve the problems cited, however, CCBPI, as soundly recommended by the study, integrated the production capacities of the different CCBPI modern and technologically advanced production facilities. This imperative integration indispensably prompted CCBPI to close, its production lines at the Manila and Antipolo Plants.
This measure taken by CCBPI indeed draws jurisprudential justification from the following sound pronouncement of the Supreme Court:"Business enterprises today are faced with the pressures of economic recession, stiff competition and labor unrest. Thus, businessmen are always pressured to adopt certain changes and programs in order to enhance their profits and protect their investments. Such changes may take various forms. Management may even choose to close a branch, department, a plant, or a shop." (Philippine Engineering Corp. vs. CR, 41 SCRA 89)Urgently propelled by this closure, CCBPI inevitably redundated the services of 639 employees based at the Manila and Antipolo Plants. The fact that their services became superfluous or in excess of what were reasonably demanded by the actual requirements of the company as a consequence of the closure certainly shows the undertone of good faith on CCBPI's part in resorting to the redundation measure.
Well in support of this urgent economic measure taken is the following postulation of the Supreme Court in the case of Wiltshire File Co., Inc. vs. NLRC, et al., 193 SCRA 665:"We believe that redundancy, for purposes of our Labor Code, exists where the services of an employee are in excess of what is reasonably demanded by the actual requirements of the enterprise. Succinctly put, a position is redundant where it is a superfluity, and superfluity of a position or positions may be the outcome of a number of facets, such as over hiring of workers, decreased volume of business, or dropping of a particular product line or service activity previously manufactured or undertaken by the enterprises. The employer has no legal obligation to keep in its payroll more employees than are necessary for the operation of its business.Another reason why the dismissal of the 639 employees was legal is that the same was attended by the observance of the requirements of due process. Indeed, as early as 9 December 1999, more than thirty (30) days prior to their actual dismissal on 1 March 2000, CCBPI served on the affected employees a written notice informing them of the closure of the two plants and subsequent redundation. Later, by 13 December 1999, CCBPI filed with the DOLE the required written notice informing it of the subject closure and consequent redundation."x x x.
"x x x The characterization of (the employee's) service as no longer necessary or sustainable, and therefore properly terminable, was an exercise of business judgment on the part of (the employer). The wisdom or soundness of such characterizing or decision was not subject to discretionary review on the part of the Labor Arbiter nor of the NLRC so long, of course, as violation of law or merely arbitrary and malicious action is not shown. X x x The determination of the continuing necessity of a particular officer or position in a business corporation is management's prerogative, and the courts will not interfere with the exercise of such so long as no abuse of discretion or merely arbitrary or malicious action on the part of management is shown."
This finding is perfectly in line with the following applicable legal excerpts:"ART. 283. Closure of establishment and reduction of personnel. ---The employer may also terminate the employment of any employee due to ".redundancy". or the closing or cessation of operation of the establishment or undertaking "by serving a written notice on the workers and the Department of Labor and Employment at least one (1) month before the intended date thereof."Needless to state, having been lawfully redundated, as comprehensively discussed above, the affected employees are entitled to payment of separation pay equivalent to one (1) month pay for every year of service, pursuant to Article 283 of the Labor Code which provides:
"For termination of employment based on just causes defined in Article 282 of the Labor Code:
(1) A written notice served [on] the employee specifying the ground or grounds for termination, and giving said employee reasonable opportunity within which to explain his side;
(ii) A hearing or conference during which the employee concerned, with the assistance of counsel if he so desires is given opportunity to respond to the charge, present his evidence or rebut the evidence presented against him; and
(iii) a written notice of termination served on the employee, indicating that upon, due consideration of all the circumstances, grounds have been established to justify his termination.
"For termination of employment as defined in Article 283 of the Labor Code, the requirement of due process shall be deemed complied with upon the service of a written notice to the employee and the appropriate Regional Office of the Department of Labor and Employment at least thirty days before [effectivity] of the termination, specifically the ground or grounds for termination." (Par. D, Section 2, Rule 1, Book VI, Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code)"In case of termination due to the installation of labor saving devices or redundancy, the worker affected thereby shall be entitled to separation pay equivalent to at least his one (1) month pay or to at least One (1) month pay for every year of service, whichever is higher."However, due to the economic adversity besetting our workers today brought about by the ever increasing standards of living, CCBPI realized that such a legal package was no longer conformable with such on obtaining economic reality. Accordingly, CCBPI granted the affected employees separation package much bigger than that legal separation package. Specifically, CCBPI paid affected employees with less than fifteen (15) years of service 150% monthly salary for every year of service and those with fifteen (15) years and above of service 195%.
x x x x
We, moreover, view that CCBPI is not guilty of unfair labor practice.
Contrary to KASAMMA-CCO-Independent's contention, CCBPI did not resort to the closure of Manila and Antipolo plants and resultant redundation of their 637 employees just to prevent the renegotiation of the CBA entered into between CCBPI and CFW Local 245. First, there is no substantial evidence on record supporting this claim. Secondly, as exhaustively explained supra, CCBPI's decision to undertake the subject closure and subsequent redundation was due to legitimate business considerations, namely 1) the production lines at the two plants had very low line efficiency; 2) the quality of water supply at such plants was rapidly deteriorating; and 3) the rehabilitation of such plants was not feasible due to the huge capital investment required as well as the congestion of their areas.
x x x x
WHEREFORE, premises considered, KASAMMA-CCO Independent, and CFW Local 245's charges in the instant labor dispute for non-grant of the CBA salary increase, mid-year gratuity, one sack of rice, overtime pay and thirteenth (13th) month pay; illegal dismissal; unfair labor practice; and recovery of moral and exemplary damages and attorney's fees are hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.
Petitioner Coca-Cola Bottlers Phils., Inc., however, is directed to grant the separation package adverted above to the affected employees who have not yet received the same. Further, the company is ordered to accord the affected employees priority in rehiring in the event the company needs, in the future, additional personnel.[5]
After painstaking efforts and a careful examination of the records, we rule against the contention of the petitioner. The conflicting factual submissions of the parties in the case at bar cannot close our eyes to the fact that the instant case pose upon an obligation on this Court to review and re-examine the factual findings and to re-evaluate the pieces of evidence which supported the conclusion of the public respondent in its disposition of the present controversy. This issue has already been settled in Deles, Jr. vs. NLRC [327 SCRA 540 (2000)], where the Supreme Court ruled:Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied in a resolution dated 5 September 2003. Hence, the instant petition."On its face, petitioner's contention would require the Court to delve into the findings of fact a quo. This we cannot do. In the review of NLRC decisions through a special civil action for certiorari, we are confined only to issues of want of jurisdiction and grave abuse of discretion on the part of the labor tribunal. We are precluded from inquiring unto the correctness of the evaluation of that evidence that underpins the labor tribunal's conclusion on matters of fact. Nor could we examine the evidence, re-evaluate the credibility of the witnesses, nor substitute our findings of fact for those of an administrative body which has the authority and expertise in its specialized field. Arguably, there may even be an error in judgment. This however is not within the ambit of the extraordinary remedy of certiorari."Moreover, the pronouncement of the High Tribunal in Dela Salle University v. Dela Salle University Employees Association [330 SCRA 363 (2000)], citing established jurisprudence, has clarified the guidelines in the resolution of petitions for certiorari involving labor cases in this wise:"As we reiterated in the case of Caltex Refinery Employees Association (CREA) vs. Jose S. Brillantes, the following are the well-settled rules in a petition for certiorari involving labor cases.In the light of the rulings established under the abovecited cases, we find no ground for disturbing the factual findings of the public respondent vis-á-vis its resolution with regard to the issue of the validity of the claims of the newly-regularized members of the petitioner union, as the same is supported by substantial evidence and in accord with established jurisprudence herein cited. It must be stressed that factual findings of labor officials are conclusive and binding on the Supreme Court when supported by substantial evidence.
First, the factual findings of quasi-judicial agencies (such as the DOLE), when supported by substantial evidence, are binding on this Court and entitled to great respect, considering the expertise of these agencies in their respective fields. It is well established that findings of these administrative agencies are generally accorded not only respect but even finality.
Second, substantial evidence in labor cases is such amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind will accept as adequate to justify a conclusion.
Third, in Flores vs. NLRC, we explained the role and function of Rule 65 as an extraordinary remedy. It should be noted, in the first place, that the instant petition is a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. An extraordinary remedy, its use is available only and restrictively in truly exceptional cases - those wherein the action of an inferior court, board or officer performing judicial or quasi-judicial acts is challenged for being wholly void on grounds of jurisdiction.
The sole office of the writ of certiorari is the correction of errors of jurisdiction including the commission of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. It does not include correction of public respondent NLRC's evaluation of the evidence and the factual findings based thereon, which are generally accorded not only great respect but even finality."
Anent the issue of the closure of the Manila and Antipolo plants of the private respondent which resulted in the termination from employment of 639 or 646 employees working under the said facilities, we find the same in order and in accord with law.
x x x x
It must be noted that in sustaining the contention of the private respondent on the said issue, the public respondent has relied on the grounds asserted by the private respondent as basis in effecting the closure and the resultant cessation of business operations in the aforesaid plants. The recent accretion to the corpus of our jurisprudence is the principle enunciated in National Federation of Labor vs. NLRC [327 SCRA 158 (2000)] which holds the view that:The closure of establishment contemplated under Article 283 of the Labor Code is a unilateral and voluntary act on the part of the employer to close the business establishment as may be gleaned from the use of the word "may" - it does not contemplate a situation where the closure of the business establishment is forced upon the employer and ultimately for the benefit of the employees.Hence, the claim of the petitioner that the technical evaluation of the private respondent which served as basis for the closure of the said facilities must be presented to the petitioner union first before the private respondent can implement the said action is bereft of legal basis. The same fate must suffer with respect to the claim of the petitioner that a prior consultation is a condition sine qua non as required under the Labor Code vis-á-vis the provision on the participation of the employees in the decision-making processes of the employer private respondent, before the latter can effectuate the said closure, is devoid of legal and jurisprudential basis.
Although the Constitution provides for protection to labor, capital and management must also be protected under a regime of justice and the rule of law.
As aptly stated by an authority in labor laws [Cesario A. Azucena, Jr., Everyone's Labor Code, 2001 Edition, p. 302], the author opined that even if the business is not losing but its owner, for reasons of his own, wants to stop doing business, he can lawfully do so anytime provided he is in good faith. He further lamented in saying that "just as no law forces anyone to go into business, no law compels anybody to stay in business."
Moreover, the private respondent has complied with the aforesaid requirements of the law when it decided to close the said establishments. The records disclose that the alleged redundant, or more appropriately, separated employees affected by the said closure were in fact individually served with a notice of termination. All of the subject employees were offered and given a separation package by the private respondent more than what is provided by the law and more than what is stipulated under their CBA, although, some refused to accept the said benefits, and insisted on their being reinstated. We take note that as of the present, 546 of the 639 terminated or separated employee-members of the petitioner union were ale to receive the said separation benefits. Moreover, the receipt of the said separation benefits was admitted by the petitioner. The Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) was also notified of such closure through a letter sent by the private respondent dated December 10, 1999.
The petitioner claims that the private respondent failed to comply with the one-month notice requirement as required under the said legal provision since the subject employees were no longer allowed to report for work effective immediately upon receipt of their termination notice. However, they were still paid their salaries effective from December 9, 1999 until February 29, 2000, although they did not anymore render service for the period. Significantly, this peculiar fact which petitioner claims as an indirect circumvention of the said law has already been addressed, albeit by analogy, in the recent case of Serrano v. NLRC [331 SCRA 341 (2000)]. In the said case, the Supreme Court held:In that case (Associate Labor Unions-VIMCONTU vs. NLRC [204 SCRA 913]), the employees and the then Ministry of Labor and Employment (MOLE) were notified in writing on August 5, 1983 that the employees' services would cease on august 31, 1983 but that they would be paid their salaries and other benefits until September 5, 1983. It was held that such written notice was "more than substantial compliance with the notice requirement of the Labor Code."
Indeed, there was more than substantial compliance with the law in that case because, in addition to the advance written notice required under Art. 284 (now Art. 283) of the Labor Code, the employees were paid for five days, from September 1 to 5, 1993, even if they rendered no service for the period.
Had private respondent given a written notice to the petitioner on October 1, 1991, at the latest, that effective October 31, 1991 his employment would cease although from October 1 he would no longer be required to work, there would be basis for private respondent's boast that "[p]ayment of this salary even [if he is] no longer working is effective notice and is much better than 30 days formal notice but working until the end of the 30 days period." This is not the case here, however. What happened here was that on October 11, 1991, petitioner was given a memorandum terminating his employment effective on the same day on the ground of retrenchment (actually redundancy).x x x
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. The assailed decision dated July 9, 2001 and the Order dated September 24, 2001 issued by public respondent National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) are hereby AFFIRMED. No costs.[6]
A. Filling-up of vacant regular plantilla positions; regularizationIt is the contention of petitioner that the date 1 December 1998 refers to the effective date of regularization of said employees, while private respondent maintains that said date is merely the reckoning date from which the one year employment requirement shall be computed. We agree with petitioner. It is erroneous for the NLRC to conclude that the regularization of the 61 employees does not retroact to 1 December 1998. A fastidious reading of the above quoted provision will clearly point to the conclusion that what is pertained to by the phrase "effective December 1, 1998" is the phrase immediately preceding it which is "converting his non-regular employment status to regular employment status." It will be defying logic to adopt private respondent's contention that the phrase "effective December 1, 1998" designates the period when the non-regular employees will be given priority in filling-up the positions, simply because the MOA was signed only on 26 December 1998. Therefore, it is logically absurd that the company will only begin to extend priority to these employees on a date that has already passed, when in fact they have already extended priority to these employees by agreeing to the contents of the MOA and signing said agreement. Consequently, we hold that the effectivity date of the regularization of the 61 employees was 1 December 1998.
The company shall fill-up all vacant plantilla positions covered by the 1998 manpower budget as already identified by the Task Force created by the parties for the purpose following the following procedures:
1. Non-regular employee (casual, contractual or agency worker) who has already served the company and is presently occupying or has occupied the position to be filled-up for at least one (1) year shall be given priority in filling-up the position by converting his non-regular employment status to regular employment status, effective 01 December 1998 without need of undergoing through the company's regular recruitment procedures such as interview and qualifying examination. x x x[9]
In that case [Associate Labor Unions-VIMCONTU v. NLRC (204 SCRA 913)], the employees and the then Ministry of Labor and Employment (MOLE) were notified in writing on August 5, 1983 that the employees' services would cease on August 31, 1983 but that they would be paid their salaries and other benefits until September 5, 1983. It was held that such written notice was "more than substantial compliance" with the notice requirement of the Labor Code.In the instant case, the employees were served notice on 9 December 1999 that their employment were being severed effective 1 March 2000; however they were no longer required to report for work but they will continue to receive their salary up to 29 February 2000. Therefore, as enunciated in the ruling in Serrano v. NLRC, said act of private respondent constitutes substantial compliance with the notice requirement of the Labor Code.
Indeed, there was "more than substantial compliance" with the law in that case because, in addition to the advance written notice required under Art. 284 (now Art. 283) of the Labor Code, the employees were paid for five days, from September 1 to 5, 1993, even if they rendered no service for the period. x x x Had private respondent given a written notice to the petitioner on October 1, 1991, at the latest, that effective October 31, 1991 his employment would cease although from October 1 he would no longer be required to work, there would be basis for private respondent's boast that "[p]ayment of this salary even [if he is] no longer working is effective notice and is much better than 30 days formal notice but working until the end of the 30 days period.- This is not the case here, however. What happened here was that on October 11, 1991, petitioner was given a memorandum terminating his employment effective on the same day on the ground of retrenchment (actually redundancy).[14]