510 Phil. 70
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
That on or about December 1, 1992, or sometime prior or subsequent thereto in the Province of Oriental Mindoro, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, a public officer, being then the Governor of the Province of Oriental Mindoro, while in the performance of his official functions, committing the offense in relation to his office, and taking advantage of his official position, acting with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and criminally cause undue injury to the Province of Oriental Mindoro, and at the same time give unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference to one CRESENTE UMBAO, a candidate who ran and lost in the 1992 election, by then and there appointing said Cresente Umbao as Sangguniang Bayan member of Pola, Oriental Mindoro, within the prohibitive period of one (1) year after an election, in flagrant violation of Sec. 6, Art IX B of the Constitution, to the damage and prejudice of the Province of Oriental Mindoro and to the government as a whole.[3]Upon arraignment on April 13, 1999, petitioner pleaded not guilty.[4]
1. Mr. Rodolfo G. Valencia, had been the Governor of the Province of Oriental Mindoro, for having won in the gobernatorial race in the May 1992 local and provincial election;On March 26, 2003, the Sandiganbayan directed the parties to sign the Joint Stipulation of Facts, thus -
2. During the 1992 election, Mr. Cresente Umbao of Pola, Oriental, Mindoro also ran for the position of councilor in the Municipality of Pola, Oriental Mindoro but he lost;
3. On October 17, 1992, Councilor Antonio Mercene, Jr. of Pola, Oriental, Mindoro died thus creating a permanent vacancy in the membership position of Sanguniang Bayan of Pola, Oriental Mindoro.
4. On December 1, 1992 then Governor Rodolfo G. Valencia of Oriental, Mindoro, appointed Cresente Umbao to the position of a councilor in the Municipal Council of Pola, Oriental Mindoro on the vacancy left by the death of Councilor Mercene.CONTENTION/ISSUES
The Prosecution contends that this appointment is in violation of Sec. 3(e) of R.A. 3019 as it gives among other, unwarranted benefit to Mr. Cresente Umbao who is disqualified to be appointed within a period of one year after having lost in May 1992 local election for councilor, while the accused, then Governor Rodolfo Valencia, maintains that the appointment of Lumbao was in the performance of his duty and that it was made in good faith pursuant to Sec. 45, Chapter 2, Title 2, of the Local Government Code (R.A. 7160).
The Parties reserve their rights to present documentary evidences as the need arise during the trial.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the parties respectfully prays that this stipulation of facts be well taken by the Honorable Sandiganbayan for pre-trial purposes.[5]
The Court orders both counsels and the accused to sign each and every page of the Joint Stipulation of Facts. Thereafter, let a pre-trial order be issued on the bases of the agreement of both parties as embodied in this Joint Stipulation of Facts.[6]The Joint Stipulation of Facts however remained unsigned by petitioner. Only the signature of the Special Prosecutor and petitioner's counsel appear on the last page thereof.
This afternoon is supposed to be the initial presentation of the defense evidence. Prosecutor Danilo F. Salindong, former handling prosecutor of this case, rested his case on the basis of the Pre-Trial Order issued by this Court. However, accused Rodolfo Valencia refused to sign the pre-trial order as per his motion for reconsideration, to which Prosecutor Agnes Autencio Daquis commented that since the accused refused to sign the pre-trial order, that the same be abrogated and that trial on the merits ensued. Consequently, the Pre-Trial Order issued by this Court on March 11, 2004 is hereby recalled and set aside. In view of the refusal of the accused to enter into any stipulation of facts, let this case be scheduled for trial on the merits. The presentation of prosecution's evidence is hereby scheduled on August 31 and September 1, 2004 at 2:00 o'clock in the afternoon. The demurrer to evidence filed by the accused is therefore considered premature and is hereby stricken out of the records.[13]Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied on July 28, 2004, as follows:
The "Motion for Reconsideration (of June 14, 2004 Order)" dated June 29, 2004 filed by accused, thru counsels which met vigorous opposition from the prosecution's Comment/Opposition dated July 16, 2004 is denied for lack of merit. As clearly stated in the Order of June 14, 2004, the case for the prosecution was re-opened because of the refusal of accused to sign the pre-trial order on the basis of which the prosecution rested its case. Justice and fairness demand the re-opening of the evidence for the prosecution because of the unwarranted act of the accused in refusing to sign the pre-trial order.[14]Hence, the instant petition contending that the Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion in issuing the assailed June 14, 2004 Order and July 28, 2004 Resolution.
SEC. 23. Demurrer to evidence. - After the prosecution rests its case, the court may dismiss the action on the ground of insufficiency of evidence (1) on its own initiative after giving the prosecution the opportunity to be heard or (2) upon demurrer to evidence filed by the accused with or without leave of court.Corollarily, Section 34, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court states:
SEC. 34. Offer of evidence. - The court shall consider no evidence which has not been formally offered. The purpose for which the evidence is offered must be specified.A demurrer to evidence tests the sufficiency or insufficiency of the prosecution's evidence. As such, a demurrer to evidence or a motion for leave to file the same must be filed after the prosecution rests its case. But before an evidence may be admitted, the rules require that the same be formally offered, otherwise, it cannot be considered by the court. A prior formal offer of evidence concludes the case for the prosecution and determines the timeliness of the filing of a demurrer to evidence.
... The judges of the Courts of First Instance are judges of both fact and law, and after hearing all the evidence adduced by the attorneys, if the court is not satisfied, we see no reason why he should not be permitted to call additional witnesses for the purpose of satisfying his mind upon any questions presented during the trial of the case.Indeed, in the furtherance of justice, the court may grant the parties the opportunity to adduce additional evidence bearing upon the main issue in question.[22] Thus, in Hon. Vega, etc., et al. v. Hon. Panis, etc., et al.,[23] the Court sustained the order of the trial court allowing the prosecution to present additional evidence after it had offered its evidence and rested its case and after the defense filed a motion to dismiss. It was stressed therein that while the prosecution had rested, the trial was not yet terminated and the case was still under the control and jurisdiction of the court. Hence, in the exercise of its discretion, the trial court may receive additional evidence.
It must be emphasized that the primary consideration in allowing the reopening of a case is for the accused to have his day in court and the opportunity to present counter evidence. Thus -... The orderly course of proceedings requires, however, that the prosecution shall go forward and should present all of its proof in the first instance; but it is competent for the judge, according to the nature of the case, to allow a party who had closed his case to introduce further evidence in rebuttal. This rule, however, depends upon the particular circumstances of each particular case and falls within the sound discretion of the judge, to be exercised or not as he may think proper.Hence, the court may allow the prosecutor, even after he has rested his case or after the defense moved for dismissal, to present involuntarily omitted evidence....[26]
... As a rule, the matter of reopening of a case for reception of further evidence after either prosecution or defense has rested its case is within the discretion of the trial court. However, a concession to a reopening must not prejudice the accused or deny him the opportunity to introduce counter evidence.In the case at bar, petitioner cannot claim denial of due process because he will have the opportunity to contest the evidence adduced against him and to prove his defenses after the prosecution concludes the presentation of its evidence. Moreover, the order of the trial court granting the reception of additional evidence for the prosecution is not technically a "reopening" of the case inasmuch as the latter had yet to formally rest its case. A motion to reopen presupposes that either or both parties have formally offered and closed their evidence.[28] If the Court sanctions the admission of additional evidence after the case had been submitted for resolution but before judgment, with more reason therefore that we should sustain the introduction of additional evidence in the present case because the prosecution had not yet concluded the presentation of its evidence. The State is also entitled to due process in criminal cases, that is, a fair opportunity to prosecute and convict. The Court has always accorded this right to the prosecution, and where the right had been denied, had promptly annulled the offending court action.[29]
... In U.S. vs. Base, we held that a trial court is not in error, if it opts to reopen the proceedings of a case, even after both sides had rested and the case submitted for decision, by the calling of additional witnesses or recalling of witnesses so as to satisfy the judge's mind with reference to particular facts involved in the case. A judge cannot be faulted should he require a material witness to complete his testimony, which is what happened in this case. It is but proper that the judge's mind be satisfied on any and all questions presented during the trial, in order to serve the cause of justice.
Appellant's claim that the trial court's concession to "reopen" the case unduly prejudiced him is not well taken. We note that appellant had every opportunity to present his evidence to support his case or to refute the prosecution's evidence point-by-point, after the prosecution had rested its case. In short, appellant was never deprived of his day in court. A day in court is the touchstone of the right to due process in criminal justice. Thus, we are unable to hold that a grave abuse of discretion was committed by the trial court when it ordered the so-called "reopening" in order to complete the testimony of a prosecution witness.[27]
... [T]he public prosecutor knew that he had not presented sufficient evidence to convict the accused.... he deliberately failed to present an available witness and thereby allowed the court to declare that the prosecution has rested its case.... he was remiss in his duty to protect the interest of the offended parties.... [and] was guilty of blatant error and abuse of discretion, thereby causing prejudice to the offended party...In the same vein, the right to speedy trial cannot be successfully invoked where to sustain the same would result in a clear denial of due process to the prosecution. While justice is administered with dispatch, the essential ingredient is orderly, expeditious and not mere speed. It cannot be definitely said how long is too long in a system where justice is supposed to be swift, but deliberate. It is consistent with delays and depends upon circumstances. It secures rights to the accused, but it does not preclude the rights of public justice. Also, it must be borne in mind that the rights given to the accused by the Constitution and the Rules of Court are shields, not weapons; hence, courts are to give meaning to that intent.[33]
By refusing to comply with the trial court's order to present evidence, the public prosecutor grossly violated the above-quoted rule. Moreover, the public prosecutor violated his bounden duty to protect the interest of the offended party.... After the trial court denied his motion to discharge Nuada as a state witness, he should have proceeded to complete the evidence of the prosecution by other means. Instead, he willfully and deliberately refused to present an available witness, i.e., the NBI Agent who was present in court on that date and time. The public prosecutor was duty-bound to exhaust all available proofs to establish the guilt of the accused and bring them to justice for their offense against the injured party.
Likewise guilty for serious nonfeasance was the trial court. Notwithstanding its knowledge that the evidence for the prosecution was insufficient to convict, especially after the public prosecutor tenaciously insisted on utilizing Nuada as state witness, the trial court passively watched as the public prosecutor bungled the case. The trial court was well aware of the nature of the testimonies of the seven prosecution witnesses that have so far been presented. Given this circumstance, the trial court, motu proprio, should have called additional witnesses for the purpose of questioning them himself in order to satisfy his mind with reference to particular facts or issues involved in the case.
Based on the foregoing, it is evident that petitioner was deprived of her day in court. Indeed, it is not only the State, but more so the offended party, that is entitled to due process in criminal cases. Inasmuch as the acquittal of the accused by the court a quo was done without regard to due process of law, the same is null and void. It is as if there was no acquittal at all, and the same cannot constitute a claim for double jeopardy.
In the case before us, the petitioner merely sat and waited after the case was submitted for resolution in 1979. It was only in 1989 when the case below was re-raffled from the RTC of Caloocan City to the RTC of Navotas-Malabon and only after respondent trial judge of the latter court ordered on March 14, 1990 the parties to follow-up and complete the transcript of stenographic notes that matters started to get moving towards a resolution of the case. More importantly, it was only after the new trial judge reset the retaking of the testimonies to November 9, 1990 because of petitioner's absence during the original setting on October 24, 1990 that the accused suddenly became zealous of safeguarding his right to speedy trial and disposition.In Dela Peña v. Sandiganbayan,[44] the Court denied a petition seeking to quash the Information holding that the silence of the accused amounted to laches. In the said case, the investigatory process was set in motion on August 14, 1992 and the Information was filed on May 6, 1997. After the arraignment was set sometime in December 1999, the accused filed a motion to quash on December 21, 1999, based on the violation of his right to due process and prompt disposition of cases. In sustaining the Sandiganbayan's denial of the motion to quash, the Court ratiocinated that:
...
... It is fair to assume that he would have just continued to sleep on his right - a situation amounting to laches - had the respondent judge not taken the initiative of determining the non-completion of the records and of ordering the remedy precisely so he could dispose of the case. The matter could have taken a different dimension if during all those ten years between 1979 when accused filed his memorandum and 1989 when the case was re-raffled, the accused showed signs of asserting his right which was granted him in 1987 when the new constitution took effect, or at least made some overt act (like a motion for early disposition or a motion to compel the stenographer to transcribe notes) that he was not waiving it. As it is, his silence would have to be interpreted as a waiver of such right.
Moreover, it is worthy to note that it was only on 21 December 1999, after the case was set for arraignment, that petitioners raised the issue of the delay in the conduct of the preliminary investigation. As stated by them in their Motion to Quash/Dismiss, "[o]ther than the counter-affidavits, [they] did nothing." Also, in their petition, they averred: "Aside from the motion for extension of time to file counter-affidavits, petitioners in the present case did not file nor send any letter-queries addressed to the Office of the Ombudsman for Mindanao which conducted the preliminary investigation." They slept on their right - a situation amounting to laches. The matter could have taken a different dimension if during all those four years, they showed signs of asserting their right to a speedy disposition of their cases or at least made some overt acts, like filing a motion for early resolution, to show that they were not waiving that right. Their silence may, therefore be interpreted as a waiver of such right. As aptly stated in Alvizo, the petitioner therein was "insensitive to the implications and contingencies" of the projected criminal prosecution posed against him "by not taking any step whatsoever to accelerate the disposition of the matter, which inaction conduces to the perception that the supervening delay seems to have been without his objection, [and] hence impliedly with his acquiescence.The foregoing doctrines were reiterated in Bernat v. Sandiganbayan,[45] where the claim of denial of the right to a speedy disposition of his criminal case was brushed aside by the Court considering that the accused waited eight years before complaining of the delay in the disposal of his case.