550 Phil. 620
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
Respondent forthwith filed a complaint for illegal termination against the TWD Board before the Regional Office No. VII of the Civil Service Commission (CSC).[10] He alleged that the Board failed to justify his termination, let alone observe due process. He also pointed out that his appointment was attested to by the CSC as permanent; hence, he could only be removed for cause.[11] The TWD Board, however, made the following comment on the charge:BOARD RESOLUTION NO. 49Series of 1996
WHEREAS, Engr. Cesar A. Quinit, Jr., Tanjay Water District General Manager had shown total disrespect for each member of the Board when he dared to refer to them as "Dogs" in a letter he sent to LWUA;
WHEREAS, Engr. Cesar A. Quinit, Jr. humiliated the members of the Board when he bluntly remarked that the Board's concern is their own personal interest and made the Water District a source of their bread and butter;
WHEREAS, Engr. Cesar A. Quinit, Jr. committed a grave error when he implemented the salary increase without the authority of the Board and without proper appropriation;
WHEREAS, Engr. Cesar A. Quinit, Jr. has corroded the relationship between he as General Manager of Tanjay Water District and the Board of Directors which is irreparable.
NOW, THEREFORE, after thorough study and deliberation, BE IT RESOLVED, as it is hereby resolved, upon motion of everybody and seconded by everybody to end the services of Engr. Cesar A. Quinit, Jr. as General Manager of Tanjay Water District and all his other concurrent positions effective September 1, 1996.
FURTHER RESOLVED to inform Engr. Cesar A. Quinit, Jr. Accordingly through this Resolution.
APPROVED. August 31, 1996
(Signatura)
CARMELITO A. LIMBAGA, SR.
Chairman
(Signatura) (Signature)
ADELINA Q. LIMBAGA GODOFREDO R. BORROMEO
Member-Secr./Treas. Member
(Signatura) (Signatura)
NENITA R. PILAS RICHARD V. REGALADO
Member Member[9]
The status and nature of the appointment of the complaint cannot go beyond the law which created the position of general manager of the water district. And this is Presidential Decree No. 198, specifically Section 23 thereof [as amended by Section 9, PD 768] which provides in part that "said officer [general manager] shall serve at the pleasure of the board."After due proceedings, the CSC, on September 18, 1997, issued Resolution No. 97-3853[13] affirming the validity of the Resolution issued by the TWD Board. The CSC ruled that respondent's position as General Manager was primarily confidential in nature and terminable at the pleasure of the TWD Board. It opined that the tenure of the General Manager would last only for as long as he enjoyed the trust and confidence of the Board. There was no violation of his right to due process of law because he was neither removed nor dismissed; his term of office merely expired. The CSC further ruled that, notwithstanding its attestation that respondent's appointment was permanent, the TWD Board was empowered to remove the General Manager from the service on the ground of loss of confidence at any time.[14]
It is humbly submitted that regardless of how many "permanent" appointments the board will issue to a general manager of a water district [which may be considered as purely ultra-vires act] and in spite of any annotation of "permanent" made by the Civil Service Commission on the appointment of any given general manager, said position continues to be primarily confidential.x x x x
It is basic and elementary, under this jurisdiction, that the term of office of appointees who serve at the pleasure of the appointing authority is co-terminus with the trust and confidence reposed upon (sic) the latter unto the former.
In the case-at-bar, when complainant breached that trust and confidence reposed on him by the respondent, the act of respondent in withdrawing its trust and confidence on the complainant operates, ipso jure as a termination of complainant's term of office.[12]
The appellate court rendered judgment setting aside the assailed Resolution of the CSC. The CA ruled that Section 23 of P.D. No. 198, as amended, which governs local water districts, explicitly provides that the General Manager of a water district shall serve at the pleasure of the Board. While the employees of a local water district are entitled to the protection of the Civil Service Law, the General Manager thereof still holds office at the pleasure of its board of directors. The appellate court declared that the Civil Service Law did not repeal P.D. No. 198 insofar as the nature and status of the position of General Manager is concerned, following the principle in statutory construction that when two statutes apply to a particular subject matter, that which was specifically enacted or designed for a particular subject matter must prevail. Hence, it declared, P.D. No. 198, as amended, which governs local water districts, must prevail over the Civil Service Law, which applies to all government employees in general.[16]
- THE PETITIONER IS A CIVIL SERVICE ELIGIBLE AND THUS ENJOYS SECURITY OF TENURE AND CANNOT BE TERMINATED WITHOUT CAUSE AND DUE PROCESS,
- THE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION GRAVELY ERRED IN UPHOLDING THE CONTINUED VALIDITY AND/OR APPLICABILITY (SIC) SEC. 23, PD 198, TO THE PETITIONER,
- THE RESOLUTION RENDERED BY THE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION IS CONTRARY TO LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE WHEN IT FAILED TO CONSIDER THE SUPREME COURT DECISIONS IN DAVAO CITY WATER DISTRICT, ET AL., VS. CSC, ET AL., BAGUIO CITY WATER DISTRICT VS. TRAJANO AND EVEN THIS COURT�S RULING IN CA-G.R. SP. NO. 35611, MARTIR VS. KABANKALAN WATER DISTRICT, ET AL.[15]
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed resolution of the Civil Service Commission is SET ASIDE, and a new judgment is hereby rendered upholding the legality of petitioner's termination as general manager, but ordering respondent Tanjay Water District to pay his full back salaries for a period of five (5) years from September 1, 1996 which is the date of his termination.The TWD and its Board (petitioners) filed the instant petition for review on certiorari, alleging that the appellate court erred as follows:
SO ORDERED.[20]
(a) Decided a question of substance, not heretofore determined by the Supreme Court by applying jurisprudence in labor cases on loss of confidence in the appealed case below;Petitioners maintain that the CA erred in upholding the validity of respondent's termination, declaring that he was denied due process, and in finding that he was a confidential employee who served at the pleasure of the TWD Board. They insist that the rulings in ordinary labor cases cannot be applied to a case involving a GOCC employee holding a primarily confidential position; in cases involving confidential positions, the due process requirement under the Constitution is satisfied by the mere act of informing the confidential employee that his or her term has expired. Petitioners further claim that they complied accordingly when they issued Board Resolution No. 49, Series of 1996. The CA cannot therefore award the full five-year back salaries to respondent.
(b) Decided the appealed case not in accord with law and applicable decision of this Honorable Tribunal when it declared that the termination of the respondent was illegal for failure to comply with the requirement of due process;
(c) Departed from the accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings when it ordered petitioner Tanjay Water District to pay respondent�s full back salaries for a period of five (5) years.[21]
Although Gray was holding a highly confidential position, the Court regarded his separation as a removal and so applied the constitutional prohibition against the suspension or dismissal of an officer or member of the civil service without cause as provided by law. That was a rather loose interpretation of the term "dismissal,"which is defined as the ouster of the incumbent before the expiration of his term. Subsequent decisions have made it clear that where a person holds his position at the pleasure of a superior or subject to some supervening event, his separation from office is not removal. It is effected by the will of the superior or by the happening of the contingency, resulting in another and different mode of terminating official relations known as expiration of the term.[27]Irrefragably, in the instant case, respondent's term as General Manager of TWD merely expired when the Board passed Resolution No. 49, Series of 1996 on August 31, 1996. This is consonant with the following ruling of this Court in Paloma v. Mora,[28] a case which also involves a general manager of a water district:
In the case at bar, P.D. No. 198, otherwise known as THE PROVINCIAL WATER UTILITIES ACT OF 1973, which was promulgated on 25 May 1973, categorically provides that the general manager shall serve at the pleasure of the board of directors, viz:Indeed, no officer or employee in the Civil Service shall be removed or suspended except for cause provided by law.[30] The phrase "cause provided by law," however, includes "loss of confidence."[31] It is an established rule that the tenure of those holding primarily confidential positions ends upon loss of confidence, because their term of office lasts only as long as confidence in them endures.[32] Their termination can be justified on the ground of loss of confidence, in which case, their cessation from office involves no removal but the expiration of their term of office.[33]Section 23. Additional Officers. — At the first meeting of the board, or as soon thereafter as practicable, the board shall appoint, by a majority vote, a general manager, an auditor, and an attorney, and shall define their duties and fix their compensation. Said officers shall serve at the pleasure of the board.Section 23 of P.D. No. 198 was later amended by P.D. No. 768 on 15 August 1975 to read:SEC. 23. The General Manager. — At the first meeting of the board, or as soon thereafter as practicable, the board shall appoint, by a majority vote, a general manager and shall define his duties and fix his compensation. Said officer shall serve at the pleasure of the board. (Emphasis supplied)Mandamus does not lie to compel the Board of Directors of the Palompon, Leyte Water District to reinstate petitioner because the Board has the discretionary power to remove him under Section 23 of P.D. No. 198, as amended by P.D. No. 768.
The case of Mita Pardo de Tavera v. Philippine Tuberculosis Society, Inc. delineated the nature of an appointment held "at the pleasure of the appointing power" in this wise:An appointment held at the pleasure of the appointing power is in essence temporary in nature. It is co-extensive with the desire of the Board of Directors. Hence, when the Board opts to replace the incumbent, technically there is no removal but only an expiration of term and in an expiration of term, there is no need of prior notice, due hearing or sufficient grounds before the incumbent can be separated from office. The protection afforded by Section 7.04 of the Code of By-Laws on Removal Of Officers and Employees, therefore, cannot be claimed by petitioner. (Emphasis supplied)In fine, the appointment of petitioner and his consequent termination are clearly within the wide arena of discretion which the legislature has bestowed the appointing power, which in this case is the Board of Directors of the Palompon, Leyte Water District. Here, considering that the petitioner is at loggerheads with the Board, the former's services obviously ceased to be "pleasurable" to the latter. The Board of Directors of a Water District may abridge the term of the General Manager thereof the moment the latter's services cease to be convivial to the former. Put another way, he is at the mercy of the appointing powers since his appointment can be terminated at any time for any cause and following Orcullo there is no need of prior notice or due hearing before the incumbent can be separated from office. Hence, petitioner is treading on shaky grounds with his intransigent posture that he was removed sans cause and due process.
Yes, as a general rule, no officer or employee of the civil service shall be removed or suspended except for cause provided by law as provided in Section 2(3), Article IX-B of the 1987 Constitution. As exception to this, P.D. No. 198, which we held in Feliciano v. Commission On Audit to be the special enabling charter of Local Water Districts, categorically provides that the General Manager shall serve "at the pleasure of the board."
Correlatively, the nature of appointment of General Managers of Water Districts under Section 23 of P.D. No. 198 falls under Section 14 of the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of Executive Order No. 292, otherwise known as the Administrative Code of 1987, which provides:Sec. 14. An appointment may also be co-terminous which shall be issued to a person whose entrance and continuity in the service is based on the trust and confidence of the appointing authority or that which is subject to his pleasure, or co-existent with his tenure, or limited by the duration of project or subject to the availability of funds.The Court has previously sustained the validity of dismissal of civil servants who serve at the pleasure of the appointing power and whose appointments are covered by Section 14 of the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of Executive Order No. 292 as cited above. Thus, in Orcullo, Jr. v. Civil Service Commission, petitioner was hired as Project Manager IV by the Coordinating Council of the Philippine Assistance Program-BOT Center. In upholding the termination of his employment prior to the expiration of his contract, we held that petitioner serves at the pleasure of the appointing authority. This Court ruled in Orcullo —
The co-terminous status may thus be classified as follows:
(1) Co-terminous with the project — when the appointment is co-existent with the duration of a particular project for which purpose employment was made or subject to the availability of funds for the same;
(2) Co-terminous with the appointing authority — when appointment is co-existent with the tenure of the appointing authority or at his pleasure;
(3) Co-terminous with the incumbent — when the appointment is co-existent with the appointee, in that after the resignation, separation or termination of the services of the incumbent the position shall be deemed automatically abolished; and
(4) Co-terminous with a specific period — appointment is for a specific period and upon expiration thereof, the position is deemed abolished; . . . (Underscoring supplied.)A perusal of petitioner's employment contract will reveal that his employment with CCPAP is qualified by the phrase "unless terminated sooner." Thus, while such employment is co-terminous with the PAPS project, petitioner nevertheless serves at the pleasure of the appointing authority as this is clearly stipulated in his employment contract. We agree with the appellate court's interpretation of the phrase "unless terminated sooner" to mean that his contractual job as Project Manager IV from March 11, 1996 to January 30, 2000 could end anytime before January 30, 2000 if terminated by the other contracting party-employer CCPAP. (Emphasis supplied)Neither is it the Court's business to intrude into the Congressional sphere on the matter of the wisdom of Section 23 of P.D. No. 198. One of the firmly entrenched principles in constitutional law is that the courts do not involve themselves with nor delve into the policy or wisdom of a statute. That is the exclusive concern of the legislative branch of the government. When the validity of a statute is challenged on constitutional grounds, the sole function of the court is to determine whether it transcends constitutional limitations or the limits of legislative power. No such transgression has been shown in this case.
Moreover, laws change depending on the evolving needs of society. In a related development, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo inked into law Republic Act No. 9286, which amended Section 23 of P.D. No. 198 providing that thereafter, the General Manager of Water Districts shall not be removed from office, except for cause and after due process. Rep. Act No. 9286 reads:Republic Act No. 9286Unfortunately for petitioner, Rep. Act No. 9286 is silent as to the retroactivity of the law to pending cases and must, therefore, be taken to be of prospective application. The general rule is that in an amendatory act, every case of doubt must be resolved against its retroactive effect. Since the retroactive application of a law usually divests rights that have already become vested, the rule in statutory construction is that all statutes are to be construed as having only a prospective operation unless the purpose and intention of the legislature to give them a retrospective effect is expressly declared or is necessarily implied from the language used.
AN ACT FURTHER AMENDING PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 198, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS "THE PROVINCIAL WATER UTILITIES ACT OF 1973", AS AMENDED
Approved: April 2, 2004x x x
Sec. 2. Section 23 of Presidential Decree No. 198, as amended, is hereby amended to read as follows:
Sec. 23. The General Manager. — At the first meeting of the Board, or as soon thereafter as practicable, the Board shall appoint, by a majority vote, a general manager and shall define his duties and fix his compensation. Said officer shall not be removed from office, except for cause and after due process. (Emphasis supplied.)x x x
Sec. 5. Effectivity Clause. — This Act shall take effect upon its approval.
First, there is nothing in Rep. Act No. 9286 which provides that it should retroact to the date of effectivity of P.D. No. 198, the original law. Next, neither is it necessarily implied from Rep. Act No. 9286 that it or any of its provisions should apply retroactively. Third, Rep. Act No. 9286 is a substantive amendment of P.D. No. 198 inasmuch as it has changed the grounds for termination of the General Manager of Water Districts who, under the then Section 23 of P.D. No. 198, "shall serve at the pleasure of the Board." Under the new law, however, said General Manager shall not be removed from office, except for cause and after due process. To apply Rep. Act No. 9286 retroactively to pending cases, such as the case at bar, will rob respondents as members of the Board of the Palompon, Leyte Water District the right vested to them by P.D. No. 198 to terminate petitioner at their pleasure or discretion. Stated otherwise, the new law can not be applied to make respondents accountable for actions which were valid under the law prevailing at the time the questioned act was committed.
Prescinding from the foregoing premises, at the time petitioner was terminated by the Board of Directors, the prevailing law was Section 23 of P.D. No. 198 prior to its amendment by Rep. Act No. 9286.[29]