502 Phil. 76
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
Sec. 7. In any sale made under the provisions of this Act, the purchaser may petition the Court of First Instance of the province or place where the property or any part thereof is situated, to give him possession thereof during the redemption period, furnishing bond in an amount equivalent to the use of the property for a period of twelve months, to indemnify the debtor in case it be shown that the sale was made without violating the mortgage or without complying with the requirements of this Act. Such petition shall be made under oath and filed in form of an ex parte motion in the registration or cadastral proceedings if the property is registered, or in special proceedings in the case of property registered under the Mortgage Law or under section one hundred and ninety-four of the Administrative Code, or of any other real property encumbered with a mortgage duly registered in the office of any register of deeds in accordance with any existing law, and in each case the clerk of the court shall, upon the filing of such petition, collect the fees specified in paragraph eleven of section one hundred and fourteen of Act Numbered Four hundred and ninety-six, as amended by Act Numbered Twenty-eight hundred and sixty-six, and the court shall, upon approval of the bond, order that a writ of possession issue, addressed to the sheriff of the province in which the property is situated, who shall execute said order immediately.That petitioners purchased their properties from MICC in good faith is of no moment. The purchases took place after MICC's mortgage to Banco Filipino had been registered in accordance with Article 2125 of the Civil Code and the provisions of P.D. 1529 (property registry decree). As such, under Articles 1312 and 2126 of the Civil Code, a real right or lien in favor of Banco Filipino had already been established, subsisting over the properties until the discharge of the principal obligation, whoever the possessor(s) of the land might be.
1. Appellant's stand is that her undivided interest consisting of 20,000 square meters of the mortgaged lot, remained unaffected by the foreclosure and subsequent sale to PNB, and she "neither secured nor contracted a loan" with said bank. What PNB foreclosed, she maintains, "was that portion belonging to Ruperta Lavilles only," not the part belonging to her.And in Roxas v. Buan this Court held:
Appellant's position clashes with precepts well-entrenched in law. By Article 2126 of the Civil Code, a "mortgage directly and immediately subjects the property on which it is imposed, whoever the possessor may be, to the fulfillment of the obligation for whose security it was constituted." Sale or transfer cannot affect or release the mortgage. A purchaser is necessarily bound to acknowledge and respect the encumbrance to which is subjected the purchased thing and which is at the disposal of the creditor "in order that he, under the terms of the contract, may recover the amount of his credit therefrom." For, a recorded real estate mortgage is a right in rem, a lien on the property whoever its owner may be. Because the personality of the owner is disregarded; the mortgage subsists notwithstanding changes of ownership; the last transferee is just as much of a debtor as the first one; and this, independent of whether the transferee knows or not the person of the mortgagee. So it is, that a mortgage lien is inseperable from the property mortgaged. All subsequent purchasers thereof must respect the mortgage, whether the transfer to them be with or without the consent of the mortgagee. For, the mortgage, until discharge, follows the property. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied; italics in the original; citations omitted)
Contending that petitioner Roxas is a party actually holding the property adversely to the debtor, Arcadio Valentin, petitioners argue that under the provisions of Act No. 3135 they cannot be ordered to vacate the property. Hence, the question of whether, under the circumstances, petitioner Roxas indeed is a party actually holding the property adversely to Valentin.As transferees of mortgagor MICC, petitioners merely stepped into its shoes and are necessarily bound to acknowledge and respect the mortgage it had earlier executed in favor of Banco Filipino.
It will be recalled that Roxas' possession of the property was premised on its alleged sale to him by Valentin for the amount of P100,000.00. Assuming this to be true, it is readily apparent that Roxas holds title to and possesses the property as Valentin's transferee. Any right he has to the property is necessarily derived from that of Valentin. As transferee, he steps into the latter's shoes. Thus, in the instant case, considering that the property had already been sold at public auction pursuant to an extrajudicial foreclosure, the only interest that may be transferred by Valentin to Roxas is the right to redeem it within the period prescribed by law. Roxas is therefore the successor-in-interest of Valentin, to whom the latter had conveyed his interest in the property for the purpose of redemption [Rule 39, Sec. 29 (a) of the Revised Rules of Court; Magno v. Viola, 61 Phil. 80 (1934); Rosete v. Prov. Sheriff of Zambales, 95 Phil. 560 (1954).] Consequently, Roxas' occupancy of the property cannot be considered adverse to Valentin.
Thus, in Belleza v. Zandaga [98 Phil. 702 (1956)], the Court held that where the purchaser in an execution sale has already received the definitive deed of sale, he becomes the owner of the property bought and, as absolute owner, he is entitled to its possession and cannot be excluded therefrom by one who merely claims to be a "successor-in-interest of the judgment debtor," unless it is adjudged that the alleged successor has a better right to the property than the purchaser at the execution sale. Stated differently, the purchaser's right of possession is recognized only as against the judgment debtor and his successor-in-interest but not against persons whose right of possession is adverse to the latter. The rule was reiterated in Guevara v. Ramos [G.R. No. L-24358, March 31, 1971, 38 SCRA 194].
The rule in Belleza, although relating to the possession of property sold in execution sales under what is now Sec. 35, Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of Court, is also applicable to the possession of property sold at extrajudicial foreclosure sales pursuant to Sec. 6 of Act No. 3135 [see IFC Service Leasing and Acceptance Corp. v. Nera, supra]. Thus, as petitioner Roxas is not a party holding the property adversely to Valentin, being the latter's successor-in-interest, there was no bar to the respondent trial court's issuance of a writ of possession upon private respondent Buan's application.
It does not matter that petitioner Roxas was not specifically named in the writ of possession, as he merely stepped into the shoes of Valentin, being the latter's successor-in-interest. On the other hand, petitioner de Guia was occupying the house as Roxas' alleged tenant [Rollo, p. 24]. Moreover, respondent court's decision granting private respondent Buan's petition for the issuance of a writ of possession ordered the Provincial Sheriff of Zambales or any of his deputies to remove Valentin "or any person claiming interest under him" from the property [Rollo, p. 16]. Undeniably, petitioners fell under this category. (Emphasis supplied)
It is settled that the buyer in a foreclosure sale becomes the absolute owner of the property purchased if it is not redeemed during the period of one year after the registration of the sale. As such, he is entitled to the possession of the said property and can demand it at any time following the consolidation of ownership in his name and the issuance to him of a new transfer certificate of title. The buyer can in fact demand possession of the land even during the redemption period except that he has to post a bond in accordance with Section 7 of Act No. 3135 as amended. No such bond is required after the redemption period if the property is not redeemed. Possession of the land then becomes an absolute right of the purchaser as confirmed owner. Upon proper application and proof of title, the issuance of the writ of possession becomes a ministerial duty of the court. (Emphasis supplied)Petitioners assert, however, that a binding agreement for the repurchase of the subject properties was reached with Banco Filipino as, so they claim, reflected in the following exchange of communications:
Petitioners' assertion does not pass muster.October 17, 1996
Mrs. Luz B. Dacasin
Real Estate Dept.
Banco Filipino Savings and Mortgage Bank
101 Paseo De Roxas cro. [sic] Dela Rosa Sts.
I am writing to you, on behalf of spouses Sonia and Rodrigo Paderes re: TCT No. 61078 formerly owned by Manila International Construction Corporation (MICC for short) now TCT No. 112352, registered in the name of Banco Filipino Savings and Mortgage Bank in July 30, 1996 at the Register of Deeds of Parañaque, Metro Manila. Incidentally, the property is denominated as Block 48, Lot 5 located at Leon Florentino St., BF Executive , Parañaque, Metro Manila.
The background facts of TCT No. 61078 are as follows:
In August 1983, the MICC executed a Deed of Absolute Sale of that lot covered by TCT No. 61078 in favor of spouses Sonia and Rodrigo Paderes which was acknowledged before a Notary Public on October 1, 1983. The value of the lot was P115,720.00. In the same year, the parties executed an addendum to the said deed of absolute sale which covered a house valued at P242,874.45. The net package price of the house and lot was fixed at P329,405.75. From this amount, the spouses Sonia and Rodrigo Paderes paid MICC inclusive of equity the amount of P125,437.35 leaving a balance of P212,985.60. The spouses moved in the house in November 1983.
Unknown to the spouses, MICC mortgaged TCT No. 61078 in favor of Banco Filipino Savings and Mortgage Bank for P1,885.00 duly inscribed in TCT No. 112352 on December 12, 1982. It was foreclosed by the bank for P3,092,547.82 pursuant to the certificate of sale executed by the sheriff as inscribed on TCT No. 112352 [should be TCT No. 61078] on July 29, 1985 . . .
Then came the news that Banco Filipino Savings and Mortgage Bank was under conservatorship by the Board of Liquidators. On the other hand, MICC became bankrupt and closed shop. The spouses were [sic] nowhere to go to then at the time to get the title of the property they purchased from MICC.
Until, the spouses received a letter dated April 6, 1987 from the Board of Liquidators via Alberto Reyes, Deputy Liquidator, informing the spouses that the property they purchased from MICC was already foreclosed by the bank. The spouses answered the letter and disclaimed any knowledge of the foreclosure. In their answer to the said letter, they emphasized that their unpaid balance with MICC was P188,985.60.
We are addressing your goodself [sic] to inform the bank that the spouses Sonia and Rodrigo Paderes are exercising their right of redemption as subrogees of the defunct MICC under special laws.
From reliable information, the bank had already made appraisal of the property and from that end, may we be informed [at] the soonest possible time the value of the property to enable the spouses to prepare for such eventuality. And, upon receipt of the said appraisal value we shall immediately inform you [of] our position on the matter.
Thank you very much.Very truly yours,
LUCIANO D. VALENCIA
Counsel for Spouses Paderes
JPA Subdivision, City of Muntinlupax x x (Emphasis supplied).October 25, 1996
Mr. Luciano D. Valencia
Counsel for Sps. Paderes
JPA Subdivision, Muntinlupa
This is with regard to your letter dated October 17, 1996 concerning the property formerly owned by Manila International Construction Corporation (MICC) foreclosed by the Bank.
Please inform Sps. Rodrigo and Sonia Paderes to come to the bank to discuss said foreclosed property directly with the bank.
Thank you.Very truly yours,
LUZ B. DACASIN
Real Estate Departmentx x x (Emphasis supplied; italics in the original).November 4, 1996
Mrs. Luz B. Dacasin
Real Estate Dept., Banco Filipino
Thank you very much for your letter dated October 25, 1996, which was received on October 31, 1996, the contents of which had been duly noted. Pursuant thereto I advised my clients - spouses Rodrigo and Sonia Paderes to see [you].
With your indulgence, I also advised my other clients - spouses Isabelo and Juana Herminia Bergado to go along with the spouses Paderes, who are similarly situated with spouses Paderes property.
Incidentally, on October 28, 1996, I also wrote your goodself another letter at the behest of spouses Isabelo and Juana Herminia Bergado whose property is equally footed with spouses Paderes.
It is hoped that, out of that conference per your invitation my clients above-named be informed formally the total amounts due the bank as a consequence of the right of redemption extended to them. Of course, whatever appraised value arrived at by the bank on the properties subject of redemption the same shall not be construed as my clients' committed liability.
Thank you very much.Very truly yours,
LUCIANO D. VALENCIA
Counsel for Spouses Paderes
JPA Subdivision, City of Muntinlupax x x (Emphasis supplied).November 8, 1996
Mrs. Luz B. Dacasin
Real Estate Department
Banco Filipino Savings & Mortgage Bank
Makati CityRe: Lot 18, Block 48 Gamboa St.
BF Homes, Parañaque, MM (264 SQ.M.)
Occupied by Sps. Isabelo Bergado &
Juana Herminia Bergado
Lot 5, Block 48, L. Florentino St.
BF Homes, Parañaque, MM (263 SQ.M.)
Occupied by Sps. Rodrigo Paderes &
Dear Madam Asst. Vice-President:
Pursuant to our conference this morning November 8, 1996, regarding our desire to redeem the properties above-captioned, which your good office accommodated, and per your advi[c]e, we submit the following facts taken out and our proposals:
1. Regarding the lot, you mentioned that, the cost per square meter was P7,500.00. To this price we are no-committal for the said price is high. Although, we are still to have the amount re-negotiated.
2. We appreciate very much your having excluded the house built in the said lot for purposes of fixing the redemption price.
3. Your advi[c]e to subject the properties (house and lot) to a real-estate mortgage with the bank so that the amount to be loaned will be used as payment of the properties to be redeemed is accepted, and we are committed to it.
Thank you very muchVery truly yours,
SPS. SONIA &
SPS. ISABELO &
JUANA HERMINIA BERGADO(Emphasis supplied).
Art. 1319. Consent is manifested by the meeting of the offer and the acceptance upon the thing and the cause which are to constitute the contract. The offer must be certain and the acceptance absolute. A qualified acceptance constitutes a counter-offer.By "offer" is meant a unilateral proposition which one party makes to the other for the celebration of the contract. There is an "offer" in the context of Article 1319 only if the contract can come into existence by the mere acceptance of the offeree, without any further act on the part of the offeror. Hence, the "offer" must be definite, complete and intentional.
Acceptance made by letter or telegram does not bind the offerer except from the time it came to his knowledge. The contract, in such a case, is presumed to have been entered into in the place where the offer was made. (Emphasis supplied)
To produce a contract, the acceptance must not qualify the terms of the offer. There is no acceptance sufficient to produce consent, when a condition in the offer is removed, or a pure offer is accepted with a condition, or when a term is established, or changed, in the acceptance, or when a simple obligation is converted by the acceptance into an alternative one; in other words, when something is desired which is not exactly what is proposed in the offer. It is necessary that the acceptance be unequivocal and unconditional, and the acceptance and the proposition shall be without any variation whatsoever; and any modification or variation from the terms of the offer annuls the latter and frees the offeror. (Emphasis supplied)A reading of the above-quoted correspondence reveals the absence of both a definite offer and an absolute acceptance of any definite offer by any of the parties.
Art. 2127. The mortgage extends to the natural accessions, to the improvements, growing fruits, and the rents or income not yet received when the obligation becomes due, and to the amount of the indemnity granted or owing to the proprietor from the insurers of the property mortgaged, or in virtue of expropriation for public use, with the declarations, amplifications and limitations established by law, whether the estate remains in the possession of the mortgagor, or it passes into the hands of a third person. (Underscoring supplied).The early case of Cu Unjieng e Hijos v. Mabalacat Sugar Co. is illustrative. In that case, this Court held:
. . . (1) That a mortgage constituted on a sugar central includes not only the land on which it is built but also the buildings, machinery, and accessories installed at the time the mortgage was constituted as well as all the buildings, machinery and accessories belonging to the mortgagor, installed after the constitution thereof (Bischoff vs. Pomar and Compañia General de Tabacos, 12 Phil. 690); (2) that the notice announcing the sale at public auction of all the properties of a sugar central extends to the machinery and accessories acquired and installed in its mill after the constitution of the mortgage; (3) that the court, that has ordered the placing of the mortgaged properties in the hands of a receiver in a foreclosure suit, has jurisdiction to order the sale at public auction of the said mortgaged properties even before the termination of the receivership; and (4) that the fact that the price at which the mortgaged properties were sold at public auction is inadequate, is not in itself sufficient to justify the annulment of the sale. (Emphasis supplied)Petitioners finally proffer that the issuance, on Banco Filipino's mere motion, of the Writ of Possession on November 5, 1996, more than 8 years since the promulgation of the RTC Order granting its petition on September 8, 1988, violated Section 6, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, viz:
Sec. 6. Execution by motion or by independent action.—A final and executory judgment or order may be executed on motion within five (5) years from the date of its entry. After the lapse of such time, and before it is barred by the statute of limitations, a judgment may be enforced by action. The revived judgment may also be enforced by motion within five (5) years from the date of its entry and thereafter by action before it is barred by the statute of limitations.Hence, petitioners argue, the writ of possession had lost its validity and efficacy and should therefore be declared null and void.
The respondents claim that the petition for the issuance of a writ of possession was filed out of time, the said petition having been filed more than five years after the issuance of the final decree of registration. In support of their contention, the respondents cite the case of Soroñgon vs. Makalintal [80 Phil. 259 (1948)], wherein the following was stated:Petitioners have not supplied any cogent reason for this Court to deviate from the foregoing ruling."It is the law and well settled doctrine in this jurisdiction that a writ of possession must be issued within the same period of time in which a judgment in ordinary civil actions may be summarily executed (section 17, Act 496, as amended), upon the petition of the registered owner or his successors in interest and against all parties who claim a right to or interest in the land registered prior to the registration proceeding."The better rule, however, is that enunciated in the case of Manlapas and Tolentino vs. Lorente [48 Phil. 298 (1925)], which has not yet been abandoned, that the right of the applicant or a subsequent purchaser to ask for the issuance of a writ of possession of the land never prescribes. . .
x x x
In a later case [Sta. Ana v. Menla, 111 Phil. 947 (1961)], the Court also ruled that the provision in the Rules of Court to the effect that judgment may be enforced within five years by motion, and after five years but within ten years by an action (Section 6, Rule 39) refers to civil actions and is not applicable to special proceedings, such as land registration cases. The Court said:"The second assignment of error is as follows:
'That the lower court erred in ordering that the decision rendered in this land registration case on November 28, 1931 or twenty six years ago, has not yet become final and unenforceable.
We fail to understand the arguments of the appellant in support of the above assignment, except in so far as it supports his theory that after a decision in a land registration case has become final, it may not be enforced after the lapse of a period of 10 years, except by another proceeding to enforce the judgment or decision. Authority for this theory is the provision in the Rules of Court to the effect that judgment may be enforced within 5 years by motion, and after five years but within 10 years, by an action (Sec. 6, Rule 39). This provision of the Rules refers to civil actions and is not applicable to special proceedings, such as a land registration case. This is so because a party in a civil action must immediately enforce a judgment that is secured as against the adverse party, and his failure to act to enforce the same within a reasonable time as provided in the Rules makes the decision unenforceable against the losing party. In special proceedings the purpose is to establish a status, condition or fact; in land registration proceedings, the ownership by a person or a parcel of land is sought to be established. After the ownership has been proved and confirmed by judicial declaration, no further proceeding to enforce said ownership is necessary, except when the adverse or losing party had been in possession of the land and the winning party desires to oust him therefrom. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)