529 Phil. 619
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
Hence, the instant petition to cite Secretary Datumanong in contempt of court.October 5, 2001
MEMORANDUM TO:
Messrs:
JIMMIE F. TEL-EQUEN
District Engineer
RUDY P. ANTONIO
Chief, Construction Section
All of Mountain Province Engineering District
This Department
This is with reference to the Order of the Ombudsman dated December 11, 1995 in OMB ADM. 0-91-0430 entitled "OMB TASK FORCE ON DPWH versus JIMMIE F. TEL-EQUEN, ET AL." (Annex "A"), affirming the March 28, 1994 Resolution (Annex "B") in the same case finding you guilty of having committed acts of dishonesty, falsification of public documents, misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service and recommending that you be DISMISSED from the service together with its accessory penalties pursuant to Sec. 23, Rule XIV, Book V of Executive Order No. 292.
The Order was affirmed by the Court of Appeals (Eight Division) in its Decision (Annex "C") promulgated on March 02, 2000 in CA-G.R. SP No. 50324 entitled "ROMULO H. MABUNGA, ET AL. versus THE OMBUDSMAND, ET AL."
Inasmuch as the Order dismissing you from the service is not a subject of any injunction or restraining order from the Supreme Court, the same is immediately executory. Wherefore, you are hereby ordered DROPPED/DISMISSED from the service effective upon receipt hereof.(Sgd.) SIMEON A. DATUMANONG
Secretary
Petitioner was administratively charged for misconduct under the provisions of R.A. 6770, the Ombudsman Act of 1989. Section 27 of the said Act provides as follows:Petitioner was charged administratively before the Office of the Ombudsman. Accordingly, the provisions of the Ombudsman Act and its Rules of Procedure should apply in his case. It is a principle in statutory construction that where there are two statutes that apply to a particular case, that which was specially designed for the said case must prevail over the other.[17]"Section 27. Effectivity and Finality of Decisions. — All provisionary orders of the Office of the Ombudsman are immediately effective and executory.The Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman likewise contain a similar provision. Section 7, Rule III of the said Rules provides as follows:
A motion for reconsideration of any order, directive or decision of the Office of the Ombudsman must be filed within five (5) days after receipt of written notice and shall be entertained only on the following grounds:x x x x x x x x x
Findings of fact of the Office of the Ombudsman when supported by substantial evidence are conclusive. Any order, directive or decision imposing the penalty of public censure or reprimand, suspension of not more than one month's salary shall be final and unappealable.
In all administrative disciplinary cases, orders, directives or decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman may be appealed to the Supreme Court by filing a petition for certiorari within ten (10) days from receipt of the written notice of the order, directive or decision or denial of the motion for reconsideration in accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.""Sec. 7. Finality of Decision — where the respondent is absolved of the charge and in case of conviction where the penalty imposed is public censure or reprimand, suspension of not more than one month, or a fine not equivalent to one month salary, the decision shall be final and unappealable. In all other cases, the decision shall become final after the expiration of ten (10) days from receipt thereof by the respondent, unless a motion for reconsideration or petition for certiorari, shall have been filed by him as prescribed in Section 27 of R.A. 6770."It is clear from the above provisions that the punishment imposed upon petitioner, i.e. suspension without pay for one year, is not among those listed as final and unappealable, hence, immediately executory. Section 27 states that all provisionary orders of the Office of the Ombudsman are immediately effective and executory; and that any order, directive or decision of the said Office imposing the penalty of censure or reprimand or suspension of not more than one month's salary is final and unappealable. As such the legal maxim "inclusio[n] unius est exclusio alterius" finds application. The express mention of the things included excludes those that are not included. The clear import of these statements taken together is that all other decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman which impose penalties that are not enumerated in the said Section 27 are not final, unappealable and immediately executory. An appeal timely filed, such as the one filed in the instant case, will stay the immediate implementation of the decision. This finds support in the Rules of Procedure issued by the Ombudsman itself which states that "(I)n all other cases, the decision shall become final after the expiration of ten (10) days from receipt thereof by the respondent, unless a motion for reconsideration or petition for certiorari (should now be petition for review under Rule 43) shall have been filed by him as prescribed in Section 27 of R.A. 6770."
x x x x
A judgment becomes "final and executory" by operation of law. Section 27 of the Ombudsman Act provides that any order, directive or decision of the Office of the Ombudsman imposing a penalty of public censure or reprimand, or suspension of not more than one month's salary shall be final and unappealable. In all other cases, the respondent therein has the right to appeal to the Court of Appeals within ten (10) days from receipt of the written notice of the order, directive or decision. In all these other cases therefore, the judgment imposed therein will become final after the lapse of the reglementary period of appeal if no appeal is perfected or, an appeal therefrom having been taken, the judgment in the appellate tribunal becomes final. It is this final judgment which is then correctly categorized as a "final and executory judgment" in respect to which execution shall issue as a matter of right. In other words, the fact that the Ombudsman Act gives parties the right to appeal from its decisions should generally carry with it the stay of these decisions pending appeal. Otherwise, the essential nature of these judgments as being appealable would be rendered nugatory. (Emphasis supplied)
Well-settled is the rule that procedural laws are construed to be applicable to actions pending and undetermined at the time of their passage, and are deemed retroactive in that sense and to that extent. As a general rule, the retroactive application of procedural laws cannot be considered violative of any personal rights because no vested right may attach to nor arise therefrom.[19]Rule III
PROCEDURE IN ADMINISTRATIVE CASES
Section 7. Finality and execution of decision. - Where the respondent is absolved of the charge, and in case of conviction where the penalty imposed is public censure or reprimand, suspension of not more than one month, or a fine equivalent to one month salary, the decision shall be final, executory and unappealable. In all other cases, the decision may be appealed to the Court of Appeals on a verified petition for review under the requirements and conditions set forth in Rule 43 of the Rules of Court, within fifteen (15) days from receipt of the written Notice of the Decision or Order denying the Motion for Reconsideration.
An appeal shall not stop the decision from being executory. In case the penalty is suspension or removal and the respondent wins such appeal, he shall be considered as having been under preventive suspension and shall be paid the salary and such other emoluments that he did not receive by reason of the suspension or removal.
A decision of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative cases shall be executed as a matter of course. The Office of the Ombudsman shall ensure that the decision shall be strictly enforced and properly implemented. The refusal or failure by any officer without just cause to comply with an order of the Office of the Ombudsman to remove, suspend, demote, fine, or censure shall be a ground for disciplinary action against said officer.
[2] Id. at 95.
[3] 356 Phil. 787, 808 (1998).
[4] Antonio v. Villa, supra at 96.
[5] Id. at 96-97.
[6] Id. at 97.
[7] Rollo, p. 12.
[8] Id. at 6.
[9] Office of the Court Administrator v. Paderanga, A.M. No. RTJ-01-1660, August 25, 2005, 468 SCRA 21, 34.
[10] Rodriguez v. Bonifacio, 398 Phil. 441, 468 (2000).
[11] Quinio v. Court of Appeals, 390 Phil. 852, 861 (2000).
[12] Section 47(4), Chapter 6, Title I of Book V of Executive Order No. 292 (1987), reads:
Sec. 47. Disciplinary Jurisdiction. —
x x x x
(4) An appeal shall not stop the decision from being executory, and in case the penalty is suspension or removal, the respondent shall be considered as having been under the preventive suspension during the pendency of the appeal in the event he wins an appeal.
[13] Section 37(d) of Article IX of P.D. No. 807 (1975), otherwise known as Civil Service Decree of the Philippines, reads:
Sec. 37. Disciplinary Jurisdiction. —
x x x x
(d) An appeal shall not stop the decision from being executory, and in case the penalty is suspension or removal, the respondent shall be considered as having been under the preventive suspension during the pendency of the appeal in the event he wins an appeal.
And, Section 47 of CSC Memorandum Circular No. 19-99, otherwise known as the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service (1999), reads:
Section 47. Effect of Filing. - An appeal shall not stop the decision from being executory, and in case the penalty is suspension or removal, the respondent shall be considered as having been under preventive suspension during the pendency of the appeal, in the event he wins an appeal.
[14] Lapid v. Court of Appeals, 390 Phil. 236, 251 (2000).
[15] Neeland v. Villanueva, Jr., 416 Phil. 580, 592 (2001).
[16] Supra at 246-247, 249.
[17] Id. at 251.
[18] Signed by Ombudsman Simeon V. Marcelo on September 15, 2003.
[19] Calacala v. Republic, G.R. No. 154415, July 28, 2005, 464 SCRA 438, 446.
[20] Sangguniang Bayan of San Andres, Catanduanes v. Court of Appeals, 348 Phil. 303, 321 (1998).