591 Phil. 194
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
During the initial hearing of LRC Case No. 273 held on 30 January 2002, the MeTC issued, upon the motion of petitioner's counsel, an Order[9] of general default against the whole world, except against the government (which, more appropriately, should be the respondent Republic), represented by the OSG through the Public Prosecutor.
- That neither the [herein petitioner] nor his predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of the land in question for thirty (30) years in accordance with Section 48(b), Public Land Act, as amended by PD 1073 and R.A. No. 6940.
- That the muniments of title, the tax declarations and tax payment receipts of [petitioner], if any, attached to or alleged in the application, do not constitute competent and sufficient evidence of bona-fide acquisition of the land applied for or of his open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation thereof in the concept of owner since June 12, 1945, or prior thereto. Said muniments of title do not appear to be genuine and the tax declarations and/or tax payment receipts indicate pretended possession of [petitioner] to be of recent vintage.
- That the parcel of land applied for is a portion of the public domain belonging to the Republic of the Philippines not subject to private appropriation.[8]
On 10 June 2003, the MeTC promulgated its Decision[25] in LRC Case No. 273. After recounting petitioner's evidence, the MeTC adjudged:
- That projection of the subject lot in our topographic map based on the technical descriptions appearing in the Notice of the Initial Hearing indicated that the lot subject of this application for registration particularly described as Lot 8689-D, Mcadm 590-D containing an area of Two Thousand Eight Hundred Ninety Two (sic) (2,890) square meters more or less are located below the reglementary lake elevation of 12.50 meters referred to datum 10.00 meters below mean lower water. Site is, therefore, part of the bed of Laguna Lake considered public land and is within the jurisdiction of Laguna Lake Development Authority pursuant to its mandate under R. A. 4850, as amended. x x x
- That Section 41 of Republic Act No. 4850, states that, "whenever Laguna Lake or Lake is used in this Act, the same shall refer to Laguna de Bay which is that area covered by the lake water when it is at the average annual maximum lake level of elevation of 12.50 meters, as referred to a datum 10.0 meters below mean low water (MLLW). Lands located at and below such elevation are public lands which form part of the bed of said lake (Section 14, R.A. 4850, as amended, underlining supplied [sic]).
- That on the strength of the [herein respondent LLDA]'s finding and applying the above-quoted provision of law, [herein petitioner's] application for registration of the subject land has no leg to stand on, both in fact and in law;
- That unless the Honorable Court renders judgment to declare the land as part of the Laguna Lake or that of the public domain, the [petitioner] will continue to unlawfully possess, occupy and claim the land as their (sic) own to the damage and prejudice of the Government in general and the Laguna Lake Development Authority in particular;
- That moreover, the land sought to be registered remains inalienable and indisposable in the absence of declaration by the Director of Lands as required by law.[24]
WHEREFORE, finding the allegations in the application to have been sufficiently established by the [herein petitioner's] evidence, this Court hereby confirms the title of [petitioner] ROBERTO Y. PONCIANO, of legal age, Filipino, single with residence at No. 30 S. Santos St., Sto. Rosario, Pateros, Metro Manila over the subject parcel of land designated at Lot 8689-DC, Mcadm-590-D, Taguig, Cadastral Mapping under Conversion-Subdivision Plan Csd-00-000627 consisting of Two Thousand Eight Hundred Ninety (2,890) square meters and hereby order the registration of the same in his name.Without seeking reconsideration of the afore-quoted MeTC Decision, respondent Republic, through the OSG, filed its Notice of Appeal.
After finality of this Decision and upon payment of the corresponding taxes due on the said lot, let an order for the issuance of decree of registration be issued.[26]
[T]his does not necessarily mean that the application for registration of title would prosper. As pointed out by [herein respondent Republic], [herein petitioner] failed to present any evidence regarding specific acts of ownership to show compliance with the possessory requirements of the law. It is settled that a claimant must present evidence as to acts taken regarding the subject parcel of land, which would show ownership in fee simple and cannot offer merely general statements sans factual evidence of possession. Thus, in Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, 335 SCRA 693 [2000], the Supreme Court held:Consequently, the fallo of the 22 February 2006 Decision of the Court of Appeals reads:"Applicant failed to prove specific acts showing the nature of its possession and that of its predecessors in interest. The applicant must present specific acts of ownership to substantiate the claim and cannot just offer general statements, which are mere conclusions of law than factual evidence of possession. Actual possession of land consists in the manifestation of acts of dominion over it of such a nature as a party would naturally exercise over his own property.In the present case, [petitioner] merely showed that he bought the land, paid real estate taxes and had it surveyed. Beyond these actions he failed to site (sic) any other act which he took regarding the land such as cultivation, putting ways and boundaries to prove his claim of ownership.[28]
The bare assertion of witnesses that the applicant of land had been in the open, adverse and continuous possession of the property for over thirty (30) years is hardly `the well-nigh incontrovertible' evidence required in cases of this nature. In other words, facts constituting possession must be duly established by competent evidence."
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Taguig, Metro Manila, Branch 74, in LRC Case No. 273 dated 10 June 2003 for registration of title is hereby REVERSED and the application for registration is hereby DENIED.[29]Records show that Atty. Nestor C. Beltran (Atty. Beltran), petitioner's counsel in CA-G.R. CV No. 80705, received a copy of the Court of Appeals Decision dated 22 February 2006 on 28 February 2006. Petitioner, thus, had until 15 March 2006 to file his Motion for Reconsideration of the said Decision; yet, said Motion was filed only on 16 March 2006, or a day late. Petitioner followed up by filing Manifestations dated 10 and 21 April 2006 begging the indulgence of the appellate court to admit his Motion for Reconsideration, considering that the delayed filing thereof was a procedural lapse which should be considered as excusable negligence, and which did not impair the rights of the respondent Republic.
To begin with, basic is the legal truism in this jurisdiction that any party seeking to reconsider a judgment or final resolution must do so within fifteen (15) days from notice thereof (Section 1, Rule 52 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure).In the end, the Court of Appeals decreed:
The above rule is too elementary to even cause confusion upon any lawyer for that matter, unless compelling reasons actually exist to justify the relaxation of the prescriptive period mandated by law within which to file a motion for reconsideration.
Having thus established herein [herein petitioner]'s Motion for Reconsideration was actually filed beyond the reglementary period, the assailed Decision dated 22 February 2006 became final and executory, thereby depriving this Court of any power to review, much more, modify or alter the same. In Philippine Coconut Authority vs. Garrido, 374 SCRA 154 [2002], the Supreme Court ruled that:"The period for filing a motion for reconsideration is non-extendible. The Appellate Court is, therefore, correct in ruling that `(t)he failure of the respondents to file their motion for reconsideration within the reglementary period renders the Decision sought to be reconsidered final and executory, thereby depriving this Court the power to alter, modify or reverse the same.'"In his attempt to persuade this Court to act on his plea to admit his Motion for Reconsideration with favor, herein [petitioner] posits:"It bears stressing once again that the undersigned got hold of the Notice of Judgment on March 2, 2006 and the Motion for Reconsideration was filed on March 16, 2006, or on the 14th day from receipt thereof. Upon verification of the records of the case, however, the undersigned counsel found out that the maid received the mail on February 28, 2006 but put the mail on its (sic) table only on March 2, 2006. The maid who received the mail earlier from the postman must have accidentally forgot to place the mail immediately on the undersigned counsel's table as time again instructed to her" (Rollo, pp. 115-116; Underscoring supplied).While a deviation from the mandated prescriptive period to file a motion for reconsideration has been allowed so many times by the Highest Tribunal due to concrete, valid and compelling reasons, however, this Court cannot really find its way to even give the slightest consideration to the reason adverted to above by the [petitioner]. By any stretch of imagination, the afore-cited explanation offered by the [petitioner] to substantiate his prayer for the admission of his Motion for Reconsideration does not constitute as a justifiable reason as the same is essentially lame, if not down right preposterous.[31]
WHEREFORE, premises considered, [herein petitioner]'s plea for the admission of his Motion for Reconsideration is hereby DENIED. Perfunctorily, NO ACTION will be taken by this Court on [herein petitioner]'s Motion for Reconsideration, the same having been filed beyond the reglementary period.[32]Petitioner presently comes before this Court raising the following issues in his Petition:
In his Memorandum, petitioner, though, re-states and presents additional issues for resolution of the Court, viz:
- Whether or not the gross negligence of petitioner's counsel binds his client; and
- Whether or not a decision based on a technicality of procedure is favored over a decision based on the merits.[33]
The Court addresses foremost the procedural issue of whether petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration should have been admitted by the Court of Appeals, for the jurisdiction of this Court over the instant Petition and the other substantive issues raised therein actually depends upon the resolution thereof.
- Whether or not the Court of Appeals acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of, or in excess of, jurisdiction in refusing to consider that the cause of the delay in filing the Motion for Reconsideration was due to excusable negligence, and in effect, denying petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration.
- Whether or not the Court of Appeals acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in reversing the Decision, dated June 10, 2003, of the Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 74, Taguig, Metro Manila.
- Whether or not the Laguna Lake Development Authority acted with grave abuse of discretion in declaring that the subject property cannot be appropriated or be subject of private ownership.
- Whether or not the Court of Appeals acted with grave abuse of discretion tantamount to lack of, or excess of, jurisdiction for overlooking the evidence presented by the petitioner for his confirmation of imperfect title and declaring that petitioner failed to prove specific acts of ownership for confirmation of his title.
- Whether or not petitioner is entitled to confirmation of title over the property subject matter of this petition.[34]
Procedural rules, we must stress, should be treated with utmost respect and due regard since they are designed to facilitate the adjudication of cases to remedy the worsening problem of delay in the resolution of rival claims and in the administration of justice. The requirement is in pursuance to the bill of rights inscribed in the Constitution which guarantees that "all persons shall have a right to the speedy disposition of their cases before all judicial, quasi-judicial and administrative bodies." The adjudicatory bodies and the parties to a case are thus enjoined to abide strictly by the rules. While it is true that a litigation is not a game of technicalities, it is equally true that every case must be prosecuted in accordance with the prescribed procedure to ensure an orderly and speedy administration of justice. There have been some instances wherein this Court allowed a relaxation in the application of the rules, but this flexibility was "never intended to forge a bastion for erring litigants to violate the rules with impunity." A liberal interpretation and application of the rules of procedure can be resorted to only in proper cases and under justifiable causes and circumstances. (Emphasis ours.)Upon petitioner, thus, falls the burden of proving to the satisfaction of the Court that cogent reasons exist herein to excuse his non-compliance with the reglementary period for filing a motion for reconsideration. Unfortunately, petitioner utterly failed in this regard.
Well-settled is the rule that the perfection of an appeal within the statutory or reglementary period is not only mandatory, but also jurisdictional. Failure to interpose a timely appeal (or a motion for reconsideration) renders the assailed decision, order or award final and executory that deprives the appellate body of any jurisdiction to alter the final judgment [Cruz v. WCC, G.R. No. L-42739, January 31, 1978, 81 SCRA 445; Volkshel Labor Union v. NLRC, G.R. No. L-39686, June 28, 1980, 98 SCRA 314; Acda v. Minister of Labor, G.R. No. 51607, December 15, 1982, 119 SCRA 306; Rizal Empire Insurance Group v. NLRC, G.R. No. 73140, May 29, 1987, 150 SCRA 565; MAI Philippines Inc. v. NLRC, G.R. No. 73662, June 18, 1987, 151 SCRA 196; Narag v. NLRC, G.R. No. 69628, October 28, 1987, 155 SCRA 199; John Clement Consultants, Inc. v. NLRC, G.R. No. 72096, January 29, 1988, 157 SCRA 635; Bongay v. Martinez, G.R. No. 77188, March 14, 1988, 158 SCRA 552; Manuel L. Quezon University v. Manuel L. Quezon Educational Institution, G.R. No. 82312, April 19, 1989, 172 SCRA 597]. This rule "is applicable indiscriminately to one and all since the rule is grounded on fundamental consideration of public policy and sound practice that at the risk of occasional error, the judgment of courts and award of quasi-judicial agencies must become final at some definite date fixed by law" [Volkschel Labor Union v. NLRC, supra, at p. 322]. Although, in a few instances, the Court has disregarded procedural lapses so as to give due course to appeals filed beyond the reglementary period (See Flexo Manufacturing Corporation v. NLRC, G.R. No. 55971, February 28, 1985,135 SCRA 145; Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Lariosa, G.R. No. 70479, February 27, 1989, 148 SCRA 187; Chong Guan Trading v. NLRC, G.R. No. 81471, April 26, 1989, 172 SCRA 831], the Court did so on the basis of strong and compelling reasons, such as serving the ends of justice and preventing a grave miscarriage thereof. (Emphasis ours.)It is clear from the foregoing that the unjustified delay in the filing of petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration in CA-G.R. CV No. 80705 is not just a procedural lapse, but also a jurisdictional defect which effectively prevents this Court from taking cognizance of the Petition at bar.
Section 48. The following-described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the public domain or claiming to own any such lands or an interest therein, but whose titles have not been perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance of the province where the land is located for confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a certificate of title thereafter, under the Land Registration Act, to wit:It is true that petitioner was able to present testimonial evidence that his predecessors-in-interest had possessed the land prior to 12 June 1945 or even earlier. Nevertheless, it must be stressed that also by petitioner's own evidence, particularly, the Certification dated 5 February 2002 issued by the Urban Forestry and Law Enforcement Unit of the DENR-NCR, it has been established that the subject property became alienable and disposable only on 3 January 1968 by virtue of Forestry Administrative Order No. 4-1141. It is already settled that any period of possession prior to the date when the subject property was classified as alienable and disposable is inconsequential and should be excluded from the computation of the period of possession; such possession can never ripen into ownership and unless the land had been classified as alienable and disposable, the rules on confirmation of imperfect title shall not apply thereto.[51]
(a) [Repealed by Presidential Decree No. 1073].
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, since June 12, 1945, or earlier, immediately preceding the filing of the applications for confirmation of title, except when prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter.
(c) Members of the national cultural minorities who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of lands of the public domain suitable to agriculture whether disposable or not, under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945 shall be entitled to the rights granted in subsection (b) hereof. (Emphasis ours.)