549 Phil. 664
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
Complaint No. 2 — The collections of miscellaneous fee of Ten Pesos (P10.00) (Annex II) per student upon enrolment which was not authorized by DECS.In view of the foregoing findings of the Auditor, the Ombudsman (Visayas) issued the Memorandum dated October 8, 1999, with the following recommendation:
As explained by the principal in her letter dated June 8, 1998, this practice had been going on when she assumed thereat and the same has the implied permission of the PTA (Annex III).
Finding:
The imposition of this miscellaneous fee of Ten Pesos (P10.00) is in violation of DECS Order No. 27 s. 1995 dated May 24, 1995 (Annex IV).
Complaint 19 & 24
The principal, Miss Heidi M. Estandarte bought the .38 Caliber Handgun and Shotgun which she registered under her name, which should not be done so because the money she used to purchase said firearm came from the student government fund.
Finding:
The firearms as alleged by the principal were intended for the use of the security guard of the school. However, the arm dealer had secured the licenses of the firearms in the name of the principal. These firearms had been turned-over to the School Supply Officer (Annex V). Representations had been made for the transfer of the license to the school, Ramon Torres National High School (Annex VI-A).
Complaint 21 & 31
She sold, kept and disbursed the income of the old newspaper with no accounting by the COA since 1994.
Complaint 23 & 25
The principal Ms. Estandarte accepted cash and in kind donations without being properly channeled and accounted first by the property custodian and the cash without first [being] deposited in the Trust Fund.
Finding:
Cash donations as acknowledged by Ms. Heidi Estandarte are as follows:
Source Amount Mrs. Ma. Belen J. Elizalde (not Phil-Am Life) (Annex VI) P 10,000.00 Coca Cola Bottlers (Annex VIII) 100,000.00 Mr. Kojima (Annex IX)53,400.00 Sales - Old Newspaper (Annex X) 3,949.00 T o t a l P167,349.00
The donations and the proceeds from the sale of old newspaper were personally received and disbursed by Ms. Estandarte. However, these amounts were not acknowledged through the issuance of official receipts. Hence the donations were not taken up in the book of accounts of the school. Further these amounts were disbursed personally by the principal Ms. Heidi Estandarte who acted as the procurement and disbursing officer at the same time and in violation of the applicable law which provides to wit:
Section 63, PD 1445
Accounting for Moneys and Property received by public officials — Except as may otherwise be specifically provided by law or competent authority all moneys and property officially received by a public office in any capacity or upon any occasion must be accounted for as government funds and government property. Government property should be taken up in the books of the agency concerned at acquisition cost or an appraised value.
Section 68 PD 1445
Issuance of Official Receipt — (1) No payment of any nature shall be received by a collecting officer without immediately issuing an official receipt in acknowledgment thereof. The receipt may be in the form of postage, internal revenue or documentary stamps and the like, or officially numbered receipts, subject to proper custody, accountability and audit.
Section 112 PD 1445
Recording of financial transactions — Each government agency shall record its financial transactions and operation conformably with generally accepted accounting principles and in accordance with pertinent laws and regulations.
1.) This RAS be upgraded to criminal and administrative cases against Ms. Estandarte;The Ombudsman (Visayas) decided to refer the administrative aspect of the case (OMB-VIS-ADM-99-0941, entitled "COA Region 6, Office of the Provincial Auditor v. Heidi Estandarte") to the DECS-Region VI for administrative adjudication pursuant to Section 23(2) of Rep. Act No. 6770. The complete records of the case were forwarded to the DECS-Region VI in a letter dated November 29, 1999.[15]
2.) Provincial Auditor Crispin Pinaga, Jr. be required to submit (his) Affidavit/s or sworn statement/s in order to substantiate his findings. The same is true with respect to the complaints;
3.) Upon receipt of the Affidavits of Provincial Auditor Pinaga, Jr. and the complainants, a preventive suspension order be issued against respondent Estandarte for a period as may be warranted under the circumstance, to be determined and recommended by the investigator to whom the administrative case may be assigned; and
4.) RAS-VIS-98-1030 be considered closed and terminated.[14]
WHEREFORE, premises considered, respondent Heidi Estandarte, Principal, Ramon Torres National High School, Bago City, Negros Occidental, is hereby found guilty of Grave Misconduct, and is meted the penalty of Dismissal from Service, with perpetual disqualification to hold public office and forfeiture of all benefits and cancellation of Civil Service eligibilities.[35]The Ombudsman (Visayas) held that Estandarte's failure to issue receipts for the donations received in violation of Sections 63, 68, and 112 of Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1445, as well as "the appropriation for personal use of the proceeds from the sale of the old newspapers and the counterpart contribution of the students for diploma case," constitute grave misconduct. The act of submitting receipts which do not prove that disputed items were purchased suggests that Estandarte is predisposed to commit misrepresentation.[36]
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing premises, judgment is hereby rendered by us GRANTING the petition filed in the case at bench, SETTING ASIDE the decision rendered by the Office of the Ombudsman (Visayas) on March 9, 2004 in OMB-V-A-02-0572-J and the order issued by it in the same case on June 3, 2004 and ORDERING the Office of the Ombudsman (Visayas) to remand the record of OMB-VIS-ADM-99-0941 to the Special Investigating Committee of DECS-Region VI created on July 26, 1999 for the said committee to conduct further proceedings therein with utmost dispatch and eventually to submit its findings and recommendations to the Director of Public Schools for the proper disposition thereof.The CA held that the Ombudsman (Visayas) acted without or in excess of jurisdiction when it took over the case after it issued a memorandum considering the case closed and terminated and after jurisdiction had already been vested in the Special Investigating Committee. Such act violates the doctrine of primary jurisdiction. Once jurisdiction is acquired by or attached to a proper investigative body or agency, such jurisdiction continues until the termination of the case. Citing Fabella v. Court of Appeals[41] and Emin v. de Leon,[42] the CA held that Rep. Act No. 4670 specifically covers and governs administrative proceedings involving public school teachers, and jurisdiction over such cases is originally and exclusively lodged with the Investigating Committee created pursuant to Section 9 of Rep. Act No. 4670. [43]
IT IS SO ORDERED.[40]
Petitioner contends that the CA erred in holding that it is bereft of the authority to directly impose on the respondent the sanction of dismissal from service. It stresses that it has full and complete administrative disciplinary jurisdiction over public school teachers. It points out that Ledesma v. Court of Appeals[47] already declared that the ruling in the Tapiador case, that the Ombudsman has no authority to directly dismiss an employee from government service, is merely an obiter dictum. Therefore, it has the authority to determine the administrative liability of a public official or employee, and direct and compel the head of office and agency concerned to implement the penalty imposed.[48]I.
THE OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN HAS FULL ADMINISTRATIVE DISCIPLINARY JURISDICTION OVER PUBLIC OFFICIALS AND EMPLOYEES UNDER ITS AUTHORITY, INCLUDING THE LESSER POWER TO ENFORCE THE SANCTIONS MPOSED ON ERRING FUNCTIONARIES, PUBLIC SCHOOL TEACHERS INCLUDED.II.
THE RELIANCE BY THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ON THE OBITER DICTUM IN TAPIADOR VS. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, 379 SCRA 322 (2002) DISPOSSESING THE OMBUDSMAN OF ITS DISCIPLINARY AUTHORITY, CONSTITUTES A GRAVE ERROR CONSIDERING THAT: THE POWER OF THE OMBUDSMAN TO IMPLEMENT ITS JUDGMENTS HAS ALREADY BEEN SETTLED BY NO LESS THAN THE HONORABLE COURT IN THE CASE OF LEDESMA [VS.] COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL., 465 SCRA 437 (2005), AND FURTHER AFFIRMED IN THE CASE OF OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN VS. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL., G.R. NO. 160675, PROMULGATED ON 16 JUNE 2006.III.
THE OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN DID NOT COMMIT ANY REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT TOOK OVER THE ADMINISTRATIVE ADJUDICATION OF THE DISCIPLINARY CASE AGAINST PRIVATE RESPONDENT ESTANDARTE. AS IN POINT OF LAW IT ACQUIRED JURISDICTION OVER THE SAID CASE WHEN THE DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION REFERRED THE SAME TO THE OMBUDSMAN.IV.
CONTRARY TO THE FINDINGS OF THE APPELLATE COURT, PRIVATE RESPONDENT ESTANDARTE WAS NOT DENIED SUBSTANTIVE AND PROCEDURAL DUE [PROCESS], AND NEITHER WAS THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDING AGAINST HER TAINTED WITH ANY IRREGULARITY, AS IN FACT THE OMBUDSMAN AFFORDED HER DUE PROCESS.V.
SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE EXISTS TO SUPPORT THE FINDINGS OF GUILT OF PRIVATE RESPONDENT ESTANDARTE WHICH WARRANTS THE IMPOSITION ON HER OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE PENALTY OF DISMISSAL FROM THE SERVICE.[46]
Sec. 12. The Ombudsman and his Deputies, as protectors of the people, shall act promptly on complaints filed in any form or manner against public officials or employees of the Government, or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations, and shall, in appropriate cases, notify the complainants of the action taken and the result thereof.[54]In a case of recent vintage, the Court held that the Ombudsman has full administrative disciplinary authority over public officials and employees of the government, thus:
All these provisions in Republic Act No. 6770 taken together reveal the manifest intent of the lawmakers to bestow on the Office of the Ombudsman full administrative disciplinary authority. These provisions cover the entire gamut of administrative adjudication which entails the authority to, inter alia, receive complaints, conduct investigations, hold hearings in accordance with its rules of procedure, summon witnesses and require the production of documents, place under preventive suspension public officers and employees pending an investigation, determine the appropriate penalty imposable on erring public officers or employees as warranted by the evidence, and necessarily, impose the said penalty.[55]However, Section 9 of Rep. Act No. 4670, otherwise known as the Magna Carta for Public School Teachers, provides that:
Section 9. Administrative Charges. — Administrative charges against a teacher shall be heard initially by a committee composed of the corresponding School Superintendent of the Division or a duly authorized representative who would at least have the rank of a division supervisor, where the teacher belongs, as chairman, a representative of the local or, in its absence, any existing provincial or national teacher's organization and a supervisor of the Division, the last two to be designated by the Director of Public Schools. The committee shall submit its findings, and recommendations to the Director of Public Schools within thirty days from the termination of the hearings: Provided, however, That, where the school superintendent is the complainant or an interested party, all the members of the committee shall be appointed by the Secretary of Education.In Fabella v. Court of Appeals,[56] the Court ruled that Section 9 of Rep. Act No. 4670 reflects the legislative intent to impose a standard and a separate set of procedural requirements in connection with administrative proceedings involving public school teachers. And in Alcala v. Villar,[57] this Court emphasized that:
Republic Act No. 6770, the Ombudsman Act of 1989, provides that the Office of the Ombudsman shall have disciplinary authority over all elective and appointive officials of the Government and its subdivisions, instrumentalities and agencies, including members of the Cabinet, local government, government-owned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries except over officials who may be removed by impeachment or over Members of Congress, and the Judiciary. However, in Fabella v. Court of Appeals, it was held that R.A. No. 4670, the Magna Carta for Public School Teachers, specifically covers and governs administrative proceedings involving public school teachers.[58]Undoubtedly, the DECS-Region VI first assumed jurisdiction over the administrative complaint against the respondent. It should be recalled that when People's Graftwatch forwarded the complaint to the Ombudsman (Visayas), the latter treated it as a request for assistance and referred it to the DECS-Region VI and COA for appropriate action. After it had resolved to upgrade the matter to an administrative case, the Ombudsman decided not to take cognizance of the same and refer it, instead, to the DECS-Region VI pursuant to Section 23(2) of R.A. 6770 which provides:
Section 23. Formal Investigation.—We do not agree with petitioner's contention that it could assume jurisdiction over the administrative case after the DECS-Region VI had voluntarily relinquished its jurisdiction over the same in favor of the petitioner. Jurisdiction is a matter of law. Jurisdiction once acquired is not lost upon the instance of the parties but continues until the case is terminated.[59] When the complainants filed their formal complaint with the DECS-Region VI, jurisdiction was vested on the latter. It cannot now be transferred to petitioner upon the instance of the complainants, even with the acquiescence of the DECS and petitioner.
x x x x
(2) At its option, the Office of the Ombudsman may refer certain complaints to the proper disciplinary authority for the institution of appropriate administrative proceedings against erring public officers or employees, which shall be terminated within the period prescribed in the civil service law. Any delay without just cause in acting on any referral made by the Office of the Ombudsman shall be a ground for administrative action against the officers or employees to whom such referrals are addressed and shall constitute a graft offense punishable by a fine of not exceeding five thousand (P5,000.00). (Emphasis supplied.)
In any event, since We are not dealing with jurisdiction but mainly with venue, considering both court concerned do have jurisdiction over the cause of action of the parties herein against each other, the better rule in the event of conflict between two courts of concurrent jurisdiction as in the present case, is to allow the litigation to be tried and decided by the court which, under the circumstances obtaining in the controversy, would, in the mind of this Court, be in a better positionConsidering that the respondent is a public school teacher who is covered by the provisions of Rep. Act No. 4670, the Magna Carta for Public School Teachers, the DECS-Region VI is in a better position to decide the matter. Moreover, the DECS has already commenced proceedings over the administrative case by constituting the Special Investigating Committee pursuant to Section 9 of Rep. Act No. 4670.
to serve the interests of justice, considering the nature of the controversy, the comparative accessibility of the court to the parties, having in view their peculiar positions and capabilities, and other similar factors. x x x x[60]
As held previously, participation by parties in the administrative proceedings without raising any objection thereto bars them from raising any jurisdictional infirmity after an adverse decision is rendered against them. In the case at bar, petitioner raised the issue of lack of jurisdiction for the first time in his amended petition for review before the CA. He did not raise this matter in his Motion to Dismiss filed before the CSC Regional Office. Notably, in his Counter-Affidavit, he himself invoked the jurisdiction of the Commission by stating that he was "open to further investigation by the CSC to bring light to the matter" and by further praying for "any remedy or judgment which under the premises are just and equitable. It is an undesirable practice of a party participating in the proceedings, submitting his case for decision, and then accepting the judgment only if favorable, but attacking it for lack of jurisdiction, when adverse.[63]However, the rulings of the Court in Alcala and de Leon are not applicable in this case. From the very start, respondent consistently protested the referral of the case back to the Ombudsman, and demanded that the same be remanded to the DECS. She refused to participate in the proceedings before the Ombudsman precisely because she believed that jurisdiction was already vested on the DECS-Region VI. Hence, she filed