492 Phil. 288
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
The real issue, however, which is to be resolved is whether or not immediate execution can be had after defendant-appellant has perfected its appeal but failed to post a supersedeas bond before the trial court?On June 4, 2002, a Manifestation/Motion for the Issuance of Writ of Execution[9] was filed by NPF for failure of PVHI to deposit the accrued and current monthly rentals. The same was denied by respondent judge in an Order[10] dated August 20, 2002.
The first paragraph of Sec. 19 of Rule 70 of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure and which was relied upon by plaintiff-appellee in its motion, speaks of immediate execution which simply means that after rendition of judgment against defendant-appellant at the court below and before the expiration of the time to appeal, execution shall issue immediately upon motion of plaintiff.
In the instant case at bar, plaintiff appears that it tarried and did not immediately file a motion for execution below upon the rendition and before defendant-appellant perfected its appeal. Rather it allowed the latter to perfect its appeal leaving the trial court without option but to elevate the case for review to the Regional Trial Court.
After the perfection of an appeal, the lower court can no longer require the filing of a supersedeas bond and execution based thereon is void. (Singson v. Babida, 79 SCRA 111). This is exactly what happened at the court below which plaintiff-appellee did not exploit to its advantage. Hence, defendant had to file a supersedeas bond before this court and not below and which it really did on April 19, 2002.
With the approval by the court, in the exercise of its sound judgment or discretion of the supersedeas bond posted by the defendant-appellant and it appearing that there is no compelling and urgent reason to order immediate execution pending appeal, plaintiff-appellee’s motion for immediate execution of the judgment of the lower court is hereby DENIED.[8]
WHEREFORE, and in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered modifying the decision of MTC, Br. 45 of Pasay City rendered on February 26, 2002 as follows:Based on the foregoing incidents, complainant alleged that the respondent judge is guilty of gross ignorance of the law, manifest bias and partiality, grave misconduct, and inefficiency for:SO ORDERED.[13]
- Ordering plaintiff-appellee to submit within thirty (30) days from receipt of a copy of this decision a written manifestation of the option or choice it selected, i.e., to appropriate the improvements upon payment of proper indemnity or compulsory sale of the land whereon the hotel building of PVHI and related improvements or facilities were erected;
- Directing plaintiff-appellee to desist and/or refrain from doing acts in the furtherance or exercise of its rights and demolition against appellants unless and after having selected the option of compulsory sale and appellants failed to pay the purchase the land (sic) within a reasonable time or at such time as this court will direct;
- Ordering defendants-appellants to pay to plaintiff-appellee its arrears in rent incurred as of July 31, 2001 in the amount of P26,183,225.41;
- Ordering defendants-appellants to pay to plaintiff-appellee the unpaid monthly rentals for the use and occupation of the premises pending this appeal from July to November 2002 only at P725,780.00 per month;
- The fourth and fifth directives in the dispositive portion of the trial court’s decision including that the last paragraph thereof JME Panlilio’s complaint is hereby affirmed;
- The parties are directed to adjust their respective rights in the interest of justice as they may deem fit and proper if necessary.
a) Denying NPF’s motion for issuance of writ of execution despite defendants’ failure to file sufficient supersedeas bond within the appeal period;[14]In his comment,[20] respondent judge insisted that the filing of the supersedeas bond is not a condition for the perfection of the appeal. After the perfection of the appeal, the trial court could no longer require the filing of the supersedeas bond. What NPF should have done was to move for the execution of the judgment before defendants perfected their appeal. Notwithstanding, upon the denial of the motions for execution, NPF could have moved for its reconsideration, but it failed to do so.
b) Granting defendants’ Manifestation/Motion to Approve Supersedeas Bond despite lack of notice thereof to NPF and notwithstanding lack of Panlilio’s signature in the supersedeas bond;[15]
c) Denying NPF’s second motion for issuance of writ of execution despite failure by the defendants to deposit with the court the accrued and current monthly rentals in accordance with the MeTC decision; and by allowing instead the defendants to deposit, although belatedly, the said rentals;[16]
d) Denying NPF’s second motion for issuance of writ of execution despite the cancellation by the bondsman of the supersedeas bond;[17]
e) Deciding on the appeal without resolving first the motion for reconsideration, in a manner that is contrary to law and prevailing jurisprudence, considering that the option either to appropriate the leased premises or to demand removal of the improvements therefrom rests with NPF as the lessor and not the defendants-lessees;[18] and for affirming the money judgment of the MeTC despite the fact that it has already become final and executory.[19]
… this administrative case is not the right forum to determine the issue of the legality of respondent’s order requiring VLI to post a cash bond for the release of its impounded vehicle. VLI should have raised the issue in the proper courts and not directly to us, and much less by way of an administrative case. There is after all a hierarchy of courts…Parenthetically, the instant administrative complaint is not the proper venue to resolve complainant’s allegation that respondent judge disposed of NPF’s appeal not in accordance with law. Aside from being a judicial act, the assailed decision is now being reviewed on appeal. In Salcedo v. Caguioa, et al,[31] we held that:…
To allow VLI to raise that issue before us and obtain a ruling thereon directly from us through an administrative complaint would be to countenance a disregard of the established rules of procedure and of the hierarchy of courts. VLI would thus be able to evade compliance with the requirements inherent in the filing of a proper petition including the payment of docket fees. Hence, we shall shun from passing upon that issue in this case.
… errors committed by a judge in the exercise of his adjudicative functions cannot be corrected through administrative proceedings, but should instead be assailed through judicial remedies. In the recent case of Bello III vs. Diaz, we reiterated that disciplinary proceedings against judges do not complement, supplement or substitute judicial remedies, whether ordinary or extraordinary; an inquiry into their administrative liability arising from judicial acts may be made only after other available remedies have been settled. We extensively quoted therein the rationale for the rule as laid down in Flores vs. Abesamis, to wit:Assuming however that, indeed, respondent judge erred in the issuance of the contested orders, still, he could not be held administratively liable because there is no proof that such error of judgment was tainted with bias or partiality, fraud, dishonesty, bad faith, deliberate intent to do an injustice, or gross ignorance. To merit disciplinary action, the error or mistake must be gross or patent, malicious, deliberate or in bad faith. In the absence of a showing to the contrary, defective or erroneous decision or order is presumed to have been issued in good faith.[32]As everyone knows, the law provides ample judicial remedies against errors or irregularities being committed by a Trial Court in the exercise of its jurisdiction. The ordinary remedies against errors or irregularities which may be regarded as normal in nature (i.e., error in appreciation or admission of evidence, or in construction or application of procedural or substantive law or legal principle) include a motion for reconsideration (or after rendition of judgment or final order, a motion for new trial), and appeal. The extraordinary remedies against error or irregularities which may be deemed extraordinary in character (i.e., whimsical, capricious, despotic exercise of power or neglect of duty, etc.) are, inter alia, the special civil action of certiorari, prohibition or mandamus, or a motion for inhibition, a petition for change of venue, as the case may be.Complainant herein utilized the available judicial remedy of certiorari before the RTC of Baguio City (Branch 7) to seek a review of the questioned order of respondent Judge. Complainant has not shown that a final decision has already been rendered by the RTC on the alleged impropriety of the order of execution to warrant this administrative recourse. Therefore, a decision on the propriety of the order of respondent Judge in this administrative proceeding would be premature. It has been said that a complainant who resorts to administrative disciplinary action, even before the judicial remedies are settled, in effect, abuses court processes.
Now, the established doctrine and policy is that disciplinary proceedings and criminal actions against Judges are not complementary or suppletory of, nor a substitute for, these judicial remedies, whether ordinary or extraordinary. Resort to and exhaustion of these judicial remedies, as well as the entry of judgment in the corresponding action or proceeding, are pre-requisites for the taking of other measures against the persons of the judges concerned, whether of civil, administrative, or criminal nature. It is only after the available judicial remedies have been exhausted and the appellate tribunals have spoken with finality, that the door to an inquiry into his criminal, civil, or administrative liability may be said to have opened, or closed.
Flores resorted to administrative prosecution (or institution of criminal actions) as a substitute for or supplement to the specific modes of appeals or review provided by law from court judgments or orders, on the theory that the Judges’ orders had caused him ‘undue injury.’ This is impermissible, as this Court has already more than once ruled. Law and logic decree that 'administrative or criminal remedies are neither alternative nor cumulative to judicial review where such review is available, and must wait on the result thereof'. Indeed, since judges must be free to judge, without pressure or influence from external forces or factors, they should not be subject to intimidation, the fear of civil, criminal or administrative sanctions for acts they may do and dispositions they may make in the performance of their duties and functions; and it is sound rule, which must be recognized independently of statute, that judges are not generally liable for acts done within the scope of their jurisdiction and in good faith; and that exceptionally, prosecution of the judge can be had only if "there be a final, declaration by a competent court in some appropriate proceeding of the manifestly unjust character of the challenged judgment or order, and ** also evidence of malice or bad faith, ignorance of inexcusable negligence, on the part of the judge in rendering said judgment or order" or under the stringent circumstances set out in Article 32 of the Civil Code.
The Court will not shirk from its responsibility of imposing discipline upon erring members of the bench. At the same time, however, the Court should not hesitate to shield them from unfounded suits that only serve to disrupt rather than promote the orderly administration of justice. This Court could not be the instrument that would destroy the reputation of any member of the bench, by pronouncing guilt on mere speculation.WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the administrative complaint against respondent Judge Ernesto A. Reyes is DISMISSED for lack of merit.