509 Phil. 118
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
That on or about November 24, 2000 in Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, some of whom are public officers, being then members of the Philippine National Police (PNP) Force assigned at Presidential Anti-Organized Crime Task Force, Camp Crame, Quezon City, (SPO4 Soberano, SPO3 Torres, SPO3 Escalante, P/Supt. Dumlao, P/C. Insp. Arnado, P/Insp. Langcauon, SPO4 Taladua, SPO3 Villanueva, SPO1 Sarmiento, SPO1 Reed, PO3 Lacasandile, PO1 Sarmiento and SPO1 Nemeno), with evident premeditation, treachery, abuse of superior strength, nighttime and remoteness of the place and with deliberate intent to kill, conspiring, confabulating and confederating with one another, the accused police officers using their offices in committing the offense, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously kill SALVADOR (Bubby) DACER and EMMANUEL CORBITO by strangulation, which was the immediate cause of their death, and thereafter dispose of their body (sic) by incineration, to the damage and prejudice of the latter's respective heirs.The case was raffled to RTC, Branch 41, Manila, presided by Judge Rodolfo A. Ponferrada.
That on or about November 24, 2000 in Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, some of whom are public officers, being then members of the Philippine National Police (PNP) Force assigned at Presidential Anti-Organized Crime Task Force, Camp Crame, Quezon City, (SPO4 Soberano, SPO3 Torres, SPO3 Escalante, P/Supt. Dumlao, P/ C. Insp. Arnado, P/Insp. Langcauon, SPO4 Taladua, SPO3 Villanueva, SPO1 Sarmiento, SPO1 Reed, PO3 Lacasandile, PO1 Sarmiento and SPO1 Nemeno), abduct SALVADOR (Bubby) DACER and EMMANUEL CORBITO at the corner of Osmeña Highway (formerly South Super Highway) and Zobel Roxas Street in Manila, and later brought them to Indang, Cavite, and with evident premeditation, treachery, abuse of superior strength, nighttime and remoteness of the place and with deliberate intent to kill, conspiring, confabulating and confederating with one another, the accused police officers using their offices in committing the offense, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously kill said SALVADOR (Bubby) DACER and EMMANUEL CORBITO by strangulation, which was the immediate cause of their death, and thereafter dispose of their body by incineration, to the damage and prejudice of the latter's respective heirs.On 24 May 2001, Soberano, Escalante, Torres, Purificacion, Renato Malabanan, Jovencio Malabanan and Rollan moved to quash the Information.
(1) discharged accused Jimmy L. Lopez, Alex B. Diloy, William L. Lopez and Glen Dumlao as they are now witnesses for the State;Accused Soberano, Torres, Escalante, Purificacion, Renato and Jovencio Malabanan opposed the Manifestation and Motion to Admit Amended Information in an Opposition[14] dated 28 September 2001. They prayed that the Motion to Admit Amended Information and the discharge of accused Dumlao, Diloy and the brothers Lopez be denied.
(2) substituted SPO3 Allan Villanueva for P/Insp. Danilo Villanueva; and
(3) charged as additional accused P/Supt. Michael Ray Aquino, P/Supt. Cezar Mancao II and P/Sr. Supt. Teofilo Viña.
WHEREFORE, all the foregoing premises considered, the present petition is hereby GIVEN DUE COURSE and the writ prayed for, accordingly GRANTED. The assailed Orders dated October 01, 2001 and October 24, 2001 which were issued by JUDGE RODOLFO A. PONFERRADA in Criminal Case No. 01-191969, entitled "People of the Philippines v. Jimmy Lopez, et al." are hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. Respondent JUDGE PERFECTO A.S. LAGUIO, JR. or any person or persons acting in his stead, is/are hereby ORDERED to ADMIT the Amended Information dated September 17, 2001 substituting SPO3 ALLAN CADENILLA VILLANUEVA for P/Insp. DANILO VILLANUEVA as accused, and charging P/Senior Supt. MICHAEL RAY AQUINO, P/Senior Supt. CEZAR MANCAO II and P/Senior Supt. TEOFILO VIÑA as additional accused, and discharging or excluding only the accused JIMMY L. LOPEZ, WILLIAM L. LOPEZ and ALEX B. DILOY and to CONTINUE with the proceedings therefrom with utmost deliberate dispatch. Needless to state, the original information filed on May 11, 2001 stands insofar as P/Senior Supt. GLEN(N) G. DUMLAO is concerned.[18]Accused Soberano, Escalante and Torres moved for the reconsideration of the Court of Appeals Decision. In a Resolution[19] dated 12 August 2002, the motion was denied for lack of merit.
Gathered from the above assignment of errors, the fundamental issue that must be resolved concerns the duty of a trial court judge when confronted with a motion to admit amended information excluding some of the accused named in the original information for utilization as witnesses for the State. The key lies in the correct interpretation of two pertinent provisions of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, i.e., Section 14 of Rule 110 on amendment of information and Section 17 of Rule 119 on the discharge of an accused as state witness.I
THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN HOLDING THAT RESPONDENT JUDGE PONFERRADA GRAVELY ABUSED HIS DISCRETION IN DENYING THE ADMISSION OF THE AMENDED INFORMATION.II
THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN APPLYING SECTION 14 OF RULE 110 OF THE REVISED RULES ON CRIMINAL PROCEDURE (RRCP) IN ALLOWING THE DISCHARGE OF ACCUSED DILOY AND THE LOPEZ BROTHERS.III
THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN HOLDING THAT A MOTION FOR REINVESTIGATION WAS TANTAMOUNT TO A PRIOR LEAVE OF COURT AS CONTEMPLATED UNDER SECTION 14 OF RULE 110 OF THE RRCP.IV
THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN NOT APPLYING SECTION 17 OF RULE 119 OF THE RRCP IN THE DISCHARGE OF THE ACCUSED.V
THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN RESTRICTING THE APPLICATION OF SECTION 17 OF RULE 119 OF THE RRCP TO A SITUATION WHERE THE ACCUSED HAS ALREADY BEEN ARAIGNED AND UNDERGOING TRIAL.
Section 14. Amendment or substitution. - A complaint or information may be amended, in form or in substance, without leave of court, at any time before the accused enters his plea. After the plea and during the trial, a formal amendment may only be made with leave of court and when it can be done without causing prejudice to the rights of the accused.On the other hand, Section 17, Rule 119 provides:
However, any amendment before plea, which downgrades the nature of the offense charged in or excludes any accused from the complaint or information, can be made only upon motion by the prosecutor, with notice to the offended party and with leave of court. The court shall state its reasons in resolving the motion and copies of its order shall be furnished all parties, especially the offended party.
Section 17. Discharge of accused to be state witness. - When two or more persons are jointly charged with the commission of any offense, upon motion of the prosecution before resting its case, the court may direct one or more of the accused to be discharged with their consent so that they may be witnesses for the state when, after requiring the prosecution to present evidence and the sworn statement of each proposed state witness at a hearing in support of the discharge, the court is satisfied that:The trial court, in denying the prosecution's motion to admit amended information discharging some accused, ratiocinated that to admit said amended information would be violative of Section 17, Rule 119, thus:(a) There is absolute necessity for the testimony of the accused whose discharge is requested;
(b) There is no other direct evidence available for the proper prosecution of the offense committed, except the testimony of said accused;
(c) The testimony of said accused can be substantially corroborated in its material points;
(d) Said accused does not appear to be the most guilty; and
(e) Said accused has not at any time been convicted of any offense involving moral turpitude.
Evidence adduced in support of the discharge shall automatically form part of the trial. If the court denies the motion for discharge of the accused as state witness, his sworn statement shall be inadmissible in evidence.
After study, it appearing that the Amended Information not only includes new accused, namely, SPO3 Allen Villanueva, P/Supt. Michael Ray Aquino, P/Supt. Cezar Mancao and P/Supt. Teofilo Viña but excludes or discharges certain accused, namely, Jimmy L. Lopez, Alex B. Diloy, William L. Diloy and Glenn Dumlao from the original Information to be used as state witnesses, the Court is not inclined to grant the motion as it believes and so holds that in the discharge of the accused to be state witnesses the provisions of Section 17, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure should be observed and/or complied with. Stated otherwise, to grant the motion and admit the Amended Information outright would violate said section which is quoted as follows. . . .[21]The Court of Appeals held the contrary view. It reasoned that Section 14, Rule 110 is applicable in the instant case and not Section 17, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, thus:
To begin with, it is undeniable, and it is necessary to point out, that Criminal Case No. 01-191969 has already been filed with the Regional Trial Court of Manila on May 11, 2001. The Motion to Admit was filed later or on September 18, 2001.The petitioners submit that the Court of Appeals erred in applying Section 14 of Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure on amendment of complaints. Instead, what should have been applied was Section 17 of Rule 119 on the discharge of an accused as witness for the state. The petitioners further aver that even if it is only a simple discharge under Section 14 of Rule 110, it is still necessary to seek prior leave of court. The prosecution simply filed an Amended Information excluding Jimmy and William Lopez, Alex Diloy and Glen Dumlao, without prior leave of court, and moved for its admission.[23]
While it is true that once the information is filed in court, the court acquires complete jurisdiction over it, We are not unmindful of the well-settled ruling of the Supreme Court that the determination of who should be criminally charged in court is essentially an executive function, not a judicial one.
Section 14, Rule 110 (Prosecution of Offenses) of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, as amended, reads -"Section 14. Amendment or substitution. - A complaint or information may be amended, in form or in substance, without leave of court, at any time before the accused enters his plea. After the plea and during the trial, a formal amendment may only be made with leave of court and when it can be done without causing prejudice to the rights of the accused.Applying the import of the afore-quoted Section 14, Rule 110, it appears that the Amended Information sought to be admitted by the petitioner finds sufficient support therein, considering, firstly, that there has been no arraignment yet. Secondly, when respondent JUDGE RODOLFO A. PONFERRADA granted the motion for reinvestigation in the Order dated July 04, 2001, there was in effect a prior leave of court given to the State Prosecutors of the Department of Justice to conduct the same, substantially complying with such requirement under the second paragraph of Section 14, Rule 110. After all, a leave of court is defined a "permission obtained from a court to take some action which, without such permission, would not be allowable: as, to sue a receiver, to file an amended pleading, to plead several pleas."
"However, any amendment before plea, which downgrades the nature of the offense charged in or excludes any accused from the complaint or information, can be made only upon motion by the prosecutor, with notice to the offended party and with leave of court. The court shall state its reasons in resolving the motion and copies of its order shall be furnished all parties, especially the offended party.
"If it appears at any time before judgment that a mistake has been made in charging the proper offense, the court shall dismiss the original complaint or information upon the filing of a new one charging the proper offense in accordance with Section 19, Rule 119, provided the accused shall not be placed in double jeopardy. The court may require the witnesses to give bail for their appearance at the trial."
In the case of People v. Montesa, Jr., the Supreme Court's pertinent ruling, which We now reiterate, finds application in the case at bench, i.e., where a judge grants a motion for reinvestigation [as in this case], he is deemed to have deferred to the authority of the prosecution arm of the Government to consider the so-called new relevant and material evidence and to determine whether the information it has filed should stand, and that the final disposition on the reinvestigation should be the sole and only valid basis for the judge's final action with respect to the reinvestigation.
Thus, in accord with the aforesaid Montesa, Jr. ruling, respondent JUDGE RODOLFO A. PONFERRADA's "sole and only basis" for the inclusion (or exclusion, for that matter) of the additional accused should be the final disposition on the reinvestigation conducted by the State Prosecutors of the Department of Justices.
Consistent with the foregoing disquisition, We hold the opinion that Section 17, Rule 119 (Trial), . . . is not applicable under the circumstances obtaining in the case at bench, although in the case of Guingona, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, We are mindful of the Supreme Court's clarification that only when an information, charging two (2) or more persons with a certain offense, has already been filed in court will Section 9, Rule 119 (Trial) of the Rules of Court [now 100% restated under Section 17, Rule 119 (Trial) of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure] "come into play."
Section 17, Rule 119 (Trial), contemplates a situation wherein the Information is already filed, the accused is already arraigned, undergoing trial and the prosecution has not rested its case.
Here, although the original Information has already been filed, the four (4) accused sought to be discharged or excluded from the Amended Information have not been arraigned and no trial has been commenced. Thus, the discharge or exclusion being sought by the petitioner may come under the purview of Republic Act No. 6981, a special law which the Department of Justice is called upon to enforce and implement. Considering that the State Prosecutor's disposition on the investigation in Criminal Case No. 01-191969 should be the sole and only valid basis of respondent JUDGE RODOLFO A. PONFERRADA in considering whether the Amended Information sought to be admitted should stand or not, it follows that the discharge/exclusion of the four (4) accused under Republic Act No. 6981 must be directed by the Department of Justice, not by the court a quo. Needless to say, Section 9, Rule 119 [of the Rules of Court] does not support the proposition that the power to choose who shall be state witness is an inherent judicial prerogative. It is not constitutionally impermissible for Congress to enact Republic Act No. 6981 vesting in the Department of Justice the power to determine who can qualify as a witness in the program and who shall be granted immunity from prosecution.[22] (Emphasis in original)
. . . Should the fiscal find it proper to conduct a reinvestigation of the case, at such stage, the permission of the Court must be secured. After such reinvestigation the finding and recommendations of the fiscal should be submitted to the Court for appropriate action. While it is true that the fiscal has the quasi judicial discretion to determine whether or not a criminal case should be filed in court or not, once the case had already been brought to Court whatever disposition the fiscal may feel should be proper in the case thereafter should be addressed for the consideration of the Court. The only qualification is that the action of the Court must not impair the substantial rights of the accused or the right of the People to due process of law.Thus, as in almost all things, the prosecution's discretion is not boundless or infinite. The prosecution must satisfy for itself that an accused excluded from the information for purposes of utilizing him as state witness is qualified therefor.
. . . [T]he decision on whether to prosecute and whom to indict is executive in character. Only when an information, charging two or more persons with a certain offense, has already been filed in court will Rule 119, Section 9[34] of the Rules of Court, come into play. . . .Prescinding from the foregoing, it is in a situation where the accused to be discharged is included in the information that the prosecution must present evidence and the sworn statement of each proposed state witness at a hearing in support of the discharge in order to convince the judge, upon whom discretion rests, as to the propriety of discharging the accused as state witness.
SEC. 3. Admission into the Program. - Any person who has witnessed or has knowledge or information on the commission of a crime and has testified or is testifying or about to testify before any judicial or quasi-judicial body, or before any investigating authority, may be admitted into the Program:It must be stressed that Section 3 of Rep. Act No. 6981 enumerates the requirements before a person may be admitted to the WPP. It does not state that if an accused cannot be admitted to the WPP, he cannot be discharged as a witness for the state. Admission to the WPP and being discharged as an accused are two different things. Dumlao's being a law enforcement officer and, thus, disqualified to be under the WPP, do not in any way prohibit him to be discharged from the information.
Provided, That:
a) the offense in which his testimony will be used is a grave felony as defined under the Revised Penal Code, or its equivalent under special laws;
b) his testimony can be substantially corroborated in its material points;
c) he or any member of his family within the second civil degree of consanguinity or affinity is subjected to threats to his life or bodily injury or there is a likelihood that he will be killed, forced, intimidated, harassed or corrupted to prevent him from testifying, or to testify falsely, or evasively, because or on account of his testimony; and
d) he is not a law enforcement officer, even if he would be testifying against other law enforcement officers. In such a case, only the immediate members of his family may avail themselves of the protection provided for under this Act.
If the Department, after examination of said applicant and other relevant facts, is convinced that the requirements of this Act and its implementing rules and regulations have been complied with, it shall admit said applicant to the Program, require said witness to execute a sworn statement detailing his knowledge or information on the commission of the crime, and thereafter issue the proper certification. For purposes of this Act, any such person admitted to the Program shall be known as the Witness.