698 Phil. 47
VELASCO JR., J.:
Notably, the parties stipulated in paragraph 4.a of the Deed of Absolute Sale with Mortgage on the eviction of informal settlers, as follows:
a. Upon execution of the Contract - P 500,000.00 b. Within 100 days thereafter, a downpayment equivalent
to 24% (P1,960,000.00) of the principal amount less the
advance of P500,000.00 - 1,460,009.20 c. The balance of P6,206,695.80 together with interest of 12% per annum
(estimated interest included) on the diminishing balance shall be payable
over a period of four (4) years on or before the month
and day of the first downpayment as follows: 2nd Payment (24%) P1,960,009.20 Interest 744,803.49 2,704,812.69 3rd Payment (24%) 1,960,009.20 Interest 509,602.39 2,469,611.59 4th Payment (24%) 1,960,009.20 Interest 274,401.28 2,234,410.48 5th Payment (24%) 326,668.20 Interest 19,600.09 346,268.29[7]
4. a. It is understood that the VENDOR shall have the property clear of any existing occupants/squatters, the removal of which shall be for the sole expenses & responsibilities of the VENDOR & that the VENDEE is authorized to withhold payment of the 1st 24% installment unless the above-undertaking is done and completed to the satisfaction of the VENDEE;[8]
3. That all accruals of interest as provided for in paragraph 2-c of the Deed of Sale With Mortgage will be deferred and the subsequent payments of installments will correspondingly [sic] extended to the date the occupants/squatters will vacate the subject property.[11]
4. That in the event the occupants/squatters will refuse to vacate the premises despite the amicable payments being offered by the FIRST PARTY (PLU) and paid by the SECOND PARTY (ALS) for the account of the FIRST PARTY, the following amount [sic] will be refunded by the FIRST PARTY to the SECOND PARTY:
- All payments made, including the downpayment
- All costs of temporary/permanent improvements introduced by the SECOND PARTY in the subject property
- All damages suffered by the SECOND PARTY due to the refusal of the occupants/squatters to vacate the premises.[12]
1. Upon the execution of this document, the SECOND PARTY shall pay the net sum of THREE HUNDRED NINETY FIVE THOUSAND PESOS (P395,000.00) after deducting expenses, covered by UCPB Check No. 078993 dated April 2, 1981 to complete the full payment of the first 24% installment.
2. The FIRST PARTY hereby executes a partial release of the mortgage to the extent of TWENTY THOUSAND SQUARE METERS (20,000 sq.m.) in consideration of the advance payment which would now amount to a total of P1,960,009.20, of a portion of the said property indicated in the attached subdivision plan herewith x x x.[15]
WHEREFORE, plaintiff respectfully prays that judgment be rendered:(1) Declaring null and void the documents attached to, and made an integral part of this complaint as Annexes “D” and “G”;Plaintiff prays for such further reliefs as this Hon. Court may deem just and proper in the premises.[20]
(2) Sentencing the defendant to pay the plaintiff the sum of Six Million Two Hundred Six Thousand Six hundred Ninety-Five Pesos & 60/100 (P6,206,695.80), with interest thereon as provided in sub-paragraph (c), paragraph 2 of the Deed of Sale with Mortgage and paragraph 6 of the same Deed, plus interests at the legal rate from the date of filing of this complaint;
(3) Sentencing the defendant to pay the plaintiff the actual damages and attorney’s fees it has suffered, as above alleged, in the total sum of Four Hundred Fifty Thousand Pesos (P450,000.00);
(4) Providing that, in the event defendant refuses or fails to pay all the above-mentioned amounts after the decision of this Hon. Court has become final and executory, the corresponding order is issued for the sale, in the corresponding Foreclosure sale of the mortgaged property described in the Deed of Sale with Mortgage, to satisfy the judgment rendered by this Hon. Court, plus costs of suit.
In the case at bar, the fulfillment of the conditional obligation to pay the subsequent installments does not depend upon the sole will or exclusive will of the defendant-buyer. In the first place, although the defendant-buyer has shown an apparent lack of interest in compelling the squatters to vacate the premises, as it agreed to do, there is nothing either in the contract or in law that would bar the plaintiff-seller from taking the necessary action to eject the squatters and thus compel the defendant-buyer to pay the balance of the purchase price. In the second place, should the squatters vacate the premises, for reasons of convenience or otherwise, and despite defendant’s lack of diligence, the latter’s obligation to pay the balance of the purchase price would arise unavoidably and inevitably. x x x Moreover, considering that the squatters’ right of possession to the premises is involved in Civil Case No. 40078 of this Court, defendant’s obligation to pay the balance of the purchase price would necessarily be dependent upon a final judgment of the Court ordering the squatters to vacate the premises.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered dismissing the instant action for foreclosure of mortgage, as the same is premature. Likewise the counterclaim is hereby ordered dismissed, for lack of sufficient merit. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.[24]
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision of the trial court is AFFIRMED in toto.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.[26]
WHEREFORE, it is most respectfully prayed that after hearing judgment be rendered directing the defendants to pay within ninety (90) days from receipt of an order the following amount:and in case of default to order the sale of the properties to satisfy the aforestated obligations pursuant to the provisions of Rule 68 of the Revised Rules of Court.
- The outstanding balance of the purchase price amounting to P6,206,695.80 plus 12% interest per annum from January, 1981 until full payment thereof has been made;
- The sum equivalent to 10% of the total outstanding obligations as and for attorney’s fee;
- The sum of P100,000.00 as and for moral damages; and,
- The sum of P50,000.00 as and for exemplary damages, plus costs;
Plaintiff also prays for such other just and equitable reliefs in the premises.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the present Complaint is hereby ordered DISMISSED for being premature.
On the counterclaim, the plaintiff is hereby ordered to reimburse the defendant-corporation the amount of P131,331.20 representing the real estate taxes paid by the latter with 12% interest thereon from the time of their actual payments to the Government until the same are fully reimbursed.
The other counterclaims are hereby ordered DISMISSED for want of sufficient merits.
SO ORDERED.[31]
Section 1. Defenses and objections not pleaded. — Defenses and objections not pleaded either in a motion to dismiss or in the answer are deemed waived. However, when it appears from the pleadings or the evidence on record that the court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter, that there is another action pending between the same parties for the same cause, or that the action is barred by a prior judgment or by statute of limitations, the court shall dismiss the claim. (Emphasis supplied)
Secondly, and more importantly, Section 1, Rule 9 of the Rules of Court provides:Section 1. Defenses and objections not pleaded. – Defenses and objections not pleaded either in a motion to dismiss or in the answer are deemed waived. However, when it appears from the pleadings or the evidence on record that the court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter, that there is another action pending between the same parties for the same cause, or that the action is barred by a prior judgment or by statute of limitations, the court shall dismiss the claim.The second sentence of this provision does not only supply exceptions to the rule that defenses not pleaded either in a motion to dismiss or in the answer are deemed waived, it also allows courts to dismiss cases motu proprio on any of the enumerated grounds – (1) lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter; (2) litis pendentia; (3) res judicata; and (4) prescription – provided that the ground for dismissal is apparent from the pleadings or the evidence on record.
Section 47. Effect of judgments or final orders. — The effect of a judgment or final order rendered by a court of the Philippines, having jurisdiction to pronounce the judgment or final order, may be as follows:
x x x x
(b) In other cases, the judgment or final order is, with respect to the matter directly adjudged or as to any other matter that could have been missed in relation thereto, conclusive between the parties and their successors in interest, by title subsequent to the commencement of the action or special proceeding, litigating for the same thing and under the same title and in the same capacity; and
(c) In any other litigation between the same parties or their successors in interest, that only is deemed to have been adjudged in a former judgment or final order which appears upon its face to have been so adjudged, or which was actually and necessarily included therein or necessary thereto.
Res judicata embraces two concepts: (1) bar by prior judgment as enunciated in Rule 39, Section 47(b) of the Rules of Civil Procedure; and (2) conclusiveness of judgment in Rule 39, Section 47(c).
There is “bar by prior judgment” when, as between the first case where the judgment was rendered and the second case that is sought to be barred, there is identity of parties, subject matter, and causes of action. In this instance, the judgment in the first case constitutes an absolute bar to the second action.
But where there is identity of parties in the first and second cases, but no identity of causes of action, the first judgment is conclusive only as to those matters actually and directly controverted and determined and not as to matters merely involved therein. This is the concept of res judicata known as “conclusiveness of judgment.” Stated differently, any right, fact or matter in issue directly adjudicated or necessarily involved in the determination of an action before a competent court in which judgment is rendered on the merits is conclusively settled by the judgment therein and cannot again be litigated between the parties and their privies, whether or not the claim, demand, purpose, or subject matter of the two actions is the same.
Thus, if a particular point or question is in issue in the second action, and the judgment will depend on the determination of that particular point or question, a former judgment between the same parties or their privies will be final and conclusive in the second if that same point or question was in issue and adjudicated in the first suit. Identity of cause of action is not required but merely identity of issue.
The elements of res judicata are: (1) the judgment sought to bar the new action must be final; (2) the decision must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; (3) the disposition of the case must be a judgment on the merits; and (4) there must be as between the first and second action, identity of parties, subject matter, and causes of action. Should identity of parties, subject matter, and causes of action be shown in the two cases, then res judicata in its aspect as a “bar by prior judgment” would apply. If as between the two cases, only identity of parties can be shown, but not identical causes of action, then res judicata as “conclusiveness of judgment” applies. (Emphasis supplied.)
The principle of res judicata may not be evaded by the mere expedient of including an additional party to the first and second action. Only substantial identity is necessary to warrant the application of res judicata. The addition or elimination of some parties does not alter the situation. There is substantial identity of parties when there is a community of interest between a party in the first case and a party in the second case albeit the latter was not impleaded in the first case.
x x x x
x x x Such identity of interest is sufficient to make them privy-in-law, thereby satisfying the requisite of substantial identity of parties.
In this connection, it is to be borne in mind that the contract shows that the parties were fully aware that the land described therein was occupied by squatters, because the fact is expressly mentioned therein (Rec. on Appeal, Petitioner’s Appendix B, pp. 12-13). As the parties must have known that they could not take the law into their own hands, but must resort to legal processes in evicting the squatters, they must have realized that the duration of the suits to be brought would not be under their control nor could the same be determined in advance. The conclusion is thus forced that the parties must have intended to defer the performance of the obligations under the contract until the squatters were duly evicted, as contended by the petitioner Gregorio Araneta, Inc. (Emphasis supplied.)