492 Phil. 314
CARPIO-MORALES, J.:
These ordinances, by granting an exclusive franchise for twenty five years, renewable for another twenty five years, to one entity for the construction and operation of one common bus and jeepney terminal facility in Lucena City, to be located outside the city proper, were professedly aimed towards alleviating the traffic congestion alleged to have been caused by the existence of various bus and jeepney terminals within the city, as the “Explanatory Note”-Whereas Clause adopting Ordinance No. 1778 states:Ordinance No. 1631[2]
AN ORDINANCE GRANTING THE LUCENA GRAND CENTRAL TERMINAL, INC., A FRANCHISE TO CONSTRUCT, FINANCE, ESTABLISH, OPERATE AND MAINTAIN A COMMON BUS-JEEPNEY TERMINAL FACILITY IN THE CITY OF LUCENAx x x
SECTION 1. – There is hereby granted to the Lucena Grand Central Terminal, Inc., its successors or assigns, hereinafter referred to as the “grantee”, a franchise to construct, finance, establish, operate, and maintain a common bus-jeepney terminal facility in the City of Lucena.
SECTION 2. – This franchise shall continue for a period of twenty-five years, counted from the approval of this Ordinance, and renewable at the option of the grantee for another period of twenty-five (25) years upon such expiration.x x x
SECTION 4. – Responsibilities and Obligations of the City Government of Lucena. – During the existence of the franchise, the City Government of Lucena shall have the following responsibilities and obligations:x x x
(c) It shall not grant any third party any privilege and/or concession to operate a bus, mini-bus and/or jeepney terminal.x x x Ordinance No. 1778[3]
AN ORDINANCE REGULATING THE ENTRANCE TO THE CITY OF LUCENA OF ALL BUSES, MINI-BUSES AND OUT-OF-TOWN PASSENGER JEEPNEYS AND FOR THIS PURPOSE, AMENDING ORDINACE NO. 1420, SERIES OF 1993, AND ORDINANCE NO. 1557, SERIES OF 1995x x x
SECTION 1. – The entrance to the City of Lucena of all buses, mini-buses and out-of-town passenger jeepneys is hereby regulated as follows:
(a) All buses, mini-buses and out-of-town passenger jeepneys shall be prohibited from entering the city and are hereby directed to proceed to the common terminal, for picking-up and/or dropping of their passengers.
(b) All temporary terminals in the City of Lucena are hereby declared inoperable starting from the effectivity of this ordinance.x x x
SECTION 3. – a) Section 1 of Ordinance No. 1557, Series of 1995, is hereby amended to read as follows:
Buses, mini-buses, and jeepney type mini-buses from other municipalities and/or local government units going to Lucena City are directed to proceed to the Common Terminal located at Diversion Road, Brgy. Ilayang Dupay, to unload and load passengers.x x x
c) Section 3 of Ordinance No. 1557, Series of 1995, is hereby amended to read as follows:
Passenger buses, mini-buses, and jeepney type mini-buses coming from other municipalities and/or local government units shall utilize the facilities of the Lucena Grand Central Terminal at Diversion Road, Brgy. Ilayang Dupay, this City, and no other terminals shall be situated inside or within the City of Lucena;
d) Section 4 of Ordinance No. 1557, Series of 1995, is hereby amended to read as follows:
Passenger buses, mini-buses, and jeepney type mini-buses coming from other municipalities and/or local government units shall avail of the facilities of the Lucena Grand Central Terminal which is hereby designated as the officially sanctioned common terminal for the City of Lucena;
e) Section 5 of Ordinance No. 1557, Series of 1995, is hereby amended to read as follows:The Lucena Grand Central Terminal is the permanent common terminal as this is the entity which was given the exclusive franchise by the Sangguniang Panglungsod under Ordinance No. 1631; (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
WHEREAS, in line with the worsening traffic condition of the City of Lucena, and with the purpose of easing and regulating the flow of the same, it is imperative that the Buses, Mini-Buses and out-of-town jeepneys be prohibited from maintaining terminals within the City, but instead directing to proceed to the Lucena Grand Central Terminal for purposes of picking-up and/or dropping off their passengers;[4]Respondent, who had maintained a terminal within the city, was one of those affected by the ordinances.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, judgment is hereby rendered, as follows:Petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration[9] of the trial court’s order having been denied by Order of August 6, 1999,[10] it elevated it via petition for review under Rule 45 before this Court.[11] This Court, by Resolution of November 24, 1999,[12] referred the petition to the Court of Appeals with which it has concurrent jurisdiction, no special and important reason having been cited for it to take cognizance thereof in the first instance.SO ORDERED. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)[8]
- Declaring City Ordinance No. 1631 as valid, having been issued in the exercise of the police power of the City Government of Lucena insofar as the grant of franchise to the Lucena Grand Central Terminal, Inc., to construct, finance, establish, operate and maintain common bus-jeepney terminal facility in the City of Lucena;
- But however, declaring the provision of Sec. 4(c) of Ordinance No. 1631 to the effect that the City Government shall not grant any third party any privilege and/or concession to operate a bus, mini-bus and/or jeepney terminal, as illegal and ultra vires because it contravenes the provisions of Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise known as “The Local Government Code”;
- Declaring City Ordinance No. 1778 as null and void, the same being also an ultra vires act of the City Government of Lucena arising from an invalid, oppressive and unreasonable exercise of the police power, more specifically, declaring illegal [sections 1(b), 3(c) and 3(e)];
- Ordering the issuance of a Writ of Prohibition and/or Injunction directing the respondents public officials, the City Mayor and the Sangguniang Panglungsod of Lucena, to cease and desist from implementing Ordinance No. 1778 insofar as said ordinance prohibits or curtails petitioner from maintaining and operating its own bus terminal subject to the conditions provided for in Ordinance No. 1557, Sec. 3, which authorizes the construction of terminal outside the poblacion of Lucena City; and likewise, insofar as said ordinance directs and compels the petitioner to use the Lucena Grand Central Terminal Inc., and furthermore, insofar as it declares that no other terminals shall be situated, constructed, maintained or established inside or within the City of Lucena; and furthermore,
- The Motion to Dismiss filed by the Intervenor, Lucena Grand Central Terminal Inc., dated October 19, 1998, is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.
SEC. 22. Notice to the Solicitor General.—In any action involving the validity of any treaty, law, ordinance, executive order, presidential decree, rules or regulations, the court in its discretion, may require the appearance of the Solicitor General who may be heard in person or through representative duly designated by him. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)Furthermore, petitioner invokes Sections 3 and 4 of Rule 63 which respectively provide:
In enacting said law, therefore, the National Assembly was prompted by considerations of public convenience and welfare. It was inspired by a desire to relieve congestion of traffic, which is, to say the least, a menace to public safety. Public welfare, then, lies at the bottom of the enactment of said law, and the state in order to promote the general welfare may interfere with personal liberty, with property, and with business and occupations.[20] (Emphasis supplied)The questioned ordinances having been enacted with the objective of relieving traffic congestion in the City of Lucena, they involve public interest warranting the interference of the State. The first requisite for the proper exercise of police power is thus present.
. . . [T]his Court cannot look into allegations that PD No. 771 was enacted to benefit a select group which was later given authority to operate the jai-alai under PD No. 810. The examination of legislative motivation is generally prohibited. (Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217, 29 L. Ed. 2d 438 [1971] per Black, J.) There is, in the first place, absolute lack of evidence to support ADC’s allegation of improper motivation in the issuance of PD No. 771. In the second place, as already averred, this Court cannot go behind the expressed and proclaimed purposes of PD No. 771, which are reasonable and even laudable. (Underscoring supplied)[23]This leaves for determination the issue of whether the means employed by the Lucena Sangguniang Panlungsod to attain its professed objective were reasonably necessary and not unduly oppressive upon individuals.
It cannot be said that such a sweeping exercise of a lawmaking power by Bocaue could qualify under the term reasonable. The objective of fostering public morals, a worthy and desirable end can be attained by a measure that does not encompass too wide a field. Certainly the ordinance on its face is characterized by overbreadth. The purpose sought to be achieved could have been attained by reasonable restrictions rather than by an absolute prohibition. The admonition in Salaveria should be heeded: “The Judiciary should not lightly set aside legislative action when there is not a clear invasion of personal or property rights under the guise of police regulation.” It is clear that in the guise of a police regulation, there was in this instance a clear invasion of personal or property rights, personal in the case of those individuals desirous of patronizing those night clubs and property in terms of the investments made and salaries to be earned by those therein employed. (Underscoring supplied)[26]In Lupangco v. Court of Appeals,[27] this Court, in declaring unconstitutional the resolution subject thereof, advanced a similar consideration. That case involved a resolution issued by the Professional Regulation Commission which prohibited examinees from attending review classes and receiving handout materials, tips, and the like three days before the date of examination in order to preserve the integrity and purity of the licensure examinations in accountancy. Besides being unreasonable on its face and violative of academic freedom, the measure was found to be more sweeping than what was necessary, viz:
Needless to say, the enforcement of Resolution No. 105 is not a guarantee that the alleged leakages in the licensure examinations will be eradicated or at least minimized. Making the examinees suffer by depriving them of legitimate means of review or preparation on those last three precious days when they should be refreshing themselves with all that they have learned in the review classes and preparing their mental and psychological make-up for the examination day itself — would be like uprooting the tree to get rid of a rotten branch. What is needed to be done by the respondent is to find out the source of such leakages and stop it right there. If corrupt officials or personnel should be terminated from their loss, then so be it. Fixers or swindlers should be flushed out. Strict guidelines to be observed by examiners should be set up and if violations are committed, then licenses should be suspended or revoked. x x x (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)[28]As in De la Cruz[29] and Lupangco,[30] the ordinances assailed herein are characterized by overbreadth. They go beyond what is reasonably necessary to solve the traffic problem. Additionally, since the compulsory use of the terminal operated by petitioner would subject the users thereof to fees, rentals and charges, such measure is unduly oppressive, as correctly found by the appellate court. [31] What should have been done was to determine exactly where the problem lies and then to stop it right there.
The true role of Constitutional Law is to effect an equilibrium between authority and liberty so that rights are exercised within the framework of the law and the laws are enacted with due deference to rights. (Underscoring supplied)[32]A due deference to the rights of the individual thus requires a more careful formulation of solutions to societal problems.
Respondents can not seek cover under the general welfare clause authorizing the abatement of nuisances without judicial proceedings. That tenet applies to a nuisance per se, or one which affects the immediate safety of persons and property and may be summarily abated under the undefined law of necessity (Monteverde v. Generoso, 52 Phil. 123 [1982]). The storage of copra in the quonset building is a legitimate business. By its nature, it can not be said to be injurious to rights of property, of health or of comfort of the community. If it be a nuisance per accidens it may be so proven in a hearing conducted for that purpose. It is not per se a nuisance warranting its summary abatement without judicial intervention. (Underscoring supplied)[38]In Pampanga Bus Co., Inc. v. Municipality of Tarlac[39] where the appellant-municipality similarly argued that the terminal involved therein is a nuisance that may be abated by the Municipal Council via an ordinance, this Court held: “Suffice it to say that in the abatement of nuisances the provisions of the Civil Code (Articles 694-707) must be observed and followed. This appellant failed to do.”
There is no question that not even the strongest moral conviction or the most urgent public need, subject only to a few notable exceptions, will excuse the bypassing of an individual's rights. It is no exaggeration to say that a person invoking a right guaranteed under Article III of the Constitution is a majority of one even as against the rest of the nation who would deny him that right.[40]WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED.