406 Phil. 774
DE LEON, JR., J.:
That on or about and during the period from December 6, 1975 to January 6, 1976, in Metro Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, said accused, Arturo Pacificador, then Chairman of the Board of the National Shipyard and Steel Corporation, a government-owned corporation, and therefore, a public officer, and Jose T. Marcelo, Jr., then President of the Philippine Smelters Corporation, a private corporation, conspiring and confederating with one another and with other individuals, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and knowingly, and with evident bad faith promote, facilitate, effect and cause the sale, transfer and conveyance by the National Shipyard and Steel Corporation of its ownership and all its titles, rights and interests over parcels of land in Jose Panganiban, Camarines Norte where the Jose Panganiban Smelting Plant is located including all the reclaimed and foreshore areas of about 50 hectares to the Philippine Smelters Corporation by virtue of a contract, the terms and conditions of which are manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the Government as the consideration thereof is only P85,144.50 while the fair market value thereof at that time was P862,150.00, thereby giving the Philippine Smelters Corporation unwarranted benefits, advantages and profits and causing undue injury, damage and prejudice to the government in the amount of P777,005.50.After his arraignment, the respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss the Information in Criminal Case No. 13044 on July 15, 1998 on the following grounds:
On August 21, 1998 the petitioner filed an Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss.
1) The court has no jurisdiction since the crime charged had been extinguished by prescription; and2) The information does not charge an offense in view of the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of San Mauricio Mining Corporation, et al., vs. Hon. Constante A. Ancheta, et al., G.R. No. L-47859 and L-57132 dated July 10, 1981.
The information in this case, dated October 19, 1988, was filed with the Sandiganbayan on October 27, 1988 on which date the existing jurisprudence on matters of prescription of the offense was the ruling enunciated in Francisco v. Court of Appeals (May 30, 1983, 122 SCRA 538) to the effect that the filing of the complaint with the fiscal's office also interrupts the period of prescription of the offense.Thereupon, on December 7, 1998, respondent Pacificador moved for the reconsideration of the Resolution of the Sandiganbayan denying his Motion to Dismiss, contending that:
The offense charged was allegedly committed from December 16, 1975 to January 6, 1976. The running of the period of prescription of the offense may have started on January 6, 1976 but was interrupted by the filing of the complaint with the appropriate investigating body. In the case at bench, We find in the record no proof, or even an allegation, of the precise date of filing of the complaint with the appropriate investigating body which investigated this case,to enable us to determine with certainty if the offense charged have (sic) indeed prescribed.
The second ground submitted by the accused-movant is precipitate at this stage of the proceedings, as it involves a matter of defense.
On February 3, 1999, the Sandiganbayan reconsidered its Resolution of November 10, 1998 and dismissed the Information in Criminal Case No. 139405 against the respondent on the ground of prescription. It ruled thus:
1) The prosecution of the crime charged is time-barred by prescription as shown by facts and circumstances on record and of judicial notice; and2) It is not precipitate for the Honorable Court to consider the Supreme Court ruling in San Mauricio Mining Co. vs. Hon. Constante A. Ancheta, et al., declaring the basic deed of sale as not illegal and with justly adequate consideration.
In Our resolution denying accused Pacificador's Motion to Dismiss, We applied Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code and the doctrine laid down in Francisco vs. CA (122 SCRA 538) to the effect that the filing of the complaint with the fiscal's office or investigating body interrupts the running of the period of prescription. This is where We committed an oversight. Instead of applying Act No. 3326, as amended, xxx, We utilized Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code.The Urgent Motion for Reconsideration of petitioner was denied by the Sandiganbayan on July 23, 1999.
In this case, as the offense involved is the violation of R.A. 3019, a special law, it follows that in computing the prescriptive period of the offense, it is not the provision contained in the Revised Penal Code that should govern but that of Act No. 3326. xxx
In Zaldivia vs. Reyes, Jr., (211 SCRA 277), the Supreme Court, in a clear language, held that the proceedings referred to in Section 2 of Act No. 3326 are "judicial proceedings" and do not include administrative proceedings. xxx
The offense imputed on accused was allegedly committed from December 6, 1975 to January 6, 1976. The offense prescribed on January 3, 1986, or ten years from January 6, 1976.
ART. 91. Computation of prescription of offenses.- The period of prescription shall commence to run from the day on which the crime is discovered by the offended party, the authorities, or their agents, and shall be interrupted by filing of the complaint or information, and shall commence to run again when such proceedings terminate without the accused being convicted or acquitted, or are unjustifiably stopped for any reason not imputable to him.Petitioner also contends that the crime, subject of this case should be deemed as discovered only on May 13, 1987 when a complaint was filed with the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) by the then Solicitor General Francisco Chavez. Hence, the filing of the information on October 27, 1988 with the Sandiganbayan was well within the prescriptive period.
The term of prescription shall not run when the offender is absent from the Philippine Archipelago.
Since the law alleged to have been violated, i.e., paragraphs (e) and (g) of Section 3, R.A. No. 3019, as amended, is a special law, the applicable rule in the computation of the prescriptive period is Section 2 of Act No. 3326, as amended, which provides:It can be gleaned from the Information in this case that respondent Pacificador allegedly committed the crime charged "on or about and during the period from December 6, 1975 to January 6, 1976." Section 11 of R.A. No. 3019, as amended by B.P. Blg. 195, provides that the offenses committed under the said statute shall prescribe in fifteen (15) years. It appears however, that prior to the amendment of Section 11 of R.A. No. 3019 by B.P. Blg. 195 which was approved on March 16, 1982, the prescriptive period for offenses punishable under the said statute was only ten (10) years. The longer prescriptive period of fifteen (15) years, as provided in Section 11 of R.A. No. 3019 as amended by B.P. Blg. 195, does not apply in this case for the reason that the amendment, not being favorable to the accused (herein private respondent), cannot be given retroactive effect. Hence, the crime prescribed on January 6, 1986 or ten (10) years from January 6, 1976.Sec. 2. Prescription should begin to run from the day of the commission of the violation of the law, and if the same be not known at the time, from the discovery thereof and institution of judicial proceedings for its investigation and punishment. (Emphasis ours)This simply means that if the commission of the crime is known, the prescriptive period shall commence to run on the day it was committed.
The prescription shall be interrupted when the proceedings are instituted against the guilty person and shall begin to run again if the proceedings are dismissed for reasons not constituting double jeopardy.
The statute is not a statute of process, to be scantily and grudgingly applied, but an amnesty, declaring that after a certain time oblivion shall be cast over the offense; that the offender shall be at liberty to return to his country, and resume his immunities as a citizen; and that from henceforth he may cease to preserve the proofs of his innocence, for the proofs of his guilt are blotted out. Hence, it is that statutes of limitation are to be liberally construed in favor of the defendant, not only because such liberality of construction belongs to all acts of amnesty and grace, but because the very existence of the statute is a recognition and notification by the legislature of the fact that time, while it gradually wears out proofs of innocence, has assigned to it fixed and positive periods in which it destroys proofs of guilt.The instant case should be distinguished from the cases of People v. Duque[18] and Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans v. Desierto[19] wherein we upheld the view that the prescriptive period started to run only upon the discovery of the illegal nature of the acts constituting the offense. The first case involves the crime of illegal recruitment where the accused, Napoleon Duque, was found to have misrepresented himself to several job applicants as a registered employment agent duly recognized by the Philippine Overseas Employment Agency (POEA). Due to the said misrepresentation of the accused, the applicable prescriptive period began to run not from the time of recruitment of job applicants by the accused but from the time his recruitment activities were ascertained by the complainants and the POEA to have been carried out without any license or authority from the government. The second, or Desierto case, which was decided by this Court on October 25, 1999, involves the grant of alleged behest loans by certain government-owned and controlled financial institutions to several individuals and corporations closely associated with the then President Ferdinand E. Marcos and his relatives. It was alleged that the public officials concerned, who were charged in the corresponding Informations, connived or conspired with the beneficiaries of the loans in covering up the anomalous transactions. Under the circumstances, it was impossible for the State, the aggrieved party, to have known the violations of R.A. No. 3019 at the time the questioned transactions were made. The prescriptive period started to run only upon discovery of the alleged illegality of the transactions after the investigations thereon were conducted.
ART. 10. Offenses not subject to the provisions of this Code. - Offenses which are or in the future may be punishable under special laws are not subject to the provisions of this Code. This Code shall be supplementary to such laws, unless the latter should specially provide the contrary.[9] Rollo, pp. 107-116.