484 Phil. 194
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
According to the complainant, the petition of its employees was essentially an action for declaratory relief, and as such, it is to be assumed that their intention therein was mainly to put forth the question of construction or the validity of Rep. Act. No. 6758, also known as the Salary Standardization Law, and its implementing rules. The complainant avers that there was no justifiable controversy to speak of in the said case, and that the respondent judge should have confined his judgment only to the question of law involved therein. Considering that in a proceeding for declaratory judgment, the relief which may be sought is only limited to a declaration of rights, and not a determination or trial of issues, the respondent judge was in grave and patent error in awarding detailed claims to the said employees.
1) Special Order, dated July 8, 2002, granting the employees’ Motion for Execution of Judgment Pending Appeal; 2) Order, dated August 22, 2002, denying MCIAA’s Motion for Reconsideration of the July 8, 2002 Order; 3) Order, dated November 29, 2002 allowing the implementation of the writ of execution; and 4) Order, dated March 18, 2003, ordering PNB to release the amount of P2,455,821.11 directly to Atty. Rolindo A. Navarro.[19]
We respectfully submit that it was incumbent upon the trial court to have, foremost, acted on herein Complainant MCIAA’s pending “Motion for Reconsideration,” either giving due course thereto or to deny the same, stating with certainty, the facts and the law on which said resolutory Order would be based, before any subsequent Order to withhold or release any of Complainant MCIAA’s funds, with any of its depository Banks, should have been made. At the very least, Complainant MCIAA is entitled to a definite ruling thereon otherwise it shall have been denied its day in court.In his Comment dated July 15, 2003, the respondent traversed the allegations of the complainant in this wise:
…
… Apropos, the very prejudicial and material consequence of this recent invalid, oppressive and arbitrary Order of March 18, 2003 of herein respondent judge is the fact that now the funds of herein complainant MCIAA have, with base sophistry and deception, come into the hands of the counsel on record in this case, Atty. Rolindo Navarro, in satisfaction of a part of his alleged attorney’s fees. For it is with a heavy heart that we inform the Honorable Court that on the same said date of March 25, 2003, when herein Complainant MCIAA firstly learned of the Order dated March 18, 2003 of the trial court, Sheriff Generoso B. Regalado of the same RTC Branch 16, Cebu City, surprisingly, immediately proceeded to serve upon the PNB-MEPZ, Lapu-Lapu City Branch, a demand letter (Annex “W”) enforcing subject Order of the trial court. Thereafter, or on April 2, 2003, the PNB released unto said Atty. Rolindo Navarro (Annex “X”), in the form of Manager’s Check, the funds of herein Complainant MCIAA, in the total amount of P2,455,821.11, again, in compliance with the trial court’s invalid Order of March 18, 2003.
Precisely, this is just one of the grave aftermath upon which we respectfully anticipated our earlier “Very Urgent Motion for Issuance of a Preliminary Prohibitory and/or Mandatory Injunction,” now pending resolution before the Honorable Court of Appeals.
Clearly, the ends of justice have been frustrated with this new development, especially, if one takes into account the fact that the monies released (P2,455,821.11) were not even made to benefit Messrs. Bongoyan, et al., the main parties-claimants herein, but were made to onerously satisfy firstly the private interests of counsel of record, Atty. Rolindo Navarro, in payment of a portion of his attorney’s fees, the total amount of which was pegged by the trial court at the rate of ten percent (10%) of the total award of P240,000,000.00 or the unconscionable amount of P24,000,000.00 (sic). As to the reason behind the patent and undue haste of herein respondent judge in satisfying, foremost, the damages aspect of the February 20, 2002 Decision, and the consequent Special Order of July 8, 2002, in the form of attorney’s fees in favor of Atty. Rolindo Navarro, we can only beg to surmise the obvious. Indeed, what travesty to the cause of Messrs. Bongoyan, et al., and what grave injury to the rights of herein Complainant MCIAA.
… For it is beyond dispute that Complainant MCIAA’s rights have been grossly prejudiced, again, by the precipitate and undue manner by which herein respondent judge proceeded to issue the herein assailed March 18, 2003 Order. We reiterate, on record is herein Complainant MCIAA’s “Motion for Reconsideration” anent the trial court’s earlier Order of November 29, 2002. The same said Motion has not been acted upon by the trial court even to date.
Absent such prior definitive ruling by the trial court on our pending Motion for Reconsideration, the subject March 18, 2003 Order was thus immoral and a patent nullity having been issued contrary to law and procedural and/or substantive due process.[20]
3) The questioned decision of respondent Judge is pending appeal before the Honorable Court of Appeals and the questioned orders emanating from the decision are likewise appealed to the Court of Appeals by way of a petition for certiorari;Pursuant to the recommendation[22] of the Court Administrator, the case was re-docketed as an administrative matter in the Resolution of December 8, 2003. The case was also assigned to Court of Appeals Associate Justice Jose Catral Mendoza.[23] The complainant, represented by Angelo C. Verdan and duly assisted by Atty. Conchita M. Vestil, appeared during the hearing of February 12, 2004. In lieu of the respondent judge, his sister, Atty. Purita Hontanosas-Cortes, appeared during the hearing and manifested that she had not yet read the complaint and the records of the case, and requested for copies thereof. The hearing was then re-set to give her time to study the complaint. The respondent was also given time to file a rejoinder-affidavit.[24] Thereafter, the respondent, through his counsel, manifested that he would no longer file a rejoinder-affidavit. The parties prayed that they be given time within which to file their respective memoranda, after which the matter would be deemed submitted for the Investigating Justice’s study and recommendation.[25]
4) That the latest development on the case is that complainant filed a motion for inhibition which respondent Judge unhesitatingly granted and the case is now re-raffled to another Branch of RTC, Cebu City;
5) That the issues raised in this administrative complaint are judicial matters which were tackled and resolved by respondent Judge in line with his functions as presiding judge trying and deciding Civil Case No. CEB-27136; the questioned Decision and Orders of respondent were the result of a carefully studied judgment call and an act of judicial discretion inherent in the act of judging;
6) That the judicial remedy of an ordinary appeal and appeal by certiorari were availed of by the complainant and said appeals are pending resolution by the Appellate Court; hence, resort to an administrative remedy is pre-mature;
7) That respondent Judge respectfully submits the jurisprudence that if the matter at issue is judicial in nature, there is no valid cause for administrative sanction. …[21]
After a studied evaluation of the records, the undersigned is of the determination that the respondent is liable for gross ignorance of the law. He was not actually “ignorant of the law.” Rather, he ignored the law, deliberately and in bad faith, when he rendered [the questioned orders] after the court had already lost jurisdiction over the case. What he had disregarded was a procedural law that was so elementary, basic and fundamental that he could not claim that he was not aware of it. When he violated it, his act could only be characterized as gross and malicious. Thus, the undersigned agrees with complainant MCIAA that the respondent is administratively guilty of gross ignorance of the law, grave misconduct, and manifest bias and partiality when he issued four (4) patently irregular interlocutory orders.[26]The Investigating Justice opined that while the mere filing of a notice of appeal does not automatically divest the trial court of its jurisdiction over the case, the records reveal that the respondent could no longer act on the employees’ motion for execution pending appeal as the said motion was filed only on May 20, 2002, beyond the reglementary period therefor. Moreover, the complainant had already perfected its appeal even before the said date; upon its receipt of the decision on March 7, 2002, it filed a notice of appeal and paid the corresponding docket fees on March 15, 2002.
Granting arguendo that the court still has jurisdiction, by precipitately acting on the Ex-Parte Manifestation, the respondent deprived the complainant of its day in court to be heard on the matter. He should have given the complainant the chance to refute, contest or just comment on, the figure as this amount was not even computed and mentioned in the questioned decision to be implemented. Clearly, the respondent was in bad faith in issuing the order only a day after the motion was filed. If the sum was a mere pittance, the order would not have raised quizzical eyebrows. Considering the staggering amount, his motive in this regard could only be considered as suspect.[27]According to the Investigating Justice, the grant of the motion for the issuance of a writ of execution pending appeal, particularly when the nature of the action, the applicable law and the exorbitant amount involved, are taken into consideration.[28] Furthermore, the Order of November 29, 2002 was baseless and was issued to render ineffective the September 27, 2002 Order of the pairing judge. Thus, the respondent gravely abused his discretion and undermined the orderly administration of justice when he again acted upon a motion which had already been resolved in an earlier order.
A] ON THE FIRST CHARGE, finding the respondent administratively guilty of gross ignorance of the law, grave misconduct and manifest bias and partiality, the undersigned respectfully recommends that he be meted the penalty of 1] suspension for, at least, three (3) years; and 2] payment of a fine equivalent to, at least, his two-year salary with a WARNING that a commission of a substantially similar offense in the future will be dealt with more severely.
B] ON THE SECOND CHARGE, the undersigned respectfully recommends that, in the meantime, a determination of the respondent’s administrative liability be suspended until the final termination of the main case which has been appealed.[31]
In his July 8, 2002 Special Order granting execution pending appeal, the respondent appeared to be sympathetic to the employees when he stated that “The dictates of social justice cannot be ignored by the Court. x x x. It is the sentiment of the Court that technical issues should be resolved in the light of the paramount principles of equal protection of the law and social justice.”The respondent judge, likewise, disregarded the order issued by Pairing Judge Fortunato M. De Gracia, Jr. on September 27, 2002 which resolved the motion for reconsideration filed by the employees by issuing an Order dated November 29, 2002, effectively reversing and setting aside the same without the said employees having filed a new motion therefor. The said Order is worded as follows:
The respondent’s sympathy for the employees, however, was indubitably hollow. It was nothing but empty cant. His heart was never for them. His ulterior motive surfaced when he issued the March 18, 2002 Order directing PNB to release the amount of P2,455,821.11 directly to Atty. Rolindo A. Navarro, the employees’ counsel.
The Special Order had, as its supposed purpose, the welfare and amelioration of the employees in mind. The March 18, 2003 Order clearly disclose that the respondent had another thing in mind – the attorney’s fees of their counsel which, considering that there was no full blown trial, was certainly more than generous. Under the circumstances, it cannot be helped if people would suspect something not right. Certainly, good faith cannot be attributed to him.
… THE RESPONDENT’S ORDER WAS
HIGHLY SUSPICIOUS AS IT WAS FOR
THE BENEFIT, NOT OF THE EMPLOYEES,
BUT THEIR COUNSEL
It is elementary that when attorney’s fees are awarded, they are so adjudicated because they are in the nature of actual damages suffered by the client (Mirasol v. De La Cruz, 84 SCRA 337) as he was constrained to engage the services of a counsel to represent him in a litigation for the protection of his interest. Being in the nature of damages, the award should have been given first to the employees, not to their counsel. In the case of Traders Royal Bank Employees Union-Independent v. NLRC, G.R. No. 120592, March 14, 1997, it was stated that “In his extraordinary concept, an attorney’s fee is an indemnity for damages ordered by the court to be paid by the losing party in a litigation. The basis of this is any of the cases provided by law where such award can be made, such as those authorized in Article 2208, Civil Code, and is payable not to the lawyer but to the client, unless they have agreed that the award shall pertain to the lawyer as additional compensation or as part thereof.”
It is on the record that direct payment was mentioned in the petition but considering that it was the employees who executed the undertakings to secure the refund thereof in case of reversal, it was not justified.
In the July 8, 2002 Order, it was stated, among others that:“(f) Restitution in the event of reversal of the Decision may be done through salary deductions in which case the interest of the respondent is assured and protected. In fact, as shown in the supplemental motion, the petitioners have signed an undertaking to this effect and, therefore, have bound themselves to the processes of this Court for any repayment to respondent if the need arises.”The execution of the undertakings was one of the reasons cited by the respondent when he granted the motion for the issuance of a writ of execution. In the case of the counsel, however, the respondent did not require him to execute one and now he is even vigorously fighting the return of the money. Those being the circumstances, people cannot but suspect that he had some personal interest in the unconscionable amount of P2,455,821.11. It is quite patent and obvious that he exhibited manifest partiality in favor of the counsel, not the employees. Thus, he committed an injustice not only to the complainant but to the employees as well.
Moreover, as it was an implementation of a writ of execution, PNB should not have been ordered to pay it directly to Atty. Navarro. The respondent should have ordered the PNB to pay it, at least, through the sheriff who is duly tasked to enforce such orders. By bypassing the sheriff, the respondent’s directive was highly irregular.[35]
Submitted for resolution is petitioners’ motion for reconsideration of the Order dated August 22, 2002, which was opposed by respondent.Admittedly, judges cannot be held to account for erroneous judgments rendered in good faith. However, this defense has been all too frequently cited to the point of staleness. In truth, good faith in situations of infallible discretion inheres only within the parameters of tolerable judgment and does not apply where the issues are so simple and the applicable legal principle evident and basic as to be beyond permissible margins of error.[37] Indeed, while a judge may not always be subjected to disciplinary action for every erroneous order or decision he renders, that relative immunity is not a license to be negligent or abusive and arbitrary in performing his adjudicatory prerogatives.[38]
After consideration of the motion and the opposition thereto as well as the manifestation of petitioners dated November 23, 2002, the Court makes the following resolution.
The Court finds the motion impressed with merit.
It is the observation of the Court that the motion for reconsideration is supported by jurisprudence particularly the ruling of the Supreme Court in the case of Philippine National Bank v. Judge Javier Pabalan, et al., 83 SCRA 595, to the effect that “funds of public corporation which can sue and be sued were not exempt from garnishment.” There is no dispute that respondent MCIAA is a public corporation which can sue and be sued.
Moreover, it is apparent from the letter of respondent thru its General Manager and addressed to petitioners’ counsel that respondent is “open for amicable, legal, just and reasonable settlement of the case.” Hence, there is need to pave the way for partial execution of judgment by way of a compromise agreement between the parties.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the motion for reconsideration is hereby GRANTED. The Order dated August 22, 2002 is RECONSIDERED in so far as the implementation of the writ of execution is concerned.
The General Manager of respondent and the concerned bank officials are directed to comply with the processes of the Court in connection with an agreed implementation by way of compromise of the writ of execution in accordance with Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
The Sheriff of this Court is also directed to continue with the enforcement of the writ of execution with the aforestated qualification unless restrained by the Honorable Court of Appeals.
Notify the parties of this Order.
SO ORDERED.[36]
Finally on the quantification of the COLA and AA benefits of the Plaintiffs in Civil Case No. CEB-27136, it appears that it was made and arrived at by employees-officers of complainant MCIAA who were conversant with the mathematical computation of said benefits. From this quantification it appears that complainant MCIAA did not file any written objection nor any Motion to Nullify said quantification despite its actual knowledge thereof. As it claims that there was no hearing on the matter of quantifying the claims for COLA and AA of the Plaintiffs in Civil Case No. CEB-27136, it is surprising to say the least why complainant MCIAA did not raise any cry over it and translate the same to a Motion for Nullification. The reason can be found in the fact that the quantification was correct.It must be stressed that a person presiding over a court of law must live and abide by it and render justice at all times without resorting to shortcuts clearly uncalled for. Judges are not common men and women, whose error men and women forgive and time forgets. Judges sit as the embodiment of the people’s sense of justice, their last recourse when all other institutions have failed.[48] When questionable orders are issued by a magistrate of law, casting doubt as to his integrity and impartiality, the erring judge must be sanctioned therefor, keeping in mind that the irresponsible or improper conduct of judges erodes public confidence in the judiciary, and, as such, must avoid all impropriety and the appearance thereof.[49]
As a closing argument, let it be underscored at this juncture that in granting the petition for certiorari of complainant MCIAA, the eighth division of the Court of Appeals through Justice Gozo-Dadule (sic), did not find that Respondent judge committed grave abuse of judicial discretion in connection with his questioned Orders of July 8, 2002 and August 22, 2002. There is no finding even of simple abuse of discretion.
While with respect to the Order of March 18, 2003 directing the PNB-Lapu-Lapu City branch to release direct(ly) to Atty. Rolindo Navarro his partial attorney’s fees in the amount of P2,455,821.11, the Court of Appeals ruled that such Order was a misplaced ratiocination which means that such an Order proceeded from an illogical reasoning (sic). Thus, such an Order was a mere error of judgment which could have been corrected had complainant MCIAA made a timely objection or filed an appropriate motion to block the release of its funds at the PNB Lapu-Lapu City branch considering that it had seven days within which to make its move.[47]