381 Phil. 393; 97 OG No. 49, 7137 (December 3, 2001)
PURISIMA, J.:
"xxx As to them, the complaint states that notwithstanding the alleged fact that Lot No. 5830 was one of two lots covered by OCT No. 8309 in the name of the predecessor-in-interest of the plaintiffs, the defendants-movants’ grandparents, fraudulently filed a petition for the reconstitution of TCT No. 6958 (par. 26 of complaint) which resulted in the issuance of TCT No. RT-687, later on transferred to TCT No. 29068 in the name of Edilberto Osmeña, father of the defendants-movants (pars. 28 and 30 of complaint); that Lot 5830 was subdivided and TCT 29068 was cancelled and in lieu thereof, TCTs Nos. 29658 to 29666 were issued, still in the name of Edilberto Osmeña (par. 35 of complaint); Edilberto Osmeña sold the subdivided lots to different vendees, who are now the other co-defendants and new titles were issued in their respective names.With the denial of their motion for reconsideration of the assailed Order of dismissal, petitioners found their way to this court via the instant petition; theorizing that the respondent court seriously erred in dismissing the complaint, as against the herein private respondents, thereby arbitrarily preventing petitioners from seeking a redress of their grievances insofar as Lot 5830 was concerned.x x x x x x x x x
The allegations of transfers of ownership of Lot 5830 referred only to Edilberto Osmeña and not to any of the defendants-movants. x x x There are no allegations of any act or omission on the part of any of the defendants-movants violative of the rights of the plaintiffs or constituting a breach of any obligation of any of the defendants-movants to the plaintiffs. Even in the allegations in pars. 40 and 41, none of the defendants-movants were informed of the existence of OCT No. 8309 when this matter was brought to the barangay captain for proceedings under the Barangay Law.xxx xxx xxx
There being no cause of action as to the defendants-movants, the date of breach of the plaintiff’s rights, cannot be determined by the court, hence there is no need to discuss the second ground of the motion to dismiss."[4]
Private respondents, on the other hand, countered that there are no averments in the complaint showing that they were privies to the subdividing and sale of subject lots to transferees nor are there allegations therein that they received properties from their late father, Edilberto Osmeña. Private respondents further argued that petitioners’ cause of action, if any, is barred by prescription and laches.
- Article 774 of the Civil Code, by virtue of which private respondents succeeded to subject parcels of land by operation of law, their lack of knowledge of the existence of such properties, notwithstanding;
- Article 1311 of the Civil Code, which provides that hereditary assets are always liable in their totality for the payment of debts of the estate;
- Petitioners further claim that subject parcels of land are registered under the Torrens system. A Torrens title is not subject to prescription.[5]
"‘In a motion to dismiss a complaint based on lack of cause of action, the question submitted to the court for determination is the sufficiency of the allegations made in the complaint to constitute a cause of action and not whether those allegations of fact are true, for said motion must hypothetically admit the truth of the facts alleged in the complaint.’In the case under consideration, petitioner’s cause of action sued upon is mainly for the declaration of nullity of the reconstituted certificates of title in the name of the late Don Sergio Osmeña covering lots 5829 and 5830 of the Cebu Cadastre, allegedly procured through fraud, and the subsequent certificates of title deriving their existence from the said titles. Such being the scenario below, petitioners should have been heard before the dismissal of their complaint, as against the private respondents, who are the children and forced heirs of the late Edilberto Osmeña, and who stand to succeed or inherit the properties or proceeds from the sale of the properties sought to be recovered by the petitioners.
‘The test of the sufficiency of the facts alleged in the complaint is whether or not, admitting the facts alleged, the court could render a valid judgment upon the same in accordance with the prayer of the complaint.’ (Garcon vs. Redemptorist Fathers, 17 SCRA 341)
If the allegations of the complaint are sufficient in form and substance but their veracity and correctness are assailed, it is incumbent upon the court to deny the motion to dismiss and require the defendant to answer and go to trial to prove his defense. The veracity of the assertions of the parties can be ascertained at the trial of the case on the merits. xxx"[6]
"Sec. 2. Hearing of Motion. - At the hearing of the motion, the parties shall submit their arguments on the questions of law and their evidence on the questions of fact involved except those not available at that time. Should the case go to trial, the evidence presented during the hearing shall automatically be part of the evidence of the party presenting the same." (underscoring supplied)The order of dismissal stated that the complaint does not allege a sufficient cause of action against the defendants-movants as there was no allegation of any act or omission on the part of the defendants-movants which violated the rights of the plaintiffs or constituted a breach of any obligations to them. Defendants-movants claimed that they were not privies to the alleged fraudulent procurement of the reconstituted certificates of title in the name of the late Don Sergio Osmeña. However, the complaint precisely impleaded the defendants-movants as the successors-in-interest of Don Sergio Osmeña. Accordingly, the affirmative defense raised by defendants-movants should have been heard before the dismissal of the complaint. Otherwise petitioners would be barred from pursuing their action without being accorded a hearing. Unlike a motion to dismiss based on the failure of the complaint to state a cause of action, which may be resolved solely on the basis of the allegations of the complaint, the motion to dismiss herein raised an affirmative defense that there is no cause of action as against them. The motion thus posed a question of fact that should be resolved after due hearing.
"Without hearing the plaintiff would be barred from pursuing her action. The plaintiff should at least have been accorded a hearing. This is the least she is entitled to. And this is true regardless of any strong opinion the court may have as to the truthfulness of the document. No such hearing was held. Without hearing, the plaintiff would be barred from pursuing her action and is to be deprived of what she claims to be her property without being given an opportunity to affirm or deny the validity of Exhibit B.WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED; the order of Branch 6 of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu, dismissing Civil Case CEB-10159, is SET ASIDE; Civil Case CEB-10159 is REINSTATED and the respondent Regional Trial Court is ordered to conduct a hearing on private respondents’ motion to dismiss the Complaint.xxx xxx xxx
However, petitioner should have been heard before dismissal of its complaint especially because there is a stipulation in the Deed of Assignment which it executed in favor of private respondent, that the nine (9) parcels of land subject of the Deed were to be forfeited in favor of private respondent who could sell them to any interested party if the loan of P100,000.00 remained unpaid on 1 October 1983, the very day petitioner allegedly tendered payment by check. Such a precipitate deprivation of ownership should have been considered by the trial court, at the very least, in requiring a hearing on the motion to dismiss, and before actually dismissing the complaint, notwithstanding private respondent’s attack on the validity of the tendered check and its character as legal tender."[7]