482 Phil. 408
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
In his written explanation,[3] the respondent stated, inter alia, that he did not attend his scheduled meeting with Dr. Tommy Reyes because they would only talk about the latter’s golf game. He claimed that he failed to call back the office because his pager could only receive thirty percent (30%) of sent messages, and, as such, the other incoming messages could not be accommodated. The respondent explained that he did not visit Dr. Carlos Dy because the latter disliked the face of his saleswoman. He denied promising to give a business class ticket to Dr. Dy for the trip to Hamburg, and asserted that it was, in fact, the latter who requested the money equivalent thereof. The respondent also claimed that he had already submitted an affidavit regarding the loss of the pager, as well as his Medicheck reports on November 3, 1997. He averred that he was not able to get in touch with Dra. Gostibolo since the doctor had been on leave for the past two (2) weeks.
- Failure to see Dr. Tommy Reyes on 13 October ’97 after you committed to see him on the said day.
- Failure to answer paging of the same doctor for two days (13-14 October ) to order Vepesid. As a result, doctor got in touch with me for his needs.
- Failure to answer paging from the office on 13-15 October ‘97. You finally answered on 15 October at 11 am after allegedly receiving a message form (sic) the office.
- Failure to accompany Dr. de los Reyes to the Mimosa Meeting of the Taxol Investigators on 18 October ’97 as committed.
- Failure to meet Dr. de los Reyes on the lobby of the Holiday Inn Hotel, Clarkfield, on 18 October ’97, 7:00 p.m. as committed to the doctor. As a result, doctor was 1 hour and 30 minutes late for the meeting despite arriving early.
- Failure to arrive on time for the Taxol Investigators’ Meeting at Clarkfield on 18 October ’97. (Arrived 2 hours late)
- Discrepancy between your Medicheck report regarding calls made to Dr. Maria Warren on 26 August and 11 September ’97 and the doctor’s claim (that you have not done those particular visits).
- Failure to visit Dr. Carlos Dy weekly as required. Doctor further claims that you only see him when called upon.
- You committed a business class ticket for Dr. Dy to attend the recent ESMO in Hamburg, Germany for which we gave a USD2,000 financial assistance. As a result, doctor feels shortchanged because of the earlier commitment.
- Failure to answer paging of same doctor on 29-30 October ’97 to order Nestor Uy’s Taxol needs. As a result, doctor got in touch with me.
- Failure to submit to date, the right affidavit regarding loss of the company pager issued to you despite numerous reminders.
- Failure to submit your Medicheck cards for August and October ’97.
- Failure to give Dra. Gostibolo an update regarding our BMS sponsorship to the APCCC. As a result, Dr. Gostibolo called to inform me that ypou (sic) have not been getting in touch so she does not know whether the sponsorship will materialize or not.[2]
THE HONORABLE COURT GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN SETTING ASIDE ITS EARLIER DECISION DATED SEPTEMBER 29, 2000 AND ORDERING THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT NLRC TO GIVE DUE COURSE TO PETITIONER’S APPEAL.[24]The Petition In The
SECTION 1. PERIOD OF APPEAL. Decisions, resolutions or orders of the Labor Arbiter shall be final and executory unless appealed to the Commission by any or both parties within ten (10) calendar days from receipt of such decisions, resolutions or orders of the Labor Arbiter and in case of a decision of the Regional Director within five (5) calendar days from receipt of such decision, resolutions, or orders. If the 10th or 5th day, as the case may be, falls on a Saturday, Sunday or a holiday, the last day to perfect the appeal shall be the next working day.Rule VI, Section 4 of the said Rules enumerates the requisites for the perfection of appeal from the decision of the Labor Arbiter –
SECTION 4. REQUISITES FOR PERFECTION OF APPEAL. a) The Appeal shall be filed within the reglementary period as provided in Section 1 of this Rule; shall be verified by appellant himself in accordance with Section 4, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court, with proof of payment of the required appeal fee and the posting of a cash or surety bond as provided in Section 6 of this Rule; shall be accompanied by a memorandum of appeal in three (3) legibly typewritten copies which shall state the grounds relied upon and the arguments in support thereof; the relief prayed for; and a statement of the date when the appellant received the appealed decision, resolution or order and a certificate of non-forum shopping with proof of service on the other party of such appeal. A mere notice of appeal without complying with the other requisites aforestated shall not stop the running of the period for perfecting an appeal.Section 7 of the same Rule provides that no motion or request for extension of period within which to perfect an appeal shall be allowed.
The Labor Arbiter resolved the issues raised by the respondent in this wise:
- Whether or not Labor Arbiter Honorable Manuel P. Asuncion erred in declaring that complainant was illegally dismissed;
- Whether or not Honorable Manuel P. Asuncion erred in denying complainant’s claim for Team Share Stock Option;
…
ON THE FIRST ISSUE:
Labor Arbiter Honorable Manuel P. Asuncion, in his decision, declared that his office has found sufficient basis for respondent to loss (sic) its trust and confidence in complainant, which validates its dismissal of complainant. In support of such declaration, said Honorable Labor Arbiter stated that complainant failed to function effectively, and efficiently as Territory Manager, assigned at the Oncology Business Unit sometime in October 1997. Complainant has not attended to the needs of company’s customers, and has left his official duties unattended. In an attempt to show a semblance of efficient performance, falsified Medicheck Reports to make it appear that he had performed his duty of visiting company’s customers regularly, when in truth he has not done so.
With due respect to Honorable Labor Arbiter Manuel P. Asuncion, this representation most respectfully submits that he erred in declaring that complainant’s termination on December 24, 1997 was valid, and in accordance with due process. During the entire period of complainant’s employment with respondent, he was efficient in the performance of his duties and obligations as such employee, and in recognition of such efficiency, complainant was cited in several Memorandum, plaque, letter of appreciation and special calling card, copies of which are hereto attached as Annex[es] “A,” “B,” “C,” “D,” “E,” “F,” “G,” “H,” “I,” “J,” “K” and “L,” respectively, and made integral parts hereof. Aside from such evidences of efficient performance of duties, complainant’s sales print out (SAL-230-P) for the month of August 1997, clearly and undoubtedly shows that extraordinary sale made by him, ….
Respondent miserably failed to prove that complainant was guilty of acts, inimical to the interest of respondent. There was no hearing conducted wherein complainant was found guilty, and as such, there was no due process of law accorded to complainant prior to his termination from employment.
The findings of Honorable Labor Arbiter Manuel P. Asuncion, that complainant in an attempt to show a semblance of efficient performance, falsified Medicheck reports to make it appear that he had performed his duties of visiting company’s customers regularly. Such declaration is unfounded, baseless and fabricated. The truth of the matter is that the signature appearing at the bottom of Annex “10-A” of respondent’s Position Paper, is not the signature of complainant, and as such, it is a forgery.
ON THE SECOND ISSUE:
Honorable Labor Arbiter Manuel P. Asuncion, likewise erred in denying complainant’s claim for Team Share Stock Option, and in support of such denial, complainant has no option to enjoy, having been terminated on December 24, 1997, and as such, he was no longer an employee on or after the third anniversary of the grant date on or before February 1, 1998.
Again, with due respect to Honorable Labor Arbiter Manuel P. Asuncion, this representation humbly and respectfully submits that complainant is entitled to all benefits due him, because his dismissal was illegal. Moreover, the grant date was on February 1, 1995, and not January 1998, as evidenced by Bristol Myers Squibb Team Share Pharmaceutical Group issued in the name of complainant, ...[38]
After a careful consideration of the evidences of both parties as well as their arguments, this Office has found sufficient basis for respondent Bristol-Myers Squibb (Phil.), Inc., to lose its trust and confidence in complainant, which validates its dismissal of the latter on said ground. It has been observed that as a Territory Manager of the company’s Marketing Division, the complainant was tasked to manage a given sales territory for optimum sales results by monitoring prescription drugs and trade calls and maintaining good customer relations. Necessarily, utmost diligence in the performance of his duties and responsibilities is thus expected and as the complainant occupies a highly sensitive position that carries the corresponding highest degree of trust and responsibility on his part.In fine, all the facts and circumstances, including the nature of the issues raised by the respondent, the decision of the Labor Arbiter, and the respondent’s resort to a prohibited pleading in conjuncto, do not justify the relaxation of the period for appeal in this case.
Unfortunately, complainant failed to function effectively and efficiently as a Territory Manager assigned at the Oncology Business Unit sometime in October 1997. It has been shown that he would not attend to the needs of the company’s customers and has left his official duties unattended such as his failure to acknowledge and respond to the order calls of the customers and his failure to regularly visit them. On occasions, the complainant’s whereabouts were unknown and he could not be relied upon to act on urgent orders of customers. There is sufficient evidence to show that the complainant, in an attempt to show a semblance of efficient performance, falsified Medicheck reports to make it appear that he had performed his duty of visiting company customers regularly, when in truth he has not done so. In particular, the complainant made it appear that he visited Dr. Maria Warren as early as January 1997 contrary to the representations of the latter. As managerial employee, complainant failed to live up to the high standard of responsibility expected of his position. These gave the respondent sufficient reason to lose its trust and confidence in complainant.
Complainant[’s] woes, however, do not end here.
It has also been established that complainant incurred unauthorized and unexcused absences. The company’s Code of Discipline for Territory Managers on absences is explicit and clear. Company policy prohibits “absence from work for three (3) or more consecutive working days without proper written notification by letter or telegram or without DM’s or superior’s prior approval even when vacation/sick leaves are due him/her.”
In the case of the complainant, he was absent from work for more than three (3) consecutive days. In fact, his disapproved application for leave was for a period of twenty-five (25) days. However, despite disapproval by his superior, the complainant remained unyielding and continued on leave. It may not be amiss to point out that complainant’s reason for filing a leave of absence for the period of 21 November to 31 December 1997 was to accompany his mother and visit his family in the United States. However, as early as 16 December 1997, he was already able to attend the investigation hearing conducted by the respondent company. Indeed, there is no doubt that such conduct of the complainant tends to mislead the company to the detriment of his assigned tasks.
In his position paper, complaint (sic) miserably failed to rebut the documentary evidences (Annexes “4” to “12”) adduced by respondent company to substantiate the charges against him for gross and habitual neglect of duties, willful breach of the trust reposed in him and serious violation of the company’s rules and regulations which prompted respondent to terminate his services. His dismissal from employment is, therefore, justified simply because gross and habitual neglect of duties and fraud or willful breach of trust and confidence are valid grounds to terminate an employee (Associated Bank vs. NLRC, G.R. 86023, June 19, 1989; Cando vs. NLRC, 189 SCRA 666; Manuel vs. N.C. Construction Supply, 282 SCRA 326).
An employer cannot be compelled to continue with the employment of workers guilty of acts of misfeasance or malfeasance, and whose continuance in the service of the employer is clearly inimical to the former’s interest. The law, in protecting the rights of workers, authorizes neither oppression nor self-destruction of the employer (Bondoc vs. NLRC, 276 SCRA 288).
There is no denying that complainant Rogelio T. Viloria was a regular employee of the respondent Bristol Myers Squibb having been employed by the latter from 26 November 1984 until 24 December 1997 with the latest position of Territory Manager. As such regular employee, he is entitled to security of tenure and cannot be terminated from the service except for a just cause or for an authorized cause and after observance of procedural due process (Art. 279 in relation to Art. 277 (b) of the Labor Code, as amended).
The law is clear that before termination of employment can be legally effected the employer must serve two (2) written notices. The first notice informs the employee of the particular act/s or omission/s for which his dismissal is being sought and giving him an opportunity to present his defense, and the second notice informs the employee of the employer’s decision to terminate/or retain him in service.
In the instant case, respondent complied with these procedural requirements. Prior to complainant’s termination on 24 December 1997, he was directed by the company to submit two (2) written explanations, first, for his repeated violation of the company’s Code of Discipline on performance of duties and second, for his absences without leave. The complainant, in compliance with the company’s first directive, had explained in writing his failure to effectively perform his duties. However, immediately thereafter, he filed his application for leave, which the company disapproved. And when asked to submit the required explanation he chose not to give his side. This nevertheless did not present the company from issuing another Memorandum dated 5 December 1997 directing complainant to attend a meeting on 16 December 1997 and explain his side.
After deliberating and evaluating Viloria’s explanation, the respondent company found the same inadequate and deficient in substance. Hence, in a letter dated 24 December 1997 the company informed complainant of its decision to terminate his employment.
On the basis of the documentary evidence submitted, it has been established that respondent has substantially complied with the twin requirements of procedural due process. As a matter of fact, the company’s decision to terminate complainant’s employment was arrived at only after receipt of complainant’s explanation.
Regarding the complainant’s claim for Team Share Stock Option, the same must be denied. An employee could exercise his Team Share Stock Option on or after the third anniversary of the grant date if he is still employed by the company or he is on approved leave of absence or has been laid off for less than or equal to one year pursuant to the respondent’s Stock Option Guide. The alleged grant date of complainant’s Team Share Stock Option is on 1 February 1995 and his right to exercise the option grant vests on or after the third anniversary of the grant date which is on or after 1 February 1998. Having been terminated on 24 December 1997, the complainant has no option to enjoy.[39]