579 Phil. 83
VELASCO JR., J.:
That on or about the 29th day of December, 1994, at around 9:30 o'clock in the evening, in San Carlos City, Pangasinan, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, armed with a gun and with intent to kill, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and shoot Ernesto Amarillo and Soledad Ferrer, thereby inflicting upon Ernesto Amarillo serious and mortal wounds which were the direct and immediate cause of his death, to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of said victim x x x; and that as a consequence of the shooting of Soledad Ferrer by said accused, the crime of Homicide would have been produced by reasons of causes independent of the will of the accused and that is due to the timely and able medical attendance rendered to Soledad Ferrer, which prevented her death.When arraigned on March 28, 1995, petitioner pleaded not guilty to the charge. During trial, the prosecution presented Benjamin Cabansag, a tricycle driver and resident of Pagal, San Carlos City, Pangasinan, who allegedly witnessed the shootings. Benjamin testified that on December 29, 1994, between 9:00 p.m. and 9:30 p.m., he was conversing with Federico Castro and Alfredo Paragas in front of the house of Kagawad Cancino in Brgy. Pagal, San Carlos City. At about that time, petitioner, a neighbor of Cancino, arrived and, upon alighting from a tricycle, kicked the gate as he entered his own house. Not long after, petitioner came out with an armalite rifle in hand, proceeded towards the middle of the road, fired shots upwards for about 15 minutes, and then started harassing passing tricycles. A single motorbike later passed by with the unsuspecting Amarillo and Ferrer on board. According to Benjamin, petitioner fired at and hit the passing duo. Amarillo died on the spot. Also hit and killed was petitioner's brother, Loreto Soriano. Ferrer, on the other hand, survived, but suffered serious injuries which eventually prevented her from testifying at the trial.[5] As the CA would later conclude, the injuries Ferrer sustained, consisting of lacerations, contusion, ecchymose, and cerebral laceration, definitely could not have been caused by bullets but must have been logically due to Ferrer's violent fall to the ground.
Contrary to Article 249 in relation to Article 250 of the Revised Penal Code.[4]
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, the Court finds the accused, Rene Soriano guilty beyond reasonable doubt with crime charged, and Homicide being the graver offense, the accused is hereby sentenced to an Indeterminate prison terms of six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum to twelve (12) years and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as maximum, and to indemnify the heirs of Ernesto Amarillo and Soledad Ferrer in the amount of Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) and Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00) respectively as civil indemnity, and to pay the costs.[12]
WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT CONVICTING HEREIN PETITIONER DESPITE THE MISERABLE FAILURE OF THE PROSECUTION TO PROVE HIS GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.Essentially, petitioner faults the appellate court for making much, as did the trial court, of Benjamin's testimony as basis of its judgment of conviction, petitioner's well-founded alibi notwithstanding.
As to the documents presented by the accused supporting his theory that he was in Kalinga Apayao, the Court cannot accord its reliance on the same because alibi cannot prevail over the positive identification of prosecution eyewitness. The facility which the accused can secure documents to bolster his claim that he was not present at the scene of the crime cannot be denied considering that the sources of such documents are his fellow soldiers many of whom are his subordinates. Even assuming arguendo that the said documents are real, in the face of the clear and positive testimony of the prosecution witness regarding the participation of the accused in the crime, the accused's alibi dwindles into [nothing]. x x x However, in the case at bar, the eyewitness pointing to the herein accused as the author of the crime has positively and in a straightforward manner identified the accused as the one who committed the crime charged.[17]Citing the RTC's Decision, the CA rejected the soldiers' testimony to prop up petitioner's defense of alibi, thus:
While it may be true that the witnesses who testified on the whereabouts of the accused are not related to him by blood, they belong to a group of men where loyalty and obedience are the first order. How many battles have been fought with a man in uniform sacrificing his own dear life just to save a brother in arms? Sadly to say, the seeming formidable defense of alibi is [dwarfed] by the positive identification of the accused by an eyewitness whose candid and straightforward account on what transpired on December 29, 1994 the defense failed to shatter.[18]Against positive evidence, alibi becomes most unsatisfactory. Alibi cannot prevail over the positive identification of a credible witness. In this case, Benjamin testified that he saw Soriano on a shooting spree on December 29, 1994, as follows:
Atty. M. Ramos (Q). Sometimes on December 29, 1994 about 9:00 to 9:30 o'clock in the evening do you remember where you were?Like the CA, the Court cannot accord cogency to the defense's characterization of Benjamin's behavior, i.e., "incredible and unnatural," during and right after the shooting incident. As aptly observed by the appellate court:
[Benjamin] Cabansag (A). Yes, sir.
x x x x
Q. Kindly inform this Honorable Court?
A. I was in front of the house of Kagawad Cancino, sir.
Q. Did [you] have any companion at that time when you were in front of the house of Kagawad Cancino?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Who were your companion[s] at that time?
A. I was with Federico Castro, Alfredo Paragas and no more, sir.
Q. And what were you doing there at that time in the company of Alfredo Paragas and the other person you have just mentioned?
A. We were just stand by, sir.
x x x x
Q. While you were there together with Mr. Paragas and Mr. Castro, do you remember if there was any unusual thing that happened at that date and time?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. What was that incident about?
A. When Rene Soriano alighted from the tricycle and kicked their gate, sir.
x x x x
Q. Now after kicking the gate of their house, what did Rene Soriano do after that?
A. He got a gun, sir.
Q. From where did Rene Soriano get the gun?
A. Inside their house, sir.
Q. Do you know what kind of gun did Rene Soriano take out from their house?
x x x x
A. Armalite, sir.
x x x x
Q. What did Rene Soriano do after he got that armalite from their house?
A. He went outside and went to the middle of the road, [and fired shots] sir.
x x x x
Q. In what direction where he fired shots while he was in the middle of the road?
A. At the town proper, he [accosted] tricycles, sir.
Q. While you saw Rene Soriano went in the middle of the road and you said you saw him fire shots towards town proper, where were you at that time?
A. I was in front of the house of Kagawad Cancino, sir.
x x x x
Q. How far were you when Rene Soriano shot those 2 persons riding tandem on a motor bike, from where Rene Soriano was?
A. About 7 meters, sir.
x x x x
Q. Before this incident, do you know this Rene Soriano whom you are referring to?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. How long have you known this Rene Soriano?
A. I was ahead in the Elementary grades sir and he follows me, and we are neighbors.
x x x x
Q. Now this person you have just pointed before this Honorable Court, is he the same Rene Soriano whom you saw on the night of December 29, 1994 at around 9:00 to 9:30 o'clock in the evening that shot 2 persons riding on a motor bike?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Now, that was evening Mr. Witness or it was a night time how were you able to identify that that person whom you saw on December 29, 1994 at around 9:30 o'clock in the evening is the same person that you have just pointed to inside this courtroom?
A. There is a fluorescent lamp in front of Kagawad Cancino, and also a light in front the house of Rene Soriano, sir.[19]
To Our mind, there is nothing incredible in [Benjamin] Cabansag's reaction of not running away or seeking cover immediately upon seeing appellant came out from house with an armalite and firing the same at random to the extent of hitting and killing his very own brother, Loreto Soriano. x x xThe ensuing parallel observation of the Solicitor General also deserves mention:
In People vs. Roncal, 272 SCRA 242 [1997], and again in People vs. Palma, 308 SCRA 466 [1999], the Supreme Court, citing Its earlier pronouncements, made it clear "that different people react differently to a given type of situation, and there is no standard form of human behavioral response when one is confronted with a strange, startling or frightful experience", adding that "[O]ne person's spontaneous or unthinking, or even instinctive, response to a horrid and repulsive stimulus may be aggression, while another person's reaction may be cold indifference".[20]
x x x Diversities in reaction are to be expected from different persons due to their psychological conditions and make-up. In this case, [Benjamin] Cabansag opted to stay put during the incident in question, thus seeing with his own eyes the minutest detail of petitioner's criminal act. This reaction on the part of Cabansag cannot be said to be unnatural. The incident that he saw was a violent stimulus that impelled him not to move where he was, though it may not have been the reaction of another person under the same circumstances. The same is true when he opted to keep silent about the incident immediately thereafter. Delay in reporting a criminal incident as long as it was fully explained is not an indication of fabricated charges [People vs. Rafanan, 182 SCRA 811 (1990)].[21]What perhaps might be viewed as unnatural and certainly inconsistent to human experience was petitioner's reaction to the death of his own brother, Loreto. Benjamin, police investigator Doldol, and petitioner's own aunt, Carmen,[22] all testified that Loreto was among the victims on that fateful night of December 29, 1994. The defense neither contradicted the witnesses' account of Loreto's death nor offered any explanation as to why petitioner and his family did not initiate a thorough probe into their kin's death. Petitioner merely testified that he learned of his brother's death while in camp on January 3, 1995.[23] He admitted that after the burial of his brother, he immediately went back to camp to resume his duties without as much as bothering to inquire from the police about how his brother died.[24] Itself puzzled by this odd behavior of the petitioner, the trial court wrote:
x x x The credibility of the accused is made suspect because the defense from their own evidence, his brother was also among the fatalities of the incident that occurred in the evening of December 29, 1994. His silence on the matter of death of his own brother is not one normally the outrage of which is to be suffered in silence, and yet, no complaint was ever filed against anybody responsible for the death of Loreto Soriano. This must be one for the books considering that the killing was perpetuated almost in front of the house of the accused.[25]The Court, like the trial court, finds petitioner's behavior indeed strange. Based on investigation reports and testimonies given below, the death of Loreto was inevitably linked to the shooting of Amarillo and Ferrer. Petitioner's silence regarding his brother's death raises some questions as to his credibility and even his alibi. Is it possible that a formal investigation of Loreto's death will place petitioner at the scene of the crime, making his liability for the fate of Amarillo and Ferrer very much easier to establish? Is it possible that petitioner's unusual silence on the death of his brother is avoidance of being implicated in the crimes charged herein, as well as an additional and more serious charge for Loreto's death? Petitioner's unexplainable reaction to his brother's death casts a doubt on his credibility and the tenability of his alibi. Silence regarding the circumstances surrounding the unjustified death of a family member is contrary to human experience.
We may add that no convincing evidence has been adduced by appellant to establish his imputation of ill-motive on the part of [Benjamin] Cabansag. [Absent] such a convincing proof, the presumption arises that Cabansag was not so ill-motivated, and therefore, his testimony deserves full faith and credit.[26] x x xLastly, petitioner assails the prosecution's failure to present other witnesses who could have had corroborated Benjamin's testimony. The assault is untenable for "[t]he testimony of a single witness, if credible, positive and satisfies the court beyond reasonable doubt, is sufficient to convict. After all, witnesses are weighed, not numbered."[27] The Court notes with approval the CA's reasons for making short shrift of petitioner's above posture. Wrote the CA:
If at all, therefore, whatever [Benjamin] Cabansag's companions could have mouthed in court could at best be merely corroborative or cumulative, reason for which their non-presentation could not have given rise to the disputable presumption that there was an attempt to suppress evidence (People vs. Pagal, 272 SCRA 443). In any event, considering that the same companions are likewise available to the defense, it puzzles Us why appellant, despite his perception that they would give an account derogatory to the prosecution's cause, did not bother to utilize them as his own witnesses.Well-settled is the principle that the evaluation of the credibility of witnesses is a matter particularly falling within the authority of the trial court, as it had the opportunity to observe the demeanor of the witnesses on the stand.[29] A trial court's assessment of the credibility of a witness is entitled to great weight--even conclusive and binding if not tainted with arbitrariness or oversight of some fact or circumstance of weight and influence.[30]
Besides, it is not for appellant to dictate on the prosecution the choice of its witnesses, as it is the prerogative of each party to determine what evidence should be presented.[28]
For one, [Benjamin] Cabansag could not have been mistaken in positively identifying appellant as the perpetrator of the crime. As testified to by this witness, there was light at the scene, and he was at a distance of only about seven (7) meters from appellant (TSN, August 7, 1995, p. 8). Cabansag, therefore, could very well see appellant when the latter fired his armalite. For sure, Cabansag could not have been mistaken appellant for somebody else, what with the undisputed fact that the two (2) were former neighbors and schoolmates (Ibid, p. 7).[32]It may be stated at this juncture that Benjamin's testimony regarding the weapon the petitioner used, an armalite rifle, is consistent with the physical evidence obtained at the scene of the crime, as SPO2 Marciano de los Santos described in his testimony.[33] This circumstance, to be sure, adds another convincing dimension to the credibility of Benjamin as witness.
Unlike in the crime of rape, we grant moral damages in murder or homicide only when the heirs of the victim have alleged and proved mental suffering. However, as borne out by human nature and experience, a violent death invariably and necessarily brings about emotional pain and anguish on the part of the victim's family. It is inherently human to suffer sorrow, torment, pain and anger when a loved one becomes the victim of a violent brutal killing. Such violent death or brutal killing not only steals from the family of the deceased his precious life, deprives them forever of his love, affection and support, x x x but often leaves them with the gnawing feeling that an injustice has been done to them. For this reason, moral damages must be awarded even in the absence of allegation and proof of the heirs' emotional suffering.[34] x x xIn accordance with jurisprudence,[35] the amount of moral damages is pegged at PhP 50,000.