453 Phil. 115
PANGANIBAN, J.:
"The Complaint arose from the [respondent's] persistent refusal to make good on four (4) RCBC checks totaling [t]wenty [t]wo [t]housand (P22,000.00) [p]esos. These dishonored checks were issued by defendant in replacement for previous checks issued to the complainant. Based on the exchange of letters between the parties, it appears that [respondent], in a letter dated June 19, 2001, had committed to `forthwith effect immediate settlement of my outstanding obligation of P22,000.00 with Engr. Lao, at the earliest possible time, preferably, on or before the end of June 2000.' Again, in a letter dated July 3, 2000, the [respondent] made a `request for a final extension of only ten (10) days from June 30, 2000 (or not later than July 10, 2000), within which to effect payment of P22,000.00 to Engr. Lao.' Needless to say, the initiation of this present complaint proves that contrary to his written promises, Atty. Medel never made good on his dishonored checks. Neither has he paid his indebtedness."[2]In his Answer[3] dated July 30, 2001, Atty. Medel reasons that because all of his proposals to settle his obligation were rejected, he was unable to comply with his promise to pay complainant. Respondent maintains that the Complaint did not constitute a valid ground for disciplinary action because of the following:
"(a). Under Sec. 27, Rule 138 of the Rules, a member of the Bar, may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before admission to practice, or for a wil[l]ful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly or wil[l]fully appearing as an attorney for a party to case without authority so to do. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice;On August 22, 2001, complainant submitted his Reply.[5] Thereafter, IBP-CBD Commissioner Renato G. Cunanan, to whom the case was assigned by the IBP for investigation and report, scheduled the case for hearing on October 4, 2001. After several cancellations, the parties finally met on May 29, 2002. In that hearing, respondent acknowledged his obligation and committed himself to pay a total of P42,000 (P22,000 for his principal debt and P20,000 for attorney's fees). Complainant agreed to give him until July 4, 2002 to settle the principal debt and to discuss the plan of payment for attorney's fees in the next hearing.
"(a.1). Applying the afore-cited legal provision to the facts obtaining in the present case, it is clear that the offense with which the respondent is being charged by the complainant, is merely a violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 (B.P. 22, for brevity), which is a special law, and is not punishable under the Revised Penal Code (RPC, for brevity). It is self-evident therefore, that the offense is not in the same category as a violation of Article 315, paragraph 2, (d), RPC, which is issuing a post-dated check or a check in payment of an obligation, with insufficient funds in the drawee bank, through false pretenses or fraudulent acts, executed prior to or simultaneously with the commission of the fraud, which is a crime involving moral turpitude;
"(b). If the respondent is to be disciplined by the Supreme Court, under Sec. 27, Rule 138 of the Rules, for the issuance of a worthless check, in violation of B.P. 22, for payment of a pre-existing obligation to the complainant, then, verily, the said Rule 138, Sec. 27, would be a cruel and an unjust law, which the Honorable Supreme Court would not countenance;
"(c). A careful examination of the specific grounds enumerated, for disbarment or suspension of a member of the Bar, under Sec. 27 of Rule 138 of the Rules, clearly shows beyond a shadow of doubt that the alleged issuance of a worthless check, in violation of B.P. 22, is NOT one of the grounds for disciplinary action against a member of the Bar, to warrant his disbarment or suspension from his office as attorney, by the Supreme Court; and
"(d). The issuance of a worthless check by a member of the Bar, in violation of B.P. 22, does NOT constitute dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct, under Canon 1 and Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. This is because, the door to the law profession swings on reluctant hinges. Stated otherwise, unless there is a clear, palpable and unmitigated immoral or deceitful conduct, of a member of the Bar, in violation of his oath as an attorney, by the mere issuance of a worthless check, in violation of B.P. 22, the Supreme Court is inclined to give the said attorney, the benefit of the doubt."[4]
"The general rule is that a lawyer may not be suspended or disbarred, and the court may not ordinarily assume jurisdiction to discipline him for misconduct in his non-professional or private capacity (In Re Pelaez, 44 Phil. 5569 [1923]). Where, however, the misconduct outside of the lawyer's professional dealings is so gross a character as to show him morally unfit for the office and unworthy of the privilege which his licenses and the law confer on him, the court may be justified in suspending or removing him from the office of attorney (In Re Sotto, 38 Phil. 569 [1923]).We likewise take notice of the high-handed manner in which respondent dealt with Commissioner Cunanan during the July 4, 2002 hearing, when the former was expected to settle his obligation with complainant. We cannot countenance the discourtesy of respondent. He should be reminded that the IBP has disciplinary authority over him by virtue of his membership therein.[15]
"The evidence on record clearly shows respondent's propensity to issue bad checks. This gross misconduct on his part, though not related to his professional duties as a member of the bar, puts his moral character in serious doubt. The Commission, however, does not find him a hopeless case in the light of the fact that he eventually paid his obligation to the complainant, albeit very much delayed.
"While it is true that there was no attorney-client relationship between complainant and respondent as the transaction between them did not require the professional legal services of respondent, nevertheless respondent's abject conduct merits condemnation from this Court.
"As early as 1923, however, the Court laid down in In Re Vicente Pelaez [44 Phil.567 (1923)] the principle that it can exercise its power to discipline lawyers for causes which do not involve the relationship of an attorney and client x x x In disciplining the respondent, Mr. Justice Malcolm said: x x x As a general rule, a court will not assume jurisdiction to discipline one of its officers for misconduct alleged to have been committed in his private capacity. But this is a general rule with many exceptions x x x. The nature of the office, the trust relation which exists between attorney and client, as well as between court and attorney, and the statutory rules prescribing the qualifications of attorneys, uniformly require that an attorney shall be a person of good moral character. If that qualification is a condition precedent to a license or privilege to enter upon the practice of the law, it would seem to be equally essential during the continuance of the practice and the exercise of the privilege. So it is held that an attorney will be removed not only for malpractice and dishonesty in his profession, but also for gross misconduct not connected with his professional duties, which shows him to be unfit for the office and unworthy of the privileges which his license and the law confer upon him x x x.
"Ten years later, in Piatt v. Abordo where the erring lawyer was suspended for one year from the practice of law for attempting to engage in an opium deal, Justice Malcolm reiterated that an attorney may be removed not only for malpractice and dishonesty in his profession, but also for gross misconduct not related to his professional duties which show him to be an unfit and unworthy lawyer. The courts are not curators of the morals of the bar. At the same time the profession is not compelled to harbor all persons whatever their character, who are fortunate enough to keep out of prison. As good character is an essential qualification for admission of an attorney to practice, when the attorney's character is bad in such respects as to show that he is unsafe and unfit to be entrusted with the powers of an attorney, the courts retain the power to discipline him x x x Of all classes and professions, the lawyer is most sacredly bound to uphold the law x x x and to that doctrine we give our unqualified support."