479 Phil. 636
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
WHEREFORE, judgment for specific performance is hereby rendered ordering defendant to execute in favor of plaintiffs a deed of absolute sale covering that parcel of land embraced in and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 327403 (now TCT No. 331582) of the Registry of Deeds of Quezon City, together with all the improvements existing thereon, free from all liens and encumbrances and once accomplished, to immediately deliver said document of sale to plaintiffs, and upon receipt thereof, the plaintiffs are ordered to pay defendants the whole balance of the purchase price amounting to P1,190,000.00 in cash. Transfer Certificate of Title No. 331582 of the Registry of Deeds of Quezon City in the name of intervenor is hereby cancelled and declared to be without any force and effect. Defendants and intervenor, and all other persons claiming under them, are hereby ordered to vacate the subject property and deliver possession thereof to plaintiffs. Plaintiffs’ claim for damages and attorney’s fees, as well as the counterclaims of defendants and intervenors, are hereby dismissed.The Mabanag Spouses, through the respondent as their counsel, appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 23000. In its Decision[4] promulgated on December 16, 1991, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the RTC in toto. Unsatisfied with the judgment of the appellate court, the respondent elevated the matter to this Court, docketed as G.R. No. 103577. The petition for review was dismissed, and the judgment appealed from was, likewise, affirmed in toto in the Court’s Decision[5] dated October 7, 1996.[6] The Court found that the questioned sale of the parcel of land between therein petitioners and Mabanag on February 18, 1985 was correctly upheld by both courts below.
No pronouncement as to costs.
So ordered.[3]
It is basic that a counsel may resort to all legal reliefs and remedies available and to invoke all pertinent provisions of the law and rules, to protect the interest of a client in order that justice may be done and duly administered. In fact, it is not only the right of a counsel to do so but rather, it is his bounden and sacred obligation as an officer of the court and as an advocate who is tasked to protect the interest of a client within the bounds of law.The respondent also alleged that the complainant’s failure to disclose the pendency of Civil Case No. Q-01-43396 in the certification against non-forum shopping in the case at bar was in gross violation of Section 5, Rule 7 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. Because of this, the respondent reasoned, the complaint should be dismissed.
…
Thus, in Civil Case No. Q-91-31268, with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, which is the first complaint, what was challenged therein is the eligibility of Ramona Patricia Alcaraz, to own urban commercial lands, within the ambit of Batas Pambansa Blg. 185, considering that she is not a Filipino citizen or at least, she does not appear nor was she alleged to be so. Evidently, therefore, this is not intended to forestall the execution of the judgment which must be executed, pursuant to the rules that is, in accordance with the dispositive portion thereof. Otherwise stated, the execution, if it must be undertaken, must be made in accordance with and consistently (sic) the dispositive portion thereof. It is well settled that execution must conform to that ordained or decreed in the dispositive portion of the decision. …
As shown in the earlier narrations, the foregoing case is presently on appeal with the Honorable Court of Appeals and is still pending thereat, up to the present.
With regards to the petition for certiorari filed with the Honorable Court of Appeals, docketed thereat as CA-G.R. SP No. 4770 (sic), whereby a decision was already rendered and such decision is already final and executory, the issues therein disposed as raised, pertinently pertained to the questioned and assailed Orders of the trial court which granted the writ of execution, upon motion of parties who are purportedly the principals of the complainant and his counsel. After the denial of the said petition and the finality of the judgment of such denial, partial execution ensued and was not of course, even attempted to be forestalled by the herein respondent counsel and his clients.
However, the execution being undertaken later on was shown to have been exceeded when, despite the fact that there is no showing that the parties who were supposed to execute a deed of absolute sale pursuant to the dispositive portion of the subject decision being sought to be implemented, had refused or at least failed, after demand, to so execute and perform the foregoing acts, the trial court ordered its branch clerk of court to perform the said acts. In fact, it was pointed out that it does not even appear that the other parties whose acts are sought, were already served with the writ of execution; hence, the trial court’s act was without basis and/or premature. Nevertheless, the trial court’s branch clerk of court notwithstanding, proceeded as in fact, executed the deed of absolute sale in favor of the Alcarazes. This act of the trial court, with due respect, unduly created chaos and confusion, which are antithetical to its function for an orderly administration of justice and the fair approximation thereof.
The matter was, thereafter, complicated further, when despite the fact that the citizenships of the Alcarazes were not indicated in the deed of absolute sale which appears to have been presented with the Register of Deeds of Quezon City, the said Register of Deeds cancelled the title of the client of the herein respondent counsel and issued a new title over the subject property in favor of the Alcarazes and in order to validate and to give a semblance of legality or color to the validity of the issuance of the said title, by making it appear that the Alcarazes are Filipino citizens, ALTHOUGH THERE IS NO INDICATION OF THEIR CITIZENSHIP IN THE SUBJECT DEED OF ABSOLUTE SALE, nevertheless, indicated in the new title that the Alcarazes are Filipinos.
Thus, the herein respondent counsel, in behalf of his client and to protect their interest, this time, was constrained to institute a petition with the Honorable Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 55576, whereby they assailed the jurisdiction of the trial judge in decreeing the foregoing execution of acts not included in the disposition portion of the decision being sought to be executed and to perform acts within the exclusive competence and direction of the Register of Deeds pursuant to Providential Decree No. 1529, otherwise known as the Board Registration Decree. This case is still pending with the Honorable Court of Appeals up to the present; hence, it is misleading for the complainant to even insinuate that a decision thereon is already final, which, of course, as shown in the earlier discussions, are farthest from the truth.
While all of the foregoing issues were still pending as they are still pending up to the present, the complainant and counsel, purportedly sold and transferred the subject property, using the title being assailed and questioned in CA-G.R. SP No. 55576, to a third person, one Emelita Mariano, with the purported deed of absolute sale being notarized by the same counsel of the herein complainant, Atty. Oscar R. Ferrer, who is representing the Alcarazes in the abovesaid cases; hence, he cannot feign ignorance of the pendency of the said cases and the issues involved therein which cast questions on the said title and, thus, rendered the purported transfer or sale fatally defective.
True to his duty to his client and as an officer of the court and in order to maintain the integrity, dignity and orderliness in the administration of justice, herein respondent counsel, filed in behalf of his client, the Complaint in Civil Case No. Q-01-43396, on February 15, 2001, with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, for the annulment of the title issued in favor of the third person, Emelita L. Mariano, for the annulment of the Deed of Absolute Sale to her and Damages with prayer for a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction.
When no temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction were issued by the trial court, herein respondent counsel, in behalf of his client, availed of the legally available remedy of a special civil action of certiorari, assailing on jurisdictional/grave abuse of discretion grounds, the refusal and/or failure of the trial court to issue the prayed for preliminary injunctive reliefs, among others. Thus, respondent, as counsel for his client, filed with the Honorable Court of Appeals, on July 24, 2001, a petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 65783, which is still pending resolution of the said Honorable Court up to the present.[13]
… In order to stall the execution of the favorable decision obtained by my principals Concepcion Alcaraz and her daughter Ramona Patricia Alcaraz as early as March 1, 1989, in Civil Case No. Q-44134, respondent acting in behalf of his clients, went to this Court three (3) times in said case and several times also to the Court of Appeals on appeals, petitions for certiorari, etc.
… Although respondent admits the fact that the subject decision of the court a quo is already final and executory, he insists that “the issues in the other cases are indeed different.” He argues in his comment that the issue in his petition (Annex “2” to Comment) pertained to the issuance of a writ of execution to implement the abovesaid final and executory decision.” This is plain hair-splitting aimed to muddle the issues and ultimately mislead the Honorable Court.[15]
… Neither purely civil not purely criminal, they do not involve a trial of an action or a suit, but are rather investigations by the Court into the conduct of one of its officers. Not being intended to inflict punishment, [they are] in no sense a criminal prosecution. Accordingly, there is neither a plaintiff nor a prosecutor therein. [They] may be initiated by the Court motu proprio. Public interest is [their] primary objective, and the real question for determination is whether or not the attorney is still a fit person to be allowed the privileges as such. Hence, in the exercise of its disciplinary powers, the Court merely calls upon a member of the Bar to account for his actuations as an officer of the Court with the end in view of preserving the purity of the legal profession and the proper and honest administration of justice by purging the profession of members who by their misconduct have prove[n] themselves no longer worthy to be entrusted with the duties and responsibilities pertaining to the office of an attorney. ….[18]As such, the instant complaint cannot be dismissed as prayed for by the respondent.
The issue being raised by the respondent on behalf of his clients in all the complaints, appeals, petitions and motions he has filed is the question of non-eligibility of Ramona Alcaraz to acquire property in the Philippines and the nullity of the sale between Alcaraz and the Coronels. These issues have already been passed upon and upheld by both the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court. In the case docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 65783, the First Division of the Court of Appeals “observed that Mabanag’s counsel, (respondent herein) has questioned the non-eligibility of Ramona Alcaraz to acquire property in the Philippines for the nth time although as early as 30 July 1998, the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 47710 had already affirmed the lower court’s ruling that the petitioner is not the proper party to question the eligibility of Alcaraz to own property in the Philippines. The petition for review on certiorari before the Supreme Court in G.R. No. 135820 upheld the right of Ramona Alcaraz as one of the vendees in the deed of sale. The Supreme Court passed judgment on her capacity to buy the property. The issue was recycled in CA-G.R. SP No. 55576, Entry of Judgment was already issued by the Supreme Court on 2 January 1997. However, petitioner has succeeded for more than five (5) years now to hold at bay the full implementation of the judgment in point.” Likewise, in dismissing the complaint filed by respondent on behalf of his client before RTC QC Branch 83 docketed as Case No. Q-97-31268 entitled Mabanag vs. Patricia Ramona Alcaraz, et. al. to declare Patricia Alcaraz ineligible to acquire real property, the court observed that for failure of the plaintiffs to get a favorable decision of the earlier case, they tried to prevent the execution by disqualifying herein defendant. (Emphasis ours).It has, thus, been clearly established that in filing such numerous petitions in behalf of his client, the respondent thereby engaged in forum shopping. The essence of forum shopping is the filing of multiple suits involving the same parties for the same cause of action, either simultaneously or successively, for the purpose of obtaining a favorable judgment. It exists when, as a result of an adverse opinion in one forum, a party seeks a favorable opinion in another, or when he institutes two or more actions or proceedings grounded on the same cause to increase the chances of obtaining a favorable decision. An important factor in determining the existence of forum shopping is the vexation caused to the courts and the parties-litigants by the filing of similar cases to claim substantially the same reliefs.[21]
In the case docketed as CA-G.R. SP [No.] 65783, a pertinent portion of the Court of Appeals decision reads “While lawyers owe (sic) entire devotion to the interest of their client’s right, they should not forget that they are officers of the court bound to exert every effort to assist in the speedy and efficient administration of justice – they should not, therefore, misuse the rules of procedure to defeat the ends of justice or unduly delay a case, impede the execution of a judgment or misuse the court processes (Eternal Gardens Memorial Park Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, 293 SCRA 622).”[20]
a) Petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with prayer for temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction filed with the Court of Appeals on May 19, 1998 and docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 47710, entitled Catalina B. Mabanag, et al. v. Hon. Estrella T. Estrada, et al.;[8] Rollo, p. 5.
b) Civil Case No. Q-97-31268 entitled Spouses Mabanag v. Ramona Alcaraz and the Register of Deeds of Quezon City, for “declaration of inability to acquire real property and damages” before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 91, which was dismissed on July 9, 1999 on the grounds of res judicata and forum shopping;
c) CA-G.R. CV No. 65124 filed before the Court of Appeals questioning the ruling of the trial court in Civil Case No. Q-97-31268;
d) Petition for review dated December 1, 1998 before the Supreme Court, docketed as G.R. No. 135820, to review the decision of the Court of Appeals dismissing CA-G.R. SP No. 47710;
e) Special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court filed with the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 55576, questioning the orders of the RTC of Quezon City, Branch 83, in Civil Case No. Q-44134 dated July 29, 1999 and September 23, 1999; and,
f) Civil Case No. Q-01-43396 entitled Catalina Balais-Mabanag v. Emelita L. Mariano, Concepcion D. Alcaraz and Ramona P. Alcaraz, Ricardo A. Foronda, Atty. Cecilia V. Santoyo and the Register of Deeds of Quezon City, before the RTC of Quezon City, Branch 80, for annulment of sale.
We are not impressed. We find the trial court’s stand on the matter to be legally unassailable. In the first place, petitioner is not the proper party to question the qualification or eligibility of Ramona Alcaraz. It is the State, through the Office of the Solicitor General, which has the legal personality and the authority to question the qualification of Ramona Alcaraz to own rural or urban land. In the second place, the decision sought to be executed has already gained finality. As held by the Supreme Court, when a court’s judgment or order becomes final and executory it is the ministerial duty of the trial court to issue a writ of execution to enforce its judgment (Rollo, p. 65-66).
a) On December 5, 2000, the Twelfth Division of the Court of Appeals had already affirmed the decision of the lower court that the authority of the Register of Deeds is confined only to the determination of whether all the requisites for registration are complied with. To authorize him to determine whether Ramona Alcaraz is qualified to own real property in the Philippines is to clothe the Register of Deeds with judicial powers which only courts can exercise.
b) The issue as to whether Ramona Alcaraz is qualified to own real property had been passed upon by the Third Division of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 47710.
c) The Third Division of the Supreme Court in G.R. No. 103577, when it ruled on October 7, 1996 that the sale of the subject land between Alcaraz and the Coronels perfected before the sale between Mabanag and the Coronels, was correctly upheld by both courts (Report and Recommendation dated October 3, 2003, p. 4).
The Supreme Court Third Division as well as in G.R. No. 103577, on October 7, 1996, ruled: “Thus the sale of the subject parcel of land between petitioners and Romana P. Alcaraz, perfected on February 6, 1985, prior to that between petitioners and Catalina B. Mabanag on February 18, 1985, was correctly upheld by both the lower courts below.[”]
Obviously, the lower court’s judgment has become final and executory as per Entry of Judgment issued by the Supreme Court. “It is axiomatic that final and executory judgment can no longer be attacked by any of the parties or be modified, directly or indirectly, even by the highest court of the land…” (Annex “E,” Rollo, p. 74).