459 Phil. 214
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Respondent Judge rendered an unjust decision because the ejectment case is a personal action against Clavel, the Administrator of POC, and POC was not impleaded as a party defendant. The POC is the owner of the disputed property and has been in continuous and peaceful possession of the same since 1953 by virtue of Proclamation Nos. 438 (Series of 1953) and 732 (Series of 1961). As such, the ejectment decision could only be enforced against Clavel and not against "whosoever is found in possession of subject properties." Respondent Judge ensured the unjust ejectment of the POC and its personnel by issuing: (a) the Order dated October 20, 1997 which granted plaintiff's motion for immediate execution without the required 3-day notice of hearing; (b) the Order dated October 27, 1997 which denied defendant Clavel's motion for reconsideration and motion to suspend implementation of the writ of execution that was issued without the benefit of a hearing; and, (c) the Order dated October 28, 1997 which denied defendant Clavel's appeal on the false premise and flimsy ground that the appellate court docket fee was not paid on time. The writ of execution issued on a wrongful decision was wrongfully implemented by respondent Deputy Sheriff resulting in prejudice and irreparable damage to the Government, POC and its other concerned personnel who were all ejected from the properties in question.In his Answer, dated February 25, 1998, respondent Judge counters:
The decision was rendered based on the evidence presented and the applicable law. The term or phrase used in the decision is in accordance with Section 1 of Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, which provides, "may . . . bring an action in the proper Municipal Court against the person or persons unlawfully withholding or depriving of possession, or any person or persons claiming under them, for the restitution of such possession". Considering that POC is claiming a right to use the property because of Presidential Proclamation No. 732 dated February 28, 1961 giving it the right to use the property subject to private rights, if there be any, and considering further that the named defendant, Clavel, as Administrator of POC, is using the premises along with the personnel and employees of the POC because of his sanction, it is but proper to consider the employees and personnel, and other people using the premises, as claiming rights under Clavel. The Solicitor General has no basis for questioning the jurisdiction of respondent Judge. The lawyers of the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) handled the case for the defendant in the trial court until it was decided. The OSG manifested that it considers the case as a government case and not a personal case against Clavel alone as a private person. Thus, they are estopped from claiming that this case is solely against Clavel. Besides, when a government corporation or agency is sued, it is the officers or administrators who are named as the defendants or respondents. Clavel being the Administrator of POC should be the one and is in fact the one named as the defendant. There is no truth that respondent Judge issued the two assailed orders without the required 3-day notice of hearing since the record belies the same. The letter-complaint should have been the proper subject of an appeal instead of using the OCA as an alternative recourse for complainant's failure to perfect the appeal in accordance with Section 19 of Rule 70 of the Rules of Court. Besides, the administrative complaint is premature because the assailed decision of respondent Judge was elevated to the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City (Branch 80) via a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, docketed as Civil Case No. Q-97-32730, entitled "Victor S. Clavel vs. Honorable Judge Augustus C. Diaz, et al."In a Letter dated August 17, 1998, Assistant Solicitor General Cecilio O. Estoesta submitted to the OCA, copies of additional evidence, which were also filed before the RTC of Quezon City (Branch 80) allegedly showing that the subject lots are properties of the Government.
As everyone knows, the law provides ample judicial remedies against errors or irregularities being committed by a Trial Court in the exercise of its jurisdiction. The ordinary remedies against errors or irregularities which may be regarded as normal in nature (i.e., error in appreciation or admission of evidence, or in construction or application of procedural or substantive law or legal principle) include a motion for reconsideration (or after rendition of judgment or final order, a motion for new trial), and appeal. The extraordinary remedies against error or irregularities which may be deemed extraordinary in character (i.e., whimsical, capricious, despotic exercise of power or neglect of duty, etc.) are, inter alia, the special civil action of certiorari, prohibition or mandamus, or a motion for inhibition, a petition for change of venue, as the case may be.The records lay bare that complainant has utilized the available judicial remedy of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus before the RTC of Quezon City for the review of the questioned decision of respondent Judge and has further elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals. Therefore, a decision on the propriety of the decision of respondent Judge in this administrative proceeding would be premature. Complainant, in effect, abuses court processes by prematurely resorting to administrative disciplinary action even before the judicial remedies are settled.[4]
Now, the established doctrine and policy is that disciplinary proceedings and criminal actions against Judges are not complementary or suppletory of, nor a substitute for, these judicial remedies, whether ordinary or extraordinary. Resort to and exhaustion of these judicial remedies, as well as the entry of judgment in the corresponding action or proceeding, are pre-requisites for the taking of other measures against the persons of the judges concerned, whether of civil, administrative, or criminal nature. It is only after the available judicial remedies have been exhausted and the appellate tribunals have spoken with finality, that the door to an inquiry into his criminal, civil, or administrative liability may be said to have opened, or closed.
Flores resorted to administrative prosecution (or institution of criminal actions) as a substitute for or supplement to the specific modes of appeals or review provided by law from court judgments or orders, on the theory that the Judges' orders had caused him `undue injury.' This is impermissible, as this Court has already more than once ruled. Law and logic decree that `administrative or criminal remedies are neither alternative nor cumulative to judicial review where such review is available, and must wait on the result thereof'. Indeed, since judges must be free to judge, without pressure or influence from external forces or factors, they should not be subject to intimidation, the fear of civil, criminal or administrative sanctions for acts they may do and dispositions they may make in the performance of their duties and functions; and it is sound rule, which must be recognized independently of statute, that judges are not generally liable for acts done within the scope of their jurisdiction and in good faith; and that exceptionally, prosecution of the judge can be had only if "there be a final declaration by a competent court in some appropriate proceeding of the manifestly unjust character of the challenged judgment or order, and ** also evidence of malice or bad faith, ignorance of inexcusable negligence, on the part of the judge in rendering said judgment or order" or under the stringent circumstances set out in Article 32 of the Civil Code.[3] (Emphasis supplied)