475 PHIL 159
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
It is a hornbook doctrine that the possession of a co-owner is like that of a trustee and shall not be regarded as adverse to the other co-owners but in fact as beneficial to all of them so much so that each co-owner may demand at anytime the partition of the common property and that this implies that an action to demand partition is imprescriptible or cannot be barred by laches (Salvador vs. Court of Appeals, 243 SCRA 23; De Castro vs. Echarri, 20 Phil. 23).
While the right of action to demand partition does not prescribe, acquisitive prescription may set in where one of the co-owners openly and adversely occupies the property without recognizing the co-ownership (Cordova vs. Cordova, 102 Phil. 1182; Heirs of Segunda Manungding vs. Court of Appeals, 276 SCRA 601), The statute of limitations operates, as in other cases, from the moment such adverse title is asserted by the possessor of the property (Ramos vs. Ramos, 45 Phil. 362; Bargayo vs. Camumot, 40 Phil. 857).
The elements constituting adverse possession by a co-owner against another co-owner or cestui que trust are: (1) that he has performed unequivocal acts of repudiation amounting to an ouster of the cestui que trust or other co-owners; (ii) that such positive acts of repudiation have been made known to the cestui que trust or the other co-owners; and (iii) that the evidence thereon must be clear and convincing (Salvador vs. Court of Appeals, supra).
Granting that appellants, as well as their predecessors-in-interest, were initially co-owners of the disputed property, nevertheless, acquisitive prescription in favor of appellees had already set in. Appellees had performed unequivocal acts of repudiation. This is shown by the unrebutted testimony of [herein respondent] Julia who declared that her brother Atilano (deceased) introduced improvements on the disputed property and the fact that appellees and their father Julian paid the realty taxes thereon as exclusive owners thereof. Moreover, applicants admitted in paragraph 12 of the Complaint that after Julian’s death (in 1950), appellees arrogated unto themselves the use and enjoyment of the disputed property, to the exclusion of appellants. This admission is bolstered by [herein petitioner] Rogelia’s testimony, as follows:
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration[8] of the appellate court’s decision upon the ground that “THIS CASE HAS BEEN OVERTAKEN BY EVENTS, PARTICULARLY ART. 19 OF THE [NEW] CIVIL CODE” which reads:
Q By the way you said that you are going to recover this 1/6 share from Julieta vda. de Gaban. Why, is she in possession of this land?A Yes, sir. Q She is presently in possession of the said lot? A Yes, sir. Q Can you tell us since when did she possess that land? A 1980. Q Previous to that, can you tell us if she was in possession of the said land? A Yes, sir. She has been in possession of the said lot before 1980. Q Was there a period of years that you have been in possession of the said land? [A No, sir. We have never been in possession of the said land.] x x xQ Were you able to gather benefits from that land? A We never benefited. Q Since when have you not benefited from that land? A Since 1919. x x xQ By the way, can you tell us since when you have been deprived of that land, from what year? A From 1919 to 1990.” (TSN, January 9, 1990, pp. 51-55). (Underscoring supplied)[7]
ART. 19. Every person, must be in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith,citing some cases in support thereof.
WHETHER OR NOT RELIANCE ON ART. 19 OF THE CIVIL CODE ISMISPLACED.Petitioners contend that “[t]here is such a thing as morality that comes into play,” as after all, the appellate court found the parties to be first cousins and, therefore, following Art. 19 of the Civil Code, petitioners should get their share in the property.II
WHETHER IN RESOLVING CASES, THE ISSUE OF MORALITY OF THE ACT DOES NOT COME INTO PLAY.III
WHETHER OR NOT LACHES IS APPLICABLE IN THE CASE AT BAR.[11]
Art. 2263, New Civil Code
ART. 2263. Rights to the inheritance of a person who died, with or without a will, before the effectivity of this Code, shall be governed by the Civil Code of 1889, by other previous laws, and by the Rules of Court. x x x
ART. 807, Spanish Civil Code of 1889
ART 807. The following are forced heirs:Assuming arguendo that petitioners’ respective fathers Francisco and Zacarias were legitimate and, therefore, were co-owners of the property: From the moment co-owner Julian occupied in 1919 and claimed to be the absolute and exclusive owner of the property and denied his brothers any share therein up to the time of his death in 1950, the question involved is no longer one of partition but of ownership in which case imprescriptibility of the action for partition can no longer be invoked. The adverse possession by Julian and his successors-in-interest- herein respondents as exclusive owner of the property having entailed a period of about 67 years at the time of the filing of the case at bar in 1986, ownership by prescription had vested in them.[12]The widower or widow, natural children legally acknowledged, and the father or the mother of the latter, in the manner and to the extent established by Articles 834, 835, 836, 837, 840, 841, 842, and 846.
- Legitimate children and descendants, with respect to their legitimate parents and ascendants;
- In default of the foregoing, legitimate parents and ascendants, with respect to their legitimate children and descendants;
ART. 939, Spanish Civil Code of 1889,
ART. 939. In the absence of legitimate descendants and ascendants, the natural children legally acknowledged and those legitimated by royal concession shall succeed to the entire estate of the deceased.
With respect to prescription:
Art. 1134, New Civil Code
ART. 1134. Ownership and other real rights over immovable property are acquired by ordinary prescription through possession of ten years.
Art. 1137, New Civil Code
ART. 1137. Ownership and other real rights over immovables also prescribe through uninterrupted adverse possession thereof for thirty years, without need of title or of good faith.