567 Phil. 420
AZCUNA, J.:
Considering that time is of the essence because all the accused except Joel Doe have been under detention at the City Jail since October 21, 1991 and considering that the City Prosecutor has not yet resolved the matter of reinvestigation on December 23, 1991 as ordered by the Court, and considering further that Asst. City Prosecutor Rosita Castro interposed no objection to the granting of bail in the amount of P40,000.00 which she considered reasonable, without determining whether or not the proper charge could be double homicide, the Court granted bail for the provisional liberty of each accused in the amount of P40,000.00.On April 13, 1992, complainant moved for the reconsideration of the Order of March 15, 1992. Respondent denied the motion in an Order dated June 8, 1992.
In view of the foregoing, the Court finds no legal and factual basis for the Motion to Inhibit.[1]
. . . The so-called hearing conducted by respondent Judge was limited to a statement from counsel of [the] accused, a query from respondent Judge to the prosecutor as to her view on the petition and the amount of bail. There was no reception of evidence [for] the prosecution to show that the evidence of guilt is strong. There was no inquiry into the character and reputation of the accused, the probability of their appearing at trial, or whether or not they were fugitives from justice. The order granting bail does not contain a summary of the evidence of the prosecution and the court’s conclusion on whether or not the evidence of guilt is strong.The Investigating Justice also found respondent guilty of partiality in favor of the accused, thus:
Respondent contends that the prosecution never requested that it be given the opportunity to demonstrate that the evidence of guilt against the accused is strong although it could have done so in at least two instances. The first was when it filed an opposition to the petition for bail, and the second was when it moved for the reconsideration of his order granting bail.
While the pleadings of the prosecution did not specifically pray for the opportunity to prove that the evidence of guilt against [the] accused is strong, enough appear therein which should have moved respondent Judge, on his own, to require the prosecution to do so. In its opposition to the petition for bail, the prosecution specifically alleged, “That the Information for Murder . . . was filed on the strength of the sworn statement[s] of several eyewitnesses to the incident which constitute a clear and strong evidence of guilt of all the . . . accused.” In its motion for reconsideration of the order granting bail, it alleged, “In cases where [the] grant of bail is discretionary, due process requires that the prosecution must be given the opportunity to present within reasonable time all the evidence it may desire to produce before the court should resolve the motion for bail ([People] vs. Hon. Procopio Donato, G.R. No. 79269, June 5, 1991).” If these are not specific requests from the prosecution, they are, at least, clear reminders to respondent Judge that he must give the prosecution every opportunity to show the evidence of guilt against the accused is strong. Assuming, however, that such a request could not be read into [the] said statements in the prosecution’s pleadings, nevertheless, respondent was duty-bound to require the presentation of proof of the strength of the evidence of guilt against the accused because without it he would have no basis for the exercise of his discretion on whether or not bail should be granted.
It may be pertinent to mention here that the orders of the respondent granting bail to the accused and denying the prosecution’s motion for reconsideration thereof were nullified by the Court of appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 28384, 19 January 1993, for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion . . . .
It is perhaps this lack of observance of the rules on the grant of bail which resulted in accused jumping bail, thus compelling respondent to order their arrest. Up to the time the respondent filed his memorandum on 24 February 1993, there was no report that the accused had been apprehended. In short, complainants’ worst fears were realized.[2]
It is quite obvious the bail was granted with undue haste, nay railroaded, to favor the accused.Accordingly, the Investigating Justice recommended that respondent be fined P20,000 following Libaros v. Dabalos.[4]
Despite the absence of the required three-day notice to the prosecution, the petition for bail was considered and granted by the respondent.
Also, at the time, the case was under reinvestigation by the Office of the City Prosecutor precisely upon the request of the accused which was granted by respondent. The deadline for submission of the result of the reinvestigation was 23 December 1992, the very same day the petition for bail was heard and granted. Respondent says that he was compelled to grant the bail because the findings on the reinvestigation were not forthcoming and time was of the essence. However, there is nothing in the record which would show that the prosecution had informed respondent that it would not be able to submit its findings on the date set, or that respondent had asked the prosecution about the status of its reinvestigation. What he should have done was to inquire into the status of the reinvestigation, and impose [a] new deadline, if necessary, instead of precipitately granting bail. Respondent asserts that “time was of the essence” but he does not state the reason why it was so, except that the accused had been in jail since the incident happened on 21 October 1991. Such does not justify the shelving of the required basic procedure in the grant of bail for those accused of a capital offense, because if evidence of guilt is strong, they cannot be released anyway.
The haste with which respondent acted on the matter is reflected in his cryptic order granting bail. No discussion of the evidence of either the prosecution or the accused was made, or a rationalization of the favorable action. The order merely states: “Finding the Petition for Bail filed by all the accused, thru counsel, to be well taken, the same is hereby “Granted”, and then proceeds to set the bail bond at P40,000.00 for each of the accused. One is left only to speculate as to the bases thereof. Equally cryptic is his denial of the prosecution’s motion for reconsideration simply “for lack of merit.” It appears that respondent would not have the accused linger in jail even for the length of time it would take him to make a reasonably sound and credible order.”[3]