493 Phil. 570
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the defendants and against the plaintiffs hereby dismissing the complaint and amended complaint.Amante, et al. appealed the aforesaid decision to the CA, docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 38182.
The plaintiffs are hereby ordered to vacate the parcels of land belonging to the defendants Luis Yulo and Sta. Rosa Realty. They are likewise enjoined from entering the subject parcels of land.
Although attorney’s fees and expenses of litigation are recoverable in case of a clearly unfounded civil action against the plaintiff (Enervida vs. De la Torre, 55 SCRA 339), this Court resolves not to award attorney’s fees etc. in favor of the defendants because the plaintiffs appear to have acted in good faith in filing the present civil action (Salao vs. Salao, 70 SCRA 65) and that it would not be just and equitable to award the same in the case at bar. (Liwanag vs. Court of Appeals, 121 SCRA 354) Accordingly, the other reliefs prayed for by the defendants are hereby dismissed.
SO ORDERED.[9]
WHEREFORE, the judgment herein appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED, with the modification that the defendants-appellees are hereby ordered, jointly and severally, to pay the plaintiffs-appellants nominal damages in the amount of P5,000.00 per plaintiff. No pronouncement as to costs.Nominal damages were awarded by the CA because it found that SRRDC violated Amante, et al.’s rights as possessors of the subject property.[12]
SO ORDERED.[11]
4.1. THE COURT OF APPEALS DECIDED THE CASE CONTRARY TO LAW OR APPLICABLE SUPREME COURT DECISIONS BECAUSE:Ejectment Cases Filed by SRRDC4.1.1 FIRST, PETITIONERS MAY NOT BE LAWFULLY EVICTED FROM THEIR LANDHOLDINGS CONSIDERING THAT:-- (A) PETITIONERS ARE ALREADY THE REGISTERED OWNERS UNDER THE TORRENS SYSTEM OF THE PROPERTIES IN QUESTION SINCE FEBRUARY 26, 1992 BY VIRTUE OF RA 6657 OR THE COMPREHENSIVE AGRARIAN REFORM LAW;
-- (B) THE COURT OF APPEALS HAS AFFIRMED THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF LAGUNA’S DISMISSAL OF THE EJECTMENT CASES FILED BY RESPONDENT SRRDC AGAINST PETITIONERS; AND
-- (C) ASSUMING FOR THE SAKE OF ARGUMENT ONLY THAT PETITIONERS ARE NOT YET THE REGISTERED OWNERS OF THE PROPERTIES IN QUESTION, RESPONDENTS MAY NOT RAISE THE ISSUE OF OWNERSHIP IN THIS CASE FOR INJUNCTION WITH DAMAGES, THE SAME TO BE VENTILATED IN A SEPARATE ACTION, NOT IN THIS CASE BROUGHT TO PREVENT RESPONDENTS FROM COMMITTING FURTHER ACTS OF DISPOSSESSION [BACAR V. DEL ROSARIO ET AL., 171 SCRA 451 (1989)].4.1.2 SECOND, PETITIONERS ARE ENTITLED TO MORAL, EXEMPLARY DAMAGES AND ATTORNEY’S FEES, INSTEAD OF MERE NOMINAL DAMAGES, CONSIDERING THAT THE COURT OF APPEALS FOUND RESPONDENTS TO HAVE UNLAWFULLY AND ILLEGALLY DISTURBED PETITIONERS’ PEACEFUL AND CONTINUOUS POSSESSION.[15]
On August 29, 1989, the farmer beneficiaries together with the BARC chairman answered the protest and objection stating that the slope of the land is not 18% but only 5-10% and that the land is suitable and economically viable for agricultural purposes, as evidenced by the Certification of the Department of Agriculture, municipality of Cabuyao, Laguna.On December 19, 1991, the DARAB promulgated a decision, affirming the dismissal of the protest of SRRDC against the compulsory coverage of the property covered by TCT Nos. 81949 and 84891. The decretal portion of the decision reads:
On September 8, 1989, MARO Belen dela Torre made a summary investigation report and forwarded the Compulsory Acquisition Folder Indorsement (CAFI) to the Provincial Agrarian Reform Officer (hereafter, PARO).
On September 21, 1989, PARO Durante Ubeda forwarded his endorsement of the compulsory acquisition to the Secretary of Agrarian Reform.
On November 23, 1989, Acting Director Eduardo C. Visperas of the Bureau of Land Acquisition and Development, DAR forwarded two (2) Compulsory Acquisition Claim Folders covering the landholding of SRRDC, covered by TCT Nos. T-81949 and T-84891 to the President, Land Bank of the Philippines for further review and evaluation.
On December 12, 1989, Secretary of Agrarian Reform Miriam Defensor Santiago sent two (2) notices of acquisition to petitioner, stating that petitioner’s landholdings covered by TCT Nos. T-81949 and T-84891, containing an area of 188.2858 and 58.5800 hectares, valued at P4,417,735.65 and P1,220,229.93, respectively, had been placed under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program.
On February 6, 1990, petitioner SRRDC in two letters separately addressed to Secretary Florencio B. Abad and the Director, Bureau of Land Acquisition and Distribution, sent its formal protest, protesting not only the amount of compensation offered by DAR for the property but also the two (2) notices of acquisition.
On March 17, 1990, Secretary Abad referred the case to the DARAB for summary proceedings to determine just compensation under R.A. No. 6657, Section 16.
On March 23, 1990, the LBP returned the two (2) claim folders previously referred for review and evaluation to the Director of BLAD mentioning its inability to value the SRRDC landholding due to some deficiencies.
On March 28, 1990, Executive Director Emmanuel S. Galvez wrote the Land Bank President Deogracias Vistan to forward the two (2) claim folders involving the property of SRRDC to the DARAB for it to conduct summary proceedings to determine the just compensation for the land.
On April 6, 1990, petitioner sent a letter to the Land Bank of the Philippines stating that its property under the aforesaid land titles were exempt from CARP coverage because they had been classified as watershed area and were the subject of a pending petition for land conversion.
On May 10, 1990, Director Narciso Villapando of BLAD turned over the two (2) claim folders (CACF’s) to the Executive Director of the DAR Adjudication Board for proper administrative valuation. Acting on the CACF’s, on September 10, 1990, the Board promulgated a resolution asking the office of the Secretary of Agrarian Reform (DAR) to first resolve two (2) issues before it proceeds with the summary land valuation proceedings.
The issues that need to be threshed out were as follows: (1) whether the subject parcels of land fall within the coverage of the Compulsory Acquisition Program of the CARP; and (2) whether the petition for land conversion of the parcels of land may be granted.
On December 7, 1990, the Office of the Secretary, DAR, through the Undersecretary for Operations (Assistant Secretary for Luzon Operations) and the Regional Director of Region IV, submitted a report answering the two issues raised. According to them, firstly, by virtue of the issuance of the notice of coverage on August 11, 1989, and notice of acquisition on December 12, 1989, the property is covered under compulsory acquisition. Secondly, Administrative Order No. 1, Series of 1990, Section IV D also supports the DAR position on the coverage of the said property. During the consideration of the case by the Board, there was no pending petition for land conversion specifically concerning the parcels of land in question.
On February 19, 1991, the Board sent a notice of hearing to all the parties interested, setting the hearing for the administrative valuation of the subject parcels of land on March 6, 1991. However, on February 22, 1991, Atty. Ma. Elena P. Hernandez-Cueva, counsel for SRRDC, wrote the Board requesting for its assistance in the reconstruction of the records of the case because the records could not be found as her co-counsel, Atty. Ricardo Blancaflor, who originally handled the case for SRRDC and had possession of all the records of the case was on indefinite leave and could not be contacted. The Board granted counsel’s request and moved the hearing on April 4, 1991.
On March 18, 1991, SRRDC submitted a petition to the Board for the latter to resolve SRRDC’s petition for exemption from CARP coverage before any administrative valuation of their landholding could be had by the Board.
On April 4, 1991, the initial DARAB hearing of the case was held and subsequently, different dates of hearing were set without objection from counsel of SRRDC. During the April 15, 1991 hearing, the subdivision plan of subject property at Casile, Cabuyao, Laguna was submitted and marked as Exhibit “5” for SRRDC. At the hearing on April 23, 1991, the Land Bank asked for a period of one month to value the land in dispute.
At the hearing on April 23, 1991, certification from Deputy Zoning Administrator Generoso B. Opina was presented. The certification issued on September 8, 1989, stated that the parcels of land subject of the case were classified as “Industrial Park” per Sangguniang Bayan Resolution No. 45-89 dated March 29, 1989.
To avert any opportunity that the DARAB might distribute the lands to the farmer beneficiaries, on April 30, 1991, petitioner filed a petition with DARAB to disqualify private respondents as beneficiaries. However, DARAB refused to address the issue of beneficiaries.[24]
. . .
WHEREFORE, based on the foregoing premises, the Board hereby orders:On July 11, 1991, DAR Secretary Benjamin T. Leong issued a memorandum directing the Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) to open a trust account in favor of SRRDC, for P5,637,965.55, as valuation for the SRRDC property.
- The dismissal for lack of merit of the protest against the compulsory coverage of the landholdings of Sta. Rosa Realty Development Corporation (Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 81949 and 84891 with an area of 254.766 hectares) in Barangay Casile, Municipality of Cabuyao, Province of Laguna under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program is hereby affirmed;
- The Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) to pay Sta. Rosa Realty Development Corporation the amount of Seven Million Eight Hundred Forty-One Thousand, Nine Hundred Ninety Seven Pesos and Sixty-Four centavos (P7,841,997.64) for its landholdings covered by the two (2) Transfer Certificates of Title mentioned above. Should there be a rejection of the payment tendered, to open, if none has yet been made, a trust account for said amount in the name of Sta. Rosa Realty Development Corporation;
- The Register of Deeds of the Province of Laguna to cancel with dispatch Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. 84891 and 81949 and new one be issued in the name of the Republic of the Philippines, free from liens and encumbrances;
- The Department of Environment and Natural Resources either through its Provincial Office in Laguna or the Regional Office, Region IV, to conduct a final segregation survey on the lands covered by Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. 84891 and 81949 so the same can be transferred by the Register of Deeds to the name of the Republic of the Philippines;
- The Regional Office of the Department of Agrarian Reform through its Municipal and Provincial Agrarian Reform Office to take immediate possession on the said landholding after Title shall have been transferred to the name of the Republic of the Philippines, and distribute the same to the immediate issuance of Emancipation Patents to the farmer-beneficiaries as determined by the Municipal Agrarian Reform Office of Cabuyao, Laguna.[25]
In the meantime, SRRDC had filed with the CA a petition for review of the DARAB’s decision, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 27234.On October 12, 2001, the Court rendered its Decision in G.R. No. 112526 only, setting aside the decision of the CA in CA-G.R. SP No. 27234 and ordering the remand of the case to the DARAB for re-evaluation and determination of the nature of the land. The dispositive portion of the Decision reads as follows:
On November 5, 1993, the CA affirmed the decision of DARAB, to wit:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the DARAB decision dated December 19, 1991 is AFFIRMED, without prejudice to petitioner Sta. Rosa Realty Development Corporation ventilating its case with the Special Agrarian Court on the issue of just compensation.[28]
Hence, SRRDC filed on November 24, 1993, herein petition, docketed as G.R. No. 112526 on the following grounds:I
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION TANTAMOUNT TO LACK OR EXCESS OF ITS JURISDICTION IN RULING THAT THE SRRDC PROPERTIES, DESPITE THE UNDISPUTED FACT OF THEIR NON-AGRICULTURAL CLASSIFICATION PRIOR TO RA 6657, ARE COVERED BY THE CARP CONTRARY TO THE NATALIA REALTY DECISION OF THIS HONORABLE COURT.i. The SRRDC properties have been zoned and approved as ‘PARK’ since 1979.
ii. The SRRDC properties form part of a watershed area.II
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION TANTAMOUNT TO LACK OR EXCESS OF ITS JURISDICTION IN DISREGARDING ECOLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS AS MANDATED BY LAW.III
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION TANTAMOUNT TO LACK OR EXCESS OF ITS JURISDICTION IN AFFIRMING THE DISTRIBUTION OF THE SRRDC PROPERTIES TO PRIVATE RESPONDENTS WHO HAVE BEEN JUDICIALLY DECLARED AS SQUATTERS AND THEREFORE ARE NOT QUALIFIED BENEFICIARIES PURSUANT TO THE CENTRAL MINDANAO UNIVERSITY DECISION OF THIS HONORABLE COURT.i. The acquisition of the SRRDC properties cannot be valid for future beneficiaries.
ii. Section 22 of RA 6657 insofar as it expands the coverage of the CARP to ‘landless residents’ is unconstitutional.IV
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION TANTAMOUNT TO LACK OR EXCESS OF ITS JURISDICTION IN HOLDING THAT THE DARAB HAS JURISDICTION TO PASS UPON THE ISSUE OF WHETHER THE SRRDC PROPERTIES ARE SUBJECT TO CARP COVERAGE.[29]
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Court SETS ASIDE the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 27234.It is the opinion of the Court in G.R. No. 112526, that the property is part of a watershed, and that during the hearing at the DARAB, “there was proof that the land may be excluded from the coverage of the CARP because of its high slopes.”[31] Thus, the Court concluded that a remand of the case to the DARAB for re-evaluation of the issue of coverage is appropriate in order to resolve the true nature of the subject property.[32]
In lieu thereof, the Court REMANDS the case to the DARAB for re-evaluation and determination of the nature of the parcels of land involved to resolve the issue of its coverage by the Comprehensive Land Reform Program.
In the meantime, the effects of the CLOAs issued by the DAR to supposed farmer beneficiaries shall continue to be stayed by the temporary restraining order issued on December 15, 1993, which shall remain in effect until final decision on the case.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.[30]
2.1 Only QUESTIONS OF LAW are admittedly and undeniably at issue; yet the Honorable Court reviewed the findings of facts of the Court of Appeals and the DARAB although the case does not fall into any of the well-recognized exceptions to conduct a factual review. Worse, the 12 October 2001 Decision assumed facts not proven before any administrative, quasi-judicial or judicial bodies;The DAR and the DARAB, through the Office of the Solicitor General, did not interpose any objection to the second motion for reconsideration. It also maintained that if SRRDC’s claim that the property is watershed is true, then it is the DENR that should exercise control and supervision in the disposition, utilization, management, renewal and conservation of the property.[34]
2.2 The DARAB and the Court of Appeals already found the land to be CARPable; yet the Honorable Court remanded the case to DARAB to re-evaluate if the land is CARPable;
2.3 The Decision did not express clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based;
2.4 The Decision renewed the Temporary Restraining Order issued on 15 December 1993, issuance of which is barred by Sec. 55 of R.A. 6657; and
2.5 This Honorable Court denied private respondents’ Motion for Reconsideration although issues raised therein were never passed upon in the 12 October 2001 Decision or elsewhere.[33]
Ocular inspections conducted by the Board show that the subject landholdings have been under the possession and tillage of the DAR identified potential beneficiaries which they inherited from their forebears (workers of the Yulo Estate). They are bonafide residents and registered voters (DARAB Exhibits “C” and “J”) of Barangay Casile, Cabuyao, Laguna. There is a barangay road leading toward the barangay school and sites and the settlement has a barangay hall, church, elementary school buildings (DARAB Exhibit “Q”), Comelec precincts (DARAB Exhibits “J-1” and J-2”), and other structures extant in progressive communities. The barangay progressive development agencies, like the DECS, DA, COMELEC, DAR and Support Services of Land Bank, DPWH, DTI and the Cooperative Development Authority have extended support services to the community (DARAB Exhibits “I”, “K” to “K-3”, “L”, “M”, “N”, “O”, “P” to “P-6”). More importantly, subject landholdings are suitable for agriculture. Their topography is flat to undulating 3-15% slope. (Testimony of Rosalina Jumaquio, Agricultural Engineer, DAR, TSN, June 21, 1991, DARAB Exhibits “F” and “H”). Though some portions are over 18% slope, nevertheless, clearly visible thereat are fruit-bearing trees, like coconut, coffee, and pineapple plantations, etc. (see Petitioners Exhibits “A” to “YYY” and DARAB Exhibits “A” to “S”, Records). In other words, they are already productive and fully developed.SRRDC however, insists that the property has already been classified as a “municipal park” and beyond the scope of CARP. To prove this, SRRDC submitted the following:
. . .
As the landholdings of SRRDC subject of the instant proceedings are already developed not only as a community but also as an agricultural farm capable of sustaining daily existence and growth, We find no infirmity in placing said parcels of land under compulsory coverage. They do not belong to the exempt class of lands. The claim that the landholding of SRRDC is a watershed; hence, belonging to the exempt class of lands is literally “throwing punches at the moon” because the DENR certified that “the only declared watershed in Laguna Province and San Pablo City is the Caliraya-Lumot Rivers (Petitioner’s Exhibit “A”). A sensu contrario, the landholdings subject herein are not.[41] (Emphasis supplied)
The evidence on record supports these findings, to wit:
- Certification dated January 16, 1989 by the OIC Provincial Environment and Natural Resources Office of Laguna that the only declared watershed in the Laguna province and San Pablo City is the Caliraya-Lumot Rivers No. 1570 dated September 1, 1976;[42]
- Map prepared by Agricultural Engineer Rosalina H. Jumaquio showing that: a) the topography of the property covered by TCT No. T-84891 topography is flat to undulating with a 5 to 10% slope; (b) it is suitable to agricultural crops; and (c) the land is presently planted with diversified crops;[43]
- Certification dated August 28, 1989 by APT Felicito Buban of the Department of Agriculture of Laguna that, per his ocular inspection, the subject property is an agricultural area, and that the inhabitants’ main occupation is farming;[44]
- Pictures taken by MARO Belen La Torre of Cabuyao, Laguna, showing that the property is cultivated and inhabited by the farmer-beneficiaries;[45]
The Court recognizes the power of a local government to reclassify and convert lands through local ordinance, especially if said ordinance is approved by the HLURB.[49] Municipal Ordinance No. 110-54 dated November 3, 1979, enacted by the Municipality of Cabuyao, divided the municipality into residential, commercial, industrial, agricultural and institutional districts, and districts and parks for open spaces.[50] It did not convert, however, existing agricultural lands into residential, commercial, industrial, or institutional. While it classified Barangay Casile into a municipal park, as shown in its permitted uses of land map, the ordinance did not provide for the retroactivity of its classification. In Co vs. Intermediate Appellate Court,[51] it was held that an ordinance converting agricultural lands into residential or light industrial should be given prospective application only, and should not change the nature of existing agricultural lands in the area or the legal relationships existing over such lands. Thus, it was stated:
- Certification dated March 1, 1991 by the Municipality of Cabuyao, Laguna that the entire barangay of Casile is delineated as Municipal Park;[46]
- Certification dated March 11, 1991 by the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board that the parcels of land located in Barangay Casile are within the Municipal Park, based on the municipality’s approved General Land Use Plan ratified by the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board as per Resolution No. 38-2 dated June 25, 1980;[47]
- Photocopies of pictures taken by Mr. Ernesto Garcia, Officer-in-Charge of the Special Project Section of CJ Yulo and Sons, Inc., of portions of Barangay Casile;[48]
A reading of Metro Manila Zoning Ordinance No. 81-01, series of 1981, does not disclose any provision converting existing agricultural lands in the covered area into residential or light industrial. While it declared that after the passage of the measure, the subject area shall be used only for residential or light industrial purposes, it is not provided therein that it shall have retroactive effect so as to discontinue all rights previously acquired over lands located within the zone which are neither residential nor light industrial in nature. This simply means that, if we apply the general rule, as we must, the ordinance should be given prospective operation only. The further implication is that it should not change the nature of existing agricultural lands in the area or the legal relationships existing over such lands …[52] (Emphasis supplied)Under Section 3 (c) of R.A. No. 6657, agricultural land is defined as land devoted to agricultural activity and not classified as mineral, forest, residential, commercial or industrial land. Section 3 (b) meanwhile defines agricultural activity as the cultivation of the soil, planting of crops, growing of fruit trees, raising of livestock, poultry or fish, including the harvesting of such products, and other farm activities, and practices performed by a farmer in conjunction with such farming operations done by persons whether natural or juridical.
Noting the absence of evidence which, in the nature of things, should have been submitted by landowner SRRDC and to avoid any claim of deprivation of its right to prove its claim to just compensation (Uy v. Genato, 57 SCRA 123). We practically directed its counsel in not only one instance, during the series of hearings conducted, to do so. We even granted continuances to give it enough time to prepare and be ready with the proof and documents. To Our dismay, none was submitted and this constrained Us to take the failure/refusal of SRRDC to present evidence as a waiver or, at least, an implied acceptance of the valuation made by the DAR.[66]The same goes with the CA, which did not have the discretion to consider evidence in a petition for certiorari or petition for review on certiorari outside than that submitted before the DARAB. The CA noted petitioner’s failure to present evidence in behalf of its arguments, thus:
. . . It must be recalled that petitioner Sta. Rosa Realty itself had asked the DARAB in a petition dated March 18, 1991 to allow it ‘to adduce evidence in support of its position that the subject parcels of land are not covered by the CARP beginning on the scheduled hearing dated April 4, 1991.’ And DARAB obliged as in fact the petitioner commenced to introduce evidence. If petitioner failed to complete the presentation of evidence to support its claim of exemption from CARP coverage, it has only itself to blame for which DARAB cannot be accused of not being impartial.[67]Consequently, there is no need to order the remand of the case to the DARAB “for re-evaluation and determination of the nature of the parcels of land involved.” It runs contrary to orderly administration of justice and would give petitioner undue opportunity to present evidence in support of its stance, an opportunity it already had during the DARAB proceedings, and which opportunity it regrettably failed to take advantage of.
I. LEGAL MANDATEIn order to be exempt from coverage, the land must have been classified or proclaimed and actually, directly and exclusively used and found to be necessary for watershed purposes.[68] In this case, at the time the DAR issued the Notices of Coverage up to the time the DARAB rendered its decision on the dispute, the subject property is yet to be officially classified or proclaimed as a watershed and has in fact long been used for agricultural purposes. SRRDC relies on the case of Central Mindanao University (CMU) vs. DARAB,[69] wherein the Court ruled that CMU is in the best position to determine what property is found necessary for its use. SRRDC claims that it is in the best position to determine whether its properties are “necessary” for development as park and watershed area.[70]
The general policy under CARP is to cover as much lands suitable for agriculture as possible. However, Section 10, RA 6657 excludes and exempts certain types of lands from the coverage of CARP, to wit:
A. Lands actually, directly and exclusively used and found to be necessary for parks, wildlife, forest reserves, reforestation, fish sanctuaries and breeding grounds, watersheds and mangroves, national defense, school sites and campuses including experimental farm stations operated by public or private schools for educational purposes, seeds and seedlings research and pilot production centers, church sites and convents appurtenant thereto, mosque sites and Islamic centers appurtenant thereof, communal burial grounds and cemeteries, penal colonies and penal farms actually worked by the inmates, government and private research and quarantine centers; and
. . .
II. POLICIES
In the application of the aforecited provision of law, the following guidelines shall be observed:A. For an area in I.A to be exempted from CARP coverage, it must be “actually, directly and exclusively used and found to be necessary” for the purpose so stated.
. . .C. Lands which have been classified or proclaimed, and/or actually directly and exclusively used and found to be necessary for parks, wildlife, forest reserves, fish sanctuaries and breeding grounds, and watersheds and mangroves shall be exempted from the coverage of CARP until Congress, taking into account ecological, developmental and equity considerations, shall have determined by law, the specific limits of public domain, as provided for under Sec. 4(a) of RA 6657, and a reclassification of the said areas or portions thereof as alienable and disposable has been approved. (Emphasis supplied)
. . .Evidently, SRRDC had a hand in the degradation of the area, and now wants to put the entire blame on the farmer-beneficiaries. It is reasonable to conclude that SRRDC is merely using “ecological considerations” to avert any disposition of the property adverse to it.
- Many bankal trees were found growing in the watershed/CARP areas, including some which have been coppiced, and that water conduits for domestic and industrial uses were found installed at the watershed area claimed by the Yulos. Records further show that in the 1970s, a Private Land Timber Permit was issued to Canlubang Sugar Estate thru its marketing arm, the Sta. Rosa Realty Devpt. Corp.
- Resident farmers denied that they have been cutting bankal trees and volunteered the information that one of the Estates’ security guards was dismissed for cutting and transporting bankal trees. The trees cut by the dismissed security guard were found stacked adjacent to the Canlubang Security Agency’s headquarters.[75]
SECTION 15. Registration of Beneficiaries. — The DAR in coordination with the Barangay Agrarian Reform Committee (BARC) as organized in this Act, shall register all agricultural lessees, tenants and farmworkers who are qualified to be beneficiaries of the CARP. These potential beneficiaries with the assistance of the BARC and the DAR shall provide the following data:In Lercana vs. Jalandoni,[76] the Court categorically stated that:
(a) names and members of their immediate farm household;
(b) owners or administrators of the lands they work on and the length of tenurial relationship;
(c) location and area of the land they work;
(d) crops planted; and
(e) their share in the harvest or amount of rental paid or wages received.
A copy of the registry or list of all potential CARP beneficiaries in the barangay shall be posted in the barangay hall, school or other public buildings in the barangay where it shall be open to inspection by the public at all reasonable hours.
Meanwhile, Administrative Order No. 10 (Rules and Procedures Governing the Registration of Beneficiaries), Series of 1989, provides:
SUBJECT: I. PREFATORY STATEMENT
Pursuant to Section 15, Chapter IV, of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988, the DAR, in coordination with the Barangay Agrarian Reform Committee (BARC), as organized pursuant to RA 6657, shall register all agricultural lessees, tenants and farmworkers who are qualified beneficiaries of the CARP. This Administrative Order provides the Implementing Rules and Procedures for the said registration.
. . .
B. Specific
1. Identify the actual and potential farmer-beneficiaries of the CARP.
… the identification and selection of CARP beneficiaries are matters involving strictly the administrative implementation of the CARP, a matter exclusively cognizable by the Secretary of the Department of Agrarian Reform, and beyond the jurisdiction of the DARAB.[77]The farmer-beneficiaries have already been identified in this case. Also, the DAR Secretary has already issued Notices of Coverage and Notices of Acquisition pertaining to the subject property. It behooves the courts to exercise great caution in substituting its own determination of the issue, unless there is grave abuse of discretion committed by the administrative agency,[78] which in these cases the Court finds none.
SECTION 22. Qualified Beneficiaries. The lands covered by the CARP shall be distributed as much as possible to landless residents of the same barangay, or in the absence thereof, landless residents of the same municipality in the following order of priority.SRRDC argues that Section 22 “sweepingly declares landless residents as beneficiaries of the CARP (to mean also squatters),” in violation of Article XIII, Section 4 of the Constitution, which aims to benefit only the landless farmers and regular farmworkers.[79]
(a) agricultural lessees and share tenants;
(b) regular farmworkers;
(c) seasonal farmworkers;
(d) other farmworkers;
(e) actual tillers or occupants of public lands;
(f) collectives or cooperatives of the above beneficiaries; and
(g) others directly working on the land.
. . .
(1) The existence of an actual and appropriate case;Earliest opportunity means that the question of unconstitutionality of the act in question should have been immediately raised in the proceedings in the court below,[81] in this case, the DAR Secretary. It must be pointed out that all controversies on the implementation of the CARP fall under the jurisdiction of the DAR, even though they raise questions that are also legal or constitutional in nature.[82] The earliest opportunity to raise a constitutional issue is to raise it in the pleadings before a competent court that can resolve the same, such that, “if it is not raised in the pleadings, it cannot be considered at the trial, and, if not considered at the trial, it cannot be considered on appeal.”[83] Records show that SRRDC raised such constitutional challenge only before this Court despite the fact that it had the opportunity to do so before the DAR Secretary. The DARAB correctly refused to deal on this issue as it is the DAR Secretary who, under the law, has the authority to determine the beneficiaries of the CARP. This Court will not entertain questions on the invalidity of a statute where that issue was not specifically raised, insisted upon, and adequately argued[84] in the DAR.
(2) A personal and substantial interest of the party raising the constitutional question;
(3) The exercise of judicial review is pleaded at the earliest opportunity; and
(4) The constitutional question is the lis mota of the case.[80] (Emphasis supplied)
SEC. 50. Quasi-Judicial Powers of the DAR. - The DAR is hereby vested with primary jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate agrarian reform matters and shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over all matters involving the implementation of agrarian reform, except those falling under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Department of Agriculture (DA) and the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR).The DAR’s jurisdiction under Section 50 of R.A. No. 6657 is two-fold. The first is essentially executive and pertains to the enforcement and administration of the laws, carrying them into practical operation and enforcing their due observance, while the second is judicial and involves the determination of rights and obligations of the parties.[87]
. . .
SECTION 1. Primary, Original and Appellate Jurisdiction. – The Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board shall have primary jurisdiction, both original and appellate, to determine and adjudicate all agrarian disputes, cases, controversies, and matters or incidents involving the implementation of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program under Republic Act No. 6657, Executive Order Nos. 229, 228 and 129-A, Republic Act No. 3844 as amended by Republic Act No. 6389, Presidential Decree No. 27 and other agrarian laws and their implementing rules and regulations.On the other hand, Administrative Order No. 06-00,[89] which provides for the Rules of Procedure for Agrarian Law Implementation (ALI) Cases, govern the administrative function of the DAR. Under said Rules of Procedure, the DAR Secretary has exclusive jurisdiction over classification and identification of landholdings for coverage under the CARP, including protests or oppositions thereto and petitions for lifting of coverage. Section 2 of the said Rules specifically provides, inter alia, that:
Specifically, such jurisdiction shall extend over but not be limited to the following:
a) Cases involving the rights and obligations of persons engaged in the cultivation and use of agricultural land covered by the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) and other agrarian laws;
b) Cases involving the valuation of land, and determination and payment of just compensation, fixing and collection of lease rentals, disturbance compensation, amortization payments, and similar disputes concerning the functions of the Land Bank;
c) Cases involving the annulment or cancellation of orders or decisions of DAR officials other than the Secretary, lease contracts or deeds of sale or their amendments under the administration and disposition of the DAR and LBP;
d) Cases arising from, or connected with membership or representation in compact farms, farmers’ cooperatives and other registered farmers’ associations or organizations, related to land covered by the CARP and other agrarian laws;
e) Cases involving the sale, alienation, mortgage, foreclosure, pre-emption and redemption of agricultural lands under the coverage of the CARP or other agrarian laws;
f) Cases involving the issuance of Certificate of Land Transfer (CLT), Certificate of Land Ownership Award (CLOA) and Emancipation Patent (EP) and the administrative correction thereof;
g) And such other agrarian cases, disputes, matters or concerns referred to it by the Secretary of the DAR.
Provided, however, that matters involving strictly the administrative implementation of the CARP and other agrarian laws and regulations, shall be the exclusive prerogative of and cognizable by the Secretary of the DAR. (Emphasis supplied)
SECTION 2. Cases Covered. - These Rules shall govern cases falling within the exclusive jurisdiction of the DAR Secretary which shall include the following:Thus, the power to determine whether a property is agricultural and subject to CARP coverage together with the identification, qualification or disqualification of farmer-beneficiaries lies with the DAR Secretary.[90]
(a) Classification and identification of landholdings for coverage under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP), including protests or oppositions thereto and petitions for lifting of coverage;
(b) Identification, qualification or disqualification of potential farmer-beneficiaries;
(c) Subdivision surveys of lands under CARP;
(d) Issuance, recall or cancellation of Certificates of Land Transfer (CLTs) and CARP Beneficiary Certificates (CBCs) in cases outside the purview of Presidential Decree (PD) No. 816, including the issuance, recall or cancellation of Emancipation Patents (EPs) or Certificates of Land Ownership Awards (CLOAs) not yet registered with the Register of Deeds;
(e) Exercise of the right of retention by landowner; . . . (Emphasis supplied)
4.5.2.2. The ISSUE ON CARP COVERAGE was initiated and incorporated in said proceeding, at the instance of petitioner itself, by filing a petition dated March 18, 1991, … Prayed therein were that DARAB:In CA-G.R. SP No. 27234, the CA likewise found that it was SRRDC that called upon the DARAB to determine the issue and it, in fact, actively participated in the proceedings before it.[93] It was SRRDC’s own act of summoning the DARAB’s authority that cured whatever jurisdictional defect it now raises. It is elementary that the active participation of a party in a case pending against him before a court or a quasi-judicial body, is tantamount to a recognition of that court’s or body’s jurisdiction and a willingness to abide by the resolution of the case and will bar said party from later on impugning the court’s or body’s jurisdiction.[94]Upon persistent request of petitioner SRRDC, it was accommodated by DARAB and a counsel of SRRDC even took the witness stand. Its lawyers were always in attendance during the scheduled hearings until it was time for SRRDC to present its own evidence.
- Take cognizance and assume jurisdiction over the question of CARP coverage of the subject parcels of land;
- Defer or hold in abeyance the proceedings for administrative valuation of the subject properties pending determination of the question of CARP coverage;
- Allow respondent SRRDC to adduce evidence in support of its position that the subject parcels of land are not covered by the CARP beginning on the scheduled hearing date of April 4, 1991” (p.3; emphasis and underscoring supplied).
4.5.2.3. But, as earlier stated, despite the open session proddings by DARAB for SRRDC to submit evidence and the rescheduling for, allegedly, they are still collating the evidence, nay, the request that it be allowed to adduce evidence, none was adduced and this constrained public respondent to declare SRRDC as having waived its right to present evidence. And, after the remaining parties were heard, the hearing was formally terminated.
. . .
4.5.3. Needless to state, the jurisdictional objection (CARP coverage), now being raised herein was not one of the original matters in issue. Principally, DARAB was called upon under Section 16 of Republic Act No. 6657 to resolve a land valuation case. But SRRDC itself insisted that DARAB should take cognizance thereof in the same land valuation proceeding. And, SRRDC, through its lawyers, actively participated in the hearings conducted.
4.5.4. It was only when an adverse decision was rendered by DARAB that the jurisdictional issue was raised in the petition for review it filed with the Honorable Court of Appeals. It was also only then that petitioner presented proof/evidence.
. . .
4.5.6. Public respondents (DAR/DARAB) are not unmindful of the rule that matter of jurisdiction may be raised at any stage of the proceeding. But for two serious considerations, the applicability thereof in the case at bar should not be allowed.
4.5.6.1. The fact [part (municipal/industrial) and/or watershed] upon which the jurisdictional issue interchangeably hinges were not established during the hearing of the case. No proof was adduced. That the matter of CARP coverage is strictly administrative implementation of CARP and, therefore, beyond the competence of DARAB, belonging, as it does, to the DAR Secretary, was not even alleged, either before DARAB or the Honorable Court of Appeals, the numerous petitions/incidents filed notwithstanding. Be it that as it may, the records of the case show that initially DARAB refused to take cognizance thereof and, in fact, forwarded the issue of CARP coverage to the office of the DAR Secretary. It was only when it was returned to DARAB by said office that proceedings thereon commenced pursuant to Section 1(g) of Rule II of the DARAB Revised Rules of Procedure.
4.5.6.2. Petitioner is now estopped from assailing the jurisdiction of DARAB. First, it expressly acknowledged the same, in fact invoked it, when it filed its petition (Annex “4”); and, second, during the scheduled hearings, SRRDC, through its counsel, actively participated, one of its counsel (sic) even testifying. It may not now be allowed to impugn the jurisdiction of public respondent …[92] (Emphasis supplied)
. . . the farmers themselves could be tapped to undertake watershed management and protection. This community-based approach in natural resource management, is in fact, being used in numerous watershed management projects nationwide. Adopting the same approach in the area is deemed the best possible solution to the case since it will not prejudice the CLOAs issued to the farmer-beneficiaries. They should, however, be required to undertake the necessary reforestation and other watershed management/rehabilitation measures in the area.If SRRDC sincerely wants to preserve the property for ecological considerations, it can be done regardless of who owns it. After all, we are all stewards of this earth, and it rests on all of us to tend to it.
In view of the foregoing, we recommend that a watershed management plan for the area espousing the community-based approach be drawn-up jointly by the DAR and DENR. . . .[103]