598 Phil. 105
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Petitioner could choose to pay off its indebtedness with individual or all five parcels of land; or it could redeem said properties by paying respondents Tan and Obiedo the following prices for the same, inclusive of interest and penalties:
TCT No. Purchase Price 38376 P 9,340,000.00 29918 P 28,000,000.00 38374 P 12,000,000.00 39232 P 1,600,000.00 39225 P 1,600,000.00
In the event that petitioner is able to redeem any of the afore-mentioned parcels of land, the Deed of Absolute Sale covering the said property shall be nullified and have no force and effect; and respondents Tan and Obiedo shall then return the owner's duplicate of the corresponding TCT to petitioner and also execute a Deed of Discharge of Mortgage. However, if petitioner is unable to redeem the parcels of land within the period agreed upon, respondents Tan and Obiedo could already present the Deeds of Absolute Sale covering the same to the Office of the Register of Deeds for Naga City so respondents Tan and Obiedo could acquire TCTs to the said properties in their names.
TCT No. Redemption Price 38376 P 25,328,939.00 29918 P 35,660,800.00 38374 P 28,477,600.00 39232 P 6,233,381.00 39225 P 6,233,381.00
13. That by reason of the fraudulent actions by the [herein respondents], [herein petitioner] is prejudiced and is now in danger of being deprived, physically and legally, of the mortgaged properties without benefit of legal processes such as the remedy of foreclosure and its attendant procedures, solemnities and remedies available to a mortgagor, while [petitioner] is desirous and willing to pay its obligation and have the mortgaged properties released.[13]In support of its second cause of action, petitioner narrated in its Complaint that on 18 January 2006, respondents Tan and Obiedo forcibly took over, with the use of armed men, possession of the five parcels of land subject of the falsified Deeds of Absolute Sale and fenced the said properties with barbed wire. Beginning 3 March 2006, respondents Tan and Obiedo started demolishing some of the commercial spaces standing on the parcels of land in question which were being rented out by petitioner. Respondents Tan and Obiedo were also about to tear down a principal improvement on the properties consisting of a steel-and-concrete structure housing a motor vehicle terminal operated by petitioner. The actions of respondents Tan and Obiedo were to the damage and prejudice of petitioner and its tenants/lessees. Petitioner, alone, claimed to have suffered at least P300,000.00 in actual damages by reason of the physical invasion by respondents Tan and Obiedo and their armed goons of the five parcels of land.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is most respectfully prayed of this Honorable Court that upon the filing of this complaint, a 72-hour temporary restraining order be forthwith issued ex parte:Upon filing its Complaint with the RTC on 16 March 2006, petitioner paid the sum of P13,644.25 for docket and other legal fees, as assessed by the Office of the Clerk of Court. The Clerk of Court initially considered Civil Case No. 2006-0030 as an action incapable of pecuniary estimation and computed the docket and other legal fees due thereon according to Section 7(b)(1), Rule 141 of the Rules of Court.
(a) Restraining [herein respondents] Tan and Obiedo, their agents, privies or representatives, from committing act/s tending to alienate the mortgaged properties from the [herein petitioner] pending the resolution of the case, including but not limited to the acts complained of in paragraph "14", above;
(b) Restraining the Register of Deeds of Naga City from entertaining moves by the [respondents] to have [petitioner's] certificates of title to the mortgaged properties cancelled and changed/registered in [respondents] Tan's and Obiedo's names, and/or released to them;
(c) After notice and hearing, that a writ of preliminary injunction be issued imposing the same restraints indicated in the next preceding two paragraphs of this prayer; and
(d) After trial, judgment be rendered:[Petitioner] further prays for such other reliefs as may be proper, just and equitable under the premises.[14]
- Making the injunction permanent;
- Declaring the provision in the Memorandum of Agreement requiring the [petitioner] to execute deed of sales (sic) in favor of the [respondents Tan and Obiedo] as dacion en pago in the event of non-payment of the debt as pactum commissorium;
- Annulling the Deed[s] of Sale for TCT Nos. 29918, 38374, 38376, 39225 and 39232, all dated January 3, 2006, the same being in contravention of law;
- Ordering the [respondents] jointly and solidarily to pay the [petitioner] actual damages of at least P300,000.00; attorney's fees in the amount of P100,000.00 plus P1,000.00 per court attendance of counsel as appearance fee; litigation expenses in the amount of at least P10,000.00 and exemplary damages in the amount of P300,000.00, plus the costs.
Wherefore, premises considered, it is most respectfully prayed that, after due hearing, judgment be rendered dismissing the complaint, and on the counterclaim, [herein petitioner] and Ruben Sia, be ordered to indemnify, jointly and severally [herein respondents Tan and Obiedo] the amounts of not less than P10,000,000.00 as liquidated damages and the further sum of not less than P500,000.00 as attorney's fees. In the alternative, and should it become necessary, it is hereby prayed that [petitioner] be ordered to pay herein [respondents Tan and Obiedo] the entire principal loan of P95,700,620.00, plus interests, surcharges and penalties computed from March 17, 2005 until the entire sum is fully paid, including the amount of P74,678,647.00 foregone interest covering the period from October 1, 2004 to December 31, 2005 or for a total of fifteen (15) months, plus incidental expenses as may be proved in court, in the event that Annexes "G" to "L" be nullified. Other relief and remedies as are just and equitable under the premises are hereby prayed for.[16]Thereafter, respondent Tan filed before the RTC an Omnibus Motion in which he contended that Civil Case No. 2006-0030 involved real properties, the docket fees for which should be computed in accordance with Section 7(a), not Section 7(b)(1), of Rule 141 of the Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 04-2-04-SC which took effect on 16 August 2004. Since petitioner did not pay the appropriate docket fees for Civil Case No. 2006-0030, the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over the said case. Hence, respondent Tan asked the RTC to issue an order requiring petitioner to pay the correct and accurate docket fees pursuant to Section 7(a), Rule 141 of the Rules of Court, as amended; and should petitioner fail to do so, to deny and dismiss the prayer of petitioner for the annulment of the Deeds of Absolute Sale for having been executed in contravention of the law or of the Memorandum of Agreement as pactum commisorium.
It must be noted that under paragraph (b) 2. of the said Section 7, it is provided that QUIETING OF TITLE which is an action classified as beyond pecuniary estimation "shall be governed by paragraph (a)". Hence, the filing fee in an action for Declaration of Nullity of Deed which is also classified as beyond pecuniary estimation, must be computed based on the provision of Section 7(A) herein-above, in part, quoted.Consequently, the RTC decreed on the matter of docket/filing fees:
Since [herein respondent], Romeo Tan in his Answer has a counterclaim against the plaintiff, the former must likewise pay the necessary filling (sic) fees as provided for under Section 7 (A) of Amended Administrative Circular No. 35-2004 issued by the Supreme Court.[18]
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the [herein petitioner] is hereby ordered to pay additional filing fee and the [herein respondent], Romeo Tan is also ordered to pay docket and filing fees on his counterclaim, both computed based on Section 7(a) of the Supreme Court Amended Administrative Circular No. 35-2004 within fifteen (15) days from receipt of this Order to the Clerk of Court, Regional Trial Court, Naga City and for the latter to compute and to collect the said fees accordingly.[19]Petitioner moved[20] for the partial reconsideration of the 24 March 2006 Order of the RTC, arguing that Civil Case No. 2006-0030 was principally for the annulment of the Deeds of Absolute Sale and, as such, incapable of pecuniary estimation. Petitioner submitted that the RTC erred in applying Section 7(a), Rule 141 of the Rules of Court, as amended, to petitioner's first cause of action in its Complaint in Civil Case No. 2006-0030.
Analyzing, the action herein pertains to real property, for as admitted by the [herein petitioner], "the deeds of sale in question pertain to real property" x x x. The Deeds of Sale subject of the instant case have already been transferred in the name of the [herein respondents Tan and Obiedo].In a letter dated 19 April 2006, the RTC Clerk of Court computed, upon the request of counsel for the petitioner, the additional docket fees petitioner must pay for in Civil Case No. 2006-0030 as directed in the afore-mentioned RTC Orders. Per the computation of the RTC Clerk of Court, after excluding the amount petitioner previously paid on 16 March 2006, petitioner must still pay the amount of P720,392.60 as docket fees.[23]
Compared with Quieting of Title, the latter action is brought when there is cloud on the title to real property or any interest therein or to prevent a cloud from being cast upon title to the real property (Art. 476, Civil Code of the Philippines) and the plaintiff must have legal or equitable title to or interest in the real property which is the subject matter of the action (Art. 447, ibid.), and yet plaintiff in QUIETING OF TITLE is required to pay the fees in accordance with paragraph (a) of Section 7 of the said Amended Administrative Circular No. 35-2004, hence, with more reason that the [petitioner] who no longer has title to the real properties subject of the instant case must be required to pay the required fees in accordance with Section 7(a) of the Amended Administrative Circular No. 35-2004 afore-mentioned.
Furthermore, while [petitioner] claims that the action for declaration of nullity of deed of sale and memorandum of agreement is one incapable of pecuniary estimation, however, as argued by the [respondent Tan], the issue as to how much filing and docket fees should be paid was never raised as an issue in the case of Russell vs. Vestil, 304 SCRA 738.
x x x x
WHEREFORE, the Motion for Partial Reconsideration is hereby DENIED.[22]
Clearly, the petitioner's complaint involves not only the annulment of the deeds of sale, but also the recovery of the real properties identified in the said documents. In other words, the objectives of the petitioner in filing the complaint were to cancel the deeds of sale and ultimately, to recover possession of the same. It is therefore a real action.Hence, the fallo of the Decision of the appellate court reads:
Consequently, the additional docket fees that must be paid cannot be assessed in accordance with Section 7(b). As a real action, Section 7(a) must be applied in the assessment and payment of the proper docket fee.
Resultantly, there is no grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the court a quo. By grave abuse of discretion is meant capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction, and mere abuse of discretion is not enough - it must be grave. The abuse must be grave and patent, and it must be shown that the discretion was exercised arbitrarily and despotically.
Such a situation does not exist in this particular case. The evidence is insufficient to prove that the court a quo acted despotically in rendering the assailed orders. It acted properly and in accordance with law. Hence, error cannot be attributed to it.[25]
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is DENIED. The assailed Orders of the court a quo are AFFIRMED.[26]Without seeking reconsideration of the foregoing Decision with the Court of Appeals, petitioner filed its Petition for Review on Certiorari before this Court, with a lone assignment of error, to wit:
18. The herein petitioner most respectfully submits that the Court of Appeals committed a grave and serious reversible error in affirming the assailed Orders of the Regional Trial Court which are clearly contrary to the pronouncement of this Honorable Court in the case of Spouses De Leon v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 104796, March 6, 1998, not to mention the fact that if the said judgment is allowed to stand and not rectified, the same would result in grave injustice and irreparable damage to herein petitioner in view of the prohibitive amount assessed as a consequence of said Orders.[27]In Manchester Development Corporation v. Court of Appeals,[28] the Court explicitly pronounced that "[t]he court acquires jurisdiction over any case only upon the payment of the prescribed docket fee." Hence, the payment of docket fees is not only mandatory, but also jurisdictional.
SEC. 7. Clerks of Regional Trial Courts. -The docket fees under Section 7(a), Rule 141, in cases involving real property depend on the fair market value of the same: the higher the value of the real property, the higher the docket fees due. In contrast, Section 7(b)(1), Rule 141 imposes a fixed or flat rate of docket fees on actions incapable of pecuniary estimation.
(a) For filing an action or a permissive OR COMPULSORY counterclaim, CROSS-CLAIM, or money claim against an estate not based on judgment, or for filing a third-party, fourth-party, etc. complaint, or a complaint-in-intervention, if the total sum claimed, INCLUSIVE OF INTERESTS, PENALTIES, SURCHARGES, DAMAGES OF WHATEVER KIND, AND ATTORNEY'S FEES, LITIGATIO NEXPENSES AND COSTS and/or in cases involving property, the FAIR MARKET value of the REAL property in litigation STATED IN THE CURRENT TAX DECLARATION OR CURRENT ZONAL VALUATION OF THE BUREAU OF INTERNAL REVENUE, WHICHEVER IS HIGHER, OR IF THERE IS NONE, THE STATED VALUE OF THE PROPERTY IN LITIGATION OR THE VALUE OF THE PERSONAL PROPERTY IN LITIGATION OR THE VALUE OF THE PERSONAL PROPERTY IN LITIGATION AS ALLEGED BY THE CLAIMANT, is:
[Table of fees omitted.]
If the action involves both a money claim and relief pertaining to property, then THE fees will be charged on both the amounts claimed and value of property based on the formula prescribed in this paragraph a.
(b) For filing:[Table of fees omitted.]
- Actions where the value of the subject matter cannot be estimated
- Special civil actions, except judicial foreclosure of mortgage, EXPROPRIATION PROCEEDINGS, PARTITION AND QUIETING OF TITLE which will
- All other actions not involving property
In a real action, the assessed value of the property, or if there is none, the estimated value thereof shall be alleged by the claimant and shall be the basis in computing the fees.It was in accordance with the afore-quoted provision that the Court, in Gochan v. Gochan,[34] held that although the caption of the complaint filed by therein respondents Mercedes Gochan, et al. with the RTC was denominated as one for "specific performance and damages," the relief sought was the conveyance or transfer of real property, or ultimately, the execution of deeds of conveyance in their favor of the real properties enumerated in the provisional memorandum of agreement. Under these circumstances, the case before the RTC was actually a real action, affecting as it did title to or possession of real property. Consequently, the basis for determining the correct docket fees shall be the assessed value of the property, or the estimated value thereof as alleged in the complaint. But since Mercedes Gochan failed to allege in their complaint the value of the real properties, the Court found that the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over the same for non-payment of the correct docket fees.
In his amended petition, respondent Manalo prayed that NTA's sale of the property in dispute to Standford East Realty Corporation and the title issued to the latter on the basis thereof, be declared null and void. In a very realsense, albeit the amended petition is styled as one for "Mandamus with Revocation of Title and Damages," it is, at bottom,a suit to recover from Standford the realtyin question and to vest in respondent the ownership and possession thereof. In short, the amended petition is in reality an action in res or a real action. Our pronouncement in Fortune Motors (Phils.), Inc. vs. Court of Appeals is instructive. There, we said:It was in Serrano v. Delica,[37] however, that the Court dealt with a complaint that bore the most similarity to the one at bar. Therein respondent Delica averred that undue influence, coercion, and intimidation were exerted upon him by therein petitioners Serrano, et al. to effect transfer of his properties. Thus, Delica filed a complaint before the RTC against Serrano, et al., praying that the special power of attorney, the affidavit, the new titles issued in the names of Serrano, et al., and the contracts of sale of the disputed properties be cancelled; that Serrano, et al. be ordered to pay Delica, jointly and severally, actual, moral and exemplary damages in the amount of P200,000.00, as well as attorney's fee of P200,000.00 and costs of litigation; that a TRO and a writ of preliminary injunction be issued ordering Serrano, et al. to immediately restore him to his possession of the parcels of land in question; and that after trial, the writ of injunction be made permanent. The Court dismissed Delica's complaint for the following reasons:A prayer for annulment or rescission of contract does not operate to efface the true objectives and nature of the action which is to recover real property. (Inton, et al., v. Quintan, 81 Phil. 97, 1948)Unfortunately, and evidently to evade payment of the correct amount of filing fee, respondent Manalo never alleged in the body of his amended petition, much less in the prayer portion thereof, the assessed value of the subject res, or, if there is none, the estimated value thereof, to serve as basis for the receiving clerk in computing and arriving at the proper amount of filing fee due thereon, as required under Section 7 of this Court's en banc resolution of 04 September 1990 (Re: Proposed Amendments to Rule 141 on Legal Fees).
An action for the annulment or rescission of a sale of real property is a real action. Its prime objective is to recover said real property. (Gavieres v. Sanchez, 94 Phil. 760, 1954)
An action to annul a real estate mortgage foreclosure sale is no different from an action to annul a private sale of real property. (Muñoz v. Llamas, 87 Phil. 737, 1950).
While it is true that petitioner does not directly seek the recovery of title or possession of the property in question, his action for annulment of sale and his claim for damages are closely intertwined with the issue of ownership of the building which, under the law, is considered immovable property, the recovery of which is petitioner's primary objective. The prevalent doctrine is that an action for the annulment or rescission of a sale of real property does not operate to efface the fundamental and prime objective and nature of the case, which is to recover said real property. It is a real action.
Even the amended petition, therefore, should have been expunged from the records.
In fine, we rule and so hold that the trial court never acquired jurisdictionoveritsCivilCaseNo. Q-95-24791.[36]
A careful examination of respondent's complaint is that it is a real action. In Paderanga vs. Buissan, we held that "in a real action, the plaintiff seeks the recovery of real property, or, as stated in Section 2(a), Rule 4 of the Revised Rules of Court, a real action is one `affecting title to real property or for the recovery of possession of, or for partition or condemnation of, or foreclosure of a mortgage on a real property.'"Brushing aside the significance of Serrano, petitioner argues that said decision, rendered by the Third Division of the Court, and not by the Court en banc, cannot modify or reverse the doctrine laid down in Spouses De Leon v. Court of Appeals.[39] Petitioner relies heavily on the declaration of this Court in Spouses De Leon that an action for annulment or rescission of a contract of sale of real property is incapable of pecuniary estimation.
Obviously, respondent's complaint is a real action involving not only the recovery of real properties, but likewise the cancellation of the titles thereto.
Considering that respondent's complaint is a real action, the Rule requires that "the assessed value of the property, or if there is none, the estimated value thereof shall be alleged by the claimant and shall be the basis in computing the fees."
We note, however, that neither the "assessed value" nor the "estimated value" of the questioned parcels of land were alleged by respondent in both his original and amended complaint. What he stated in his amended complaint is that the disputed realties have a "BIR zonal valuation" of P1,200.00 per square meter. However, the alleged "BIR zonal valuation" is not the kind of valuation required by the Rule. It is the assessed value of the realty. Having utterly failed to comply with the requirement of the Rule that he shall allege in his complaint the assessed value of his real properties in controversy, the correct docket fee cannot be computed. As such, his complaint should not have been accepted by the trial court. We thus rule that it has not acquired jurisdiction over the present case for failure of herein respondent to pay the required docket fee. On this ground alone, respondent's complaint is vulnerable to dismissal.[38]
As this Court has previously discussed herein, the nature of Civil Case No. 2006-0030 instituted by petitioner before the RTC is closer to that of Serrano, rather than of Spouses De Leon, hence, calling for the application of the ruling of the Court in the former, rather than in the latter.
- Ordering the nullification or rescission of the Contract of Conditional Sale (Supplementary Agreement) for having violated the rights of plaintiffs (private respondents) guaranteed to them under Article 886 of the Civil Code and/or violation of the terms and conditions of the said contract.
- Declaring void ab initio the Deed of Absolute Sale for being absolutely simulated; and
- Ordering defendants (petitioners) to pay plaintiffs (private respondents) attorney's fees in the amount of P100,000.00.[41]