461 Phil. 437
PANGANIBAN, J.:
"WHEREFORE, premises considered, the present petition is hereby DENIED DUE COURSE and accordingly DISMISSED, for lack of merit. The Joint Decision dated February 5, 2001 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 20 of Cauayan, Isabela which embodied the assailed judgment in Civil Case No. 20-1125 and affirmed the Decision dated September 1, 2000 of the Municipal Trial Court of Cauayan, Isabela, dismissing the complaint for ejectment of the petitioners in Civil Case No. 2325, entitled ` Heirs of Demetrio Melchor represented by Cleto Melchor v. Julio Melchor, ' is hereby AFFIRMED and REITERATED.The assailed Resolution denied petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration.
"Costs against the petitioners." [4]
"Petitioners, who are the heirs of DEMETRIO MELCHOR, claim to be the owners, by way of succession, of the subject property allegedly in possession of respondent JULIO MELCHOR. The subject property is a portion of the twenty (20) hectares of land registered in the name of PEDRO MELCHOR, evidenced by Original Certificate of Title No.I-6020 of the Registry of Deeds for Isabela. The said property was purchased by the late DEMETRIO MELCHOR from PEDRO MELCHOR, the deceased father of herein respondent JULIO MELCHOR. During the lifetime of the late DEMETRIO MELCHOR, a request for the approval of the Deed of Sale dated February 14, 1947 between DEMETRIO MELCHOR and PEDRO MELCHOR was made to the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources on September 4, 1953, which was subsequently approved. Since February 14, 1947 up to the present, petitioners further allege that respondent has been occupying the subject property and has been harvesting crops thereon and using it for grassing cows and carabaos.
"A demand letter dated August 21, 1999 was allegedly sent by the petitioners to the respondent, demanding him to vacate and surrender the said property, but the latter refused. The disagreement reached the barangay authorities, which case was not amicably settled, resulting in the issuance of a certification to file action.
"Petitioners filed against respondent a complaint for ejectment before the MTC of Cauayan, Isabela which they subsequently refiled in their Second Amended Complaint, docketed as Civil Case No. 2325 and dated May 31, 2001, to accommodate additional allegations therein.
"For his part, the defendant (now respondent) in Civil Case No. 2325 principally raised the matter of ownership by alleging affirmative/special defenses, among others, that the parcel of land in possession of the defendant is registered in the name of ANTONIA QUITERAS, the deceased mother of the defendant, as per Transfer of Certificate of Title No. T-274828 of the Registry of Deeds for Isabela, and that the same property is now owned by the defendant and his three (3) sisters and one (1) brother, having inherited the same from their late mother, ANTONIA QUITERAS."The Decision dated September 1, 2000, which was penned by acting MTC Judge BERNABE B. MENDOZA, was rendered in favor of the respondent, the pertinent portions of which read:"On appeal, the Regional Trial Court, Branch 20 of Cauayan, Isabela, presided over by Executive Judge HENEDINO P. EDUARTE, rendered, together with another related complaint for ejectment, i.e., Civil Case No. 20-1126, the Joint Decision dated February 5, 2001, the decretal portion of which reads:
`There is no allegation that plaintiffs have been deprived of the possession of the land by force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth.
`The dispossession was made in 1947. As such, ejectment is not the proper remedy.
`WHEREFORE, a judgment is hereby rendered dismissing the case.
`No pronouncement as to costs.
`SO ORDERED.'`WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:
`1. Affirming the decision in Civil Case No. Br. 20-1126 entitled, `Heirs of Liberato Lumelay, et al. vs. Heirs of Julio Melchor.' Costs against the appellants.
`2. Affirming the decision in Civil Case No. 201-1125, entitled, `Heirs of Demetrio Melchor, et al. vs. Julio Melchor.' Costs against the appellants.
`SO ORDERED.'"[5]
"The Court of Appeals committed a grave error when it ruled that the Second Amended Complaint does not allege a sufficient cause of action for x x x unlawful detainer."[8]
"(1) In an action for forcible entry, the plaintiff must allege and prove that he was in prior physical possession of the premises until deprived thereof, while in illegal detainer, the plaintiff need not have been in prior physical possession; and (2) in forcible entry, the possession by the defendant is unlawful ab initio because he acquires possession by force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth, while in unlawful detainer, possession is originally lawful but becomes illegal by reason of the termination of his right of possession under his contract with the plaintiff. In pleadings filed in courts of special jurisdiction, the special facts giving the court jurisdiction must be specially alleged and set out. Otherwise, the complaint is demurrable."[20]As correctly held by the appellate court, "[f]orcible entry must be ruled out as there was no allegation that the petitioners were denied possession of the subject property through any of the means stated in Section 1, Rule 70 [of the Rules of Court]."[21]
"The jurisdictional facts must appear on the face of the complaint. When the complaint fails to aver facts constitutive of forcible entry or unlawful detainer, as where it does not state how entry was effected or how and when dispossession started, as in the case at bar, the remedy should either be an accion publiciana or an accion reivindicatoria in the proper regional trial court.WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED, and the assailed Decision AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.
"If private respondent is indeed the owner of the premises subject of this suit and she was unlawfully deprived of the real right of possession or the ownership thereof, she should present her claim before the regional trial court in an accion publiciana or an accion reivindicatoria, and not before the municipal trial court in a summary proceeding of unlawful detainer or forcible entry. For even if one is the owner of the property, the possession thereof cannot be wrested from another who had been in the physical or material possession of the same for more than one year by resorting to a summary action for ejectment. This is especially true where his possession thereof was not obtained through the means or held under the circumstances contemplated by the rules on summary ejectment."
"SECTION 1. Who may institute proceedings, and when. - Subject to the provisions of the next succeeding section, a person deprived of the possession of any land or building by force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth, or a lessor, vendor, vendee, or other person against whom the possession of any land or building is unlawfully withheld after the expiration or termination of the right to hold possession, by virtue of any contract, express or implied, or the legal representatives or assigns of any such lessor, vendor, vendee, or other person, may, at any time within one (1) year after such unlawful deprivation or withholding of possession, bring an action in the proper Municipal Trial Court against the person or persons unlawfully withholding or depriving of possession, or any person or persons claiming under them, for the restitution of such possession, together with damages and costs."[10] Barba v. Court of Appeals, GR No. 126638, February 6, 2002; citing Spouses Benitez v. Court of Appeals, 334 Phil 216, January 16, 1997.