562 Phil. 262
Before Us is a special civil action for
certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court to annul and set aside the Decision
[1] and Resolution
[2]
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 83621, dated 23 December 2005
and 19 July 2006, respectively, which reversed and set aside the Order
[3] dated 9 June 2004 and Resolution
[4] dated 3 August 2004 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Tarlac City, Branch 64 in Civil Case No. 9556.
Established are the following factual antecedents:
Sometime in 1996, respondent Relia Quizon Arciga filed an action before
the RTC of Pasig City against Wilfredo P. Abedes (Wilfredo), husband of
herein petitioner Emelinda V. Abedes, seeking support for her daughter,
Dannielle Ann Arciga (Danielle Ann). The case was docketed as JDRC
Case No. 3866.
[5]
On 10 October 2000, a Decision was therein rendered, declaring Wilfredo
the natural father of Danielle Ann. Wilfredo was similarly ordered by
the RTC of Pasig City to support Danielle Ann, with a fixed amount of
P10,000.00 per month.
The dispositive portion of the Decision in JDRC Case No. 3866, reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered
declaring the [therein] respondent Wilfredo P. Abedes, as the natural
father of the child, Daniele Ann Arciga and entitled to support from
him.
Considering that the child is already of school age, the amount of
support is hereby fixed at Ten Thousand Pesos (PhP10,000.00) per month
which [Wilfredo P. Abedes] is obliged to give retroactive to the date
of judicial demand which corresponds to the time this case was filed,
May 1996. The [respondent therein Wilfredo P. Abedes] is ordered to
give the said amount of support, apart from the support in arrears, on
or before the end of every month, until otherwise ordered by this court.[6]
Since no appeal was interposed by the parties, the judgment became
final and executory. Respondent Relia Quizon Arciga filed a Motion for
Execution. Accordingly, a writ of execution was issued on 21 February
2001 by the RTC of Pasig City. Unfortunately, the Sheriff’s Return
[7] dated 19 December 2001 showed that no personal property of Wilfredo could be levied upon to satisfy the judgment.
[8] The Writ of Execution was returned unsatisfied.
Later, a property covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 292139
[9] was discovered to be allegedly registered in the name of Wilfredo. Thus, the Sheriff
[10] caused the registration of a Notice of Levy on Execution
[11]
on TCT No. 292139, with the Office of the Registry of Deeds for the
Province of Tarlac, to satisfy the judgment in JDRC Case No. 3866.
Upon notice of the same, petitioner filed a Notice of Third Party Claim
[12]
with the RTC of Pasig. Petitioner alleged that the property covered by
TCT No. 292139 belongs exclusively to her, and Wilfredo had no present
and existing right thereto. Therefore, it may not be utilized to
satisfy the judgment rendered against her husband Wilfredo in the
aforesaid JDRC Case No. 3866.
Notwithstanding the adverse claim, on 12 September 2003, a Notice of
Sheriff’s Sale was made announcing the sale to the public and to the
highest bidder of all the rights, claims, and shares of Wilfredo in the
property covered by TCT No. 292139. For such purpose, a public auction
was scheduled to be held on 20 October 2003.
Aggrieved, petitioner, represented by her attorney-in-fact Wilfredo, filed a Complaint
[13]
for Injunction with Prayer for Writ of Preliminary Injunction and
Temporary Restraining Order and Damages before the RTC of Tarlac City.
The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 9556. In her Complaint,
petitioner alleged that unless the sale at public auction is enjoined,
she will stand to suffer permanent damage for the loss of her property
without valuable consideration and in violation of the process of law.
She further sought the cancellation of Entries No. 42-7961 and No.
42-10782 annotated on TCT No. 292139 of the Registry of Deeds of the
Province of Tarlac. Moreover, she sought to recover moral damages,
attorney’s fees and costs of litigation.
After due hearing, on 14 October 2003, the RTC of Tarlac City issued a Temporary Restraining Order.
[14]
It was convinced that irreparable damage and injury to petitioner would
result, should respondent Sheriff Ronberto B. Valino proceed with the
public auction of the property covered by TCT No. 292139. Further, the
RTC conducted a hearing on the prayer for the issuance of a Writ of
Preliminary Injunction, and granted the same on 7 November 2003,
[15] effectively preserving the
status quo.
[16]
Meanwhile, respondents Relia Quizon Arciga and Sheriff Ronberto B. Valino filed an Urgent Motion to Dismiss
[17] the Complaint in Civil Case No. 9556. On 1 December 2003, the RTC of Tarlac City rendered a Resolution
[18] dismissing the motion for want of merit.
Petitioner then filed a Motion to Declare Defendants in Default
[19]
for the latter’s failure to file an Answer within the period granted by
the RTC of Tarlac City. The Motion was, however, denied. It appeared
that the RTC of Tarlac City already received the Answer
[20] by the time the aforesaid Motion to Declare Defendants in Default was filed.
In their Answer, respondents Relia Quizon Arciga and Sheriff Ronberto
B. Valino principally contended that the property subject of the levy
is presumed conjugal property; and as such, liable for the judgment
against Wilfredo.
In view of this development, petitioner filed a Motion for Summary Judgment,
[21] on the ground that the Answer did not raise a genuine issue as to any material fact. Respondents filed a Comment
[22]
to petitioner’s Motion for Summary Judgment. In their Comment, they
sought the denial of the Motion, and prayed that the case be set aside
for further proceedings. The Motion was then declared submitted for
resolution by the RTC of Tarlac City.
On 9 June 2004, the RTC of Tarlac City issued the assailed Order ruling in petitioner’s favor.
The RTC of Tarlac City opined that the property covered by TCT No.
292139 is petitioner’s paraphernal property. As her exclusive
property, it may not be made liable for the obligations of Wilfredo
under the Decision dated 10 October 2000 in JDRC Case No. 3866,
rendered by the RTC of Pasig City. Otherwise stated, the property may
not be liable for the support which Wilfredo is obliged to give to
Danielle Ann.
In so ruling that the property covered by TCT No. 292139 is
paraphernal, the RTC of Tarlac City alluded to the declaration
appearing on TCT No. 292139, which states that the property described
therein is registered in accordance with the provisions of the Property
Registration Decree “in the name of Emelinda V. Abedes,” married to
Wilfredo P. Abedes. Citing
Ruiz v. Court of Appeals,
[23]
the RTC of Tarlac City reasoned that when the title is in the name of
“x married to y,” the phrase “married to y” is merely descriptive of
the personal status of the owner, x. It was also of the opinion that
no evidence was adduced that the property covered by TCT No. 292139 was
acquired within the marriage of petitioner to Wilfredo; hence, the
presumption that it belongs to the conjugal partnership does not apply.
The RTC of Tarlac City further explained that even assuming that the
property covered by TCT No. 292139 is part of the conjugal partnership,
it may not be held liable for the support of Danielle Ann who is an
illegitimate child of Wilfredo. It declared that the property regime
of petitioner and Wilfredo is governed by the Civil Code as they were
married on 10 February 1966. Under Article 161(5)
[24] of the Civil Code, the conjugal partnership shall only be liable,
inter alia,
for the maintenance of the family and education of the legitimate
children. The support of illegitimate children cannot be charged to
the conjugal partnership.
Hence, the RTC enjoined respondent Sheriff Ronberto B. Valino from
conducting the public sale of the property covered by TCT No. 292139 of
the Register of Deeds of the Province of Tarlac. It likewise ordered
that Entries No. 42-7961 and No. 42-10782 annotated on TCT No. 292139
be cancelled. The exact words of the RTC of Tarlac City in its
assailed judgment read:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the
plaintiff [Emelinda V. Abedes Represented by her Atty. In-fact Wilfredo
P. Abedes] and against the defendants [Relia Quizon Arciga for herself
and for Danielle Ann Arciga and Sheriff Ronberto Valino]
1.) Making permanent the writ of preliminary injunction dated November
4, 2003, enjoining permanently the sheriff of RTC Branch 70, Pasig City
from proceeding with public sale of the property covered by TCT No.
292139 of the Register of Deeds of Tarlac Province;
2.) Ordering the cancellation of entries [N]os. 42-7961 and 42-10782 at
the back of the said title on file with the Register of Deeds;
Costs de oficio.[25]
Respondents’ Motion for Reconsideration of the foregoing order was denied by the RTC of Tarlac City in another Order
[26] dated 3 August 2003, prompting respondents to file an appeal with the Court of Appeals.
On 23 December 2005, the Court of Appeals issued a Decision, reversing
and setting aside the appealed Order and Resolution of the RTC of
Tarlac City.
[27]
In its ruling, the Court of Appeals said that the Family Code
provisions on conjugal partnerships govern the property relations
between petitioner and Wilfredo, notwithstanding the fact that their
marriage was celebrated prior to the effectivity of the Family Code.
It found legal bearings on Article 105
[28]
of the Family Code, which mandates that its provisions on conjugal
partnership of gains shall also apply to conjugal partnerships already
established between spouses before the effectivity of the Family Code,
without prejudice to vested rights already acquired in accordance with
the Civil Code or other laws, as provided in Article 255.
[29]
It found that there were no vested rights that would preclude the
application of Article 105 on the property regime of petitioner and
Wilfredo. As the Family Code establishes the presumption that
properties acquired during the marriage is conjugal, the property
covered by TCT No. 292139, not having been shown otherwise is, thus,
conjugal.
Following the foregoing line of ratiocination, the Court of Appeals
held that the property covered by TCT No. 292139 may be levied upon in
execution for the support of Danielle Ann. In so concluding, it relied
on Articles 122
[30] and 197
[31] of the Family Code which charges the support of illegitimate children against the conjugal partnership.
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration
[32]
of the 23 December 2005 Decision of the Court of Appeals, raising the
issue of lack of jurisdiction on the part of the appellate court over
the matters raised on appeal because the issues involved are purely
questions of law. According to the petitioner, Section 2
[33]
of Rule 50 of the Rules of Court mandates the dismissal of appeals
which involve pure questions of law erroneously brought to the Court of
Appeals. It is petitioner’s theory that the Court of Appeals did not
have to resolve any question of fact as there was no factual issue
raised.
Unimpressed, the Court of Appeals rejected this contention, and found
no reason to depart from its earlier ruling. In denying petitioner’s
Motion for Reconsideration for lack of merit, the appellate court held:
In this case, [petitioner Emelinda V. Abedes] had
participated in the appeal proceedings. Thus, the claimed lack of
jurisdiction is inconsistent with her actuation before Us. An
examination of her appellee’s brief even reveals her recognition of Our
jurisdiction. We observe that in her brief she prayed for the
dismissal of the appeal and the affirmance of the appealed decision.
This is certainly an acknowledgment that We have the power to hear and
resolve the questions raised in the appeal.[34]
Hence, the Petition before us filed under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
In her Memorandum, petitioner submitted the following issues,
viz:
I
WHETHER OR NOT PUBLIC RESPONDENT HAS STATUTORY JURISDICTION OVER THE SUBJECT MATTER OF THE CASE.
II
WHETHER OR NOT PETITIONER IS BARRED BY ESTOPPEL FROM QUESTIONING PUBLIC RESPONDENT’S JURISDICTION.
First, the preliminaries.
A petition for
certiorari
under Rule 65 is proper if a tribunal, board or officer exercising
judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess of
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction and there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
[35]
However, the proper remedy of petitioner from the assailed Decision and
Resolution of the Court of Appeals is an ordinary appeal
[36] to this Court
via a petition for review under Rule 45 and not a petition for
certiorari under Rule 65.
[37] To draw a distinction, an appeal by petition for review on
certiorari under Rule 45 is a continuation of the judgment complained of, while that under Rule 65 is an original or independent action.
[38] We have underscored that the remedy of
certiorari is not a substitute for lost appeal. The remedies of appeal and
certiorari are mutually exclusive and not alternative or successive.
[39] Hence, the special civil action for
certiorari under Rule 65 is not and cannot be a substitute for an appeal, where the latter remedy is available.
[40] Such a remedy will not be a cure for failure to timely file a petition for review on
certiorari under Rule 45.
[41] Rule 45 is clear that decisions, final orders or resolutions of the Court of Appeals in any case,
i.e.,
regardless of the nature of the action or proceedings involved, may be
appealed to this Court by filing a petition for review, which would be
but a continuation of the appellate process over the original case.
[42]
Under Rule 45, the reglementary period to file an appeal is 15 days
from notice of the judgment or final order or resolution appealed from,
or of the denial of the petitioner’s motion for reconsideration filed
in due time, after notice of the judgment on said motion.
In the case at bar, the Resolution of the appellate court, dated 19
July 2006, which denied reconsideration of its Decision dated 23
December 2005, was received by petitioner on 2 August 2005.
[43]
She had until 17 August 2005 within which to perfect her appeal.
However, none was made. Instead, she comes to this Court via a
petition for
certiorari in an
effort to salvage her lost appeal. Evidently, appeal was available to
petitioner. It was also the speedy and adequate remedy under the
circumstances. Petitioner was, therefore, unsuccessful in satisfying
the rudiments for the writ of
certiorari under Rule 65 to issue. Petitioner was unable to show that there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy
[44] in the ordinary course of law.
Parenthetically, it must be emphasized that under Rule 56, Sec. 5(f)
[45]
of the Rules of Court, which governs the procedure in the Supreme
Court, a wrong or inappropriate mode of appeal, as in this case, merits
an outright dismissal.
[46]
Patently, the petition must fail.
This conclusion is made ineluctably certain for the further reason that even as petitioner files a special civil action for
certiorari
under Rule 65 before us, there is no allegation whatsoever that the
Court of Appeals acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction, or
with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction. What petitioner ascribes is merely lack of jurisdiction
on the part of the Court of Appeals which, to the mind of this Court,
does not satisfy the legal fundamentals for a writ of
certiorari to lie.
To reiterate, for a petition for
certiorari
or prohibition to be granted, it must set out and demonstrate, plainly
and distinctly, all the facts essential to establish a right to a writ.
[47]
The petitioner must allege in his petition and has the burden of
establishing facts to show that any other existing remedy is not speedy
or adequate and that (a) the writ is directed against a tribunal, board
or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions; (b) such
tribunal, board or officer has acted without or in excess of
jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or
lack of jurisdiction; and, (c) there is no appeal or any plain, speedy
and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
[48] These matters must be threshed out and shown by petitioner.
In a petition for
certiorari
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, the petitioner is burdened to
establish that the respondent tribunal acted without jurisdiction,
meaning, that it does not have the legal power to determine the case;
or that it acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, meaning, that
having been clothed with power to determine the case, it oversteps its
authority as determined by law, or that it committed grave abuse of its
discretion or acted in a capricious, whimsical, arbitrary or despotic
manner in the exercise of its jurisdiction as to be equivalent to lack
of jurisdiction.
[49]
In any event, even if we brush aside technicalities and allow the
instant petition under Rule 65, the same must necessarily be dismissed.
It can be gleaned that petitioner’s case is founded upon the argument
that the Court of Appeals improperly took cognizance of respondents’
appeal from the adverse rulings of the RTC of Tarlac City in Civil Case
No. 9556. Petitioner’s argument revolves on the core rationalization
that as respondents’ appeal to the Court of Appeals raised only
questions of law, the appellate court should have dismissed the same as
the appellate court had no jurisdiction over pure questions of law,
citing Rule 50, Section 2 of the Rules of Court. Simply, petitioner
asserts that respondents’ appeal from the RTC should not have been
taken to the Court of Appeals.
In
Suarez v. Villarama, Jr.,
[50] we distinguish the three modes of appeal from decisions of the RTC,
viz:
(1) Ordinary appeal or appeal by writ of error, where
judgment was rendered in a civil or criminal action by the RTC in the
exercise of original jurisdiction; (2) petition for review, where
judgment was rendered by the RTC in the exercise of appellate
jurisdiction; and (3) petition for review to the Supreme Court.[51]
Section 2, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court elaborates on the modes of appeal:
SEC. 2. Modes of appeal. —
(a) Ordinary appeal.
— The appeal to the Court of Appeals in cases decided by the Regional
Trial Court in the exercise of its original jurisdiction shall be taken
by filing a notice of appeal with the court which rendered the judgment
or final order appealed from and serving a copy thereof upon the
adverse party. No record on appeal shall be required except in special
proceedings and other cases of multiple or separate appeals where the
law or these Rules so require. In such cases, the record on appeal
shall be filed and served in like manner.
(b) Petition for review.
— The appeal to the Court of Appeals in cases decided by the Regional
Trial Court in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction shall be by
petition for review in accordance with Rule 42.
(c) Appeal by certiorari.
— In all cases where only questions of law are raised or involved, the
appeal shall be to the Supreme Court by petition for review on
certiorari in accordance with Rule 45.
The first mode of appeal, governed by Rule 41,
[52]
is taken to the Court of Appeals on questions of fact or mixed
questions of fact and law. The second mode of appeal, covered by Rule
42,
[53] is brought to the
Court of Appeals on questions of fact, of law, or mixed questions of
fact and law. The third mode of appeal, provided for by Rule 45,
[54] is elevated to the Supreme Court only on questions of law.
[55]
In the case at bar, respondents utilized the first mode of appeal.
Respondents filed a Notice of Appeal with the RTC of Tarlac City on 18
August 2004, giving notice that they were appealing its Order and
Resolution, dated 9 June 2004 and 3 August 2004, respectively, to the
Court of Appeals. Indeed, Section 3
[56] of Rule 41 of the Rules of Court states that an appeal to the Court of Appeals shall be taken by filing a notice of appeal
[57] with the court which rendered the judgment and serving a copy thereof upon the adverse party.
The question now arises whether respondents raised questions of fact or
mixed questions of fact and law before the Court of Appeals.
It is axiomatic that a question of law arises when there is doubt as to
what the law is on a certain state of facts, while there is a question
of fact when the doubt arises as to the truth or falsity of the alleged
facts.
[58]
A review of the records reveals that respondents, in their appeal with
the Court of Appeals, raised mixed questions of fact and law.
Anent the question of fact, it cannot be gainsaid that respondents
assailed the finding of the RTC of Tarlac City that the property
covered by TCT No. 292139 is petitioner’s paraphernal property.
Indeed, the determination of whether such property pertains exclusively
to petitioner is factual. It involves the truth or falsity of
petitioner’s allegation in her Complaint filed with the RTC of Tarlac
City that the property was purchased with her exclusive money and
during her marriage to Wilfredo. A necessity arose on the part of the
Court of Appeals to make a determination of whether sufficient evidence
was adduced to substantiate the same.
Anent the question of law, it was material for the appellate court to
determine the applicable provisions of law. For instance, given the
factual background that the marriage of petitioner to Wilfredo was
celebrated prior to the effectivity of the Family Code
vis-à-vis
the date of acquisition of the property covered by TCT No. 292139
during the effectivity of the Family Code, the Court of Appeals was
tasked to resolve whether the case is governed by the provisions of the
Civil Code or the Family Code. After such a determination, the
appellate court must ascertain the charges which may be made against
the property regime governing the marriage of petitioner and Wilfredo;
and the propriety of the levy in execution of the property covered by
TCT No. 292139 to satisfy the judgment in JDRC Case No. 3866.
Further, we reiterate in substance the finding of the Court of Appeals
in its Resolution dated 19 July 2006 that petitioner may not belatedly
be allowed to question its jurisdiction after it has actively
participated in the proceedings before it. While we find that the case
herein is not one of estoppel by jurisdiction, for the Court of Appeals
clearly had jurisdiction over respondents’ appeal, we are of the
opinion that petitioner’s allegation of lack of jurisdiction for the
first time in her Motion for Reconsideration constitutes a last ditch
effort to assail the judgment of the Court of Appeals.
Finally, this Court finds no reason to delve into the merits of the
Decision of the Court of Appeals with regard to the propriety of the
levy in execution of the property covered by TCT No. 292139 for the
support of Danielle Ann. Petitioner does not raise the issue in her
pleadings. That matter has been laid to rest, and is outside the scope
of the instant Petition. Issues not raised in the pleadings, as
opposed to ordinary appeal of criminal cases where the whole case is
opened for review,
[59] are deemed waived or abandoned.
[60]
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DISMISSED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Ynares-Santiago, (Chairperson), Carpio, Austria-Martinez, and
Nachura, JJ., concur.
[1] Penned by former
Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeals Ruben T. Reyes (now a member
of the Supreme Court) with Associate Justices Juan Q. Enriquez, Jr. and
Vicente Q. Roxas, concurring;
rollo, pp. 87-102.
[2] Penned by former
Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeals Ruben T. Reyes (now a member
of the Supreme Court) with Associate Justices Juan Q. Enriquez, Jr. and
Monina Arevalo-Zenarosa, concurring, id. at 111-113.
[3] Penned by Pairing Judge Arsenio P. Adriano; Records, pp. 105-107.
[4] Penned by Judge Martonino R. Marcos; id. at 118-119.
[5] Entitled,
Relia Quizon Arciga, for herself and for Danielle Ann Arciga v. Wilfredo P. Abedes.
[6] Records, p. 12.
[7] Id. at 14.
[8] The Sheriff’s Return stated,
viz:
There were no [p]ersonal property/ies of said [Wilfredo P.
Abedes] to be levied that would satisfy the judgment claim, instead
[Wilfredo P. Abedes] promised that he will pay the amount of Fifty
Thousand by (sic) the month of May but he failed to do so and he made
another promise that he will pay that amount this December but he did
not.; id.
[9] Described as follows:
A parcel of land (Lot 6, Block 3 of the consolidation
subdivision plan (LRC) Pcs-18063, being a portion of Lot 3-A-3-0 (LRC)
Psd-200873, LRC Rec. No. 2793), situated in the Barrio of Binauganan,
Mun. of Tarlac, Province of Tarlac, Island of Luzon.Bounded on the N.,
points 5 to 1 by Lot 7, on the E., points 1 to 2 by Lot 5 both of Block
3, on the SE., and SW., points 2 to 4 by street Lot 58, and on the W.,
points 4 to 5 by Street Lot 44 all of the consolidation-subd. Plan.
Beginning at a point marked “1” on plan being S. 31 deg. 20’E., 2496.82
m. from BLLM No. 1 Tarlac cadastre, thence S. 2 45’E., 12.29 m. to
point 2; thence, S. 59 deg. 22’W., 18.75 m. to point 3; id. at 10.
[10] Sheriff IV Ronberto B. Valino.
[11] The annotations read
42-7964 Kind: Writ of Execution in favor of Relia Quizon
Arciga for herself and for Danielle Ann Arciga Cond: Judgment is hereby
rendered declaring the respondent Wilfredo P. Abedes as the natural
father of the child Danielle Ann Arciga and entitled to support from
him. Considering that the child is already of school age, the amount
of support is hereby fixed at Ten thousand pesos per month which the
defendant is obliged to give retroactive to the date of judicial demand
which corresponds to the time this case was filed, May 1996. Wilfredo
P. Abedes is ordered to give the said amount of support, apart from the
support in arrears on or before the end of every month until otherwise
ordered by this court.
[D]ate of instrument: Feb 21,2001
[D]ate of inscription: April 25, 2001 3:00 p,
GUERRERO L. CAMPOS Reg of Deeds
42-10782 Kind: Notice of Levy in favor of Relia Quizon Arciga for
herself and for Danielle Ann Arciga Cond: Notice is hereby given that
the property described in this title is hereby levied upon under JDRC
Case No. 3866 entitled Relia Quizon Arciga for herself and for Danielle
Ann Arciga versus Wilfredo Abedes at the RTC of Pasig Branch 70 duly
supported by a writ of execution under E-42-10788
[D]ate of ; Records, p. 11.
[12] Id. at 15.
[13] Id. at 1-6.
[14] Issued by Judge Martonino R. Marcos; Records, p. 34.
[15] The date of preliminary
injunction as it appears in the Order of 9 June 2004 of the RTC of
Tarlac City in Civil Case No. 9556 is, however, written as November 4,
2003. The records show that on 4 November 2003, the RTC of Tarlac City
issued an Order granting the issuance of the writ of preliminary
injunction upon the filing and approval of the bond in the amount of
P20,000.00.
More accurately, on 7 November 2003, after a finding that the bond was
filed in accordance with the Order of 4 November 2003, the RTC issued
the writ of preliminary injunction.
[16] Issued by Judge Martonino R. Marcos; id. at 66, 71.
[17] Id. at 45-47.
[18] Id. at 78-79.
[19] Id. at 83-85.
[20] Id. at 80-82.
[21] Id. at 96-97.
[22] Id. at 108-109.
[23] 449 Phil. 419, 431 (2003).
[24] ART. 161. The conjugal partnership shall be liable for:
x x x x
(5) The maintenance of the family and the education of the children of
both husband and wife, and of legitimate children of one of the spouses;
x x x x
[25] Records, p. 107.
[26] Id. at 118-119.
[27] The dispositive portion of the Decision dated 23 December 2005, reads:
WHEREFORE, the appealed order is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The complaint filed with the RTC-Tarlac is hereby ordered DISMISSED.
[28] ART. 105 – In case the
future spouses agree in the marriage settlements that the regime of
conjugal partnerships of gains shall govern their property relations
during marriage, the provisions in this Chapter shall be of
supplementary application.
The provisions of this Chapter shall also apply to conjugal
partnerships of gains already established between spouses before the
effectivity of this Code, without prejudice to vested rights already
acquired in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws, as provided
in Article 255.
[29] ART. 255. – If any provision of this Code is held invalid, all the other provisions not affected thereby shall remain valid.
[30] ART 122. The payment of
personal debts contracted by the husband or the wife before or during
the marriage shall not be charged to the conjugal partnership except
insofar as they redounded to the benefit of the family.
Neither shall the fines and pecuniary indemnities imposed them be charged to the partnership.
However, the payment of personal debts contracted by either spouse
before the marriage, that of fines and indemnities imposed upon them,
as well as the support of illegitimate children of either spouse, may
be enforced against the partnership assets after the responsibilities
enumerated in the preceding Article have been covered, if the spouse
who is bound should have no exclusive property or if it should be
insufficient; but at the time of the liquidation of the partnership,
such spouse shall be charged for what has been paid for the purposes
abovementioned.
[31] ART. 197. In case of
legitimate ascendants; descendants, whether legitimate or illegitimate,
and brothers and sisters, whether legitimately or illegitimately
related, only the separate property of the person obliged to give
support shall be answerable provided that in case the obligor has no
separate property, the absolute community or the conjugal partnership,
if financially capable, shall advance the support, which shall be
deducted from the share of the spouse obliged upon the liquidation of
the absolute community or the conjugal partnership.
[32] CA
rollo, pp. 101-104.
[33] SEC. 2.
Dismissal of improper appeal to the Court of Appeals.
– An appeal under Rule 41 taken from the Regional Trial Court to the
Court of Appeals raising only questions of law shall be dismissed,
issues purely of law not being reviewable by said court. Similarly, an
appeal by notice of appeal instead of by petition for review from the
appellate judgment of a Regional Trial Court shall be dismissed.
An appeal erroneously taken to the Court of Appeals shall not be
transferred to the appropriate court but shall be dismissed outright.
[34] Rollo, p. 113.
[35] Section 1, Rule 65,
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
[36] Section 1, Rule 45 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides that, “A party desiring to appeal by
certiorari
from a judgment or final order or resolution of the Court of Appeals,
the Sandiganbayan, the Regional Trial Courts or other courts whenever
authorized by law, may file with the Supreme Court a verified petition
for review on
certiorari. The petition shall raise only questions of law which must be distinctly set forth.
[37] Banco Filipino Savings and Mortgage Bank v. Court of Appeals, 389 Phil. 644, 654 (2000).
[38] Id.
[39] Obando v. Court of Appeals, 419 Phil. 124, 130 (2001).
[40] Land Bank of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, 456 Phil. 755, 785 (2003).
[41] Id.
[42] Id., citing
Heirs of Marcelino Pagobo v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 121687, 16 October 1997, 280 SCRA 870, 883.
[43] Rollo, p. 7.
[44] Jurisprudence states
that a remedy is considered "plain, speedy and adequate" if it will
promptly relieve the petitioners from the injurious effects of the
judgment and the acts of the lower court or agency.
[45] SEC. 5.
Grounds for dismissal of appeal. – The appeal may be dismissed
motu proprio or on motion of the respondent on the following grounds:
x x x x
(f) Error in the choice or mode of appeal.
[46] Chua v. Santos, G.R. No. 132467, 18 October 2004, 440 SCRA 365, 372.
[47] Lee v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 159288, 19 October 2004, 440 SCRA 662, 677.
[48] Id.
[49] Rivera v. Palattao, G.R. No. 157824, 17 January 2005, 448 SCRA 623, 634.
[50] G.R. No. 124512, 27 June 2006, 493 SCRA 74, 80, citing
Murillo v. Consul, Resolution of the Court En Banc in UDK-9748, 1 March 1990.
[51] Id.
[52] Section 1 of Rule 41 of
the Rules of Court provides that an appeal may be taken from a judgment
or final order that completely disposes of the case, or of a particular
matter therein when declared by these Rules to be appealable.
[53] Under Section 1 of Rule
42 of the Rules of Court, a party desiring to appeal from a decision of
the Regional Trial Court rendered in the exercise of its appellate
jurisdiction may file a verified petition for review with the Court of
Appeals.
[54] Rule 45 covers appeal by
certiorari to the Supreme Court.
[55] Suarez v. Villarama, supra note 50.
[56] SEC. 3. –
Period of ordinary appeal.
– The appeal shall be taken within fifteen (15) days from notice of the
judgment or final order appealed from. Where a record on appeal is
required, the appellants shall file a notice of appeal and a record on
appeal within thirty (30) days from notice of the judgment or final
order. However, on appeal in
habeas corpus cases shall be taken within forty-eight (48) hours from notice of the judgment or final order appealed from.
(A.M. No. 01-1-03-SC, 19 June 2001.)
[57] SEC. 5. –
Notice of appeal.
- The notice of appeal shall indicate the parties to the appeal,
specify the judgment or final order or part thereof appealed from,
specify the court to which the appeal is being taken, and state the
material dates showing the timeliness of the appeal.
[58] Suarez v. Villarama, supra note 50.
[59] City of Cebu v. Heirs of Candido Rubi, 366 Phil. 70 (1999).
[60] Manalili v. Court of Appeals, 345 Phil. 632 (1997);
Ledesma v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 113216, 5 September 1997, 278 SCRA 656.