507 Phil. 620
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.
On September 27, 1998, Lucio Tan filed a complaint against reporter Armand Nocum, Capt. Florendo Umali, ALPAP and Inquirer with the Regional Trial Court of Makati, docketed as Civil Case No. 98-2288, seeking moral and exemplary damages for the alleged malicious and defamatory imputations contained in a news article.Dissatisfied, petitioners, together with defendants Capt. Florendo Umali and the Airline Pilots Association of the Philippines, Inc. (ALPAP), appealed the RTC decision to the Court of Appeals. Two petitions for certiorari were filed, one filed by petitioners which was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 55192, and the other by defendants Umali and ALPAP which was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 54894. The two petitions were consolidated.
INQUIRER and NOCUM filed their joint answer, dated October 27, 1998, wherein they alleged that: (1) the complaint failed to state a cause of action; (2) the defamatory statements alleged in the complaint were general conclusions without factual premises; (3) the questioned news report constituted fair and true report on the matters of public interest concerning a public figure and therefore, was privileged in nature; and (4) malice on their part was negated by the publication in the same article of plaintiff's or PAL's side of the dispute with the pilot's union.
ALPAP and UMALI likewise filed their joint answer, dated October 31, 1998, and alleged therein that: (1) the complaint stated no cause of action; (2) venue was improperly laid; and (3) plaintiff Lucio Tan was not a real party in interest. It appeared that the complaint failed to state the residence of the complainant at the time of the alleged commission of the offense and the place where the libelous article was printed and first published.
Thus, the Regional Trial Court of Makati issued an Order dated February 10, 1999, dismissing the complaint without prejudice on the ground of improper venue.
Aggrieved by the dismissal of the complaint, respondent Lucio Tan filed an Omnibus Motion dated February 24, 1999, seeking reconsideration of the dismissal and admission of the amended complaint. In par. 2.01.1 of the amended complaint, it is alleged that "This article was printed and first published in the City of Makati" (p. 53, Rollo, CA-G.R. SP No. 55192), and in par. 2.04.1, that "This caricature was printed and first published in the City of Makati" (p. 55, id.).
The lower court, after having the case dismissed for improper venue, admitted the amended complaint and deemed set aside the previous order of dismissal, supra, stating, inter alia, that:"The mistake or deficiency in the original complaint appears now to have been cured in the Amended Complaint which can still be properly admitted, pursuant to Rule 10 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, inasmuch as the Order of dismissal is not yet final. Besides, there is no substantial amendment in the Amended Complaint which would affect the defendants' defenses and their Answers. The Amendment is merely formal, contrary to the contention of the defendants that it is substantial."
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby DENIED DUE COURSE and DISMISSED for lack of merit. The Order of the court a quo is hereby AFFIRMED.The motions for reconsideration filed by petitioners and by defendants Umali and ALPAP were likewise denied in a resolution dated 15 September 2000.
Petitioners assigned the following as errors:Petitioners state that Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code vests jurisdiction over all civil and criminal complaints for libel on the RTC of the place: (1) where the libelous article was printed and first published; or (2) where the complainant, if a private person, resides; or (3) where the complainant, if a public official, holds office. They argue that since the original complaint only contained the office address of respondent and not the latter's actual residence or the place where the allegedly offending news reports were printed and first published, the original complaint, by reason of the deficiencies in its allegations, failed to confer jurisdiction on the lower court.
- THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING (1) THAT THE LOWER COURT HAD JURISDICTION OVER THE CASE (ON THE BASIS OF THE ORIGINAL COMPLAINT) NOTWITHSTANDING THE FACT THAT THE LOWER COURT HAD EARLIER DISMISSED THE ORIGINAL COMPLAINT FOR ITS FAILURE TO CONFER JURISDICTION UPON THJE COURT; AND (2) THAT THE AMENDED COMPLAINT WAS PROPERLY ALLOWED OR ADMITTED BECAUSE THE LOWER COURT WAS "NEVER DIVESTED" OF JURISDICTION OVER THE CASE;
- THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT RULING THAT THE ORIGINAL COMPLAINT OF RESPONDENT WAS AMENDED PURPOSELY TO CONFER UPON THE LOWER COURT JURISDICTION OVER THE CASE.[10]
We further restated[18] the rules on venue in Article 360 as follows:
- General rule: The action may be filed in the Court of First Instance of the province or city where the libelous article is printed and first published or where any of the offended parties actually resides at the time of the commission of the offense.
- If the offended party is a public officer with office in Manila at the time the offense was committed, the venue is Manila or the city or province where the libelous article is printed and first published.
- Where an offended party is a public official with office outside of Manila, the venue is the province or the city where he held office at the time of the commission of the offense or where the libelous article is printed and first published.
- If an offended party is a private person, the venue is his place of residence at the time of the commission of the offense or where the libelous article is printed and first published.
The common feature of the foregoing rules is that whether the offended party is a public officer or a private person, he has always the option to file the action in the Court of First Instance of the province or city where the libelous article is printed or first published.
We fully agree with the Court of Appeals when it ruled:
- Whether the offended party is a public official or a private person, the criminal action may be filed in the Court of First Instance of the province or city where the libelous article is printed and first published.
- If the offended party is a private individual, the criminal action may also be filed in the Court of First Instance of the province where he actually resided at the time of the commission of the offense.
- If the offended party is a public officer whose office is in Manila at the time of the commission of the offense, the action may be filed in the Court of First Instance of Manila.
- If the offended party is a public officer holding office outside of Manila, the action may be filed in the Court of First Instance of the province or city where he held office at the time of the commission of the offense.
We note that the amended complaint or amendment to the complaint was not intended to vest jurisdiction to the lower court, where originally it had none. The amendment was merely to establish the proper venue for the action. It is a well-established rule that venue has nothing to do with jurisdiction, except in criminal actions. Assuming that venue were properly laid in the court where the action was instituted, that would be procedural, not a jurisdictional impediment. In fact, in civil cases, venue may be waived.It is elementary that objections to venue in CIVIL ACTIONS arising from libel may be waived since they do not involve a question of jurisdiction. The laying of venue is procedural rather than substantive, relating as it does to jurisdiction of the court over the person rather than the subject matter. Venue relates to trial and not to jurisdiction.[20] It is a procedural, not a jurisdictional, matter. It relates to the place of trial or geographical location in which an action or proceeding should be brought and not to the jurisdiction of the court.[21] It is meant to provide convenience to the parties, rather than restrict their access to the courts as it relates to the place of trial.[22] In contrast, in criminal actions, it is fundamental that venue is jurisdictional it being an essential element of jurisdiction.[23]
Consequently, by dismissing the case on the ground of improper venue, the lower court had jurisdiction over the case. Apparently, the herein petitioners recognized this jurisdiction by filing their answers to the complaint, albeit, questioning the propriety of venue, instead of a motion to dismiss.
. . .
We so hold that dismissal of the complaint by the lower court was proper considering that the complaint, indeed, on its face, failed to allege neither the residence of the complainant nor the place where the libelous article was printed and first published. Nevertheless, before the finality of the dismissal, the same may still be amended as in fact the amended complaint was admitted, in view of the court a quo's jurisdiction, of which it was never divested. In so doing, the court acted properly and without any grave abuse of discretion.[19]