620 Phil. 175
BRION, J.:
Sec. 2. Term of Office. - The term of office of all barangay and sangguniang kabataan officials after the effectivity of this Act shall be three (3) years.
No barangay elective official shall serve for more than three (3) consecutive terms in the same position: Provided, however, That the term of office shall be reckoned from the 1994 barangay elections. Voluntary renunciation of office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of service for the full term for which the elective official was elected.
I. The term limit of Barangay officials should be applied prospectively and not retroactively.
II. Implementation of paragraph 2 Section 2 of RA No. 9164 would be a violation of the equal protection of the law.
III. Barangay officials have always been apolitical.
When the Local Government Code of 1991 took effect abrogating all other laws inconsistent therewith, a different term was ordained. Here, this Court agrees with the position of the petitioners that Section 43 of the Code specifically exempted barangay elective officials from the coverage of the three (3) consecutive term limit rule considering that the provision applicable to these (sic) class of elective officials was significantly separated from the provisions of paragraphs (a) and (b) thereof. Paragraph (b) is indeed intended to qualify paragraph (a) of Section 43 as regards to (sic) all local elective officials except barangay officials. Had the intention of the framers of the Code is (sic) to include barangay elective officials, then no excepting proviso should have been expressly made in paragraph (a) thereof or, by implication, the contents of paragraph (c) should have been stated ahead of the contents of paragraph (b).In declaring this retroactive application unconstitutional, the RTC explained that:
x x x x
Clearly, the intent of the framers of the constitution (sic) is to exempt the barangay officials from the three (3) term limits (sic) which are otherwise applicable to other elected public officials from the Members of the House of Representatives down to the members of the sangguniang bayan/panlungsod. It is up for the Congress whether the three (3) term limit should be applied by enacting a law for the purpose.
The amendment introduced by R.A. No. 8524 merely increased the term of office of barangay elective officials from three (3) years to five (5) years. Like the Local Government Code, it can be noted that no consecutive term limit for the election of barangay elective officials was fixed therein.
The advent of R.A. 9164 marked the revival of the consecutive term limit for the election of barangay elective officials after the Local Government Code took effect. Under the assailed provision of this Act, the term of office of barangay elective officials reverted back to three (3) years from five (5) years, and, this time, the legislators expressly declared that no barangay elective official shall serve for more than three (3) consecutive terms in the same position. The petitioners are very clear that they are not assailing the validity of such provision fixing the three (3) consecutive term limit rule for the election of barangay elective officials to the same position. The particular provision the constitutionality of which is under attack is that portion providing for the reckoning of the three (3) consecutive term limit of barangay elective officials beginning from the 1994 barangay elections.
x x x
Section 2, paragraph 2 of R.A. 9164 is not a mere restatement of Section 43(c) of the Local Government Code. As discussed above, Section 43(c) of the Local Government Code does not provide for the consecutive term limit rule of barangay elective officials. Such specific provision of the Code has in fact amended the previous enactments (R.A. 6653 and R.A. 6679) providing for the consecutive term limit rule of barangay elective officials. But, such specific provision of the Local Government Code was amended by R.A. 9164, which reverted back to the previous policy of fixing consecutive term limits of barangay elective officials." [3]
By giving a retroactive reckoning of the three (3) consecutive term limit rule for barangay officials to the 1994 barangay elections, Congress has violated not only the principle of prospective application of statutes but also the equal protection clause of the Constitution inasmuch as the barangay elective officials were singled out that their consecutive term limit shall be counted retroactively. There is no rhyme or reason why the consecutive limit for these barangay officials shall be counted retroactively while the consecutive limit for other local and national elective officials are counted prospectively. For if the purpose of Congress is [sic] to classify elective barangay officials as belonging to the same class of public officers whose term of office are limited to three (3) consecutive terms, then to discriminate them by applying the proviso retroactively violates the constitutionally enshrined principle of equal protection of the laws.
Although the Constitution grants Congress the power to determine such successive term limit of barangay elective officials, the exercise of the authority granted shall not otherwise transgress other constitutional and statutory privileges.
This Court cannot subscribe to the position of the respondent that the legislature clearly intended that the provision of RA No. 9164 be made effective in 1994 and that such provision is valid and constitutional. If we allow such premise, then the term of office for those officials elected in the 1997 barangay elections should have ended in year 2000 and not year 2002 considering that RA No. 9164 provides for a three-year term of barangay elective officials. The amendment introduced by R.A. No. 8524 would be rendered nugatory in view of such retroactive application. This is absurd and illusory.
True, no person has a vested right to a public office, the same not being property within the contemplation of constitutional guarantee. However, a cursory reading of the petition would show that the petitioners are not claiming vested right to their office but their right to be voted upon by the electorate without being burdened by the assailed provision of the law that, in effect, rendered them ineligible to run for their incumbent positions. Such right to run for office and be voted for by the electorate is the right being sought to be protected by assailing the otherwise unconstitutional provision.
Moreover, the Court likewise agrees with the petitioners that the law violated the one-act-one subject rule embodied in the Constitution. x x x x The challenged law's title is "AN ACT PROVIDING FOR THE SYNCHRONIZED BARANGAY AND SANGGUNIANG KABATAAN ELECTIONS, AMENDING REPUBLIC ACT 7160 OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE OF 1991 AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES." x x x x
x x x x
To this court, the non-inclusion in the title of the act on the retroactivity of the reckoning of the term limits posed a serious constitutional breach, particularly on the provision of the constitution [sic] that every bill must embrace only one subject to be expressed in the title thereof.
x x x the Court is of the view that the affected barangay officials were not sufficiently given notice that they were already disqualified by a new act, when under the previous enactments no such restrictions were imposed.
Even if this Court would apply the usual test in determining the sufficiency of the title of the bill, the challenged law would still be insufficient for how can a retroactivity of the term limits be germane to the synchronization of an election x x x x.[4]
As a unit of government, the barangay antedated the Spanish conquest of the Philippines. The word "barangay" is derived from the Malay "balangay," a boat which transported them (the Malays) to these shores. Quoting from Juan de Plasencia, a Franciscan missionary in 1577, Historian Conrado Benitez wrote that the barangay was ruled by a dato who exercised absolute powers of government. While the Spaniards kept the barangay as the basic structure of government, they stripped the dato or rajah of his powers. Instead, power was centralized nationally in the governor general and locally in the encomiendero and later, in the alcalde mayor and the gobernadorcillo. The dato or rajah was much later renamed cabeza de barangay, who was elected by the local citizens possessing property. The position degenerated from a title of honor to that of a "mere government employee. Only the poor who needed a salary, no matter how low, accepted the post."
After the Americans colonized the Philippines, the barangays became known as "barrios." For some time, the laws governing barrio governments were found in the Revised Administrative Code of 1916 and later in the Revised Administrative Code of 1917. Barrios were granted autonomy by the original Barrio Charter, RA 2370, and formally recognized as quasi-municipal corporations by the Revised Barrio Charter, RA 3590. During the martial law regime, barrios were "declared" or renamed "barangays" -- a reversion really to their pre-Spanish names -- by PD. No. 86 and PD No. 557. Their basic organization and functions under RA 3590, which was expressly "adopted as the Barangay Charter," were retained. However, the titles of the officials were changed to "barangay captain," "barangay councilman," "barangay secretary" and "barangay treasurer."
Pursuant to Sec. 6 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 222, "a Punong Barangay (Barangay Captain) and six Kagawads ng Sangguniang Barangay (Barangay Councilmen), who shall constitute the presiding officer and members of the Sangguniang Barangay (Barangay Council) respectively" were first elected on May 17, 1982. They had a term of six years which began on June 7, 1982.
The Local Government Code of 1983 also fixed the term of office of local elective officials at six years. Under this Code, the chief officials of the barangay were the punong barangay, six elective sangguniang barangay members, the kabataang barangay chairman, a barangay secretary and a barangay treasurer.
B.P. Blg. 881, the Omnibus Election Code, reiterated that barangay officials "shall hold office for six years," and stated that their election was to be held "on the second Monday of May nineteen hundred and eighty eight and on the same day every six years thereafter." [Emphasis supplied.]
SEC. 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall be determined by law, shall be three years and no such official shall serve for more than three consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was elected. [Emphasis supplied.]
After the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution, the barangay election originally scheduled by Batas Pambansa Blg. 881[7] on the second Monday of May 1988 was reset to "the second Monday of November 1988 and every five years thereafter by RA No. 6653."[8] Section 2 of RA No. 6653 changed the term of office of barangay officials and introduced a term limitation as follows:
MR. NOLLEDO: One clarificatory question, Madam President. What will be the term of the office of barangay officials as provided for? MR. DAVIDE: As may be determined by law. MR. NOLLEDO: As provided for in the Local Government Code? MR. DAVIDE: Yes. x x x x x x x x x THE PRESIDENT: Is there any other comment? Is there any objection to this proposed new section as submitted by Commissioner Davide and accepted by the Committee? MR. RODRIGO: Madam President, does this prohibition to serve for more than three consecutive terms apply to barangay officials? MR. DAVIDE: Madam President, the voting that we had on the terms of office did not include the barangay officials because it was then the stand of the Chairman of the Committee on Local Governments that the term of barangay officials must be determined by law. So it is now for the law to determine whether the restriction on the number of reelections will be included in the Local Government Code. MR. RODRIGO: So that is up to Congress to decide. MR. DAVIDE: Yes. MR. RODRIGO: I just wanted that clear in the record."[6] [Emphasis supplied.]
SEC. 2. The term of office of barangay officials shall be for five (5) years from the first day of January following their election. Provided, however, That no kagawad shall serve for more than two (2) consecutive terms. [Emphasis supplied]
SEC. 1. The elections of barangay officials set on the second Monday of November 1988 by Republic Act No. 6653 are hereby postponed and reset to March 28, 1989. They shall serve a term which shall begin on the first day of May 1989 and ending on the thirty-first day of May 1994.
There shall be held a regular election of barangay officials on the second Monday of May 1994 and on the same day every five (5) years thereafter. Their term shall be for five (5) years which shall begin on the first day of June following the election and until their successors shall have been elected and qualified: Provided, That no barangay official shall serve for more than three (3) consecutive terms.
The barangay elections shall be nonpartisan and shall be conducted in an expeditious and inexpensive manner.
SEC. 41. Manner of Election. -- (a) The x x x punong barangay shall be elected at large x x x by the qualified voters" therein.
SEC. 43. Term of Office. - (a) The term of office of all local elective officials elected after the effectivity of this Code shall be three (3) years, starting from noon of June 30, 1992 or such date as may be provided for by law, except that of elective barangay officials: Provided, That all local officials first elected during the local elections immediately following the ratification of the 1987 Constitution shall serve until noon of June 30, 1992.
(b) No local elective official shall serve for more than three (3) consecutive terms in the same position. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of service for the full term for which the elective official concerned was elected.
(c) The term of office of barangay officials and members of the sangguniang kabataan shall be for three (3) years, which shall begin after the regular election of barangay officials on the second Monday of May 1994.
SEC. 387. Chief Officials and Offices. -- (a) There shall be in each barangay a punong barangay, seven (7) sangguniang barangay members, the sangguniang kabataan chairman, a barangay secretary and a barangay treasurer.x x x x x x x x x
SEC. 390. Composition. -- The Sangguniang barangay, the legislative body of the barangay, shall be composed of the punong barangay as presiding officer, and the seven (7) regular sanguniang barangay members elected at large and the sanguniang kabataan chairman as members. [Emphasis supplied.]
To a great degree, the 1987 Constitution has narrowed the reach of the political doctrine when it expanded the power of judicial review of this court not only to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable but also to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of government. Heretofore, the judiciary has focused on the "thou shalt not's" of the Constitution directed against the exercise of its jurisdiction. With the new provision, however, courts are given a greater prerogative to determine what it can do to prevent grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of government. Clearly, the new provision did not just grant the Court power of doing nothing. In sync and symmetry with this intent are other provisions of the 1987 Constitution trimming the so called political thicket. xxxx
MARCH 5, 2002:
THE DEPUTY SPEAKER (Rep. Espinosa, E.R.). Majority Leader.
REP. ESCUDERO. Mr. Speaker, next to interpellate is the Gentleman from Zamboanga City. I ask that the Honorable Lobregat be recognized.
THE DEPUTY SPEAKER (Rep. Espinosa, E.R.). The Honorable Lobregat is recognized.
REP. LOBREGAT. Thank you very much, Mr. Speaker. Mr. Speaker, this is just ...
REP. MACIAS. Willingly to the Gentleman from Zamboanga City.
REP. LOBREGAT. ... points of clarification, Mr. Speaker, the term of office. It says in Section 4, "The term of office of all Barangay and sangguniang kabataan officials after the effectivity of this Act shall be three years." Then it says, "No Barangay elective official shall serve for more than three (3) consecutive terms in the same position."
Mr. Speaker, I think it is the position of the committee that the first term should be reckoned from election of what year, Mr. Speaker?
REP. MACIAS. After the adoption of the Local Government Code, Your Honor. So that the first election is to be reckoned on, would be May 8, 1994, as far as the Barangay election is concerned.
REP. LOBREGAT. Yes, Mr. Speaker. So there was an election in 1994.
REP. MACIAS. Then an election in 1997.
REP. LOBREGAT. There was an election in 1997. And there will be an election this year ...
REP. LOBREGAT. ... election this year.
REP. MACIAS. That is correct. This will be the third.
xxx xxx
REP. SUMULONG. Mr. Speaker.
THE DEPUTY SPEAKER (Rep. Espinosa, E.R.) The Honorable Sumulong is recognized.
REP. SUMULONG. Again, with the permission of my Chairman, I would like to address the question of Congressman Lobregat.
THE DEPUTY SPEAKER (Rep. Espinosa, E.R.). Please proceed.
REP. SUMULONG. With respect to the three-year consecutive term limits of Barangay Captains that is not provided for in the Constitution and that is why the election prior to 1991 during the enactment of the Local Government Code is not counted because it is not in the Constitution but in the Local Government Code where the three consecutive term limits has been placed. [Emphasis supplied.]
March 6, 2002COMMITTEE ON AMENDMENTS
REP. GONZALES. May we now proceed to committee amendment, if any, Mr. Speaker.
THE DEPUTY SPEAKER (Rep. Gonzalez). The Chair recognizes the distinguished Chairman of the Committee on Suffrage and Electoral Reforms.
REP. SYJUCO. Mr. Speaker, on page 2, line 7, after the word "position", substitute the period (.) and add the following: PROVIDED HOWEVER THAT THE TERM OF OFFICE SHALL BE RECKONED FROM THE 1994 BARANGAY ELECTIONS. So that the amended Section 4 now reads as follows:"SEC. 4. Term of Office. - The term of office of all barangay and sangguniang kabataan officials after the effectivity of this Act shall be three (3) years.
No barangay elective local official shall serve for more than three (3) consecutive terms in the same position COLON (:) PROVIDED, HOWEVER, THAT THE TERM OF OFFICE SHALL BE RECKONED FROM THE 1994 BARANGAY ELECTIONS. Voluntary renunciation of office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of service for the full term for which the elective official was elected.
Congress exercises the power to prescribe the qualifications for SK membership. One who is no longer qualified because of an amendment in the law cannot complain of being deprived of a proprietary right to SK membership. Only those who qualify as SK members can contest, based on a statutory right, any act disqualifying them from SK membership or from voting in the SK elections. SK membership is not a property right protected by the Constitution because it is a mere statutory right conferred by law. Congress may amend at any time the law to change or even withdraw the statutory right.
A public office is not a property right. As the Constitution expressly states, a "[P]ublic office is a public trust." No one has a vested right to any public office, much less a vested right to an expectancy of holding a public office. In Cornejo v. Gabriel, decided in 1920, the Court already ruled:Again, for this petition to come under the due process of law prohibition, it would be necessary to consider an office a "property." It is, however, well settled x x x that a public office is not property within the sense of the constitutional guaranties of due process of law, but is a public trust or agency. x x x The basic idea of the government x x x is that of a popular representative government, the officers being mere agents and not rulers of the people, one where no one man or set of men has a proprietary or contractual right to an office, but where every officer accepts office pursuant to the provisions of the law and holds the office as a trust for the people he represents.
Petitioners, who apparently desire to hold public office, should realize from the very start that no one has a proprietary right to public office. While the law makes an SK officer an ex-officio member of a local government legislative council, the law does not confer on petitioners a proprietary right or even a proprietary expectancy to sit in local legislative councils. The constitutional principle of a public office as a public trust precludes any proprietary claim to public office. Even the State policy directing "equal access to opportunities for public service" cannot bestow on petitioners a proprietary right to SK membership or a proprietary expectancy to ex-officio public offices.
Moreover, while the State policy is to encourage the youth's involvement in public affairs, this policy refers to those who belong to the class of people defined as the youth. Congress has the power to define who are the youth qualified to join the SK, which itself is a creation of Congress. Those who do not qualify because they are past the age group defined as the youth cannot insist on being part of the youth. In government service, once an employee reaches mandatory retirement age, he cannot invoke any property right to cling to his office. In the same manner, since petitioners are now past the maximum age for membership in the SK, they cannot invoke any property right to cling to their SK membership. [Emphasis supplied.]
The proscription is aimed against the evils of the so-called omnibus bills and log-rolling legislation as well as surreptitious and/or unconsidered encroaches. The provision merely calls for all parts of an act relating to its subject finding expression in its title.
To determine whether there has been compliance with the constitutional requirement that the subject of an act shall be expressed in its title, the Court laid down the rule that -Constitutional provisions relating to the subject matter and titles of statutes should not be so narrowly construed as to cripple or impede the power of legislation. The requirement that the subject of an act shall be expressed in its title should receive a reasonable and not a technical construction. It is sufficient if the title be comprehensive enough reasonably to include the general object which a statute seeks to effect, without expressing each and every end and means necessary or convenient for the accomplishing of that object. Mere details need not be set forth. The title need not be an abstract or index of the Act.
x x x x
x x x This Court has held that an act having a single general subject, indicated in the title, may contain any number of provisions, no matter how diverse they may be, so long as they are not inconsistent with or foreign to the general subject, and may be considered in furtherance of such subject by providing for the method and means of carrying out the general subject.x x x x
x x x Moreover, the avowed purpose of the constitutional directive that the subject of a bill should be embraced in its title is to apprise the legislators of the purposes, the nature and scope of its provisions, and prevent the enactment into law of matters which have not received the notice, action and study of the legislators and the public.
The power of judicial review is the power of the courts to test the validity of executive and legislative acts for their conformity with the Constitution. Through such power, the judiciary enforces and upholds the supremacy of the Constitution. For a court to exercise this power, certain requirements must first be met, namely:[13] See Estrada v. Desierto, supra note 11.
(1) an actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power;
(2) the person challenging the act must have "standing" to challenge; he must have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement;
(3) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest possible opportunity; and
(4) the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case.
Section 3. The Congress shall enact a local government code which shall provide for a more responsive and accountable local government structure instituted through a system of decentralization with effective mechanisms of recall, initiative, and referendum, allocate among the different local government units their powers, responsibilities, and resources, and provide for the qualifications, election, appointment and removal, term, salaries, powers and functions and duties of local officials, and all other matters relating to the organization and operation of the local units.[19] 433 Phil. 620 (2002).