482 Phil. 385
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
Gloria prayed that judgment be rendered in her favor, as follows:
- That said Mario M. Biascan, then an overseas worker, and with the use of his earnings, purchased a lot and house situated at Bo. Camarin, Caloocan City, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 207197, a copy of which is hereto attached as Annex “A” and made [an] integral part hereof; said properties have a total value of
P104,000.00 per Tax Declaration No. 196644, a copy of which is hereto attached as Annex “B” and made integral part hereof;- That said Transfer Certificate of Title No. 207197 (Annex “A”) and Tax Declaration No. 196644 (Annex “B”), were issued to “Spouses Mario M. Biascan and Zenaida D. Biascan”, thru the fraudulent misrepresentation of defendant that she is the legal wife of Mario M. Biascan;
- That the inclusion of the name of defendant in the said transfer certificate of title and tax declaration, is without any legal basis whatsoever, because defendant is not the legal wife of Mario M. Biascan, and that the money used in acquiring the lot and house belonged to Mario M. Biascan;
- That the defendant’s use of the surname “Biascan” is a usurpation of surname under Article 377 of the New Civil Code of the Philippines, and as such, plaintiff, who is the legal wife of Mario M. Biascan, is entitled to recover damages from defendant;
- That by reason of defendant’s illegal acts in causing the inclusion of her name in the aforesaid transfer certificate of title and tax declaration, plaintiff, the legal wife of Mario M. Biascan, is unduly deprived of her right over the property covered by said title and declaration, and to vindicate such right, she is constrained to institute the instant action and retain the services of counsel to which she has agreed to pay the sum of
P20,000.00 for and as attorney’s fees and the sum ofP1,000.00 as appearance fee.[11]
1) Declaring as null and void the issuance of Transfer Certificate of Title No. 207197 in favor of Spouses Mario M. Biascan and Zenaida D. Biascan, including Tax Declaration No. 196644;Zenaida filed a Motion to Dismiss[13] on January 20, 1994, principally on the ground that, under Article 113 of the Civil Code and Section 4, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, a married woman cannot sue or be sued alone without joining her husband, and that, as registered co-owner of the subject property, the latter was an indispensable party. She also alleged that she had no idea that Mario was a married man; that she tried to leave him when such fact came to her knowledge; and that Mario made repeated promises of marriage.
2) Defendant to recover the undivided one-half (1/2) portion of the lot in question to plaintiff, who is the legal wife of Mario M. Biascan;
3) Defendant to pay to plaintiff the amount of Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00) Philippine Currency, as damages for usurping the surname “Biascan” which rightfully belongs to the plaintiff;
4) Defendant to pay to plaintiff the sum of Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00) Philippine Currency, for and as attorney’s fees; and
5) To pay the costs of this suit.Plaintiff further prays for such other relief this Honorable Court may deem just and equitable in the premises.[12]
After the parties submitted their respective pre-trial briefs, Gloria filed an amended complaint,[19] impleading her husband Mario as party-defendant. Thereafter, in an Order[20] dated July 6, 1994, the RTC, Branch 120, issued a writ of preliminary injunction restraining and enjoining the enforcement of the writ of execution[21] issued by the RTC, Branch 129 in Civil Case No. C-259. Gloria then filed a bond in the amount ofWHEREFORE, premises considered, it is most respectfully prayed to the Honorable Court that after due hearing judgment be rendered in favor of the defendant and against the plaintiff, DISMISSING the complaint and GRANTING all the counterclaim[s] interposed by the defendant.
- That the institution of the instant case is tainted with malice, for plaintiff know[s] for a fact that the defendant is a lawful co-owner of the subject lot and the house erected thereon, because said plaintiff was always present during the hearing of the Partition case filed by the defendant before Branch 129 of this Honorable Court, docketed under Civil Case No. C-259, and of the fact that said case had already been decided in favor of the defendant;
- That plaintiff and Mario Biascan even tried to convince to settle the case although [the said] decision was already rendered, showing plaintiff knowledge of the fact that the defendant is indeed entitled to one-half of the property;
- That obviously, the institution of the case was made to delay and frustrate the immediate enforcement of the decision in Civil Case No. C-259 because plaintiff and her children, and Mario Biascan, are enjoying the use of the subject property to the prejudice of the defendant;
- That because of the baseless and malicious institution of the instant case, the defendant suffered serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feeling[s] and sleepless nights to which plaintiff should be held answerable in the sum of not less than
P50,000.00 plusP25,000.00 as exemplary damages;- That for her protection, the defendant is constrained to secure the services of the undersigned counsel at an agreed attorney’s fees of
P20,000.00 plusP1,000.00 per court appearances (sic) to which plaintiff should, likewise, be held answerable;- That plaintiff, in connivance with Mario Biascan, has forcibly ousted the defendant from the premises through strategy and stealth, and because plaintiff, Mario Biascan and their children are presently occupying that portion owned by the defendant, it is but just and fair that they be adjudged to pay reasonable rent of
P2,500.00 per month from date of the decision in Civil Case No. C-259 for the use thereof, up to the time said portion is surrendered to the defendant.
Defendant further prays for such other reliefs as are just and equitable under the premises.[18]
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the complaint is dismissed. On the counterclaim, plaintiff is ordered to pay co-defendant Zenaida Dapar:The trial court ruled that the law on co-ownership governed the property relations of Mario and Zenaida, who were living in an adulterous relationship or in a state of concubinage at the time the house and lot in question was acquired. The trial court further explained that under Article 148 of the Family Code, properties acquired by both of the parties through their actual joint contribution of money shall be owned in common in proportion to their respective contributions, and in the event that the amount of such contributions could not be determined, as in the present case, they shall be presumed to be equal. The trial court concluded that the shares of Mario and Zenaida as described in TCT No. 207197 was in accordance with the sharing prescribed in Article 148. As such, there was no legal basis to order the reconveyance of the one-half share of the petitioner in favor of Gloria Biascan.SO ORDERED.[23]
- Attorney’s fees in the sum of
P20,000.00, plusP1,000.00 per court appearance- Exemplary damages in the amount of
P25,000.00; and- To pay the costs.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision dated October 28, 1997 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and in lieu thereof, another judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the appellant and against the appellee as follows:The appellate court ruled that Zenaida’s contention that Mario was unemployed from 1985 to 1988, and that she had savings and substantial earnings from her jewelry business was untenable. The appellate court also ruled that the remittances from relatives as claimed by Zenaida were not meant for her, as they were either unsigned or addressed to someone else. Clearly, the appellate court ruled, such remittances were not intended to increase Zenaida’s resources to support her claim that she contributed to the payment of the house and lot in question from her own funds. The appellate court noted that the appellee’s income was so meager that it was not even enough for her, and that she failed to establish, by clear and convincing evidence, that her savings and/or the remittances of her mother and brothers were deposited to the PNB joint savings account. The appellate court further ratiocinated as follows:SO ORDERED.[24]
- declaring the Transfer Certificate of Title No. 207197 of the Register of Deeds for Caloocan City, registered in the name of the spouses Mario M. Biascan and Zenaida D. Biascan, null and void;
- ordering appellee to reconvey in favor of the appellant one-half (1/2) undivided portion of the property described in said title, she being the legal wife of Mario M. Biascan;
- ordering the appellee to pay the appellant attorney’s fee in the amount of
P20,000.00- ordering the appellee to pay the costs.
For failure of the appellee to prove by satisfactory evidence that she contributed money to the purchase price of the house and lot in question, there is no basis to justify her co-ownership; the same must revert to the conjugal partnership [of] Mario Biascan and his lawful wife, the appellant (Agapay v. Palang, 276 SCRA 340). The entry in the Transfer Certificate of Title No. 207197, the word “Spouses Mario M. Biascan and Zenaida D. Biascan”, where the latter is not legally married to the former, is no proof that she contributed her money for the purchase of the property in question. In the case at bar, no iota of evidence was adduced to prove contribution. In the determination of the nature of the property acquired during their live-in partner status, the controlling factor is the source of the money utilized in the purchase.Zenaida’s motion for reconsideration was, likewise, denied in a Resolution dated February 4, 2000.
Evidently, from the Contract to Sell (Exh. “2”), Mario M. Biascan was in Saudi Arabia and the appellee was probably of the impression that is she made it appear that they are spouses, the same belong to both of them. Regrettably, there is no law to support such belief.
Indeed, there was fraud, deceit and misrepresentation in the acquisition of the property in question, depriving the lawful wife, the appellant herein, the property acquired during the marriage which forms part of the conjugal partnership between Mario M. Biascan and Gloria Lozano Biascan.[25]
The petitioner catalogues the deposits made in the PNB account from 1985 to November 1988,[27] and avers that such deposits could not possibly be considered as remittances of respondent Mario Biascan because he was jobless in 1983, and, thereafter, from 1985 to 1988, and was then in the Philippines wholly dependent upon her for support. The petitioner also avers that the alleged remittances cannot be considered as respondent Mario Biascan’s record of employment abroad, and that based on the evidence on record, he could not have paid even one-half (½) of the purchase price of the subject property. However, since the contribution of the petitioner and respondent could not be determined, considering that no specific amounts were properly identified as actual deposits of the parties in the joint account, such shares are presumed equal.
- The subject properties are acquired thru (sic) the common funds of petitioner and respondent Mario Biascan;
- Petitioner has source of income and had contributed in the purchase of the subject properties (sic);
- The subject properties (sic) were acquired in good faith by petitioner and not with fraudulent means;
- There are (sic) no proper and legal basis in the annulment of title and reconveyance of the subject properties (sic);
- No proper basis for the award of attorney’s fees against petitioner; and
- The decision in Civil Case No. C-259 must be respected for being res judicata.[26]
Res judicata literally means “a matter adjudged; a thing judicially acted upon or decided; a thing or matter settled by judgment.” Res judicata lays the rule that an existing final judgment or decree rendered on the merits, and without fraud or collusion, or by a court of competent jurisdiction, upon any matter within its jurisdiction, is conclusive of the rights of the parties or their privies, in all other actions or suits in the same or any other judicial tribunal of concurrent jurisdiction on the points and matters in issue in the first suit. The principle of res judicata has two aspects, namely: (a) “bar by prior judgment” as enunciated in Rule 39, Section 49(b) of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure; and (b) “conclusiveness of judgment” which is contained in Rule 39, Section 47(c).Contrary to the contentions of the respondents, the petitioner consistently invoked the finality of the judgment of the RTC of Caloocan City, Branch 129, in Civil Case No. C-259 for partition of the property covered by TCT No. 207197, as well as a 1976 model Toyota car. Eighty-three (83) days after learning of the said decision,[33] respondent Mario Biascan filed a petition for relief from judgment, which the trial court dismissed, and which dismissal was affirmed by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 32512 promulgated on December 17, 1993. The decision in Civil Case No. C-259 became final and executory, thus satisfying the first requisite. Furthermore, such judgment was on the merits and was rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties.
There is “bar by prior judgment” when, as between the first case where the judgment was rendered and the second case that is sought to be barred, there is identity of parties, subject matter, and causes of action. In this instance, the judgment in the first case constitutes an absolute bar to the second action. Otherwise put, the judgment or decree of the court of competent jurisdiction on the merits concludes the litigation between the parties, as well as their privies, and constitutes a bar to a new action or suit involving the same cause of action before the same or other tribunal.
But where there is identity of parties in the first and second cases, but no identity of causes of action, the first judgment is conclusive only as to those matters actually and directly controverted and determined and not as to matters merely involved therein. This is the concept of res judicata known as “conclusiveness of judgment.” Stated differently, any right, fact, or matter in issue directly adjudicated or necessarily involved in the determination of an action before a competent court in which judgment is rendered on the merits is conclusively settled by the judgment therein and cannot again be litigated between the parties and their privies whether or not the claim, demand, purpose, or subject matter of the two actions is the same.[32]
To split the proceedings into declaration of nullity of the deed of sale and trial for the partition case, or to hold in abeyance the partition case pending resolution of the nullity case would result in the multiplicity of suits, duplicitous procedure and unnecessary delay, as the lower court observed. The conduct of separate trials of the parties’ respective claims would entail a substantial duplication of effort and time not only of the parties but also of the courts concerned. On the other hand, it would be in the interest of justice of the partition court hears all the actions and incidents concerning the properties subject of the partition in a single and complete proceeding.Indeed, the difference in form and nature of the two actions is immaterial and is not a reason for exemption from the effects of res judicata. The philosophy behind this rule prohibits the parties from litigating the same issue more than once. When a right or fact has been judicially tried and determined by a court of competent jurisdiction or an opportunity for such trial has been given, the judgment of the court, as long as it remains unreversed, should be conclusive upon the parties and those in privity with them.[37] Whatever has once been irrevocably established as the controlling legal principle in an earlier final judgment continues to be the law of the case between the same parties in another suit, as long as the facts on which such decision was predicated continue to be the facts of the dispute before the court.[38]
After all, the issue of nullity can be properly ventilated before the partition court. Thus, even with the dismissal of the action for nullity, petitioner is not without recourse. She can still dispute the execution of the deed of absolute sale and assert her rights to the properties subject of the said instrument in the partition case. There is no need for a separate case to resolve the matter.[36]
Nothing is more settled in law than that once a judgment attains finality it thereby becomes immutable and unalterable. It may no longer be modified in any respect, even if the modification is meant to correct what is perceived to be an erroneous conclusion of fact or law, and regardless of whether the modification is attempted to be made by the court rendering it or by the highest court of the land. Just as the losing party has the right to file an appeal within the prescribed period, the winning party also has the correlative right to enjoy the finality of the resolution of his case. The doctrine of finality of judgment is grounded on fundamental considerations of public policy and sound practice, and that, at the risk of occasional errors, the judgments or orders of courts must become final at some definite time fixed by law; otherwise, there would be no end to litigation, thus setting to naught the main role of courts of justice which is to assist in the enforcement of the rule of law and the maintenance of peace and order by settling justiciable controversies with finality.[41]Indeed, it is readily apparent that the action for annulment of judgment was, in effect, a second cycle of review regarding a subject matter which has already been finally decided.[42] It is, likewise, not lost upon this Court that respondent Gloria Biascan resorted to filing the second case for annulment of title as an afterthought, after realizing her husband’s failure to appeal Civil Case No. C-259, and the inevitable dismissal of the petition for relief from judgment by the trial court and, thereafter, the petition for certiorari before the appellate court.
On the other cause of action referring to the use by Zenaida of the family name Biascan for which damages is prayed for by the plaintiff, there is evidence to show that defendant Mario Biascan was the one who suggested, and in fact authorized Zenaida Dapar to use said family name. It would appear that the very first time that Zenaida Dapar’s name had the surname Biascan was when defendant Mario Biascan had executed the affidavit of undertaking in connection with his employment in Saudi Arabia, wherein he designated as his beneficiary Zenaida Dapar Biascan. The undertaking was sworn to by the defendant on April 7, 1982 and which also showed that his effective date of employment in Saudi Arabia was April 1982 and to expire on February 1984 (Exhibit “A”). This is an extrajudicial admission that would not allow proof to the contrary. Zenaida appeared to have no participation in the preparation of said document. Moreover, when the contract to sell and the deed of sale of the property in question were executed, Zenaida Dapar used the surname Biascan and defendant Mario Biascan did not object to the use of such surname. Also, in the joint bank account with the PNB Valenzuela, the name Zenaida Dapar Biascan is described as a joint depositor.The mere use of a surname cannot be enjoined; it is the use thereof coupled with the representation that one is the lawful wife, or the usurpation of the wife’s status, which gives rise to an action for damages.[46]
Defendant Zenaida Dapar testified that she used the surname Biascan because she was instructed by her co-defendant to do so and she thought the latter was not married. She only became aware of his civil status a few years later after their living together in 1981.
The use by Zenaida Dapar of the surname of her co-defendant Mario Biascan was allowed by the latter and in no case could it be considered usurpation of surname. Accordingly, co-defendant Zenaida Dapar can no longer be held liable for damages for the use thereof.[45]
(1) | Mario M. Biascan, then an overseas worker, and with the use of his earnings purchased the property in question; | |
(2) | That the inclusion of defendant Zenaida F. Dapar in TCT No. 207197 in the owner’s name: “Spouses Mario M. Biascan and Zenaida D. Biascan” was a fraudulent misrepresentation as defendant Zenaida D. Biascan is not the legal wife of Mario M. Biascan; and | |
(3) | That by reason of defendant’s illegal acts in causing the inclusion of her name in the aforesaid certificate of title and tax declaration, plaintiff, the legal wife of Mario M. Biascan, is unduly deprived of her right over the property covered by said title and declaration x x x. |