483 Phil. 416
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
“WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed of this Honorable Court that judgment be rendered:Respondent, in its answer with counterclaim,[5] denied that it obtained a loan from petitioner; and that it did not authorize its then president, Dr. Eduardo Escobar, to secure any loan from petitioner or issue various checks as payment for interests.
(a) holding/declaring defendant (now respondent) guilty of breach of contract x x x; and
(b) ordering defendant to pay plaintiff (now petitioner) the following sums:P195,155.00 as actual damages;
P200,000.00 as moral damages;
P100,000.00 as exemplary damages; and
P100,000.00 as attorney’s fees, plus the costs of suit.
Plaintiff prays for such other relief just and equitable in the premises.”
“22. WHEREFORE, the court hereby renders judgment as follows:Respondent then filed a motion for reconsideration[7] questioning for the first time the trial court’s jurisdiction. It alleged that since the amount of petitioner’s principal demand (P195,155.00) does not exceed P200,000.00, the complaint should have been filed with the Metropolitan Trial Court pursuant to Republic Act No. 7691.[8]
22.1. The defendant FASTFORMS PHILS., INC. is ordered to pay the plaintiff, MARIE ANTOINETTE R. SOLIVEN, the following amounts:
22.1.1. P175,000.00 – the amount of the loan and its interest covered by the check (Exh. 3);
22.1.2. Five (5%) percent of P175,000.00 – a month from June 25, 1993 until the P175,000.00 is fully paid – less the sum of P76,250.00 – as interest;
22.1.3. P50,000.00 – as attorney’s fees.
22.2. The COMPLAINT for MORAL and EXEMPLARY damages is DISMISSED.
22.3. The COUNTERCLAIM is DISMISSED; and
22.4. Costs is taxed against the defendant.”
“2. The exclusion of the term ‘damages of whatever kind’ in determining the jurisdictional amount under Section 19 (8) and Section 33 (1) of B.P. Blg. 129, as amended by R.A. No. 7691, applies to cases where the damages are merely incidental to or a consequence of the main cause of action. However, in cases where the claim for damages is the main cause of action, or one of the causes of action, the amount of such claim shall be considered in determining the jurisdiction of the court.” (underscoring ours)Here, the main cause of action is for the recovery of sum of money amounting to only P195,155.00. The damages being claimed by petitioner are merely the consequences of this main cause of action. Hence, they are not included in determining the jurisdictional amount. It is plain from R.A. 7691 and our Administrative Circular No. 09-94 that it is the Metropolitan Trial Court which has jurisdiction over the instant case. As correctly stated by the Court of Appeals in its assailed Decision:
“Conformably, since the action is principally for the collection of a debt, and the prayer for damages is not one of the main causes of action but merely a consequence thereto, it should not be considered in determining the jurisdiction of the court.”While it is true that jurisdiction may be raised at any time, “this rule presupposes that estoppel has not supervened.”[13] In the instant case, respondent actively participated in all stages of the proceedings before the trial court and invoked its authority by asking for an affirmative relief. Clearly, respondent is estopped from challenging the trial court’s jurisdiction, especially when an adverse judgment has been rendered. In PNOC Shipping and Transport Corporation vs. Court of Appeals,[14] we held:
“Moreover, we note that petitioner did not question at all the jurisdiction of the lower court x x x in its answers to both the amended complaint and the second amended complaint. It did so only in its motion for reconsideration of the decision of the lower court after it had received an adverse decision. As this Court held in Pantranco North Express, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 105180, July 5, 1993, 224 SCRA 477, 491), participation in all stages of the case before the trial court, that included invoking its authority in asking for affirmative relief, effectively barred petitioner by estoppel from challenging the court’s jurisdiction. Notably, from the time it filed its answer to the second amended complaint on April 16, 1985, petitioner did not question the lower court’s jurisdiction. It was only on December 29, 1989 when it filed its motion for reconsideration of the lower court’s decision that petitioner raised the question of the lower court’s lack of jurisdiction. Petitioner thus foreclosed its right to raise the issue of jurisdiction by its own inaction.” (underscoring ours)Similarly, in the subsequent case of Sta. Lucia Realty and Development, Inc. vs. Cabrigas,[15] we ruled:
“In the case at bar, it was found by the trial court in its 30 September 1996 decision in LCR Case No. Q-60161(93) that private respondents (who filed the petition for reconstitution of titles) failed to comply with both sections 12 and 13 of RA 26 and therefore, it had no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case. However, private respondents never questioned the trial court’s jurisdiction over its petition for reconstitution throughout the duration of LCR Case No. Q-60161(93). On the contrary, private respondents actively participated in the reconstitution proceedings by filing pleadings and presenting its evidence. They invoked the trial court’s jurisdiction in order to obtain affirmative relief – the reconstitution of their titles. Private respondents have thus foreclosed their right to raise the issue of jurisdiction by their own actions.WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision dated February 8, 1999 and Resolution dated June 17, 1999 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 51946 are REVERSED. The Decision dated July 3, 1995 and Resolution dated October 11, 1995 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 60, Makati City in Civil Case No. 94-1788 are hereby AFFIRMED.
“The Court has constantly upheld the doctrine that while jurisdiction may be assailed at any stage, a litigant’s participation in all stages of the case before the trial court, including the invocation of its authority in asking for affirmative relief, bars such party from challenging the court’s jurisdiction (PNOC Shipping and Transport Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, 297 SCRA 402 [1998]). A party cannot invoke the jurisdiction of a court to secure affirmative relief against his opponent and after obtaining or failing to obtain such relief, repudiate or question that same jurisdiction (Asset Privatization Trust vs. Court of Appeals, 300 SCRA 579 [1998]; Province of Bulacan vs. Court of Appeals, 299 SCRA 442 [1998]). The Court frowns upon the undesirable practice of a party participating in the proceedings and submitting his case for decision and then accepting judgment, only if favorable, and attacking it for lack of jurisdiction, when adverse (Producers Bank of the Philippines vs. NLRC, 298 SCRA 517 [1998], citing Ilocos Sur Electric Cooperative, Inc. vs. NLRC, 241 SCRA 36 [1995]).” (underscoring ours)