511 Phil. 162
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiffs [herein private respondents], whereby defendant [herein petitioner] is ordered to:Herein petitioner Dionisio Caraan then appealed the RTC judgment to the CA. On October 29, 1999, the CA promulgated its Decision ruling thus:
(a) Vacate the premises concerned and to deliver and surrender the possession of the same to the plaintiff;(b) To pay plaintiffs the sum of P54,000.00 as reasonable compensation for the use and occupancy of the premises subject matter of the above-entitled case;(c) Pay the plaintiffs the sum P30,000.00 as moral damages;(d) Pay the plaintiffs the sum of P20,000.00 as attorney's fees and to pay the cost of the suit.[3]
... Absent any countervailing factum probandum adduced by the defendant-appellant [herein petitioner], the indefeasibility of the Torrens title under their [herein private respondents'] names buttresses the presumption ad homini that they have a better right of ownership over the land. ...The appellate court then affirmed the RTC judgment ordering petitioner Dionisio Caraan to vacate subject premises and to deliver and surrender possession thereof to herein private respondents. The CA, however, deleted the sums for compensatory and moral damages and attorney's fees awarded by the RTC in favor of private respondents. No motion for reconsideration of the CA Decision was filed.
The defendant-appellant [herein petitioner] cannot seek refuge on his contention that he is a holder of a residential permit allegedly issued by the Bureau of Forest Development. Within the aegis of Section 3 (ff) of Presidential Decree No. 705, otherwise known as the Revised Forestry Code, a "[p]ermit is a short-term privilege or authority granted by the State to a person to utilize any limited forest resources or undertake a limited activity within any forest land without any right to occupation and possession therein." ...
...
Neither is the defendant-appellant a possessor in the concept of an owner, which fact is a conditio sine qua non in order to be entitled to ownership through acquisitive prescription.
... mere possession with a juridical title, e.g., as a usufructuary, a trustee, a lessee, an agent or a pledgee, not being in the concept of owner, cannot ripen into ownership by acquisitive prescription, unless the juridical relation is first expressly repudiated and such repudiation has been communicated to the other party.[4] ...
... When is an action an attack on a title? It is when the object of the action or proceeding is to nullify the title, and thus challenge the judgment pursuant to which the title was decreed. The attack is direct when the object of an action or proceeding is to annul or set aside such judgment, or enjoin its enforcement. On the other hand, the attack is indirect or collateral when, in an action to obtain a different relief, an attack on the judgment is nevertheless made as an incident thereof.[8]In the present case, the attack on the title is definitely merely collateral as the relief being sought by private respondents in their action was recovery of possession. The attack on the validity of private respondents' certificate of title was merely raised as a defense in petitioners' Answer filed with the trial court. In Ybañez vs. Intermediate Appellate Court,[9] the Court categorically ruled that:
It was erroneous for petitioners to question the Torrens Original Certificate of Title issued to private respondent over Lot No. 986 in Civil Case No. 671, an ordinary civil action for recovery of possession filed by the registered owner of the said lot, by invoking as affirmative defense in their answer the Order of the Bureau of Lands, dated July 19, 1978, issued pursuant to the investigatory power of the Director of Lands under Section 91 of Public Land Law (C.A. 141 as amended). Such a defense partakes of the nature of a collateral attack against a certificate of title brought under the operation of the Torrens system of registration pursuant to Section 122 of the Land Registration Act, now Section 103 of P.D. 1259. The case law on the matter does not allow collateral attack on the Torrens certificate of title on the ground of actual fraud. The rule now finds expression in section 48 of P.D. 1529 otherwise known as the Property Registration Decree.[10] (Emphasis supplied)The Court cannot, therefore, resolve the issue of the alleged invalidity of private respondents' certificate of title in the present action for recovery of possession. Even petitioners' claim that subject property could not have been titled in favor of private respondents because the same has not yet been classified for alienation for private ownership, cannot be given consideration because, as clearly stated in Apostol vs. Court of Appeals, "[t]he issue of the validity of the title of respondents can only be assailed in an action expressly instituted for that purpose."[11]
Atty. Mazo:Furthermore, no objection was raised by counsel for petitioners in their written opposition/comment to private respondents' offer of evidence[12] regarding the fact that what was marked and submitted to the court was the photocopy. In Blas vs. Angeles-Hutalla,[13] the Court held thus:Your Honor, we are presenting in evidence this Transfer Certificate of Title No. RT-71061 (214949) as Exhibit A. The purpose of which, Your Honor, is to show that the property subject matter of this case is registered in the name of the herein plaintiff spouses Salcedo R. Cosme and Nora Linda S. Cosme. And in that regard, Your Honor, may we invite Counsel to stipulate that this is a Xerox copy and that we request to be marked as Exhibit A is a faithful reproduction of the original.If Counsel will stipulate, this will be the one to be submitted in evidence.
Atty. Moya:This is a faithful reproduction, Your Honor. (Emphasis supplied)
The established doctrine is that when a party failed to interpose a timely objection to evidence at the time they were offered in evidence, such objection shall be considered as waived. In Tison v. Court of Appeals, the Supreme Court set out the applicable principle in the following terms:Hence, considering the fact that counsel for petitioners admitted that the photocopy of TCT No. RT-71061 (214949) is a faithful reproduction of the original thereof, stipulated with private respondents' counsel that what will be marked and submitted to the trial court as Exhibit A is the photocopy, and the lack of objection on such ground which is then deemed a waiver thereof, the admission into evidence of the photocopy of TCT No. RT-71061 was absolutely correct.[F]or while the documentary evidence submitted by petitioners do not strictly conform to the rules on their admissibility, we are, however, of the considered opinion that the same may be admitted by reason of private respondent's failure to interpose any timely objection thereto at the time they were being offered in evidence. It is elementary that an objection shall be made at the time when an alleged inadmissible document is offered in evidence, otherwise, the objection shall be treated as waived, since the right to object is merely a privilege which the party may waive.
As explained in Abrenica vs. Gonda, et al., it has been repeatedly laid down as a rule of evidence that a protest or objection against the admission of any evidence must be made at the proper time, otherwise, it will be deemed to have been waived. The proper time is when from the question addressed to the witness, or from the answer thereto, or from the presentation of the proof, the inadmissibility of the evidence is, or may be inferred.
Thus, a failure to except to the evidence because it does not conform with the statute is a waiver of the provisions of the law.[14]...
... In a long line of cases, we have consistently ruled that lands covered by a title cannot be acquired by prescription or adverse possession. So it is that in Natalia Realty Corporation vs. Vallez, et al., we held that a claim of acquisitive prescription is baseless when the land involved is a registered land because of Article 1126 of the Civil Code in relation to Act 496 (now, Section 47 of Presidential Decree No. 1529):Therefore, as emphasized in the above quoted ruling, petitioners' allegations of uninterrupted possession for 30 years cannot prevail over private respondents' certificate of title, which is the best proof of ownership. As the Court stated in Apostol vs. Court of Appeals, et al.,[20] the registered owners are entitled to the possession of the property covered by the said title from the time such title was issued in their favor. Preponderance of evidence being in favor of private respondents, there can be no other conclusion but that private respondents, being the registered owners of subject property, should be placed in possession thereof.Appellants' claim of acquisitive prescription is likewise baseless. Under Article 1126 of the Civil Code, prescription of ownership of lands registered under the Land Registration Act shall be governed by special laws. Correlatively, Act No. 496 provides that no title to registered land in derogation of that of the registered owner shall be acquired by adverse possession. Consequently, proof of possession by the defendants is both immaterial and inconsequential. (Emphasis supplied)