532 Phil. 368
AZCUNA, J.:
That on or about or within the period comprised between July 1, 1997 to July 31, 1997 in the morning, in [B]arangay Lourdes, [M]unicipality of Pandan, [P]rovince of Catanduanes, Philippines, within the jurisdiction of the Honorable Court, the said accused, by means of force and intimidation, and with the use of a bladed weapon, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, did lie and succeeded in having carnal knowledge of SALLY IDANAN, a minor who was then 13 years old at the time of the commission of the offense.Sally Idanan, fifteen years old, single, and a resident of Lourdes, Pandan, Catanduanes testified before the trial court that she personally knew appellant because they used to be neighbors. In 1997, they transferred residence but appellant would frequently pass by their place.[2]
That the commission of the crime was aggravated by dwelling the fact that the crime was committed inside the house of the offended party.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[1]
WHEREFORE, finding the accused Nicanor Salome also known as Canor Sabediano GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Rape with the use of a deadly weapon, committed inside the dwelling of the offended party, as defined and penalized under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, he is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of DEATH, to give monthly support in the sum of Two Thousand (P2,000.00) Pesos to the offspring of complainant Sally Idanan born on April 11, 1998, and to indemnify Sally Idanan in the sum of Fifty Thousand (P50,000.00) Pesos, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.Due to the imposition of death penalty on appellant, the case was directly elevated to this Court for review. Subsequently, however, the case was referred to the Court of Appeals for intermediate review pursuant to our ruling in People v. Mateo.[9]
SO ORDERED.[8]
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated April 3, 2001 of the trial court is affirmed subject to the following modifications:Appellant assigns the following errors:
(1) The award of civil indemnity on the amount of P50,000.00 is increased to P75,000.00; and,(2) Appellant is ordered to pay private complainant moral damages of P75,000.00 and exemplary damages of P25,000.00.
Pursuant to A.M. No. 00-5-03-SC (Amendments to the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure to govern Death Penalty Cases) which took into effect on October 15, 2004, this case is elevated and certified to the Supreme Court for its automatic review.
SO ORDERED.[10]
As a rule, the trial court's assessment of the credibility of witnesses is generally accorded the highest degree of weight and respect, if not finality, for the reason that the trial judge has the unique opportunity to observe the demeanor of witnesses while testifying.[11]I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GIVING WEIGHT AND CREDENCE TO THE UNCONVINCING AND IMPROBABLE TESTIMONY OF PRIVATE COMPLAINANT SALLY IDANAN; AND,II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN APPRECIATING DWELLING AS AN AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCE.
The fact that the accused did not shout or resist when her shorts and panty were removed because of fear (TSN, Oct. 21, 1999, p. 12) does not lessen complainant's credibility. To an innocent girl who was then barely thirteen (13) years old, the threat engendered in her a well-grounded fear that if she dared resist or frustrate the bestial desires of the accused, she and her family would be killed. Intimidation is addressed to the mind of the victim and is, therefore, subjective. It must be viewed in the light of the victim's perception and judgment at the time of the commission of the crime and not by any hard and fast rule. The workings of the human mind when placed under emotional stress are unpredictable and people react differently. In such a given situation, some may shout; some may faint; and some may be shocked into sensibility; while others may openly welcome the intrusion. (People v. Cabradilla, 133 SCRA 413 (1984)). The test for its sufficiency under Article 335 of the revised Penal Code is whether it produces a reasonable fear in the victim that if she resists or does not yield to the bestial demands of the accused, that which the latter threatened to do would happen to her, or those dear to her, in this case, her family. Where such degree of intimidation exists, and the victim is cowed into submission as a result thereof, thereby rendering resistance futile, it would be extremely unreasonable to expect the victim to resist with all her might and strength. And even if some degree of resistance would nevertheless be futile, offering none at all cannot amount to consent to the sexual assault. For rape to exist, it is not necessary that the force or intimidation employed in accomplishing it be so great or of such character as could not be resisted; it is only necessary that the force or intimidation be sufficient to consummate the purpose which the accused had in mind. (People v. Savellano, 57 SCRA 320 (1974)).Likewise, Sally's delay in reporting the incident to the authorities is understandable. It is not uncommon for young girls to conceal for some time the assault against their virtue because of the threats on their lives.[19] Failure, therefore, by the victim to file a complaint promptly to the proper authorities would not necessarily destroy the truth per se of the complaint nor would it impair the credibility of the complainant, particularly if such delay was satisfactorily explained.[20] As a matter of fact, delay in reporting a rape case due to threats is justified.[21] As the Court held in People v. Ballester:[22]
Neither can appellant find refuge in complainant's failure to promptly report the sexual assault to her relatives. Long silence and delay in reporting the crime of rape has not always been construed as an indication of a false accusation. In fact this principle applies with greater force in this case where the offended party was barely twelve years old, and was therefore susceptible to intimidation and threats of physical harm.Not all rape victims can be expected to act conformably to the usual expectations of everyone. Different and varying degrees of behavioral responses is expected in the proximity of, or in confronting, an aberrant episode. It is settled that different people react differently to a given situation or type of situation and there is no standard form of human behavioral response when one is confronted with a strange, startling or frightful experience.[23]
The defense offered by the accused that he could not have raped the complainant because he went fishing three (3) times in the month of July 1997 in Sicmil, Gigmoto, Catanduanes (TSN, February 8, 2000, p. 3) is sorely inadequate to overcome the evidence adduced by the prosecution relative to his guilt, considering that his absence for only three (3) days could not prevent him from committing the offense in the remaining twenty-eight (28) days of the month. In any event, a probe into the accused's alibi readily yields the latter's inherent weakness. It is settled that for the defense of alibi to prosper, the accused must establish the physical impossibility for him to have been present at the scene of the crime at the time of its commission (People v. Cristobal, G.R. No. 116279, January 29, 1996) In the instant case, the accused failed to demonstrate such impossibility.The Court notes that appellant does not deny the existence of the knife during the commission of the rape. This Court sustains the finding that the trial court did not err in convicting appellant of the crime of rape perpetrated with the use of a deadly weapon. The presentation of the knife is not necessary to his conviction, in light of the victim's unwavering testimony as to how appellant, armed with a knife, threatened and raped her.
The allegation in the Information that the offense was committed within the period comprised between July 1, 1997 to July 31, 1997, sufficiently informs the accused of the approximate time of commission of the offense and affords him opportunity to show that he could not have committed the crime on any of the thirty-one (31) days of July 1997...
Additionally, Manny Torralba, one of the accused's fishing companions, declared that they went home from fishing everyday (TSN, February 28, 2001, p. 6) and that every time they went home from fishing, they parted ways as each went to his own home, and would not know what the accused would be doing while he was at his own home (Idem, p. 9). Thus, even in those days when the accused went to fish out at sea, the accused's presence in the house of the complainant where the subject offense was committed was far from impossible.[26]
It is settled that the non-presentation of the weapon used in the commission of rape is not essential to the conviction of the accused. The testimony of the rape victim that appellant was armed with a deadly weapon when he committed the crime is sufficient to establish the fact for so long as the victim is credible. It must be stressed that in rape, it is usually only the victim who can attest to its occurrence and that is why courts subject the testimony of the alleged victims to strict scrutiny before relying on it for the conviction of the accused.People v. Philippines Vitancur[28] also illustrates this principle:
The fact that the weapon with which complainant claimed she was intimidated by accused-appellant could not be presented in court could not impeach private complainant's credibility as the weapon is not essential to the prosecution of rape cases. What is important is that because of force and intimidation, private complainant was made to submit to the will of accused-appellant. ... [T]he test is whether the threat or intimidation produces in the mind of a reasonable person fear that if she persists or does not yield to the desires of the accused, the threat will be carried out.Appellant committed the crime of rape with the use of a bladed weapon, the imposable penalty of which is reclusion perpetua to death in accordance with Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. No. 7659:
ARTICLE 335. When and how rape is committed. � Rape is committed by having carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances:In addition, and in relation to the second assignment of error, the crime of rape is aggravated by dwelling.[29] As the Court of Appeals noted:The crime of rape shall be punished by reclusion perpetua.
- By using force or intimidation;
- When the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; and
- When the woman is under twelve years of age or is demented.
Whenever the crime of rape is committed with the use of a deadly weapon or by two or more persons, the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to death.
Whenever by reason of or on occasion of the rape, the victim has become insane, the penalty shall be death.
There is no question that the amended information sufficiently alleged "that the commission of the crime was aggravated by dwelling the fact that the crime was committed inside the house of the offended party." Accused-appellant does not dispute that the crime was committed inside the victim's house. However, he posits that the prosecution must prove the absence of provocation by Sally.The above ruling is in accordance with Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code which provides that in all cases in which the law prescribes a penalty composed of two indivisible penalties, the greater penalty shall be applied when an aggravating circumstance, such as dwelling in this case, is present in the commission of the offense.
It suffices to state that private complainant categorically testified that she was sleeping inside her house when appellant came and perpetrated the crime. This is proof enough of the absence of provocation on the part of private complainant. For a sleeping thirteen (13) - year old barrio girl cannot possibly give any kind of provocation to appellant under the circumstances.
Since the crime of rape was committed by appellant with the use of a deadly weapon, punishable by reclusion perpetua to death, the presence of the aggravating circumstance of dwelling, without the presence of any mitigating circumstance, justified the trial court's imposition of the death penalty.[30]
The Court, therefore, has no recourse but to apply the law and affirm the trial court's imposition of the death penalty. This is without prejudice, of course, to the provisions of section 25, R.A. 7659 regarding the possible exercise of the pardoning power of the Office of the President upon the finality of the death sentence.[32]In light, however, of the passage of Republic Act No. 9346, entitled "An Act Prohibiting the Imposition of Death Penalty in the Philippines," which was signed into law by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo on June 24, 2006, the imposition of the death penalty has been prohibited.[33] The law provides:
SECTION 1. The imposition of the penalty of death is hereby prohibited. Accordingly, Republic Act No. Eight Thousand One Hundred Seventy-Seven (R.A. No. 8177), otherwise known as the Act Designating Death by Lethal Injection, is hereby repealed. Republic Act No. Seven Thousand Six Hundred Fifty-Nine (R.A. No. 7659), otherwise known as the Death Penalty Law, and all other laws, executive orders and decrees, insofar as they impose the death penalty are hereby repealed or amended accordingly.After a thorough review of the records, the Court agrees with the evaluation of the evidence by the Regional Trial Court and the Court of Appeals. Pursuant to the new law, even as the Court sustains the conviction of appellant, the penalty imposed upon him should be reduced to reclusion perpetua, but appellant shall not be eligible for parole under the Indeterminate Sentence Law.
SECTION 2. In lieu of the death penalty, the following shall be imposed:
(a) the penalty of reclusion perpetua, when the law violated makes use of the nomenclature of the penalties of the Revised Penal Code; or
(b) the penalty of life imprisonment, when the law violated does not make use of the nomenclature of the penalties of the Revised Penal Code.
SECTION 3. Persons convicted of offenses punished with reclusion perpetua, or whose sentences will be reduced to reclusion perpetua, by reason of this Act, shall not be eligible for parole under Act No. 4103, otherwise known as the Indeterminate Sentence Law, as amended.
As to damages, we have held that if the rape is perpetrated with any of the attending qualifying circumstances that require the imposition of the death penalty, the civil indemnity for the victim shall be P75,000 .... Also, in rape cases, moral damages are awarded without the need of proof other than the fact of rape because it is assumed that the victim has suffered moral injuries entitling her to such an award. However, the trial court's award of P50,000.00 as moral damages should also be increased to P75,000 pursuant to current jurisprudence on qualified rape. Lastly, exemplary damages in the amount of P25,000.00 is also called for, by way of example, and to protect the young from sexual abuse.It should be noted that while the new law prohibits the imposition of the death penalty, the penalty provided for by law for a heinous offense is still death and the offense is still heinous. Consequently, the civil indemnity for the victim is still P75,000. On the other hand, the automatic appeal in cases when the trial court imposes the death penalty will henceforth not apply, since its imposition is now prohibited, so that there is a need to perfect an appeal, if appeal is desired, from a judgment of conviction for an offense where the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua in lieu of the death penalty pursuant to the new law prohibiting its imposition.