700 Phil. 180
CARPIO, ACTING C.J.:
In a VERIFIED ADMINISTRATIVE COMPLAINT dated September 25, 2009 (with enclosures), Dr. Janos B. Vizcayno (complainant) charges Judge Jasper Jesse G. Dacanay (respondent judge) of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC), Liloan-Compostela, Cebu, with Gross Ignorance of the Law, Abuse of Authority, Manifest Partiality and Delay.
Complainant is the defendant in a civil complaint for forcible entry and damages, docketed as Civil Case No. 650-R entitled, “Deodito R. Pulido, et al. v. Janos B. Vizcayno,” filed before the MCTC, Liloan-Compostela, Cebu. On March 31, 2009, respondent judge (together with the plaintiff who allegedly fraternized with and entertained him), without notice to complainant, conducted an ex-parte ocular inspection on the property subject of the civil action. Complainant only learned of the ocular inspection through neighbors Norma Tan, Herminia Domain, and Fernan Baguio. Feeling aggrieved, complainant filed a motion for inhibition of respondent judge to hear the civil action. The motion was set for hearing on April 24, 2009. However, respondent judge opted to proceed with the hearing of the case on May 29, 2009. In a heated argument, complainant and his counsel moved that the motion for inhibition be first resolved, but respondent judge ignored the same.
Complainant argues that respondent judge committed a gross violation of the due process clause protected under the Constitution when the latter conducted an ex-parte ocular inspection without notice to him. Also, respondent judge failed to live up to that norm of conduct that “judges should not only be impartial but should also appear impartial,” when he conducted the ocular inspection together with the plaintiffs. Such act, complainant claims, is highly improper and grossly inappropriate, and is a violation of Canon 2 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary (New Code of Judicial Conduct) which provides that “a judge should avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all activities.”
In his COMMENT dated November 24, 2009 (with enclosures), respondent judge, among others, explains that he went to the subject property with his utility personnel only to conduct his own personal investigation on the case to determine whether the disputed construction therein really exists, and to help him in suggesting to the parties to settle the case amicably. At the time of his personal inspection of the property, no one from either the plaintiffs or the defendant ever entertained him. What he did was to make a mere assessment of the property for his personal satisfaction, in all good faith and without fraud, dishonesty, or malicious intent.
Respondent judge further stresses that it is still premature for complainant and his counsel to conclude that he is biased against them, as the case is still then in the preliminary stage wherein there is still a possibility of amicable settlement. Likewise, respondent judge maintains that complainant and his counsel should have waited for the finality of the denial of the motion for his inhibition. Citing the case of Roxas v. Eugenio, Jr., respondent judge argues that an administrative complaint against a judge cannot be pursued simultaneously with the judicial remedies accorded to parties aggrieved by an erroneous order or judgment, as administrative remedies are neither alternative nor cumulative to judicial review where such review is available to aggrieved parties and the same has not been resolved with finality.
Respondent judge asserts that he cannot be accused of gross ignorance of the law, abuse of authority, manifest partiality, and delay, as he made the inspection in good faith and with noble intentions. Citing Lumbos v. Baliguat, he argues that to constitute gross ignorance of the law, it is not enough that the subject decision, order or actuation of the judge in the performance of his official duties is contrary to existing law and jurisprudence, but it must be moved by bad faith, fraud, dishonesty or corruption. He likewise denies incurring delay, averring that the records of the case easily reveal that it was complainant and his counsel who, for several instances, failed to appear during the scheduled hearings of the case.
Respondent judge intimates that it was Atty. Gabriel Cañete (complainant’s counsel) who actually filed the instant administrative complaint against him. He states that complainant’s counsel got embarrassed before his client when, during the May 29, 2009 hearing, Atty. Carlos Allan Cardenas (opposing counsel for plaintiff) argued that the motion for inhibition was a mere scrap of paper for his failure to state thereat his Mandatory Continuing Legal Education (MCLE) number and the date of issue of the requisite certificate of compliance with respect thereto. Chagrined with what happened, complainant’s counsel threatened respondent judge that he was going to file several charges against him.
Respondent judge states that the instant administrative case stemmed from two (2) events when he went to the area where the subject property is situated to without notifying the parties while the case is pending before his sala, and when he allegedly ignored the motion to inhibit himself from handling the case filed by the complainant, the defendant in Civil Case No. 650-R.
When complainant’s counsel filed the Motion for Inhibition, he did not indicate his MCLE compliance. Thus, respondent judge did not inhibit from handling the case. Under Bar Matter No. 1922 (2009), the failure of a practicing lawyer to disclose the number and date of issue of his MCLE Certificate of Compliance or Certificate of Exemption in his pleadings in court “would cause the dismissal of the case and the expunction of the pleadings from the records.” Complainant’s counsel might have felt that he was being forced out from the case, which might have made him angry. Nonetheless, respondent judge eventually inhibited from handling the case on March 10, 2010. From the time the civil case was filed in 2008 up to the time when he (respondent judge) inhibited himself on March 10, 2010, complainant cannot categorically say that he was placed at a disadvantage because no ruling was issued by the respondent judge.[1] (Emphasis in the original)
RECOMMENDATION: Respectfully submitted, for the consideration of the Honorable Court, is our recommendation that the instant administrative complaint against Judge Jasper Jesse G. Dacanay of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court, Liloan-Compostela, Cebu, be REDOCKETED as a regular administrative case; and the same be REFERRED to the Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Mandaue City, for investigation, report and recommendation within sixty (60) days from receipt of the records.[4] (Emphasis in the original)
WHEREFORE, the undersigned Executive Judge respectfully submits the following recommendations to the Honorable Supreme Court, for consideration, to wit:
a. To find the respondent judge, Judge Jasper Jesse G. Dacanay, liable for Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service; and
b. To reprimand the respondent judge, Judge Japer [sic] Jesse G. Dacanay, with a warning that a repetition of the same or similar act in the future shall be dealt with severely.[9]
PREMISES CONSIDERED, for conducting an ocular inspection without informing the parties, we find respondent, Judge Jasper Jesse Dacanay, guilty of conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service in violation of Sec. 1, Canon 4 of The New Code of Judicial Conduct, which is considered a serious charge.
x x x x
Considering that respondent judge has been previously imposed a fine of eleven thousand pesos (P11,000) in A.M. No. MTJ-03-1480 dated September 10, 2003 which has not been paid yet, we respectfully recommend that Judge Jasper Jesse G. Dacanay be:
1. found GUILTY of committing conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service in violation of Canon 4 of The New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary, and meted or imposed a FINE of twenty-five thousand pesos (P25,000.00) to be paid together with the FINE of eleven thousand pesos (P11,000.00) imposed in A.M. No. MTJ-03-1480, dated September 10, 2003, within fifteen (15) days from notice; and
2. STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar offense shall be dealt with more severely.[11] (Emphasis in the original)
Judges should be extra prudent in associating with litigants and counsel appearing before them to avoid even a mere perception of possible bias or partiality. Judges need not live in seclusion, nor avoid all social interrelations. When time and work commitments permit, judges may continue to relate to members of the bar in worthwhile endeavors in such fields of interest as are in keeping with the noble objectives of the legal profession.
However, in pending or prospective litigations before them, judges should be scrupulously careful to avoid anything that may tend to awaken the suspicion that their personal, social or sundry relations could influence their objectivity. Not only must judges possess proficiency in law, they must also act and behave in such manner that would assure litigants and their counsel of the judges’ competence, integrity and independence.[15]
SEC. 11. Sanctions. – A. If the respondent is guilty of a serious charge, any of the following sanctions may be imposed:
1. Dismissal from the service, forfeiture of all or part of the benefits as the Court may determine, and disqualification from reinstatement or appointment to any public office, including government-owned or controlled corporations. Provided, however, that the forfeiture of benefits shall in no case include accrued leave credits;
2. Suspension from office without salary and other benefits for more than three (3) but not exceeding six (6) months; or
3. A fine of more than P20,000.00 but not exceeding P40,000.00.
x x x [R]espondent judge in his Order dated September 30, 2009, expunged from the records the said motion because the counsel of complainant failed to indicate the date of issue and number of his MCLE Compliance as required by Bar Matter No. 1922. Said Order may therefore be considered as a denial of the Motion for Inhibition, which was issued within the 90-day period to resolve a motion.
The failure of respondent judge to resolve the Motion for Reconsideration of the Order dated September 30, 2009, which was filed on October 21, 2009, could not be attributable to him because on November 9, 2009, he received a directive from the Office of the Court Administrator to comment on the instant complaint. Since an order was issued on September 30, 2009 to expunge the Motion for Inhibition from the record of the case, and that on March 30, 2010, he eventually inhibited from the case, there was no unreasonable delay on the part of the respondent judge.[17]