620 Phil. 422
PERALTA, J.:
Petitioner [Judge Adoracion G. Angeles] was the foster mother of her fourteen (14) year-old grandniece Maria Mercedes Vistan who, in April 1990 was entrusted to the care of the former by the girl's grandmother and petitioner's sister Leonila Angeles Vda. de Vistan when the child was orphaned at the tender age of four.On March 18, 2003, petitioner filed a petition for review[5] before the CA assailing the Order of the Office of President. Petitioner argued that the Office of the President erred in not addressing the merits of her petition by relying on Memorandum Circular No. 58, series of 1993. Petitioner assailed the constitutionality of the memorandum circular, specifically arguing that Memorandum Circular No. 58 is an invalid regulation because it diminishes the power of control of the President and bestows upon the Secretary of Justice, a subordinate officer, almost unfettered power.[6] Moreover, petitioner contended that the Department of Justice (DOJ) erred in dismissing the complaint against respondent Michael Vistan for violations of Presidential Decree No. 1829[7] (PD No. 1829) and for violation of Republic Act No. 7610[8] (RA No. 7610).[9]
Petitioner provided the child with love and care, catered to her needs, sent her to a good school and attended to her general well-being for nine (9) memorable and happy years. The child also reciprocated the affections of her foster mother and wrote the latter letters.
Petitioner's love for the child extended to her siblings, particularly her half-brother respondent Michael Vistan, a former drug-addict, and the latter's family who were regular beneficiaries of the undersigned's generosity. Michael would frequently run to the undersigned for his variety of needs ranging from day to day subsistence to the medical and hospital expenses of his children.
In the evening of 11 April 1999, Michael Vistan had a falling out with petitioner for his failure to do a very important errand for which he was severely reprimanded over the phone. He was told that from then on, no assistance of any kind would be extended to him and that he was no longer welcome at petitioner's residence.
Feeling thwarted, he, in conspiracy with his co-horts (sic), retaliated on 12 April 1999 by inducing his half-sister, Maria Mercedes, to leave petitioner's custody. Michael used to have free access to the undersigned's house and he took the girl away while petitioner was at her office.
In the evening of that day, 12 April 1999, petitioner, accompanied by her friend Ines Francisco, sought Michael Vistan in his residence in Sta. Cruz, Guiguinto, Bulacan to confront him about the whereabouts of his half-sister. He disclosed that he brought the girl to the residence of her maternal relatives in Sta. Monica, Hagonoy, Bulacan. Petitioner then reported the matter and requested for the assistance of the 303rd Criminal Investigation and Detective Group Field Office in Malolos, Bulacan to locate the girl. Consequently, PO3 Paquito M. Guillermo and Ruben Fred Ramirez accompanied petitioner and her friend to Hagonoy, Bulacan where they coordinated with police officers from the said place. The group failed to find the girl. Instead, they were given the run-around as the spouses Ruben and Lourdes Tolentino and spouses Gabriel and Olympia Nazareno misled them with the false information that Maria Mercedes was already brought by their brother Carmelito Guevarra and the latter's wife Camilia to Casiguran, Quezon Province.
On 13 April 1999, petitioner filed a complaint for Kidnapping under Article 271 of the Revised Penal Code (Inducing a Minor to Abandon His Home) against Michael Vistan, the Tolentino spouses, the Nazareno spouses and Guevarra spouses, all maternal relatives of Maria Mercedes Vistan.
Warrants of arrest were subsequently issued against them and to evade the long arm of the law, Michael Vistan went into hiding. He dragged along with him his half-sister Maria Mercedes.
From 12 April 1999 to 16 April 1999, Michael Vistan, with his little sister in tow, shuttled back and forth from Guiguinto to Hagonoy, Bulacan as well as in Manila and Quezon City, living the life of a fugitive from justice. He eventually brought the girl to ABS-CBN in Quezon City where he made her recite a concocted tale of child abuse against herein petitioner hoping that this would compel the latter to withdraw the kidnapping charge which she earlier filed.
In the early morning of 16 April 1999, Michael Vistan brought Maria Mercedes to the DSWD after he felt himself cornered by the police dragnet laid for him.
Prompted by his overwhelming desire to retaliate against petitioner and get himself off the hook from the kidnapping charge, Michael Vistan had deliberately, maliciously, selfishly and insensitively caused undue physical, emotional and psychological sufferings to Maria Mercedes Vistan, all of which were greatly prejudicial to her well-being and development.
Thus, on 1 December 1999, petitioner filed a complaint against Michael Vistan before the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor in Malolos, Bulacan for five counts of Violation of Section 10 (a), Article VI of RA 7610, otherwise known as the Child Abuse Act, and for four counts of Violation of Sec. 1 (e) of PD 1829. She likewise filed a complaint for Libel against Maria Cristina Vistan, aunt of Michael and Maria Mercedes.
In a Resolution dated March 3, 2000, Investigating Prosecutor Benjamin R. Caraig recommended upheld (sic) the charge of Violation of RA 7160 but recommended that only one Information be filed against Michael Vistan. The charge of Violation of PD 1829 was dismissed. Nonetheless, the Resolution to uphold the petitioner's complaint against Maria Cristina Vistan must (sic) remained.
However, Provincial Prosecutor Amando C. Vicente denied the recommendation of the Investigating Prosecutor that Michael Vistan be indicted for Violation RA 7610. He also approved the recommendation for the dismissal of the charge for Violation of PD 1829.
On 14 April 2000, petitioner filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration. This was denied in a Resolution dated 28 April 2000.
Petitioner then filed a Petition for Review before the Department of Justice on 18 May 2000. She also filed a Supplement thereto on 19 May 2000.
In a Resolution dated 5 April 2001, Undersecretary Manuel A.J. Teehankee, acting for the Secretary of Justice, denied the petition for review. The undersigned's Motion for Reconsideration filed on 25 April 2001 was likewise denied by then DOJ Secretary Hernando B. Perez in a Resolution dated 15 October 2001.
On 26 November 2001, the undersigned filed a Petition for Review before the Office of President. The petition was dismissed and the motion for reconsideration was denied before said forum anchored on Memorandum Circular No. 58 which bars an appeal or a petition for review of decisions/orders/resolutions of the Secretary of Justice except those involving offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua or death.[4]
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.[10]
When the President herself did not revoke the order issued by respondent Acting Deputy Executive Secretary for Legal Affairs nor saw the necessity to exempt petitioner's case from the application of Memorandum Circular No. 58, the act of the latter is deemed to be an act of the President herself.[11]
- THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN UPHOLDING THE RELIANCE OF THE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT IN THE PROVISIONS OF MEMORANDUM CIRCULAR NO. 58.
- THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN UPHOLDING THE DISMISSAL BY THE DOJ SECRETARY OF THE COMPLAINT OF VIOLATION OF SECTION 1(E). P.D. 1829 (OBSTRUCTION OF JUSTICE) AGAINST PRIVATE RESPONDENT MICHAEL VISTAN.
- THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN UPHOLDING THE DISMISSAL OF THE COMPLAINT OF VIOLATION OF R.A. 7610 (CHILD ABUSE) AGAINST PRIVATE RESPONDENT MICHAEL VISTAN.[14]
x x x With reference to the Executive Department of the government, there is one purpose which is crystal-clear and is readily visible without the projection of judicial searchlight, and that is, the establishment of a single, not plural, Executive. The first section of Article VII of the Constitution, dealing with the Executive Department, begins with the enunciation of the principle that "The executive power shall be vested in a President of the Philippines." This means that the President of the Philippines is the Executive of the Government of the Philippines, and no other. The heads of the executive departments occupy political positions and hold office in an advisory capacity, and, in the language of Thomas Jefferson, "should be of the President's bosom confidence" (7 Writings, Ford ed., 498), and, in the language of Attorney-General Cushing (7 Op., Attorney-General, 453), "are subject to the direction of the President." Without minimizing the importance of the heads of the various departments, their personality is in reality but the projection of that of the President. Stated otherwise, and as forcibly characterized by Chief Justice Taft of the Supreme Court of the United States, "each head of a department is, and must be, the President's alter ego in the matters of that department where the President is required by law to exercise authority" (Myers v. United States, 47 Sup. Ct. Rep., 21 at 30; 272 U.S., 52 at 133; 71 Law. ed., 160).[18]
In the interest of the speedy administration of justice, the guidelines enunciated in Memorandum Circular No. 1266 (4 November 1983) on the review by the Office of the President of resolutions/orders/decisions issued by the Secretary of Justice concerning preliminary investigations of criminal cases are reiterated and clarified.
No appeal from or petition for review of decisions/orders/resolutions of the Secretary of Justice on preliminary investigations of criminal cases shall be entertained by the Office of the President, except those involving offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua to death x x x.
Henceforth, if an appeal or petition for review does not clearly fall within the jurisdiction of the Office of the President, as set forth in the immediately preceding paragraph, it shall be dismissed outright x x x.
x x x Withal, at first blush, the argument of ratification may seem plausible under the circumstances, it should be observed that there are certain prerogative acts which, by their very nature, cannot be validated by subsequent approval or ratification by the President. There are certain constitutional powers and prerogatives of the Chief Executive of the Nation which must be exercised by him in person and no amount of approval or ratification will validate the exercise of any of those powers by any other person. Such, for instance, is his power to suspend the writ of habeas corpus and proclaim martial law (par. 3, sec. 11, Art. VII) and the exercise by him of the benign prerogative of mercy (par. 6, sec. 11, idem).[21]
The evident exigency of having the Secretary of Finance implement the decision of the President to execute the debt-relief contracts is made manifest by the fact that the process of establishing and executing a strategy for managing the government's debt is deep within the realm of the expertise of the Department of Finance, primed as it is to raise the required amount of funding, achieve its risk and cost objectives, and meet any other sovereign debt management goals.
If, as petitioners would have it, the President were to personally exercise every aspect of the foreign borrowing power, he/she would have to pause from running the country long enough to focus on a welter of time-consuming detailed activities-the propriety of incurring/guaranteeing loans, studying and choosing among the many methods that may be taken toward this end, meeting countless times with creditor representatives to negotiate, obtaining the concurrence of the Monetary Board, explaining and defending the negotiated deal to the public, and more often than not, flying to the agreed place of execution to sign the documents. This sort of constitutional interpretation would negate the very existence of cabinet positions and the respective expertise which the holders thereof are accorded and would unduly hamper the President's effectivity in running the government.[26]
(e) Delaying the prosecution of criminal case by obstructing the service of processes or court orders or disturbing proceedings in the fiscals' offices in Tanodbayan, or in the courts. x x x
x x x It is a surprise to hear from petitioner who is a member of the bench to argue that unserved warrants are tantamount to another violation of the law re: "obstruction of justice." Petitioner is like saying that every accused in a criminal case is committing another offense of "obstruction of justice" if and when the warrant of arrest issued for the former offense/ charge is unserved during its life or returned unserved after its life - and that the accused should be charged therewith re: "obstruction of justice." What if the warrant of arrest for the latter charge ("obstruction of justice") is again unserved during its life or returned unserved? To follow the line of thinking of petitioner, another or a second charge of "obstruction of justice" should be filed against the accused. And if the warrant of arrest issued on this second charge is not served, again, a third charge of "obstruction of justice" is warranted or should be filed against the accused. Thus, petitioner is effectively saying that the number of charges for "obstruction of justice" is counting and/or countless, unless and until the accused is either arrested or voluntarily surrendered. We, therefore, find the position taken by petitioner as contrary to the intent and spirit of the law on "obstruction of justice." x x x[30]
Any person who shall commit any other act of child abuse, cruelty or exploitation or responsible for other conditions prejudicial to the child's development, including those covered by Article 59 of PD No. 603, as amended, but not covered by the Revised Penal Code, as amended, shall suffer the penalty of prision mayor in its minimum period.
APPROVED for: (1) x x x (2) x x x The recommendation to file an information for viol. of Sec. 10 (a) RA # 7610 vs. M. Vistan is hereby denied. The affidavit of Ma. Mercedes Vistan, the minor involved, is to the effect that she found happiness and peace of mind away from the complainant and in the company of her relatives, including her brother, respondent Michael Vistan. How can her joining the brother be prejudicial to her with such statement?[37]
x x x the determination of probable cause for the filing of an information in court is an executive function, one that properly pertains at the first instance to the public prosecutor and, ultimately, to the Secretary of Justice. For this reason, the Court considers it sound judicial policy to refrain from interfering in the conduct of preliminary investigations and to leave the Department of Justice ample latitude of discretion in the determination of what constitutes sufficient evidence to establish probable cause for the prosecution of supposed offenders. Consistent with this policy, courts do not reverse the Secretary of Justice's findings and conclusions on the matter of probable cause except in clear cases of grave abuse of discretion. Thus, petitioners will prevail only if they can show that the CA erred in not holding that public respondent's resolutions were tainted with grave abuse of discretion.[39]