597 Phil. 668
TINGA, J.:
The case stemmed from the three (3) Demolition Orders issued by the City Mayor of Baguio City, Braulio D. Yaranon, ordering the demolition of the illegal structures constructed by Lazaro Bawas, Alexander Ampaguey, Sr. and a certain Mr. Basatan on a portion of the Busol Watershed Reservation located at Aurora Hill, Baguio City, without the required building permits and in violation of Section 69 of Presidential Decree No. 705, as amended, Presidential Decree No. 1096 and Republic Act No. 7279.Acting on the petition for certiorari filed by petitioners,[4] the Court of Appeals upheld the jurisdiction of the NCIP over the action filed by private respondents and affirmed the temporary restraining orders dated October 16[5] and 19, 2006,[6] and the Resolution dated November 10, 2006,[7] granting the application for a writ of preliminary injunction, issued by the NCIP. The appellate court also ruled that Baguio City is not exempt from the coverage of Republic Act No. 8371, otherwise known as the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997 (IPRA).
Pursuant thereto, the corresponding demolition advices dated September 19, 2006 were issued informing the occupants thereon of the intended demolition of the erected structures on October 17 to 20, 2006. Consequently, Elvin Gumangan, Narciso Basatan and Lazaro Bawas (hereinafter private respondents) filed a petition for injunction with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction against the Office of the City Mayor of Baguio City through its Acting City Mayor, Reynaldo Bautista, the City Building and Architecture Office, the Anti-Squatting Task Force, and the Public Order and Safety Division, among others, (collectively called petitioners) before the National Commission on Indigenous Peoples, Cordillera Administrative Region (NCIP-CAR), Regional Hearing Office, La Trinidad, Benguet, docketed as Case No. 31-CAR-06.
In their petition, private respondents basically claimed that the lands where their residential houses stand are their ancestral lands which they have been occupying and possessing openly and continuously since time immemorial; that their ownership thereof have been expressly recognized in Proclamation No. 15 dated April 27, 1922 and recommended by the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) for exclusion from the coverage of the Busol Forest Reserve. They, thus, contended that the demolition of their residential houses is a violation of their right of possession and ownership of ancestral lands accorded by the Constitution and the law, perforce, must be restrained.
On October 16 and 19, 2006, Regional Hearing Officer Atty. Brain S. Masweng of the NCIP issued the two (2) assailed temporary restraining orders (TRO) directing the petitioners and all persons acting for and in their behalf to refrain from enforcing Demolition Advice dated September 18, 2006; Demolition Order dated September 19, 2006; Demolition Order No. 25, Series of 2004; Demolition Order No. 33, Series of 2005; and Demolition Order No. 28, Series of 2004, for a total period of twenty (20) days.
Subsequently, the NCIP issued the other assailed Resolution dated November 10, 2006 granting the private respondents' application for preliminary injunction subject to the posting of an injunctive bond each in the amount of P10,000.00.[3]
Sec. 5. Jurisdiction of the NCIP.--The NCIP through its Regional Hearing Offices shall exercise jurisdiction over all claims and disputes involving rights of ICCs/IPs and all cases pertaining to the implementation, enforcement, and interpretation of R.A. 8371, including but not limited to the following:In order to determine whether the NCIP has jurisdiction over the dispute in accordance with the foregoing provisions, it is necessary to resolve, on the basis of the allegations in their petition, whether private respondents are members of ICCs/IPs. In their petition[14] filed before the NCIP, private respondents, members of the Ibaloi tribe who first settled in Baguio City, were asserting ownership of portions of the Busol Forest Reservation which they claim to be their ancestral lands. Correctly denominated as a petition for injunction as it sought to prevent the enforcement of the demolition orders issued by the City Mayor, the petition traced private respondents' ancestry to Molintas and Gumangan and asserted their possession, occupation and utilization of their ancestral lands. The petition also alleged that private respondents' claim over these lands had been recognized by Proclamation No. 15 which mentions the names of Molintas and Gumangan as having claims over portions of the Busol Forest Reservation.[15]
(1) Original and Exclusive Jurisdiction of the Regional Hearing Office (RHO):(2) Original Jurisdiction of the Regional Hearing Officer:
- Cases involving disputes and controversies over ancestral lands/domains of ICCs/IPs;
- Cases involving violations of the requirement of free and prior and informed consent of ICCs/IPs;
- Actions for enforcement of decisions of ICCs/IPs involving violations of customary laws or desecration of ceremonial sites, sacred places, or rituals;
- Actions for redemption/reconveyance under Section 8(b) of R.A. 8371; and
- Such other cases analogous to the foregoing.
(3) Exclusive and Original Jurisdiction of the Commission:
- Cases affecting property rights, claims of ownership, hereditary succession, and settlement of land disputes, between and among ICCs/IPs that have not been settled under customary laws; and
- Actions for damages arising out of any violation of Republic Act No. 8371.
- Petition for cancellation of Certificate of Ancestral Domain Titles/Certificate of Ancestral Land Titles (CADTs/CALTs) alleged to have been fraudulently acquired by, and issued to, any person or community as provided for under Section 54 of R.A. 8371. Provided that such action is filed within one (1) year from the date of registration.
Sec. 69. Quasi-Judicial Powers of the NCIP.--The NCIP shall have the power and authority:NCIP Administrative Circular No. 1-03 echoes the above-quoted provision in Sec. 82, Rule XV, which provides:
a) To promulgate rules and regulations governing the hearing and disposition of cases filed before it as well as those pertaining to its internal functions and such rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out the purposes of this Act;
b) To administer oaths, summon the parties to a controversy, issue subpoenas requiring the attendance and testimony of witnesses or the production of such books, papers, contracts, records, agreements, and other document of similar nature as may be material to a just determination of the matter under investigation or hearing conducted in pursuance of this Act;
c) To hold any person in contempt, directly or indirectly, and impose appropriate penalties therefor; and
d) To enjoin any or all acts involving or arising from any case pending before it which, if not restrained forthwith, may cause grave or irreparable damage to any of the parties to the case or seriously affect social or economic activity. [Emphasis supplied]
Sec. 82. Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order.--A writ of preliminary injunction or restraining order may be granted by the Commission pursuant to the provisions of Sections 59 and 69 of R.A. [No.] 8371 when it is established, on the basis of sworn allegations in a petition, that the acts complained of involving or arising from any case, if not restrained forthwith, may cause grave or irreparable damage or injury to any of the parties, or seriously affect social or economic activity. This power may also be exercised by RHOs in cases pending before them in order to preserve the rights of the parties.As can be gleaned from the foregoing provisions, the NCIP may issue temporary restraining orders and writs of injunction without any prohibition against the issuance of the writ when the main action is for injunction. The power to issue temporary restraining orders or writs of injunction allows parties to a dispute over which the NCIP has jurisdiction to seek relief against any action which may cause them grave or irreparable damage or injury. In this case, the Regional Hearing Officer issued the injunctive writ because its jurisdiction was called upon to protect and preserve the rights of private respondents who are undoubtedly members of ICCs/IPs.
SEC. 78. Special Provision.--The City of Baguio shall remain to be governed by its Charter and all lands proclaimed as part of its townsite reservation shall remain as such until otherwise reclassified by appropriate legislation: Provided, That prior land rights and titles recognized and/or acquired through any judicial, administrative or other processes before the effectivity of this Act shall remain valid: Provided, further, That this provision shall not apply to any territory which becomes part of the City of Baguio after the effectivity of this Act. [Emphasis supplied]The foregoing provision indeed states that Baguio City is governed by its own charter. Its exemption from the IPRA, however, cannot ipso facto be deduced because the law concedes the validity of prior land rights recognized or acquired through any process before its effectivity. The IPRA demands that the city's charter respect the validity of these recognized land rights and titles.
Pursuant to the provisions of section eighteen hundred and twenty-six of Act Numbered Twenty-seven Hundred and eleven[,] I hereby establish the Busol Forest Reservation to be administered by the Bureau of Forestry for the purpose of conserving and protecting water and timber, the protection of the water supply being of primary importance and all other uses of the forest are to be subordinated to that purpose. I therefore withdraw from sale or settlement the following described parcels of the public domain situated in the Township of La Trinidad, City of Baguio, Mountain Province, Island of Luzon, to wit:The fact remains, too, that the Busol Forest Reservation was declared by the Court as inalienable in Heirs of Gumangan v. Court of Appeals.[19] The declaration of the Busol Forest Reservation as such precludes its conversion into private property. Relatedly, the courts are not endowed with jurisdictional competence to adjudicate forest lands.