586 Phil. 19
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
The records disclose that the petitioner, Philux, Inc., is a corporation engaged in the manufacture and sale of wood furnitures; while private respondent Patricia (Patria) Perjes was a daily-paid regular employee of the latter occupying the position of saleslady assigned to the petitioner's showroom at SM South mall, Zapote, Alabang Road, Las Piñas City.In a decision dated June 30, 2000,[3] the Labor Arbiter rendered judgment in private respondent's favor. In part, the decision states:
On April 20, 1999, for failure of the petitioner-corporation to positively respond to the private respondent's demand incorporated in her letter dated October 20, 1998, the National Labor Union in behalf of the private respondent filed a Complaint before the Labor Arbiter docketed as NLRC Case No. 00-04-04757-99. The aforesaid Complaint prayed for the following reliefs:(a) Payment of monthly commission from June 1998 until final settlement of the case;On June 24, 1999, the private respondent filed a Manifestation and Motion to include Additional Complaint for illegal dismissal based on her transfer of work assignment from the petitioner's showroom in SM Las Piñas to SM Megamall, EDSA, Mandaluyong City. The private respondent demanded her reinstatement to her former position with full backwages from May 12, 1999 up to her actual reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and other privileges.
(b) Payment of underpaid P50.00 from June 1998 up to November 20, 1998;
(c) Payment of 7 days sick leave and 7 days vacation leave for 1998 based on management practice;
(d) Payment of 13th month pay for the year 1997; and
(e) Payment of damages and attorney's fees.
Upon order of the Labor Arbiter, the parties submitted their respective position papers.
In her position paper, the private respondent asserted her right for payment of commission, 13th month pay, and overtime pay, the same being based on existing laws. She also claimed that the deduction of P50.00 from her basic salary was likewise illegal, there being no written authorization therefore.
The private respondent insisted that she never abandoned her work. Her failure to report for work was with a valid reason, i.e., she had to look after her then sick brother who had suffered hypertensive intra-cerebral bleeding and pneumonia. Moreover, she allegedly needed to work near his place of abode. She lives in Bo. San Vicente, San Pedro, Laguna and it would take her 2 to 3 hours travel time, more or less, to and from her new post. Besides, petitioners' decision to transfer her to SM Megamall was purely harassment, especially so when it came to know that she has filed the aforementioned claims for payment.
On the other hand, the petitioners alleged that on June 8, 1998, the management suspected an anomaly in the reported sales of its showroom at SM South Mall then manned by Francis Otong and the private respondent. Petitioner Max Kienle reported the matter to the police of Almanza Uno, Las Piñas city. Thenceforth, an investigation was conducted where Francis Ong and the private respondent admitted in writing the following:1. that Francis Otong had been manipulating the sales record of the petitioner with the knowledge and consent of the private respondent, enabling them to pocket the sum of P460,167.79;Hence, according to the petitioners, the claims of the private respondent have no basis at all. The deductions made against her salary were authorized. She was not required to work continuously for 9 hours and the management had no control as regards the duration of her break time. Ergo, she was not entitled to overtime pay. Her 13th month pay for 1997 was already paid. As regards her claim of leave payments, she admitted in her position paper that the amount representing 5 days sick leave and 5 days vacation leave were already remitted to her; while her claim for additional 2 days each was without basis in law and in fact. Also, the private respondent's claim for damages and attorney's fees has no merit, her termination being an act of self-defense of the petitioner so as to avert unnecessary losses for unauthorized transaction.
2. That the management for humanitarian reason accepted the admission xxx and their offer of re-payment by payroll deductions.
3. That the private respondent authorized in writing the deductions from her payroll to be applied to the account of Mr. Otong with the petitioner. Mr. Otong promised to reimburse the private respondent whatever amount deducted from the latter.
4. That with their written consent, starting June 15, 1998, the petitioner deducted the amount of P50.00 from the private respondent's daily basic salary plus her commission.
The management likewise decided to transfer the private respondent to its Megamall showroom so that she could be supervised by other Philux employees, unlike in the South Mall where most of the time she was alone. The move by the petitioner was purposely made to avert recurrence of losses. Moreover, her transfer was sought because of her propensity to be absent for flimsy reasons which resulted in not opening the store on time and/or leaving the store manned only by one person. Such was allegedly against the contract of employment of the private respondent with the petitioner. Thus, the questioned transfer is not without basis. On the contrary, the private respondent's willful disobedience constitutes a valid ground for termination of her employment.[2]
It appears that complainant and co-employee Francis Otong were involved in a violation of company policy. However, management admittedly condoned their offense and the parties agreed to a schedule of salary deductions so that complainant and Otong will be able to pay their financial liabilities to the company.A copy of the aforesaid Labor Arbiter's decision was received on July 14, 2000 by the petitioners. The latter filed a Motion for Reconsideration[4] on July 24, 2000 and private respondent filed an Opposition[5] thereto. In its Resolution dated August 31, 2000[6], the NLRC treated the motion for reconsideration as an appeal from the Labor Arbiter's decision but dismissed the same for failure of the petitioners to post a bond as mandated by law.
Complainant having been totally condoned, management is estopped from doing further acts which are deemed prejudicial to her interest, thus her transfer to another branch which will cause inconvenience to her and against her will and consent amount to constructive illegal dismissal.
Thus, complainant is entitled to reinstatement to her former position and station and full backwages until her actual reinstatement, computed below as follows:As for the money claims, respondent have explained that they were the result of the schedule of salary deductions agreed upon by both parties pursuant to the condonation of offense as discussed above.
May 12, 1999 to June 30, 2000 = 13.633 months Basic salary: P 250.00 1. Salaries and Wages P 250.00 x 26 days x 13.633 months 88,614.50 2. 13th Month Pay P 88,614.50/12 7,384.54 3. Service Incentive Leave Pay P 250.00 x 5 days x 13.633/12 1,420.10 TOTAL P 97,419.14
WHEREFORE, premises considered, complainant is hereby declared to have been illegally dismissed and respondent corporation is hereby directed to reinstate her and pay her backwages as computed above.
SO ORDERED.
xxx as long as a party was given the opportunity to defend her interests in due course, she cannot be said to have been denied due process of law, for this opportunity to be heard is the very essence of due process. The chronology of events shows that the case took its regular course in the trial and appellate courts but Legarda's counsel failed to act as any ordinary counsel should have acted, his negligence every step of the way amounting to "abandonment, " in the words of the Gancayco decision. Yet, it cannot be denied that the proceedings which led to the filing of this case were not attended by any irregularity. The judgment by default was valid, so was the ensuing sale at public auction. If Cabrera was adjudged highest bidder in said auction sale, it was not through any machination on his part. All of his actuations that led to the final registration of the title in his name were aboveboard, untainted by any irregularity.In Escudero v. Dulay,[27] the Court sustained therein petitioners' contention that the general rule should not be applied automatically to their case as their trial counsel's blunder in procedure and gross ignorance of existing jurisprudence changed their cause of action and violated their substantive rights. The Court likewise held that where the application of this rule of procedure will result in a manifest failure or miscarriage of justice, the rule may be relaxed.
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The Gancayco decision makes much of the fact that Legarda is now "consigned to penury" and, therefore, this Court "must come to the aid of the distraught client." It must be remembered that this Court renders decisions, not on the basis of emotions but on its sound judgment, applying the relevant, appropriate law. Much as it may pity Legarda, or any losing litigant for that matter, it cannot play the role of a "knight in shining armor" coming to the aid of someone, who through her weakness, ignorance or misjudgment may have been bested in a legal joust which complied with all the rules of legal proceedings.[26]
The requirement that the employer post a cash or surety bond to perfect its/his appeal is apparently intended to assure the workers that if they prevail in the case, they will receive the money judgment in their favor upon the dismissal of the employer's appeal. It was intended to discourage employers from using an appeal to delay, or even evade, their obligation to satisfy their employees' just and lawful claims.While the bond requirement on appeals involving monetary awards has been relaxed in certain cases, this can only be done where there was substantial compliance of the NLRC Rules of Procedure or where the appellants, at the very least, exhibited willingness to pay by posting a partial bond [32] or where the failure to comply with the requirements for perfection of appeal was justified.[33]
Be it noted that the petitioners received the Decision of the Labor Arbiter dated June 30, 2000 on July 14, 2000. The petitioners filed their motion for reconsideration which the NLRC treated as an appeal on July 24, 2000, sans the required bond. On August 31, 2000, the NLRC resolved to dismiss the appeal for failure to post the bond as mandated by law. It was only upon receipt of the aforesaid Resolution on September 15, 2000, that the petitioners were prompted to post the appeal bond. As a matter of fact, the filing thereof was further delayed as it was made only on September 25, 2000, ten (10) days after receipt of the Resolution. Obviously, the petitioner never intended to post the bond as it awaited two (2) months, more or less, from July 14, 2000, before it took the necessary steps to file the same. The petitioners' allegation that their signing officers were at that time out of the country does not justify their failure to file the same.[35]Thus, in this case, since there was no appeal bond filed within the ten (10)-day period provided by law for the perfection of appeal, no appeal from the decision of the Labor Arbiter was perfected. Accordingly, said decision of the Labor Arbiter became final and executory and, therefore, immutable. Hence, the NLRC was correct in dismissing the petitioners' appeal therefrom. And a fortiori, so was the CA.
It bears stressing that the bond is sine qua non to the perfection of appeal from the labor arbiter's monetary award. The requirements for perfecting an appeal must be strictly followed as they are considered indispensable interdictions against needless delays and for orderly discharge of judicial business. The failure of the petitioners to comply with the requirements for perfection of appeal had the effect of rendering the decision of the labor arbiter final and executory and placing it beyond the power of the NLRC to review or reverse it. As a losing party has the right to file an appeal within the prescribed period, so also the winning party has the correlative right to enjoy the finality of the resolution of his/her case.
ART. 223. Appeal. - Decisions, awards or orders of the Labor Arbiter are final and executory unless appealed to the Commission by any or both parties within ten (10) calendar days from receipt of such decisions, awards, or orders.[18] Rule VI of the New Rules of Procedure of the NLRC which implements Article 223 of the Labor Code pertinently provides the following:
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In case of a judgment involving a monetary award, an appeal by the employer may be perfected only upon the posting of a cash or surety bond issued by a reputable bonding company duly accredited by the Commission, in the amount equivalent to the monetary award in the judgment appealed from.
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Section. 1. Periods of Appeal.- Decisions, awards, or orders of the Labor Arbiter and the POEA Administrator shall be final and executory unless appealed to the Commission by any or both parties within ten (10) calendar days from receipt of such decisions, awards or orders of the Labor Arbiter or of the Administrator, and in case of a decision of the Regional Director or his duly authorized Hearing Officer within five (5) calendar days from receipt of such decisions, awards or orders xxx[19] Id., Section 3.
Section 3. Requisites for Perfection of Appeal.-(a) The appeal shall be filed within the reglementary period as provided in Sec. 1 of this Rule; shall be under oath with proof of payment of the required appeal fee and the posting of a cash or surety bond as provided in Sec. 5 of this Rule; shall be accompanied by memorandum of appeal which shall state the grounds relied upon and the arguments in support thereof; the relief prayed for; and a statement of the date when the appellant received the appealed decision, order or award and proof of service on the other party of such appeal.
A mere notice of appeal without complying with the other requisite afore-stated shall not stop the running of the period for perfecting an appeal.
Section 5. Appeal Fee.-- The appellant shall pay an appeal fee of One hundred (P100.00) pesos to the Regional Arbitration Branch, Regional Office, or to the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration and the official receipt of such payment shall be attached to the records of the case.
Section 6. Bond.-- In case the decision of the Labor Arbiter, the Regional Director or his duly authorized Hearing Officer involves a monetary award, an appeal by the employer shall be perfected only upon the posting of a cash or surety bond, which shall be in effect until final disposition of the case, issued by a reputable bonding company duly accredited by the Commission or the Supreme Court in an amount equivalent to the monetary award, exclusive of damages and attorney's fees.
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The Commission may, in justifiable cases and upon Motion of the Appellant, reduce the amount of the bond. The filing of the motion to reduce bond shall not stop the running of the period to perfect appeal.
Section 7. No extension of Period.- No motion or request for extension of the period within which to perfect an appeal shall be allowed.