482 Phil. 193
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Respondent’s Answer also contained a denial under oath, which reads:
- The allegations in par. 2, Complaint, on the existence of the alleged loan of
P1-Million, and the purported documents evidencing the same, only the signature appearing at the back of the promissory note, Annex “A” seems to be that of herein defendant. However, as to any liability arising therefrom, the receipt of the said amount ofP1-Million shows that the amount was received by another person, not the herein defendant. Hence, no liability attaches and as further stated in the special and affirmative defenses that, assuming the promissory note exists, it does not bind much less is there the intention by the parties to bind the herein defendant. In other words, the documents relative to the loan do not express the true intention of the parties.[8]
I, MARIANO Z. VELARDE, of age, am the defendant in this case, that I caused the preparation of the complaint and that all the allegations thereat are true and correct; that the promissory note sued upon, assuming that it exists and bears the genuine signature of herein defendant, the same does not bind him and that it did not truly express the real intention of the parties as stated in the defenses; …[9]During pre-trial, the issues were defined as follows:
On September 6, 1995, petitioner bank presented its sole witness, Antonio Marquez, the Assistant Department Manager of the Philippine Deposit Insurance Corporation (PDIC) and the designated Deputy Liquidator for petitioner bank, who identified the Promissory Note[11] dated September 28, 1983, the Loan Release Sheet[12] dated September 28, 1983, and the Disclosure Statement of Loan Credit Transaction.[13]
- Whether or not the defendant has an outstanding loan obligation granted by the plaintiff;
- Whether or not the defendant is obligated to pay the loan including interests and attorney’s fees;
- Whether or not the defendant has really executed the Promissory Note considering the doubt as to the genuineness of the signature and as well as the non-receipt of the said amount;
- Whether or not the obligation has prescribed on account of the lapse of time from date of execution and demand for enforcement; and
- Whether or not the defendant is entitled to his counterclaim and other damages.[10]
The trial court, in its Decision dated January 26, 1996, found merit in respondent’s demurrer to evidence and dismissed the complaint including respondent’s counterclaims, without pronouncement as to costs.[15]
(a) PLAINTIFF FAILED TO PROVE ITS CASE BY PREPONDERANCE OF EVIDENCE.(b) THE CAUSE OF ACTION, CONCLUDING ARGUENTI THAT IT EXISTS, IS BARRED BY PRESCRIPTION AND/OR LACHES.[14]
Before going into the merits of the petition, the Court finds it necessary to reiterate the well-settled rule that only questions of law may be raised in a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, as “the Supreme Court is not a trier of facts.”[20] It is not our function to review, examine and evaluate or weigh the probative value of the evidence presented.[21]4.1
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT PETITIONER FAILED TO ESTABLISH THE GENUINENESS, DUE EXECUTION AND AUTHENTICITY OF THE SUBJECT LOAN DOCUMENTS.4.2
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT PETITIONER’S CAUSE OF ACTION IS ALREADY BARRED BY PRESCRIPTION AND OR LACHES.[19]
The mere presentation of supposed documents regarding the loan, but absent the testimony of a competent witness to the transaction and the documentary evidence, coupled with the denial of liability by the defendant does not suffice to meet the requisite preponderance of evidence in civil cases. The documents, standing alone, unsupported by independent evidence of their existence, have no legal basis to stand on. They are not competent evidence. Such failure leaves this Court without ample basis to sustain the plaintiff’s cause of action and other reliefs prayed for. The loan document being challenged. (sic) Plaintiff did not exert additional effort to strengthen its case by the required preponderance of evidence. On this score, the suit must be dismissed.[23]The Court of Appeals concurred with the trial court’s finding and affirmed the dismissal of the complaint, viz.:
… The bank should have presented at least a single witness qualified to testify on the existence and execution of the documents it relied upon to prove the disputed loan obligations of Velarde. … This falls short of the requirement that (B)efore any private writing may be received in evidence, its due execution and authenticity must be proved either: (a) By anyone who saw the writing executed; (b) By evidence of the genuineness of the handwriting of the maker; or (c) By a subscribing witness. (Rule 132, Sec. 21, Rules of Court) …A reading of respondent’s Answer, however, shows that respondent did not specifically deny that he signed the loan documents. What he merely stated in his Answer was that the signature appearing at the back of the promissory note seems to be his. Respondent also denied any liability on the promissory note as he allegedly did not receive the amount stated therein, and the loan documents do not express the true intention of the parties.[25] Respondent reiterated these allegations in his “denial under oath,” stating that “the promissory note sued upon, assuming that it exists and bears the genuine signature of herein defendant, the same does not bind him and that it did not truly express the real intention of the parties as stated in the defenses …”[26]
It is not true, as the Bank claims, that there is no need to prove the loan and its supporting papers as Velarde has already admitted these. Velarde had in fact denied these in his responsive pleading. And consistent with his denial, he objected to the presentation of Marquez as a witness to identify the Exhibits of the Bank, and objected to their admission when these were offered as evidence. Though these were grudgingly admitted anyway, still admissibility of evidence should not be equated with weight of evidence. …[24]
… This means that the defendant must declare under oath that he did not sign the document or that it is otherwise false or fabricated. Neither does the statement of the answer to the effect that the instrument was procured by fraudulent representation raise any issue as to its genuineness or due execution. On the contrary such a plea is an admission both of the genuineness and due execution thereof, since it seeks to avoid the instrument upon a ground not affecting either.In fact, respondent’s allegations amount to an implied admission of the due execution and genuineness of the promissory note. The admission of the genuineness and due execution of a document means that the party whose signature it bears admits that he voluntarily signed the document or it was signed by another for him and with his authority; that at the time it was signed it was in words and figures exactly as set out in the pleading of the party relying upon it; that the document was delivered; and that any formalities required by law, such as a seal, an acknowledgment, or revenue stamp, which it lacks, are waived by him.[28] Also, it effectively eliminated any defense relating to the authenticity and due execution of the document, e.g., that the document was spurious, counterfeit, or of different import on its face as the one executed by the parties; or that the signatures appearing thereon were forgeries; or that the signatures were unauthorized.[29]
An action upon a written contract must be brought within ten years from the time the right of action accrues (Art. 1144[1], Civil Code). "The prescription of actions is interrupted when they are filed before the court, when there is a written extrajudicial demand by the creditors, and when there is any written acknowledgment of the debt by the debtor" (Art. 1155, Ibid, applied in Gonzalo Puyat & Sons, Inc. vs. City of Manila, 117 Phil. 985, 993; Philippine National Bank vs. Fernandez, L-20086, July 10, 1967, 20 SCRA 645, 648; Harden vs. Harden, L-22174, July 21, 1967, 20 SCRA 706, 711).Respondent’s obligation under the promissory note became due and demandable on October 13, 1983. On July 27, 1988, petitioner’s counsel made a written demand for petitioner to settle his obligation. From the time respondent’s obligation became due and demandable on October 13, 1983, up to the time the demand was made, only 4 years, 9 months and 14 days had elapsed. The prescriptive period then commenced anew when respondent received the demand letter on August 5, 1988.[39] Thus, when petitioner sent another demand letter on February 22, 1994,[40] the action still had not yet prescribed as only 5 years, 6 months and 17 days had lapsed. While the records do not show when respondent received the second demand letter, nevertheless, it is still apparent that petitioner had the right to institute the complaint on September 14, 1994, as it was filed before the lapse of the ten-year prescriptive period.
A written extrajudicial demand wipes out the period that has already elapsed and starts anew the prescriptive period. Giorgi says: "La interrupcion difiere de la suspension porque borra el tiempo transcurrido anteriormente y obliga a la prescripcion a comenzar de nuevo" (9 Teoria de las Obligaciones, 2nd Ed., p. 222). "La interrupcion . . . quita toda eficacia al tiempo pasado y abre camino a un computo totalmente nuevo, que parte del ultimo momento del acto interruptivo, precisamente, como si en aquel momento y no antes hubiese nacido el credito" (8 Giorgi, ibid pp. 390-2).
…
That same view as to the meaning of interruption was adopted in Florendo vs. Organo, 90 Phil. 483, 488, where it ruled that the interruption of the ten-year prescriptive period through a judicial demand means that "the full period of prescription commenced to run anew upon the cessation of the suspension". "When prescription is interrupted by a judicial demand, the full time for the prescription must be reckoned from the cessation of the interruption" (Spring vs. Barr, 120 So. 256 cited in 54 C.J.S. 293, note 27). That rule was followed in Nator and Talon vs. CIR, 114 Phil. 661, Sagucio vs. Bulos, 115 Phil. 786 and Fulton Insurance Co. vs. Manila Railroad Company, L-24263, November 18, 1967, 21 SCRA 974, 981.
…
Interruption of the prescriptive period as meaning renewal of the original term seems to be the basis of the ruling in Ramos vs. Condez, L-22072, August 30, 1967, 20 SCRA 1146, 1151. In that case the cause of action accrued on June 25, 1952. There was a written acknowledgment by the vendors on November 10, 1956 of the validity of the deed of sale.
…
In National Marketing Corporation vs. Marquez, L-25553, January 31, 1969, 26 SCRA 722, it appears that Gabino Marquez executed on June 24, 1950 a promissory note wherein he bound himself to pay to the NamarcoP12,000 in installments within the one-year period starting on June 24, 1951 and ending on June 25, 1952. After making partial payments on July 7, 1951 and February 23, 1952, Marquez defaulted.
His total obligation, including interest, as of October 31, 1964, amounted toP19,990.91. Written demands for the payment of the obligation were made upon Marquez and his surety on March 22, 1956, February 16, 1963, June 10, September 18 and October 13, 1964. Marquez did not make any further payment.
The Namarco sued Marquez and his surety on December 16, 1964. They contended that the action had prescribed because the ten-year period for suing on the note expired on June 25, 1962. That contention was not sustained. It was held that the prescriptive period was interrupted by the written demands, copies of which were furnished the surety.