512 Phil. 348
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
WHEREFORE, all the foregoing considered, judgment is hereby rendered, ordering the defendants and all persons claiming rights under each or all of them to vacate the premises covered by Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. T-143850, T-123637, T-143835, RT-56228 (T-143901), T-105730, RT-25934 (T-143828), RT-31362 (T-143820), RT-69550 (T-143843), and RT-66853 (T-143863), all of the Register of Deeds of Bulacan and to surrender to the respective plaintiffs or their successors-in-interest, their respective possessions of the land thus registered in said plaintiff's (sic) respective names.[27] (Underscoring supplied)Both parties appealed to the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malolos, Bulacan before which petitioners assailed the MTC's failure to grant attorney's fees and damages in the form of reasonable compensation for the use and occupation of their lots.[28] Respondents, on the other hand, again raised the issue of jurisdiction and, in any event, assailed the MTC decision as not in accordance with the facts and the evidence.[29]
Respondents, insisting that the complaint involves an agrarian dispute, claim that they have been tilling the lots as tenants of SMC, hence, as found by the appellate court the subsequent acquisition by petitioners thereof did not sever the tenancy relationship.x x x
- For many years before the institution of this Complaint, Plaintiffs were either employees or relatives of some employees of a big company who were members of a cooperative formed by the company's labor force;
- The cooperative subsequently acquired several parcels of land located at Pritil, Sta. Rita, Guiguinto, Bulacan which it subdivided, sold and titled to its members, the Plaintiffs included, for residential purposes;
- For the record, Plaintiff Norberto Rimasug bought a 400 square meter portion of this land and was later given Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-143850 of the Bulacan Registry of Deeds. A copy of this title is attached and made part hereon as Annex A;
- The other Plaintiffs who acquired other portions of the land in question are the following:
PLAINTIFF AREA TCT NO. Rodolfo Fernandez
400 sq. mts. TCT No. RT-36061 Jose Policina
400 sq. mts. TCT No. 143863 Heriberto De Leon
800 sq. mts. TCT No. T-123637 Generoso Silan
400 sq. mts. TCT No. T-143835 Jesus del Mundo
400 sq. mts. TCT No. RT-25934 Marcelino Polintan 400 sq. mts. TCT No. RT-42270 Paulino Olivares
800 sq. mts. TCT No. RT-31362 Leonardo Cruz
400 sq. mts. TCT No. RT-143843 Dionisio Atienza
400 sq. mts. TCT No. RT-56228 Natividad Hermoso 800 sq. mts. TCT No. RT-105730 - Copies of the titles described above are attached and made part of this Complaint as Annexes B, C, D, E, F, G, H, I, J and K, respectively;
- Plaintiffs intended to use their respective portions as their residential lands but, due to the tight financial condition of each of them and because of their inability to raise the necessary funds to construct their houses, this intention did not materialize right away;
- To their shock and dismay, however, the Defendants entered the lands in question and without the Plaintiffs' knowledge, permission and consent utilized the said lands for various agricultural crops;
- This entry into the lands and their use for various agricultural crops was illegal and contrary to the provisions of existing laws;
- When Plaintiffs learned of this entry into their lands, they immediately sought out the Defendants and gave notice of their ownership of those lands;
- In fact, this matter was even brought to the barangay authorities in the area but Defendants proved themselves uncooperative. More, they brashly asserted their alleged rights as tillers of the land even if, at the same time, they refused to share the produce of the lands with the Plaintiffs;
- This led to some sort of a stand-off for the Plaintiffs because of their inability to come up with the money to start a legal battle with the Defendants or to start the construction of their residential units in the area;
- Consequently, faced with no better option, Plaintiffs told the Defendants that their use and occupancy of the lands would continue to be tolerated until such time that the funds necessary to construct the Plaintiffs' residential units would have been raised by them;
- On May 31, 1999, Plaintiffs, through counsel, wrote a letter to the Defendants, in which Defendants were given notice that their tolerated stay and use of the lands in question was already being terminated, upon their receipt of the letter. The letter says:
"Dahil dito, aming ipinapaabot sa inyo na kanila ng tinatapos ang inyong paggamit sa lupang nabanggit, at pagtatapos ng paggamit na ito ay mayroong bisa pagkatanggap ninyo ng sulat naming ito x x x"- More, the Defendants were also given the demand to vacate the lands within fifteen (15) days from their receipt of the letter, in the following manner:
"Dahil pa rin dito, amin kayong binibigyan ng labing limang araw mula sa pagkakatanggap ninyo ng sulat na ito upang umalis sa lupang pag-aari ng mga dumulog sa amin. Kung hindi po kayo aalis sa loob ng panahong ito, mapipilitan po kaming magsampa ng kasong ejectment laban sa inyo sa husgado x x x"- Defendants received that letter from the Plaintiffs but, despite the lapse of the period given therein, they have failed and refused to vacate;
- Defendants therefore have become deforciants, amendable to being ejected;
x x x[44] (Emphasis in the original; underscoring supplied)
SECTION 9. Severance of Relationship. – The tenancy relationship is extinguished by the voluntary surrender of the land by, or the death or incapacity of, the tenant, but his heirs or the members of his immediate farm household may continue to work the land until the close of the agricultural year. The expiration of the period of the contract as fixed by the parties, and the sale or alienation of the land do not of themselves extinguish the relationship. In the latter case, the purchaser or transferee shall assume the rights and obligations of the former landholder in relation to the tenant. In case of death of the landholder, his heir or heirs shall likewise assume his rights and obligations. (Underscoring supplied)Section 10 of Republic Act No. 3844 (Code of Agrarian Reforms of the Philippines) likewise provides:
SEC. 10. Agricultural Leasehold Relation Not Extinguished by Expiration of Period, etc. – The agricultural leasehold relation under this Code shall not be extinguished by mere expiration of the term or period in a leasehold contract nor by the sale, alienation or transfer of the legal possession of the landholding. In case the agricultural lessor sells, alienates or transfers the legal possession of the landholding, the purchaser or transferee thereof shall be subrogated to the rights and substituted to the obligations of the agricultural lessor. (Underscoring supplied)For the above-quoted statutory provisions to apply, however, the existence of a tenancy relationship between the previous landowner and the subsequent landowner must in the first place be proven. For this purpose, the concurrence of all the following essential requisites must be established by substantial evidence:
By their own admission,[46] respondents were "informed" that the lots they are tilling are "allegedly" owned by SMC because the one collecting the payments was working at SMC, although the official receipts issued to them were under the name of SMCCU.[47] On that score alone, the claim of the existence of a tenancy relationship fails, requirements No. 1 – that the parties are the landowner and the tenant is agricultural lessee, – and No. 3 – that there is consent between the parties – not being present, for how could respondents have contracted with a landowner whose identity they are not even certain of? Such uncertainty becomes more pronounced when note is taken that before the trial and appellate courts they maintained that the lots are owned by SMC. Before this Court, however, they now adopt the observation of the appellate court that the lots were owned by SMCCU.
- the parties are the landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee; 2. the subject matter of the relationship is an agricultural land; 3. there is consent between the parties to the relationship; 4. the purpose of the relationship is to bring about agricultural production; 5. there is personal cultivation on the part of the tenant or agricultural lessee; and 6. the harvest is shared between the landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee.[45]
[These receipts]...were either issued by a certain Atty. Remigio Calalang whose capacity to do so was neither alleged nor prove[n], and by the San Miguel Credit Union. xxx Also submitted were various National Irrigation Administration (NIA) receipts. Said receipts are, at best in relation to the issues herein, proof of payment of fees for irrigation services. They cannot be construed as indicative, in any way, of the agrarian status of the payee, and much less of the legality of such status.which merited the affirmance by the RTC in this wise:
The certification from the Barangay Agrarian Reform Committee, and that from the Municipal Agrarian Reform Office, (Exhibits 12 and 13 respectively), do not even specify the supposedly tenanted lands, let alone that said lands refer to the plaintiff's registered lands.
On the other hand, the affidavit of supposed other farmers from the locality, as well as that of the Barangay Chairman, merely allege that the defendants cultivate farmlands in their locality. Again, there is no specific reference to the plaintiffs' registered property. In fact, said affiants do not even prove their competence to testify on the facts stated, other than residence in the locality common with that of the defendants[49] (Underscoring supplied),
xxx The contention of the defendants-appellants that they are registered agricultural tenants of the subject properties by the former owner, San Miguel Corporation was not duly substantiated in court. As fully discussed by the lower Court, the pieces of evidence presented did not pertain particularly to the parcels of land owned by plaintiffs nor did it unequivocally stated (sic) that herein defendants-appellants are the tenants of the parcels of land owned by the plaintiffs[50] (Underscoring supplied),being well-taken, must be accorded great respect, no facts of substance having been omitted or overlooked[51] or sufficient reasons having been proffered to alter the same.
Sina Catalino Martin, at Bernardo Santiago, ay mga magsasakang namumuisan sa lupang sakahang mga pagaari ng SMB-Credit Union Inc. na inyo naming pinamamahalaan na nasa Barangay ng Pritil, Giginto, Bulacan, ay hind[i] po sila nakapagtanim ng palay sa panagaraw (regular crops) sa ngayon sa dahilang ang kanila pong sinasaka ay mataas, at mahirap patubigan sa ikalawang pagtatanim ng palay.At all events, this Court's ruling in Bautista v. Araneta[55] is instructive:
Ang kanila pong itinanim ay pacuan, at ito po ay naani na nila, kaya't ang kanila pong nakahandang ibubuis sa ngayon ay pera. Ang buis po nila sa panagaraw ay Catalino Martin ay 10 cavanes at si Bernardo Santiago ay 10 cavanes din. Kaya po sila ay may dalang P500.00 bawat isa.
1. Catalino Martin . . . . . P500.00 2. Bernardo Santiago . . .
500.00 3. Cabooan Buis . . . . . P1,000.00
Umaasa po kami Atty. Kalalag, na ito ay magiging kasiya-siya sa inyo at sa mga taga SMB-Credit Union Inc. ang naihanda naming Buis para sa taong anihan ng panagaraw 1983. Salamat po.
[R]espondent and the landowner are not bound by the alleged agricultural leasehold agreement between petitioner and Gregorio. In the 1961 case of Lastimoza v. Blanco we ruled that "tenancy relationship can only be created with the consent of the true and lawful landholder who is either the 'owner, lessee, usufructuary or legal possessor of the land' (sec. 6 [b], Rep. Act No. 1199), and not thru the acts of the supposed landholder who has no right to the land subject of the tenancy. xxx To rule otherwise, would be to pave the way for fraudulent collusions among the unscrupulous to the prejudice of the true and lawful landholder." (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)As for the appellate court's charging petitioners with actual knowledge of respondents' purported tenancy on the questioned lots on account of which it deems petitioners to have been in estoppel for failure to assert their rights for more than two decades, the same does not lie.
Estoppel in pais, or equitable estoppel arises when one, by his acts, representations or admissions or by his silence when he ought to speak out, intentionally or through culpable negligence, induces another to believe certain facts to exist and such other rightfully relies and acts on such belief so that he will be prejudiced if the former is permitted to deny the existence of such facts. The real office of the equitable norm of estoppel is limited to supplying deficiency in the law but should not supplant positive law. The requisites for the existence of a tenancy relationship are explicit in the law and these elements cannot be done away with by conjectures.[56] (Underscoring supplied)In fine, respondents' occupancy and continued possession of the subject lots, upon their "honest belief and impression" that they are tenants of SMC or SMCCU, does not make them de jure tenants.[57]
SECTION 409. Venue. – xxx[22] Section 412 of the Local Government Code of 1991 (R.A. 7160) provides:
(c) All disputes involving real property or any interest therein shall be brought in the barangay where the real property or the larger portion thereof is situated.
x x x
SECTION 412. Conciliation. – (a) Pre-condition to filing of complaint in court. – No complaint, petition, action, or proceeding involving any matter within the authority of the lupon shall be filed or instituted directly in court or any other government office for adjudication, unless there has been a confrontation between the parties before the lupon chairman or the pangkat and that no conciliation or settlement has been reached as certified by the lupon secretary or pangkat secretary as attested to by the lupon or pangkat chairman or unless the settlement has been repudiated by the parties thereto.
Sec. 33. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in Civil Cases. – Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall exercise:xxx
(2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over cases of forcible entry and unlawful detainer: Provided, That when, in such cases, the defendant raises the question of ownership in his pleadings and the question of possession cannot be resolved without deciding the issue of ownership, the issue of ownership shall be resolved only to determine the issue of possession; andxxx
Section 50. Quasi-Judicial Powers of the DAR. – The DAR is hereby vested with the primary jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate agrarian reform matters and shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over all matters involving the implementation of agrarian reform, except those falling under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Department of Agriculture and the Department of Environment and Natural Resources.[42] Hilado v. Chavez, 438 SCRA 623, 641 (2004).
x x x (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)