489 Phil. 735
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
This Headquarters finds that there exists substantial evidence to prove the administrative culpability of all the respondents. The totality of the defense evidence submitted, as obtaining on record, is not legally sufficient to overcome the overwhelming evidence adduced proving their guilt.Thereafter, Police Chief Superintendent Anselmo Sayson Avenido, Jr., issued Special Order No. 2017[4] dismissing the petitioners from the police service effective September 19, 1995. The petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration[5] of the said Order dated August 3, 1995, alleging that the findings of fact made by the disciplinary body were not supported by substantial evidence. Instead of waiting for their motion to be resolved, however, the petitioners appealed the decision to the National Appellate Board (NAB) of the National Police Commission (NAPOLCOM), docketed therein as NAB SD Case No. 2-96-113. The NAB rendered its Decision on July 17, 1996, finding that the petitioners’ appeal was without merit and affirming the latter’s dismissal from the service. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, SPO1 Nestor Cayago, SPO1 Loreto Francisco, PO3 Cesar Nakar and PO3 Virgilio Ferrer are hereby ordered dismissed from the police service.
SO ORDERED.[3]
In light of all the foregoing, this Board finds the Appeals filed by SPO1 Nestor Cayago and PO3 Virgilio Ferrer without merit, and accordingly, affirms their summary dismissal from the police service as contained in the Decision dated July 24, 1995 of the Chief, PNP.The petitioners did not file a motion for reconsideration of the said decision.
So Ordered.[6]
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the case is hereby dismissed against accused Nestor Cayago and Virgilio Ferrer as prayed for, and dismissed as against the other accused motu proprio, on [the] ground of insufficiency of evidence with costs de oficio.The petitioners submitted a copy of the said resolution to the PNP Chief in support of their still unresolved motion for reconsideration.
Consequently, the bail bonds put up by all the herein accused, are cancelled in accordance with law.
SO ORDERED.[7]
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision sought to be reconsidered is hereby SET ASIDE and the orders issued implemental thereof is likewise hereby CANCELLED/NULLIFIED. Let another Decision be entered finding SPO1 Nestor Mejia Cayago and PO3 Virgilio Manzon Ferrer guilty of Less Grave Irregularities in the Performance of Duties and, accordingly, the penalty of ninety (90) days suspension without pay is hereby imposed on each of them which penalty is now deemed served.The PNP Chief, thereafter, issued Special Order No. 1910[9] restoring the petitioners to full duty status effective August 19, 1997. However, in a Memorandum[10] dated October 14, 1997, NAPOLCOM Commissioner Edgar Dula Torres directed the PNP Chief to nullify the said order on the ground that the latter had no jurisdiction to take cognizance of and resolve the petitioners’ motion for reconsideration. The Commissioner ruled that the NAB Decision dated July 17, 1996, affirming the dismissal of the petitioners from the service, had long become final and executory. Hence, Special Order No. 2568[11] dated October 24, 1997 was issued nullifying Special Order No. 1910, effectively dismissing the petitioners from the police service.
SO ORDERED.[8]
Applying the foregoing jurisprudence in petitioners’ case, there is therefore no denying that petitioners were accorded due process: (1) they were apprised of the charges against them; (2) they presented their counter-affidavits, supplemental affidavits and other pieces of evidence to rebut the Sworn Affidavit of complainant Veloria; (3) they were represented by counsel before the Summary Dismissal Hearing Officer; and (4) they were able to redress their case all the way from the PNP Director General up to the Civil Service Commission. Contrary to petitioners’ contention, cross-examination in summary dismissal proceedings is not mandatory. The Affidavit of complainant Veloria already comprises his direct testimony. Petitioners’ Counter-Affidavit and other supplemental Affidavits, on the other hand, take the place of their cross-examination as therein lies their refutation of complainant’s charges.
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In fact, as pointed out in the NAB Decision dated July 17, 1996, “(T)hey were furnished copies of pertinent documents relative to the case and promised to submit their respective additional controverting evidence on June 8, 1995 which they failed to comply.” (p. 36, Rollo)
Finally, their acquittal from the criminal charges for Kidnapping filed against them before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 94, bears no consequence with regard to their administrative liability. It is fundamental that in administrative cases, the quantum of proof is only preponderance of evidence to establish administrative guilt, as against proof beyond reasonable doubt of the criminal charge. Their acquittal merely relieved them from criminal liability but in no way carried with it relief from the administrative liability of dismissal from the service. (Jaculina v. National Police Commission, supra, at page 497)
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition for review is hereby DENIED.
SO ORDERED.[15]
The petitioners aver that the decision of the NAB was “void ab initio” and, as such, had not attained finality. They insist that when they filed their motion for reconsideration before the PNP Chief, the latter retained jurisdiction over the case. In fact, the petitioners aver, they were made to understand by the NAB that it could not act on their appeal in view of the pendency of the motion for reconsideration before the PNP Chief.I
WHETHER OR NOT THE DECISION RENDERED BY THE NATIONAL APPELLATE BOARD (NAB) IS VOID AB INITIO AS THE LATTER HAD NO JURISDICTION OVER THE CASE.II
WHETHER OR NOT PETITIONERS WERE ACCORDED DUE PROCESS IN THEIR DISMISSAL FROM THE SERVICE.[16]
When Cayago and Ferrer waited for more than one (1) year to lapse before they appealed the NAB Decision to the DILG Secretary, the same should no longer be disturbed as it has long attained finality. Thus, when the appellants appealed the NAB decision to the Commission, said appeal did not operate to stop the running of the period to appeal to the DILG Secretary, which should, in the first place, have been the initial and proper remedy.The applicable law on the discipline of members of the PNP is Republic Act No. 6975, otherwise known as “An Act Establishing the Philippine National Police under a Reorganized Department of Interior and Local Government, and for Other Purposes.”[22] The pertinent provisions thereof are Sections 44 and 45, which provide as follows:
It should be pointed out that even the instant appeal was also filed outside the fifteen (15)-day reglementary period of filing an appeal to this Commission.
As noted, Cayago and Ferrer had categorically admitted in their Appeal Memorandum that they received the Decision of DILG Secretary Puno dismissing their appeal thereat on August 27, 1998. It was only on September 22, 1998 that appellants filed their appeal with the Commission. Counting the number of days from the date they received the DILG Secretary’s decision up to the time they interposed their present appeal, it is clear that almost one (1) month had elapsed.
Applicable at this juncture is Section 49(1), Chapter 7, Title I(A), Book V of the Administrative Code of 1987 (Executive Order No. 292) which provides, as follows:“SEC. 49 Appeals. - (1) Appeals, where allowable, shall be made by the party adversely affected by the decision within fifteen days from receipt of the decision unless a petition for reconsideration is seasonably filed, which petition shall be decided within fifteen (15) days. x x x”…Corollarily, Section 37, C (Appeals), Part II (Disciplinary Cases), of the Uniform Rules of Procedure in the Conduct of Administrative Investigations explicitly states as follows:“Section 37. Appeals. – Decisions of heads of departments, agencies, provinces, cities, municipalities and other instrumentalities, imposing penalties exceeding thirty (30) days salary, may be appealed to the Commission proper within a period of fifteen days from receipt thereof.” (Underscoring supplied)The aforequoted provisions state clearly that the decision of the department head, in this case the DILG Secretary, may be appealed to the Commission within fifteen (15) days from receipt thereof. Failure to appeal the same within the period prescribed by the law and rules renders the said decision final and executory.
Considering that Cayago and Ferrer interposed this instant appeal about one month after they received the decision of DILG Secretary Puno, the instant appeal should not be entertained.[21]
SEC. 44. Disciplinary Appellate Boards. – The formal administrative disciplinary machinery for the PNP shall be the National Appellate Board and the regional appellate boards.Thus, when a police officer is dismissed by the PNP Director General and the dismissal is affirmed by the NAB, the proper remedy of the aggrieved party is to appeal the dismissal to the DILG Secretary.[23]
The National Appellate Board shall consist of four (4) divisions, each division composed of a Commissioner as Chairman and two (2) others as members. The Board shall consider appeals from decisions of the Chief of the PNP.
The National Appellate Board may conduct its hearings or sessions in Metropolitan Manila or any part of the country as it may deem necessary.
There shall be at least one (1) regional appellate board per administrative region in the country to be composed of a senior officer of the regional commission as Chairman and one (1) representative each from the PNP, and the regional peace and order council members. It shall consider appeals from decisions of the regional directors, other officials, mayors and the PLEBs: Provided, That the Commission may create additional regional appellate boards as the need arises.
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SEC. 45. Finality of Disciplinary Action. – The disciplinary action imposed upon a member of the PNP shall be final and executory: Provided, That a disciplinary action imposed by the regional director or by the PLEB involving demotion or dismissal from the service may be appealed to the regional appellate board within ten (10) days from receipt of the copy of the notice of decision: Provided, further, That the disciplinary action imposed by the Chief of the PNP involving demotion or dismissal may be appealed to the National Appellate Board within ten (10) days from receipt thereof; Provided, furthermore, That the regional or National Appellate Board, as the case may be, shall decide the appeal within sixty (60) days from receipt of the notice of appeal; Provided, finally, That failure of the regional appellate board to act on the appeal within said period shall render the decision final and executory without prejudice, however, to the filing of an appeal by either party with the Secretary.
… [I]t is clear that the NAB has exclusive appellate jurisdiction over disciplinary actions imposed by the PNP Director General. In the present case, the Court notes that petitioners took that recourse, i.e., filed an appeal with the National Appellate Board. However, the Court, likewise, notes that prior to their filing of an appeal with the NAB, petitioners also filed a Motion for Reconsideration with the PNP Director General. Thus, arises the dilemma. The NAB rendered its Decision sustaining the PNP Director General’s decision summarily dismissing petitioners from the service. On the other hand, the PNP Director General subsequently reversed its own initial Decision and found petitioners guilty of a lesser offense. And while petitioners cannot be blamed for their display of zeal in the pursuit of their case, it must be emphasized however, that the law provides for the proper remedies. Furthermore, there is no such specie of appeal such as “precautionary appeal” which petitioners resorted to when they elevated their case to the National Appellate Board (NAB), pending resolution of their motion for reconsideration. Likewise, petitioners cannot simultaneously resort to the filing of a motion for reconsideration with the PNP Director General, and an appeal with the NAB. Either they file a motion for reconsideration, and if denied, appeal their case to the NAB, OR, without filing a motion for reconsideration, directly appeal their case to the NAB. Petitioners’ simultaneous filing of these two remedies is a clear act of trifling with judicial processes, for the distinct possibility that these two bodies will render conflicting resolutions of the case is not highly improbable, as what happened in this case. It is well-settled that a party is not allowed to pursue simultaneous remedies in two different fora because such practice works havoc on orderly judicial procedure. (Professional Regulation Commission, et al. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 118437, July 9, 1998) And now, petitioners want the Court to settle the quandary that they themselves created.The petitioners’ contention that the appeal to the NAB from the July 24, 1995 Order of the PNP Director General was merely precautionary is but an afterthought. As gleaned from the July 17, 1996 Decision of the NAB, the appeals of the petitioners were in due course, and not merely precautionary or ex abundantia cautela. The petitioners failed to show that their appeal to the NAB was without prejudice to the resolution by the PNP Chief of their motion for reconsideration.
In this light, the Court holds that the Decision rendered by the NAB is valid as it has jurisdiction over the appeal filed by petitioners. As adverted to above, it has exclusive appellate jurisdiction over the summary dismissal imposed by the PNP Director General. (Section 45 of Republic Act No. 6975) Notably, unlike in other administrative cases, the filing of a Motion for Reconsideration with the PNP Director General is not a condition sine qua non before an appeal may be assayed. Hence, when petitioners filed an appeal with the NAB, in effect, they abandoned their Motion for Reconsideration with the PNP Director General, and appellate jurisdiction was vested with the NAB. Consequently, the Decision dated July 17, 1996 rendered by the NAB is a valid decision.[25]
… [T]he essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard, or, as applied to administrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain one’s side or an opportunity to seek for a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. And any seeming defect in its observance is cured by the filing of a motion for reconsideration. A formal or trial-type hearing is not at all times and in all instances essential. The requirements are satisfied where the parties are afforded fair and reasonable opportunity to explain their side of the controversy at hand. What is frowned upon is the absolute lack of notice and hearing. …[29]In this case, the record shows that (1) the petitioners were apprised of the charges against them; (2) they presented their counter-affidavits, supplemental affidavits, and other pieces of evidence, to rebut the Sworn Affidavit of complainant Veloria; (3) they were represented by counsel before the summary dismissal hearing officer; and (4) they were able to elevate their case from the PNP Chief, Director General to the CSC.[30] Thus, the petitioners were adequately apprised of the charges against them and were afforded the opportunity to answer such charges.[31]