526 Phil. 700
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Petitioners | TCT/EP Nos. | Areas (has.) |
1. SAMUEL ESTRIBILLO | TCT No. T-287/EP No. A-037675 | 1.7833 |
2. CALIXTO P. ABAYATO, JR. | TCT No. T-297/EP No. A-037814 TCT No. T-829/EP No. A-027293 | 2.0000 0.1565 |
3. RONGIE D. AGUILAR | TCT No. T-913/EP No. A-027295 | 3.1441 |
4. TACIANA D. AGUILAR | TCT No. T-944/EP No. A-027296 | 4.2405 |
5. ARTEMIO G. DE JUAN | TCT No. T-302/EP No. A-037809 | 3.3082 |
6. ESTANISLAO DELA CRUZ, SR. | TCT No. T-290/EP No. A-035676 | 3.1437 |
7. EDGAR DUENAS | TCT No. T-949/EP No. A-037658 | 4.0128 |
8. MARIO P. ERIBAL | TCT No. T-952/EP No. A-037836 | 2.3087 |
9. REYNALDO C. ESENCIA | TCT No. T-950/EP No. A-037844 | 2.0950 |
10. RUBEN A. IBOJO | TCT No. T-928/EP No. A-037873 | 1.5737 |
11. SAMUEL JAMANDRE | TCT No. T-909/EP No. A-159348 | 2.2670 |
12. HILARION V. LANTIZA | TCT No. T-288/EP No. A-037674 TCT No. T-401/EP No. A-037825 | 4.5526 0.4579 |
13. ANSELMO LOPEZ | TCT No. T-973/EP No. A-037840 | 4.4939 |
14. TERESITA NACION | TCT No. T-900/EP No. A-037849 | 2.2140 |
15. CHARIE E. NASTOR | TCT No. T-825/EP No. A-037829 | 3.9291 |
16. NELSON L. NULLAS | TCT No. T-396/EP No. A-037826 | 2.7491 |
17. CARLITO S. OLIA | TCT No. T-910/EP No. A-037673 | 1.7954 |
18. ROBERTO T.PATIÑO | TCT No. T-912/EP No. A-037860 | 6.4266 |
19. ANTONIO P. ROCHA | TCT No. T-914/EP No. A-037830 | 2.2143 |
20. FERNANDO C. RUFINO | TCT No. T-923/EP No. A-037848 | 4.5322 |
21. PATERNO P. SAIN | TCT No. T-954/EP No. A-037813 | 4.3223 |
22. CLAUDIO S. SAYSON, and | TCT No. T-891/EP No. A-037880 | 3.7151 |
23. JOEMARIE VIBO | TCT No. T-893/EP No. A-037827 | 1.3185[2] |
(Deceased) Registered Owners | TCT/EP Nos. | Areas (has.) |
1. MANUEL S. GONZAGA | TCT No. T-920/EP No. A-037832 | 4.1953 |
2. RAFAEL PATIÑO | TCT No. T-929/EP No. A-037861 | 3.0078[3] |
Lot No. | Area (in hectares) |
Lot No. 1620, Pls – 4 | 28.52; |
Lot No. 1621, Pls – 4 | 11.64 |
Lot No. 1622, Pls – 4 | 487.47 |
TOTAL | 527.83[4] |
A perusal of the petition reveals that the Verification and Certification of Non-Forum Shopping was executed by Samuel A. Estribillo who is one of the petitioners, without the corresponding Special Power of Attorneys executed by the other petitioners authorizing him to sign for their behalf in violation of Section 5, Rule 7 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended.Petitioners filed a "Motion for Reconsideration With Alternative Prayer with Leave of Court for the Admission of Special Power of Attorney (SPA) Granted to Petitioner Samuel Estribillo by his Co- Petitioners." The Court of Appeals denied the motion by issuing the following assailed Resolution:
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED DUE COURSE and necessarily DISMISSED.[6]
Petitioners seek the reconsideration of Our Resolution promulgated on January 27, 2003 which dismissed the petition for certiorari.Petitioners now file this present Petition contending that there had been compliance with Rule 7, Section 5 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. They further reiterate their argument that the EPs are ordinary titles which become indefeasible one year after their registration.
We find no reason to reverse, alter or modify the resolution sought to be reconsidered, since petitioners have failed to show that their belated submission of the special power of attorney can be justified as against the unequivocal requirements set forth by Sec. 5, Rule 7 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended.
While it is true that the Supreme Court has recognized special circumstances that justify the relaxation of the rules on non-forum shopping, such circumstances, however, are not present in the case at bar.
More importantly, said Rules cannot be relaxed in view of the Supreme Court's ruling in Loquias vs. Ombudsman, 338 SCRA 62, which stated that, substantial compliance will not suffice in a matter involving strict observance by the rules. The attestation contained in the certification [on] non-forum shopping requires personal knowledge by the party who executed the same.
Since the Verification and Certification on Non-Forum shopping was executed without the proper authorization from all the petitioners, such personal knowledge cannot be presumed to exist thereby rendering the petition fatally defective.
Par. 2, Sec. 5 of Rule 7 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended states:"Failure to comply with the foregoing requirements shall not be curable by mere amendment of the complaint or other initiatory pleading but shall be cause for the dismissal of the case without prejudice x x x"It is, thus, clear that the Motion for Reconsideration has no legal basis to support it and should be dismissed forthwith. Moreover, granting arguendo that a special power of attorney belatedly filed could cure the petition's defect, the requirement of personal knowledge of all the petitioners still has not been met since some of the other petitioners failed to sign the same.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Motion for Reconsideration is hereby DENIED.[7]
Sec. 5. Certification against forum shopping. – The plaintiff or principal party shall certify under oath in the complaint or other initiatory pleading asserting a claim for relief, or in a sworn certification annexed thereto and simultaneously filed therewith: (a) that he has not theretofore commenced any action or filed any claim involving the same issues in any court, tribunal or quasi- judicial agency and, to the best of his knowledge, no such other action or claim is pending therein; (b) if there is such other pending action or claim, a complete statement of the present status thereof; and (c) if he should thereafter learn that the same or similar action or claim has been filed or is pending, he shall report that fact within five (5) days therefrom to the court wherein his aforesaid complaint or initiatory pleading has been filed.Revised Circular No. 28-91 "was designed x x x to promote and facilitate the orderly administration of justice and should not be interpreted with such absolute literalness as to subvert its own ultimate and legitimate objective or the goal of all rules of procedure – which is to achieve substantial justice as expeditiously as possible."[8] Technical rules of procedure should be used to promote, not frustrate, justice.[9] The same guidelines should still apply in interpreting what is now Rule 7, Section 5 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
Failure to comply with the foregoing requirements shall not be curable by mere amendment of the complaint or other initiatory pleading but shall be cause for the dismissal of the case without prejudice, unless otherwise provided, upon motion and after hearing. The submission of a false certification or non-compliance with any of the undertakings therein shall constitute indirect contempt of court, without prejudice to the corresponding administrative and criminal actions. If the acts of the party or his counsel clearly constitute willful and deliberate forum shopping, the same shall be ground for summary dismissal with prejudice and shall constitute direct contempt as well as a cause for administrative sanctions.
The certification in this petition was improperly executed by the external legal counsel of petitioner. For a certification of non-forum shopping must be by the petitioner, or any of the principal parties and not by counsel unless clothed with a special power of attorney to do so. This procedural lapse on the part of petitioner is also a cause for the dismissal of this action. (Emphasis supplied)The Court of Appeals heavily relied on the seemingly conflicting case of Loquias v. Office of the Ombudsman,[13] where this Court ruled that:
At the outset, it is noted that the Verification and Certification was signed by Antonio Din, Jr., one of the petitioners in the instant case. We agree with the Solicitor General that the petition is defective. Section 5, Rule 7 expressly provides that it is the plaintiff or principal party who shall certify under oath that he has not commenced any action involving the same issues in any court, etc. Only petitioner Din, the Vice-Mayor of San Miguel, Zamboanga del Sur, signed the certification. There is no showing that he was authorized by his co-petitioners to represent the latter and to sign the certification. It cannot likewise be presumed that petitioner Din knew, to the best of his knowledge, whether his co-petitioners had the same or similar actions or claims filed or pending. We find that substantial compliance will not suffice in a matter involving strict observance by the rules. The attestation contained in the certification on non-forum shopping requires personal knowledge by the party who executed the same. Petitioners must show reasonable cause for failure to personally sign the certification. Utter disregard of the rules cannot justly be rationalized by harking on the policy of liberal construction. (Emphasis supplied)Loquias, however, was a case involving only five petitioners seeking relief from the Resolution of the Ombudsman charging them with violation of Republic Act No. 3019, where the above declaration "at the outset" was made together with a determination on the lack of jurisdiction on our part to decide the Petition.[14] There being only five petitioners in Loquias, the unreasonableness of the failure to obtain the signatures of Antonio Din, Jr.'s four co-accused is immediately apparent, hence the remark by this Court that "[p]etitioners must show reasonable cause for failure to personally sign the certification." In the present petition, petitioners allege that they are farmer-beneficiaries who reside in a very remote barangay in Agusan del Sur. While they reside in the same barangay, they allegedly have to walk for hours on rough terrain to reach their neighbors due to the absence of convenient means of transportation. Their houses are located far apart from each other and the mode of transportation, habal-habal, is scarce and difficult. Majority of them are also nearing old age. On the other hand, their lawyers (who are members of a non-government organization engaged in development work) are based in Quezon City who started assisting them at the latter part of the RARAD level litigation in 1998, and became their counsel of record only at the DARAB level. The petitioner who signed the initiatory pleading, Samuel Estribillo, was the only petitioner who was able to travel to Manila at the time of the preparation of the Petition due to very meager resources of their farmers' organization, the Kahiusahan sa Malahutayong mga Mag-uugma Para sa Ekonomikanhong Kalambuan (KAMMPE). When the Petition a quo was dismissed, petitioners' counsel went to Agusan del Sur and tried earnestly to secure all the signatures for the SPA. In fact, when the SPA was being circulated for their signatures, 24 of the named petitioners therein failed to sign for various reasons – some could not be found within the area and were said to be temporarily residing in other towns, while some already died because of old age.[15] Be that as it may, those who did not sign the SPA did not participate, and are not parties to this petition.
[P]etitioner complied with this procedural requirement except that it was not accompanied by a board resolution or a secretary's certificate that the person who signed it was duly authorized by petitioner to represent it in the case. It would appear that the signatory of the certification was, in fact, duly authorized as so evidenced by a board resolution attached to petitioner's motion for reconsideration before the appellate court. It could thus be said that there was at least substantial compliance with, and that there was no attempt to ignore, the prescribed procedural requirements.In Shipside Incorporated v. Court of Appeals,[18] the authority of petitioner's resident manager to sign the certification against forum shopping was submitted to the Court of Appeals only after the latter dismissed the Petition. It turned out, in the Motion for Reconsideration, that he already had board authority ten days before the filing of the Petition. We ratiocinated therein that:
The rules of procedure are intended to promote, rather than frustrate, the ends of justice, and while the swift unclogging of court dockets is a laudable objective, it, nevertheless, must not be met at the expense of substantial justice. Technical and procedural rules are intended to help secure, not suppress, the cause of justice and a deviation from the rigid enforcement of the rules may be allowed to attain that prime objective for, after all, the dispensation of justice is the core reason for the existence of courts. [Acme Shoe, Rubber and Plastic Corp. vs. Court of Appeals; BA Savings Bank vs. Sia, 336 SCRA 484].
On the other hand, the lack of certification against forum shopping is generally not curable by the submission thereof after the filing of the petition. Section 5, Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides that the failure of the petitioner to submit the required documents that should accompany the petition, including the certification against forum shopping, shall be sufficient ground for the dismissal thereof. The same rule applies to certifications against forum shopping signed by a person on behalf of a corporation which are unaccompanied by proof that said signatory is authorized to file a petition on behalf of the corporation.In Uy v. Land Bank of the Philippines,[19] we, likewise, considered the apparent merits of the substantive aspect of the case as a special circumstance or compelling reason for the reinstatement of the case, and invoked our power to suspend our rules to serve the ends of justice. Thus:
In certain exceptional circumstances, however, the Court has allowed the belated filing of the certification. In Loyola v. Court of Appeals, et al. (245 SCRA 477 [1995]), the Court considered the filing of the certification one day after the filing of an election protest as substantial compliance with the requirement. In Roadway Express, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, et al. (264 SCRA 696 [1996]), the Court allowed the filing of the certification 14 days before the dismissal of the petition. In Uy v. Landbank, supra, the Court had dismissed Uy's petition for lack of verification and certification against non-forum shopping. However, it subsequently reinstated the petition after Uy submitted a motion to admit certification and non-forum shopping certification. In all these cases, there were special circumstances or compelling reasons that justified the relaxation of the rule requiring verification and certification on non-forum shopping.
In the instant case, the merits of petitioner's case should be considered special circumstances or compelling reasons that justify tempering the requirement in regard to the certificate of non-forum shopping. Moreover, in Loyola, Roadway, and Uy, the Court excused non-compliance with the requirement as to the certificate of non-forum shopping. With more reason should we allow the instant petition since petitioner herein did submit a certification on non-forum shopping, failing only to show proof that the signatory was authorized to do so. That petitioner subsequently submitted a secretary's certificate attesting that Balbin was authorized to file an action on behalf of petitioner likewise mitigates this oversight.
It must also be kept in mind that while the requirement of the certificate of non-forum shopping is mandatory, nonetheless the requirements must not be interpreted too literally and thus defeat the objective of preventing the undesirable practice of forum-shopping. Lastly, technical rules of procedure should be used to promote, not frustrate justice. While the swift unclogging of court dockets is a laudable objective, the granting of substantial justice is an even more urgent ideal.
The admission of the petition after the belated filing of the certification, therefore, is not unprecedented. In those cases where the Court excused non-compliance with the requirements, there were special circumstances or compelling reasons making the strict application of the rule clearly unjustified. In the case at bar, the apparent merits of the substantive aspects of the case should be deemed as a "special circumstance" or "compelling reason" for the reinstatement of the petition. x x xThere were even cases where we held that there was complete non-compliance with the rule on certification against forum shopping, but we still proceeded to decide the case on the merits. In De Guia v. De Guia,[20] petitioners raised in their Petition for Review the allowance of respondents' Appeal Brief which did not contain a certificate against forum shopping. We held therein that:
With regard to the absence of a certification of non-forum shopping, substantial justice behooves us to agree with the disquisition of the appellate court. We do not condone the shortcomings of respondents' counsel, but we simply cannot ignore the merits of their claim. Indeed, it has been held that "[i]t is within the inherent power of the Court to suspend its own rules in a particular case in order to do justice."In Damasco v. National Labor Relations Commission,[21] the non-compliance was disregarded because of the principle of social justice, which is equally applicable to the case at bar:
We note that both petitioners did not comply with the rule on certification against forum shopping. The certifications in their respective petitions were executed by their lawyers, which is not correct. The certification of non-forum shopping must be by the petitioner or a principal party and not the attorney. This procedural lapse on the part of petitioners could have warranted the outright dismissal of their actions.The foregoing cases show that, even if we assume for the sake of argument that there was violation of Rule 7, Section 5 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, a relaxation of such rule would be justified for two compelling reasons: social justice considerations and the apparent merit of the Petition, as shall be heretofore discussed.
But, the court recognizes the need to resolve these two petitions on their merits as a matter of social justice involving labor and capital. After all, technicality should not be allowed to stand in the way of equitably and completely resolving herein the rights and obligations of these parties. Moreover, we must stress that technical rules of procedure in labor cases are not to be strictly applied if the result would be detrimental to the working woman.
It must be emphasized that a certificate of title issued under an administrative proceeding pursuant to a homestead patent, as in the instant case, is as indefeasible as a certificate of title issued under a judicial registration proceeding, provided the land covered by said certificate is a disposable public land within the contemplation of the Public Land Law.The same confusion, uncertainty and suspicion on the distribution of government-acquired lands to the landless would arise if the possession of the grantee of an EP would still be subject to contest, just because his certificate of title was issued in an administrative proceeding. The silence of Presidential Decree No. 27 as to the indefeasibility of titles issued pursuant thereto is the same as that in the Public Land Act where Prof. Antonio Noblejas commented:
There is no specific provision in the Public Land Law (C.A. No. 141, as amended) or the Land Registration Act (Act 496), now P.D. 1529, fixing the one (1) year period within which the public land patent is open to review on the ground of actual fraud as in Section 38 of the Land Registration Act, now Section 32 of P.D. 1529, and clothing a public land patent certificate of title with indefeasibility. Nevertheless, the pertinent pronouncements in the aforecited cases clearly reveal that Section 38 of the Land Registration Act, now Section 32 of P.D. 1529 was applied by implication by this Court to the patent issued by the Director of Lands duly approved by the Secretary of Natural Resources, under the signature of the President of the Philippines in accordance with law. The date of issuance of the patent, therefore, corresponds to the date of the issuance of the decree in ordinary registration cases because the decree finally awards the land applied for registration to the party entitled to it, and the patent issued by the Director of Lands equally and finally grants, awards, and conveys the land applied for to the applicant. This, to our mind, is in consonance with the intent and spirit of the homestead laws, i.e. conservation of a family home, and to encourage the settlement, residence and cultivation and improvement of the lands of the public domain. If the title to the land grant in favor of the homesteader would be subjected to inquiry, contest and decision after it has been given by the Government through the process of proceedings in accordance with the Public Land Law, there would arise uncertainty, confusion and suspicion on the government's system of distributing public agricultural lands pursuant to the "Land for the Landless" policy of the State.
Inasmuch as there is no positive statement of the Public Land Law, regarding the titles granted thereunder, such silence should be construed and interpreted in favor of the homesteader who come into the possession of his homestead after complying with the requirements thereof. Section 38 of the Land Registration Law should be interpreted to apply by implication to the patent issued by the Director of Lands, duly approved by the Minister of Natural Resources, under the signature of the President of the Philippines, in accordance with law.[23]After complying with the procedure, therefore, in Section 105 of Presidential Decree No. 1529, otherwise known as the Property Registration Decree (where the DAR is required to issue the corresponding certificate of title after granting an EP to tenant-farmers who have complied with Presidential Decree No. 27), [24] the TCTs issued to petitioners pursuant to their EPs acquire the same protection accorded to other TCTs. "The certificate of title becomes indefeasible and incontrovertible upon the expiration of one year from the date of the issuance of the order for the issuance of the patent, x x x. Lands covered by such title may no longer be the subject matter of a cadastral proceeding, nor can it be decreed to another person."[25]
The rule in this jurisdiction, regarding public land patents and the character of the certificate of title that may be issued by virtue thereof, is that where land is granted by the government to a private individual, the corresponding patent therefor is recorded, and the certificate of title is issued to the grantee; thereafter, the land is automatically brought within the operation of the Land Registration Act, the title issued to the grantee becoming entitled to all the safeguards provided in Section 38 of the said Act. In other words, upon expiration of one year from its issuance, the certificate of title shall become irrevocable and indefeasible like a certificate issued in a registration proceeding. (Emphasis supplied.)The EPs themselves, like the Certificates of Land Ownership Award (CLOAs) in Republic Act No. 6657 (the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988), are enrolled in the Torrens system of registration. The Property Registration Decree in fact devotes Chapter IX[27] on the subject of EPs. Indeed, such EPs and CLOAs are, in themselves, entitled to be as indefeasible as certificates of title issued in registration proceedings.
WHEREFORE, the Resolutions of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 73902 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The following EPs and the corresponding TCTs issued to petitioners or to their successors-in-interest are hereby declared VALID and SUBSISTING:
(i) HMI neither asked for rentals nor brought any action to oust petitioners from the farm they were cultivating;(ii) HMI had not paid realty taxes on the disputed property from 1972 onwards and never protested petitioners' act of declaring the same for realty taxation;(iii) HMI, represented by a certain Angela Colmenares, signed the LTPA covering the entire landholdings or the area of 527.8308 hectares, which was then represented to be rice and corn lands;(iv) HMI abandoned the entire landholdings after executing the Deed of Assignment of Rights in 1977.
Original Grantees | TCT/EP Nos. |
1. SAMUEL ESTRIBILLO | TCT No. T-287/EP No. A-037675 |
2. CALIXTO P. ABAYATO, JR. | TCT No. T-297/EP No. A-037814 TCT No. T-829/EP No. A-027293 |
3. RONGIE D. AGUILAR | TCT No. T-913/EP No. A-027295 |
4. TACIANA D. AGUILAR | TCT No. T-944/EP No. A-027296 |
5. ARTEMIO G. DE JUAN, | TCT No. T-302/EP No. A-037809 |
6. ESTANISLAO DELA CRUZ, SR. | TCT No. T-290/EP No. A-035676 |
7. EDGAR DUENAS | TCT No. T-949/EP No. A-037658 |
8. MARIO P. ERIBAL | TCT No. T-952/EP No. A-037836 |
9. REYNALDO C. ESENCIA | TCT No. T-950/EP No. A-037844 |
10. RUBEN A. IBOJO | TCT No. T-928/EP No. A-037873 |
11. SAMUEL JAMANDRE | TCT No. T-909/EP No. A-159348 |
12. HILARION V. LANTIZA | TCT No. T-288/EP No. A-037674 TCT No. T-401/EP No. A-037825 |
13. ANSELMO LOPEZ | TCT No. T-973/EP No. A-037840 |
14. TERESITA NACION | TCT No. T-900/EP No. A-037849 |
15. CHARIE E. NASTOR | TCT No. T-825/EP No. A-037829 |
16. NELSON L. NULLAS | TCT No. T-396/EP No. A-037826 |
17. CARLITO S. OLIA | TCT No. T-910/EP No. A-037673 |
18. ROBERTO T. PATIÑO | TCT No. T-912/EP No. A-037860 |
19. ANTONIO P. ROCHA | TCT No. T-914/EP No. A-037830 |
20. FERNANDO C. RUFINO | TCT No. T-923/EP No. A-037848 |
21. PATERNO P. SAIN | TCT No. T-954/EP No. A-037813 |
22. CLAUSIO S. SAYSON | TCT No. T-891/EP No. A-037880 |
23. JOEMARIE VIBO | TCT No. T-893/EP No. A-037827 |
24. MANUEL S. GONZAGA | TCT No. T-920/EP No. A-037832 |
25. RAFAEL PATIÑO | TCT No. T-297/EP No. A-037861 |