566 Phil. 472
For review is the Decision
[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated January 28, 2002 and its Resolution
[2] dated July 17, 2002 in CA-G.R. CR No. 23853. The assailed decision affirmed with modification the Decision
[3]
of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 47, Tagbilaran City finding
petitioner Climaco Amora guilty of the crime of Destructive Arson
defined and penalized under Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1613. The
RTC sentenced petitioner to suffer the indeterminate penalty of 17
years, 4 months and 1 day of
reclusion temporal, as minimum, to 20 years of
reclusion temporal,
as maximum. The CA, while affirming the conviction, modified the
penalty imposed by the RTC, and sentenced the petitioner to an
indeterminate penalty of 12 years, 5 months and 11 days of
reclusion temporal, as minimum, to 18 years, 8 months and 1 day of
reclusion temporal, as maximum.
Gleaned from the records, the facts are as follows:
On June 27, 1993, a fire broke out in the building used by petitioner
as residence and as a bakery. The fire also gutted nearby houses.
Petitioner’s edifice was constructed on a lot owned by Adelfa Maslog
Tagaytay (Adelfa). Adelfa’s father had earlier entered into a contract
of lease with petitioner, whereby the latter was to use the lot and
erect a building thereon for a monthly rental of P50.00, for a period
of twenty (20) years. The lease contract provided that, upon the
expiration of the contract on July 10, 1993, ownership over the
building shall be transferred to the lessor.
On January 4, 1993, Adelfa informed petitioner that she would no longer renew the contract of lease.
On January 14, 1993, petitioner secured a fire insurance coverage over
the subject building from the Malayan Insurance Company for
P150,000.00, then obtained another fire insurance policy from Makati
Insurance Company for P300,000.00. It appears that the amounts of
insurance coverage were substantially higher than the building’s market
value (pegged at P52,590.00 in the 1985 Tax Declaration).
As found by the trial court, during the actual fire, petitioner was
within the premises, heard shouts from his neighbor, ignored the same
at first, and only later on did he finally stand up to see what was
going on.
The authorities who conducted an investigation submitted an Investigation Report which concluded with the finding that:
“(B)ased
on the testimonies of witnesses available and after a meticulous study
of the fire incident, the investigation concludes that the cause of
fire was intentionally done.”
Thus, petitioner was charged with the crime of Destructive Arson, in an Information
[4] which reads:
That, on or about the 27th day of June 1993, in the City of
Tagbilaran, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, with intent of gain, that is, of
claiming the fire insurance coverage procured by accused over the
building owned by him and located at CPG Ave., Tagbilaran City, and
which fire insurance coverage is substantially more than the actual
value of the building, did, then and there set the said building on
fire, causing as a result the burning and complete destruction of the
said building and in said manner also caused the complete burning and
destruction of the residential houses owned by Adelfa Maslog Tagaytay,
Fernando C. Maslog and Lucena C. Ganados to their damage and prejudice
in the amount to be proved in court.
Act committed contrary to the provision of P.D. No. 1613.
to which petitioner pleaded “not guilty.”
After trial on the merits, the RTC found petitioner guilty as charged,
and, as earlier stated, this finding was affirmed by the CA which
considered the following circumstances as adequate proof of
petitioner’s guilt:
First, there is motive on the part of [petitioner]
to commit arson, as the contract of lease over the building would soon
be terminated by owner Adelfa Maslog-Tagaytay, against his will.
Settled is the rule that a key element in the web of circumstantial
evidence is motive.
Second, [petitioner]
insured the property despite the fact that the lease would soon be
terminated and in fact, he had already been advised to vacate the place.
Third, the amount covering the fire insurance was substantially more than its market and assessed value. x x x.
Fourth, [petitioner] was seen in his residence immediately before the fire and subsequently in a neighbor’s shop during the fire.
Fifth, the Fire Investigators concluded in their report that the fire
was intentionally done. In the absence of any showing that these
investigators were ill-motivated in testifying against [petitioner], their testimonies are given weight and credit. x x x.[5]
Aggrieved, petitioner comes before us in a Petition for Review on
Certiorari
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, raising the sole question of
whether the guilt of petitioner was proven beyond reasonable doubt.
[6]
We deny the petition for lack of merit.
The applicability of P.D. 1613 is beyond cavil. The facts show that the
crime was committed in a place where bakeries, barber shops, tailoring
shops and other commercial and residential buildings were situated. In
fact, other structures were razed by the fire that originated from
petitioner’s establishment. It is clear that the place of the
commission of the crime was a residential and commercial building
located in an urban and populated area. This qualifying circumstance
places the offense squarely within the ambit of Section 2(7) of P.D.
1613, and converts it to “destructive arson,”
[7] viz.:
Section 2. Destructive Arson. The penalty of
Reclusion Temporal in its maximum period to Reclusion Perpetua shall be
imposed if the property burned is any of the following:
x x x x
7. Any building, whether used as a dwelling or not, situated in a populated or congested area.
It was also established that the subject building was insured against
fire for an amount substantially more than its market value, a fact
that has given rise to the unrebutted
prima facie evidence of arson, as provided in Section 6 of P.D. 1613:
Section 6. Prima facie evidence of Arson. Any of the following circumstances shall constitute prima facie evidence of arson:
x x x x
4. If the building or property is insured for substantially more than
its actual value at the time of the issuance of the policy.
Petitioner’s only real challenge against the CA decision is the absence
of direct evidence to prove his culpability which ostensibly negates
the appellate court’s finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
At the outset, it may be well to emphasize that direct evidence is not
the sole means of establishing guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
[8]
Established facts that form a chain of circumstances can lead the mind
intuitively or impel a conscious process of reasoning towards a
conviction. Indeed, rules on evidence and principles in jurisprudence
have long recognized that the accused may be convicted through
circumstantial evidence.
[9]
Circumstantial evidence has been defined as such evidence which goes to
prove a fact or series of facts, other than the facts in issue, which,
if proved, may tend by inference to establish the fact in issue.
Circumstantial evidence may be resorted to when to insist on direct
testimony would ultimately lead to setting felons free.
[10]
But for circumstantial evidence to be sufficient for a conviction, the
following requisites must be present, namely: (a) there is more than
one circumstance; (b) the facts from which the inferences are derived
have been proven; and (c) the combination of all the circumstances
results in a moral certainty that the accused, to the exclusion of all
others, is the one who has committed the crime.
[11]
These requisites obtain in the instant case. The trial court found that
the circumstances enumerated above sufficiently point to the petitioner
as the author of the crime. Indeed, all these circumstances, taken
together, are consistent with the hypothesis that petitioner is guilty,
and at the same time inconsistent with the hypothesis that he is
innocent.
[12]
We find no cogent reason to disturb the findings of the trial court as
affirmed by the appellate court. Case law states that findings of facts
of the trial court, especially if affirmed by the appellate court, are
given great respect, if not conclusive effect, by this Court unless the
trial court ignored, misunderstood or misinterpreted facts and
circumstances of substance which, if considered, would alter the
outcome of the case. Having had the unique advantage of observing and
monitoring at close range the demeanor and conduct of witnesses, the
trial court is in a better position to pass judgment on the credibility
of witnesses and the probative weight of their testimonies.
[13]
As to the penalty to be imposed, the Court of Appeals correctly modified the same. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the
maximum term of the penalty shall be that which, in view of the attending circumstances, could be properly imposed, while the
minimum term of which shall be within the range of the penalty next lower to that prescribed by the Code for the offense.
[14]
The penalty prescribed for the offense is
reclusion temporal in its maximum period to
reclusion perpetua.
Considering that no mitigating nor aggravating circumstance attended
the commission of the offense, the proper imposable penalty, and thus
the maximum term of the indeterminate penalty, is 18 years, 8 months
and 1 day to 20 years. In determining the penalty next lower in degree,
Section 3, Article 61 of the
Revised Penal Code applies:
Article 61. Rules for graduating penalties.
x x x x
- When the penalty prescribed for the crime is
composed of one or two indivisible penalties and the maximum period of
another divisible penalty, the penalty next lower in degree shall be
composed of the medium and minimum periods of the proper divisible
penalty and the maximum period of that immediately following in said
respective graduated scale.
In the instant case, the penalty lower in degree is
prision mayor maximum to reclusion temporal medium. Hence, the minimum term of the indeterminate penalty shall be within the range of the aforesaid lower degree.
The CA, therefore, correctly meted the indeterminate penalty of twelve (12) years, five (5) months and eleven (11) days of
reclusion temporal, as
minimum, to eighteen (18) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as maximum.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is
DENIED.
The Decision of the Court of Appeals, dated January 28, 2002, and its
Resolution dated July 17, 2002 in CA-G.R. CR No. 23853, are
AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Ynares-Santiago, (Chairperson), Austria-Martinez, Corona, and
Reyes, JJ., concur.
[1] Penned by Associate
Justice Mercedes Gozo-Dadole, with Associate Justices Salvador J.
Valdez, Jr. and Juan Q. Enriquez, Jr., concurring;
rollo, pp. 22-36.
[2] Rollo, p. 38.
[3] Penned by Presiding Judge Raineldo T. Son, CA
rollo, pp. 15-32.
[4] CA
rollo, pp. 13-14.
[5] Rollo, p. 28.
[6] Id. at 14.
[7] People v. Omotoy, 334 Phil. 801, 810 (1997).
[8] Gan v. People, G.R. No. 165884, April 23, 2007;
People v. Casitas, Jr., 445 Phil. 407, 417 (2003).
[9] People v. Casitas, Jr., supra, id.
[10] Gan v. People, supra note 8.
[11] Id.;
People v. Casitas, Jr., supra note 8, at 417;
People v. Operaña, Jr., 397 Phil. 48, 68 (2000).
[12] People v. Operaña, supra, id.
[13] People v. Gallego, 453 Phil. 825, 846 (2003).
[14] Section 1, Act No. 4103 as amended by Act No. 4225.