456 Phil. 520
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
In a letter dated January 19, 1998, respondent Philmalay retrenched petitioner effective January 20, 1998 and promised to pay him separation benefits pursuant to the provisions of the Labor Code.[7] He was, however, offered a separation pay equivalent to four months only, or the total amount of P578,600.00 (P144,650 x 4). The offer was not accepted by petitioner and efforts to settle the impasse proved futile.
- payment of underpaid salary for the period December 1989 - December 31, 1997 together with the additional one month salary payable in December of every year which was paid at the rate of P26.00 instead of the floating rate;
- brand new car (Galant Super Saloon) or its equivalent;
- life insurance policy in the amount of US$100,000.00 from December 1, 1989 to December 31, 1997, or the premiums due thereon;
- office rentals at the rate of US$300.00 or its peso equivalent for the use of his residence as office of Philmalay for the period December 1, 1989 to July 1996; and
- retention of the services of the law firm Quasha Ancheta Pena and Nolasco Law Firm, which was hired by respondents to defend him in the illegal recruitment case filed against him in connection with his employment with respondents.[6]
PREMISES CONSIDERED, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the complainant and against the respondents, as follows:On appeal by respondents to the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), the Decision of the Labor Arbiter was modified by deleting the awards of - (1) US$3,370.00 representing unpaid salary for the period January 1, 1998 to January 19, 1998; (2) US$28,600.00 as vacation leave; (3) brand new car or its equivalent in the sum of P945,100.00; (4) US$23,700.00 as office rentals for the period of December 1, 1989 to July 1996; (5) US$100,000.00 life insurance policy or the equivalent premium in the amount of US$24,628.50; (6) P2.5 million as moral damages; and (7) P2.5 million as exemplary damages. The NLRC likewise reduced the amount of petitioner's separation pay to US$44,400.00 after adjusting its computation based on the length of service of petitioner which it lowered from 9 years to 8 years; and by limiting the basis of the 10% attorneys fees to the total of the awards of underpayment of salary (P207,460.00), 13th month pay differential (P59,785.00) and cash equivalent of sick leave (US$28,600.00) only, and excluding therefrom the award of separation pay in the amount of US$44,400.00. The decretal portion of the said decision[11] states:
1. To order respondents to pay jointly and severally the complainant, the following: (a) Unpaid salary from January 1, 1998 to January 19, 1998, the same to be computed in the following manner:19 = days % 31 days of January `98 = 0.613 month x US$5,500.00 = US$3,370.00 (b) Underpayment of salary, the same to be computed at net US$5,500.00 or its peso-equivalent from July 1, 1997 to December 31, 1997, together with the additional one (1) salary payable every year, the same to be paid at the rate of P26.30 instead of the following rate computed as follows:July 1997 - P27.66 - P1.36 - P7, 480.00 August 1997 - 29.33 - 3.02 - 16, 665.00 September - 32.39 - 6.09 - 33, 495.00 October 1997 - 34.46 - 8.16 - 44, 880.00 November 1997 - 34.51 - 8.21 - 45, 155.00 December 1997 - 37.17 - 10.57- 59, 785.00 P207,460.00(c) 13th month pay for December 1997 computed as follows: December 1997 - P37.17 - P10.57 - P59,785.00.2. To order respondents to pay jointly and severally the complainant the following: (a) Unused vacation and sick leaves from December 01, 1989 to December 31, 1997 based on the same salary, to be computed as follows:i) Vacation Leave - Fifteen (15) days for every year of services x 9 years = 135 days 135 days % 26 working days a month = 5.2 months = US$28,600.00 ii) Sick Leave - Fifteen (15) Days for every [year] of service x 9 years = 135 days 135 days % 26 working days a month = 5.2 months x US$5,500.00 / month = US$28,600.00 3) To order respondents to pay jointly and severally the complainant his separation pay equivalent to one (1) month pay for very year of service at the rate of US $5,500.00 or its peso equivalent from December 1, 1989 to January 19, 1998, computed as follows:
9 years x US$5,500.00 = US$49,500.00 4) To order respondents to pay jointly and severally the complainant's other claims and benefits: a) A brand new car (Galant super saloon) or its equivalent in the sum of P945,100.00; b) Office rentals for the use of his residence situated at No. 38 Don Wilfredo St., Don Enrique Heights Diliman, Quezon City, [from] 01 December 1989 to July 1996 at the rate of US$300.00 or its peso equivalent to US$23,700.00;c) Life insurance policy for US$100,000.00 from December 1, 1989 to December 31, 1997, or if the same was not secured the premiums due thereon for the above period, the same to be computed as follows:US$2,736.50 x 9 years = US$24,628.50 d) The services of the Law firm of Quasha Ancheta Peña and Nolasco be continued to be retained by the two (2) companies to represent complainant in the illegal recruitment case before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 96, docketed as Crim. Case No. Q-93-46421, entitled "People of the Philippines vs. Dr. Antonio B. Mangahas, et al.," filed against ... him in connection with his employment by Leong Hup, or in default thereof to pay the attorney's fees of the new counsel, that may be hired by the complainant to defend him in the said case estimated in the sum of P200,000.00, more or less;5) To order the respondents to pay jointly and severally the complainant moral damages in the sum of P2.5 million and exemplary damages of P2.5 million;6) To order the respondents to pay jointly and severally the complainant in the sum equivalent to ten percent (10%) of the total claim as and for attorney's fees.7) Respondents' counterclaims are hereby dismissed for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.[10]
WHEREORE, premises considered, the Decision dated December 22, 1999 is hereby MODIFIED as follows:Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, however, the same was denied.[13] Undaunted, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals, which was dismissed on January 28, 2002 for failure to attach to the petition the following: "(1) complainant's (petitioner) Position Paper filed before the Labor Arbiter; (2) Decision dated 22 December 1992 penned by Labor Arbiter Ariel Cadiente Santos; and (3) Memorandum of Appeal filed by the petitioner."[14]
Respondents are hereby ordered to pay jointly and severally the complainant, the following:
(a) underpayment of salary as computed in the appealed Decision in the amount of P207, 460.00;
(b) 13th month pay differential as computed in the appealed Decision in the amount of P59,785.00;
(c) monetary equivalent of complainant's sick leave as computed in the appealed Decision in the amount of US$28,600.00;
(d) separation pay in the amount of US$44,000.00 as earlier computed in this Decision;
(e) attorney's fees equivalent to ten (10%) percent of the total award based on the awards representing underpayment of salary, 13th month pay, [and] cash equivalent of sick leave.
Respondents are likewise directed to provide legal counsel to complainant as defendant in Criminal Case No. Q-93-46421.
The awards of unpaid wages from June 1-19, 1998, vacation leave in the amount of US$28,600, P945,000 for car, US23,700.00, for office rentals, life insurance policy in the amount of US$100,000.00 and moral and exemplary damages in the amount of 2.5 million pesos are hereby DELETED on grounds above-discussed.
SO ORDERED.[12]
The issues for resolution are: (1) whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the petition; and (2) whether or not the decision of the Labor Arbiter should be reinstated.
1. COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF OR IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION, IN ISSUING THE QUESTIONED RESOLUTION DISMISSING THE PETITION FOR CERTIORARI BASED ON TECHNICALITIES, THAT PETITIONER FAILED TO COMPLY WITH SEC. 1, RULE 65, RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE FOR FAILURE TO ATTACH THREE (3) DOCUMENTS CONSISTING OF:Complainant's (petitioner) Position Paper filed before the labor arbiter; Decision dated 22 December 1999 penned by Labor Arbiter Ariel Cadiente Santos; and Memorandum of Appeal filed by the petitioner. WHICH RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS CONSIDERED AS MATERIAL PORTIONS OF THE RECORD DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE SUBJECT DOCUMENTS SOUGHT TO BE PRODUCED HAVE ACTUALLY BEEN REPRODUCED OR SUBSTANTIALLY COVERED BY THE QUESTIONED JUDGMENT, ORDER OR RESOLUTION FILED/SUBMITTED BEFORE IT.2. COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN DISMISSING THE PETITION, AND IN DENYING THE MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION THEREOF ON THE GROUND THAT THERE IS NO COGENT REASON FOR IT TO OVERTURN ITS DISMISSAL, DESPITE CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE, EXTANT ON THE RECORDS SHOWING THAT THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION'S (NLRC) DECISION AND RESOLUTION WERE FLAWED, A PALPABLE OR PATENT ERROR, WHICH MAY BE SUMMARIZED, TO WIT:(A) IN DECLARING THAT PETITIONER HAD RESIGNED FROM HIS EMPLOYMENT, AND NOT RETRENCHED OR TERMINATED DESPITE A DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE EXTANT ON THE RECORD ISSUED BY PRIVATE RESPONDENTS DATED JANUARY 19, 1998 GIVING "FORMAL NOTICE TO YOU (PETITIONER) OF YOUR TERMINATION DUE TO RETRENCHMENT EFFECTIVE JANUARY 20, 1998".(B) IN HOLDING AGAIN, AND DENYING PETITIONER'S VALID CLAIMS DESPITE DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE OR THE EXISTENCE OF A CONTRACT OF EMPLOYMENT STATING THAT: (1) EMPLOYEES (INCLUDING PETITIONER AS GENERAL MANAGER) AS A MATTER OF COMPANY POLICY AND/OR PRACTICE) WHO ARE RETRENCHED ARE ENTITLED TO INCENTIVES INCLUDING 15-DAYS VACATION LEAVE AND 15-DAYS SICK LEAVE WITH PAY; A FACT ADMITTED NO LESS BY PRIVATE RESPONDENTS' OWN WITNESS, MS. MA. ROWENA LOPEZ (FORMER PERSONNEL MANAGER OR PHILMALAY) WHO EXECUTED AN AFFIDAVIT ADMITTING THE SAME.(2) PETITIONER'S ENTITLEMENT AS PER CONTRACT TO A BRAND NEW CAR (OR AT LEAST TO THE CASH EQUIVALENT THEREOF); $100,000.00 LIFE INSURANCE POLICY (OR IN DEFAULT THEREOF AT LEAST TO THE PREMIUMS THEREIN), AND OFFICE RENTALS FOR THE USE OF THE PETITIONER'S PRIVATE RESIDENCE AS OFFICE OF RESPONDENTS.(3) PETITIONER IS ENTITLED, TO MORAL AND EXEMPLARY DAMAGES DUE TO PRIVATE RESPONDENTS ACTS OF BAD FAITH IN REQUIRING PETITIONER TO EXECUTE A LETTER OF RESIGNATION, WHEN IN FACT HE WAS ADMITTEDLY TERMINATED THRU RETRENCHMENT, AND ITS REFUSAL TO PAY HIM HIS VALID CLAIMS, DESPITE HIS CONTRACT OF EMPLOYMENT, COMPANY POLICY, AND LETTER OF TERMINATION ISSUED BY PRIVATE RESPONDENTS.(4) PETITIONER'S ENTITLEMENT TO 10% OF THE TOTAL AMOUNT OF THE AWARD OF ATTORNEY'S FEES AS PROVIDED FOR BY LAW AND AS PER PETITIONER'S CONTRACT WITH COUNSEL, AND NOT ONLY 10% OF THE TOTAL AWARD REPRESENTING UNDER PAYMENT OF SALARY, 13TH MONTH PAY, AND CASH EQUIVALENT OF SICK LEAVE AND IN ORDERING PRIVATE RESPONDENT TO PROVIDE LEGAL COUNSEL TO PETITIONER IN CRIM. CASE NO. Q-93-46421, WHEN THE SUBJECT CASE HAD ALREADY BEEN DISMISSED AT THE EXPENSE OF PETITIONER WHO HAD PREVIOUSLY HIRED HIS OWN COUNSEL OF CHOICE FOR THE PURPOSE.
Petitioner is right that the MeTC's decision cannot be considered a "disputed decision." The phrase is the equivalent of "ruling, order or decision appealed from" in Rule 32, §2 of the 1964 Rules made applicable to appeals from decisions of the then Courts of First Instance to the Court of Appeals by R.A. No. 296, as amended by R.A. No. 5433. Since petitioner was not appealing from the decision of the MeTC in her favor, she was not required to attach a certified true copy - but only a true or plain copy - of the aforesaid decision of the MeTC. The reason is that inclusion of the decision is part of the requirement to attach to the petition for review "other material portion of the record as would support the allegations of the petition." Indeed, petitioner referred to the MeTC decision in many parts of her petition for review in the Court of Appeals for support of her theory.In Jaro v. Court of Appeals,[18] we applied the rule on substantial compliance because the petitioner amended his defective petition and attached thereto the relevant annexes certified according to the rules. Thus -
Nonetheless, the Court of Appeals should have reconsidered its dismissal of petitioner's appeal after petitioner submitted a certified true copy of the MeTC's decision. It was clear from the petition for review that the RTC incurred serious errors in awarding damages to private respondents which were made without evidence to support the award and without any explanation...[17]
There is ample jurisprudence holding that the subsequent and substantial compliance of an appellant may call for the relaxation of the rules of procedure. In Cusi-Hernandez vs. Diaz and Piglas-Kamao vs. National Labor Relations Commission, we ruled that the subsequent submission of the missing documents with the motion for reconsideration amounts to substantial compliance. The reasons behind the failure of the petitioners in these two cases to comply with the required attachments were no longer scrutinized. What we found noteworthy in each case was the fact that the petitioners therein substantially complied with the formal requirements...[19]The same leniency should be applied to the instant case considering that petitioner subsequently submitted with his motion for reconsideration the certified true copy of the Labor Arbiter's decision, the complainant's position paper and the respondent's memorandum of appeal. Clearly, petitioner had demonstrated willingness to comply with the requirements set by the rules. If we are to apply the rules of procedure in a very rigid and technical sense, as the Court of Appeals did in this case, the ends of justice would be defeated.
We regret to inform you that in view of the prevailing market conditions and the continuous losses being incurred by the company, the management has decided to cut down on expenses and prevent further losses through retrenchment of some of our personnel effective January 19, 1998.While it is true that petitioner tendered his resignation letter to respondents requesting that he be given the same benefits granted by the company to resigned/retrenched employees, there is no showing that respondents accepted his resignation. Acceptance of a resignation tendered by an employee is necessary to make the resignation effective.[24] No such acceptance, however, was shown in the instant case. What appears in the record is a letter terminating the services of petitioner due to retrenchment effective January 20, 1998. Verily, said letter should be interpreted as a non-acceptance of petitioner's resignation effective December 31, 1997. As correctly pointed out by the Labor Arbiter, if respondents considered petitioner resigned as of December 31, 1997, then there would be no need to retrench him.
In compliance with the requirement of the law, this will serve as a formal notice to you of your termination due to retrenchment effective January 20, 1998. To provide you with sufficient time to seek alternative employment, you need not report for work (unless otherwise requested) starting January 20, 1998. Notwithstanding the above mentioned affectivity date, you may come down to the office and receive your separation benefits pursuant to the Labor Code...[23]
The foregoing expressly states that a retrenched employee is entitled to 15-day vacation leave. Paragraph 4 is the retrenchment package granted to retrenched employees, whereas paragraph 3 refers to the feasibility of commutation of unused sick and vacation leaves. Except for the sentence entitling employees to vacation and sick leaves, the last 2 sentences in paragraph 3 have nothing to do with the retrenchment benefits in paragraph 4. Note that the 15-day vacation and sick leave with pay in paragraph 4(c) are not qualified by the word "unused". The 15-day vacation and sick leaves are granted to retrenched employees as part of the retrenchment benefits regardless of whether or not they have unused sick and vacation leaves at the time of the retrenchment. Moreover, the applicability of the said provisions to petitioner was not disputed by respondents. They even invoked the same in manifesting conformity to the deletion by the NLRC of the award of 15-day vacation leave for every year of service. At any rate, any ambiguity therein must be resolved strictly against the respondents, who drafted these provisions.[31] Hence, petitioner is entitled not only to 15 days sick leave but also to 15 days vacation leave with pay
- That based on company policy and/or practice the rank-and-file employees are entitled to 15-days vacation leave and 15-days sick leaves. However, the vacation leave must be availed of within the year or applied to the remaining period of employment for those who resigned or go on terminal leave. In case of sick leaves all unused sick leaves are also commutable to cash;
- That employees who were retrenched are entitled to the following incentives:
(a) One (1) month additional leave with pay effective after their last day of employment to enable them to look for a new job;
(b) Plus one (1) month separation pay for every year of service; and
(c) 15-days vacation leave and 15-days sick leave with pay as stated in paragraph 3 hereof.[30]
Art. 111. Attorney's fees. - (a) In cases of unlawful withholding of wages, the culpable party may be assessed attorney's fees equivalent to ten percent of the amount of wages recovered...The afore-quoted Article 111 is an exception to the declared policy of strict construction in the awarding of attorney's fees. Although an express finding of facts and law is still necessary to prove the merit of the award, there need not be any showing that the employer acted maliciously or in bad faith when it withheld the wages. There need only be a showing that the lawful wages were not paid accordingly, as in this case.[33]