571 Phil. 588
YNARES-SATIAGO, J.:
The foregoing evidences presented by the applicant indubitably established sufficient basis to grant the applicant (sic) for registration. Originally, the whole parcel of land was owned by spouses Teofilo Abellara and Abella Charmine who acquired the same by virtue of a Deed of Sale from Cynthia Cacho, Agustin Cacho, Jr., Jasmin Cacho, Jover Cacho and Lauro Cacho. Later, they sold the same parcel of land to spouses Tony C. Villamil and Alicia Bautista, who in turn sold the same land to herein applicants.Aggrieved, respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals which rendered the assailed Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
The same parcel of land has been declared in the name of the applicant and her predecessors-in-interest and its taxes has (sic) been religiously paid.
The said circumstances further show that the possession and ownership of the applicant and her (sic) predecessors-in- interest over the same parcel of land has (sic) been continuous and peaceful under bona fide claim of ownership before the filing of the instant application for registration on [July 1, 1999].
WHEREFORE, after confirming the Order of General Default, the Court hereby orders and decrees the registration of a parcel of land as shown on plan ap-01-004897 approved by the Bureau of Land(s) situated in Barangay Anolid, Mangaldan, Pangasinan, containing an area of Five Hundred Seventy Four (574) square meters, subject of the application for registration of title, in accordance with Presidential Decree No. 1529, in favor of CHARLIE L. ONG in his behalf and as representative of his brothers namely, ROBERTO L. ONG, ALBERTO L. ONG and CESAR L. ONG.
Furnish copies of this Decision to the Office of the Solicitor General, Makati City, Metro Manila, the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor, Dagupan City, Atty. Celestino Domingo Jr., the Office of the Land Registration Authority, Quezon City, as well as the applicant.
SO ORDERED.[5]
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is GRANTED. Accordingly, the decision of the court a quo granting the application for registration of title of applicants-appellees is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. No pronouncement as to costs.In reversing the decision of the trial court, the Court of Appeals found that the subject lot is part of the alienable and disposable lands of the public domain. Thus, it was incumbent upon petitioner to prove that they possessed the subject lot in the nature and for the duration required by law. However, petitioner failed to prove that he or his predecessors-in-interest have been in adverse possession of the subject lot in the concept of owner since June 12, 1945 or earlier as mandated by Section 14(1) of P.D. 1529. It noted that the earliest tax declaration which petitioner presented is dated 1971. Consequently, petitioner could not fairly claim possession of the land prior to 1971. Neither was petitioner able to prove that he or his predecessors-in-interest actually occupied the subject lot prior to the filing of the application. Thus, the trial court erred in granting the application for registration of title over the subject lot.
SO ORDERED.[6]
The petition lacks merit.
- WHETHER OR NOT PETITIONER, TOGETHER WITH HIS BROTHERS, NAMELY, ROBERTO L. ONG, ALBERTO L. ONG AND CEZAR L. ONG, HAVE REGISTRABLE OWNERSHIP OVER THE REAL PROPERTY SUBJECT MATTER OF LAND REGISTRATION CASE NO. 99-023, AND
- WHETHER OR NOT THE FINDINGS AND CONCLUSION OF THE FORMER SPECIAL FOURTH DIVISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS THAT THE SUBJECT REAL PROPERTY IS A PUBLIC LAND IS CORRECT.[7]
SEC. 14. Who may apply. –The following persons may file in the proper Court of First Instance an application for registration of title to land, whether personally or through their duly authorized representatives:Thus, pursuant to the aforequoted provision of law, applicants for registration of title must prove: (1) that the subject land forms part of the disposable and alienable lands of the public domain, and (2) that they have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the same under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.[8] These requisites involve questions of fact which are not proper in a petition for review on certiorari. Factual findings of the court a quo are generally binding on this Court except for certain recognized exceptions, as is the case here, where the trial court and the Court of Appeals arrived at conflicting findings.[9] After a careful review of the records, we sustain the findings and conclusions of the Court of Appeals.
(1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.
The law speaks of possession and occupation. Since these words are separated by the conjunction and, the clear intention of the law is not to make one synonymous with the other. Possession is broader than occupation because it includes constructive possession. When, therefore, the law adds the word occupation, it seeks to delimit the all encompassing effect of constructive possession. Taken together with the words open, continuous, exclusive and notorious, the word occupation serves to highlight the fact that for an applicant to qualify, his possession must not be a mere fiction. Actual possession of a land consists in the manifestation of acts of dominion over it of such a nature as a party would naturally exercise over his own property.[20]Petitioner admitted that after he and his brothers bought the subject lot from spouses Tony Bautista and Alicia Villamil in 1998, neither he nor his brothers actually occupied the subject lot.[21] No improvements were made thereon and the most that they did was to visit the lot on several occasions.[22] Petitioner’s predecessor-in-interest, Tony Bautista testified that he and his wife never actually occupied the subject lot from the time they bought the same from spouses Teofilo Abellera and Abella Sarmen in 1997.[23] Aside from these two testimonies, no other evidence was presented to establish the character of the possession of the subject lot by petitioner’s other alleged predecessors-in-interest. Clearly, petitioner’s evidence failed to establish specific acts of ownership to substantiate the claim that he and his predecessors-in-interest possessed and occupied the subject lot in the nature and duration required by law.