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LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
A parcel of land, [L]ot No. 1,H-186034, containing an area of 31,682 sq.m., more or less; bounded on the North by public land on the southeast, by lot 2 of plan H-186034 and lot 9556 of Tuguegarao Cadastre; on the south by public land and on the southwest by Cagayan River;
A parcel of land of Lot No. 2, H-186034, containing an area of (1,723) sq.m., more or less. Bounded on the N., by Lot 9546 of Tuguegarao Cadastre; on the E., by Lot 9556; and on the SW., by Lot 1 of plan H-186034.[4]
9. The said deed of sale which led to the cancellation of OCT No. P-311 in favor of Juan Binayug has been falsified as said Gerardo Ugaddan and herein [respondent] Basilia Lacambra could legibly write their names but the deed of sale presented to the Registry of Deeds of Cagayan appears to have been thumbmarked;
10. [Respondents] cannot recall any deed or instrument of sale which was executed in favor of Juan Binayug in the year 1951, particularly that deed of sale dated July 10, 1951, allegedly notarized by Atty. Jose P. Carag under Doc. No. 100; Page No. 20; Book No. VII; Series of 1951 x x x;
11. The affixed [thumbmark] above the name of [respondent] Basilia Lacambra is a forgery as shown in the Technical Investigation/ Identification Report FP Case No. 98-347 of the National Bureau of Investigation [NBI], Manila x x x;
12. OCT No. P-311 having been issued pursuant to a homestead patent cannot be “alienated, transferred or conveyed after five (5) years and before twenty-five (25) years next following the issuance thereof in the year 1951, without the approval of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources x x x as annotated at the back of the same, x x x;
13. On April 8, 1997, without any legal personality or right, [petitioner] Ana Ugaddan executed a Confirmation of Sale concerning said lots embraced under [OCT No.] P-311, stating thereat that she is a surviving heir of the deceased Gerardo Ugaddan which is a falsehood as she is not related in any manner to the deceased Gerardo Ugaddan, save for the same family name, “Ugaddan”, x x x;
14. Earlier in November 11, 1996, [petitioner] Ana Ugaddan filed a notice of loss of OCT No. P-311 with the Register of Deeds of Cagayan stating among others that the original duplicate copy of OCT No. P-311 was lost while in her possession, x x x;
15. Thereafter, [petitioner] Ana Ugadan petitioned for the issuance of another owner’s copy of OCT No. P-311 which ultimately led to the issuance of TCT No. T-106394 in the name of Juan Binayug, deceased father of [petitioner] Alejandro Binayug;
16. The original owner’s duplicate copy of OCT No. P-311 was never lost as the same has been and is still in the possession of [respondent] Basilia Lacambra, hence the manner by which [petitioners] caused the transfer of title in the name of Juan Binayug was a fraud[.][8]
3. x x x that, the [respondents], except Geronima Ugaddan and Basilia Lacambra, are tenants over the parcels of land covered by TCT No. T-106394; that due to the failure of the said [respondents] to pay the agreed lease rentals, the herein [petitioners] were constrained to file an action against them at the [Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board] x x x;
x x x x
8. That [respondent] Ana Ugaddan reported the loss of the owner’s duplicate copy of OCT No. P-311 because when [respondents] demanded from Basilia Lacambra and her children the surrender of the said title so that [the] deed of sale in favor of Juan Binayug could be registered, they told said [petitioner] that it was lost, and when asked to sign an affidavit of loss, they also refused to do so;
x x x x
10. That if the owner’s duplicate copy of said OCT No. P-311 was not actually lost, then said Basilia Lacambra and her children have only themselves to blame if the loss was reported by said Ana Ugaddan because, as above stated, when the [petitioners] demanded the surrender to them of the said title, Basilia Lacambra and her children, told them that it was lost;
x x x x
12. That after [respondents’] predecessor-in-interest had already long sold the subject property to [petitioners’] predecessor-in-interest, the former have no more existing legal rights over the same which is one of the requisites before an injunction can be issued[.][10]
The first witness presented by the [respondents] is Jose Palma, an employee of the Dactyloscopic Division of the National Bureau of Investigation. He testified that in his examinations, the [thumbmark] of Basilia Lacambra in the purported deed of sale is different from her standard fingerprint. This finding was not refuted by the [petitioners]. Instead, they pointed their argument that the [thumbmark] of Gerardo is genuine and likewise affixed his [thumbmark] on the questioned deed of sale and it is placed a little bit above the name of Basilia. [Petitioners’] theory in a nutshell is that, Gerardo laid his thumbmarks on both his name and of Basilia. They however presented no evidence to prove this contention. At best, it is merely surmises. The court sees no reason either why Gerardo would utilize his own [thumbmark] in lieu of his wife[’s]. If the [petitioners] claim that spouses Gerardo and Basilia were alive when the supposed deed of sale was executed, then it is presumed that both assented to the conveyance of the contested lots absent of any indication that it was only Gerardo who participated. But having found that the [thumbmark] of Basilia is spurious, the genuineness and authenticity of the deed of sale become suspect.
The findings of witness-Palma is bolstered by the testimony of Guillermo Casagan when he testified that Basilia knows how to write instead of resorting to her [thumbmarks] on documents:ATTY. MARTIN
x x x x
Q- Do you know whether or not Basilia Ladambra has the ability to write?
A- Yes sir. She knows how to write.
Q- Why do you know that she can write?
A- I know that she knows how to write because she had a store before and I have often seen her write.
Q- Mr. witness, how old were you in the year 1951?
A- Thirteen years old, sir.
x x x x
In his cross-examination, his declaration on this subject was not touched by the [petitioners’] counsel. In light of this factual milieu, the court finds that the thumbprint of Basilia Lacambra in the Absolute Deed of Sale dated July 10, 1951 is not her own. There is no dispute that Gerardo and Basilia were married. Thus, there is hardly any reason to reject that the homestead property is conjugal [in] nature. And since no consent was given by Basilia in the alleged transfer, it necessarily follows that the document has no force and effect.[13]
First, as proven by the testimonies of [respondents’] witnesses, the marital consent was not obtained by Gerardo.
Second, Section 118 of the Public Land Law, amended by Commonwealth Act No. 456, reads as follows:“Section 118. Except in favor of the Government or any of its branches, units, or institutions, lands acquired under free patent or homestead provisions shall not be subject to encumbrance or alienation from the date of the approval of the application and for a term of five years from and after the date of issuance of the patent or grant, nor shall they become liable to the satisfaction of any debt contracted prior to the expiration of said period, but the improvements or crops on the land may be mortgaged or pledged to qualified persons, associations, or corporations.
“No alienation, transfer, or conveyance of any homestead after five and before twenty-five years after issuance of title shall be valid without the approval of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, which approval shall be denied except on constitutional and legal grounds.”
On the basis of the afore-quoted section, a homestead patent cannot be alienated or encumbered within five (5) years from the approval of application except in favor of the government or any of its branches or institutions. Where a homestead was sold during the prohibited period, even if the sale is approved by the Director of Lands subsequently after five (5) years, the approval will not give it any valid curative effect. Such sale is illegal, inexistent, and null and void ab initio. The action to declare the existence of such contract will not prescribe. As a matter of fact, the vendor never lost his title or ownership over the homestead, and there is no need for him or his heirs to repurchase the same from the vendee, or for the latter to execute a deed of reconveyance. Of course, the purchaser may recover the price which he has paid, and where the homesteader vendor died, the recovery may be pursued as a claim filed against his estate in the corresponding proceeding.
[Petitioners] do not deny that the contested lots were originally covered by a homestead patent. It then behooves on their part to prove that the purported deed of sale was executed outside the five-year prohibitory period. Failure to do so, the court has no choice but to declare null and void the deed of sale executed by spouses Gerardo and Basilia in favor of Juan Binayug.
Evident from the records is that the issuance of the Patent was on 12 January 1951. The registration thereof to the Register of Deeds was on 5 March 1951 and the supposed deed of sale was executed on July 10, 1951. From the pleadings and testimonies of [petitioners] and their witness, none can be carved out from them that the sale was beyond the prohibitory period. In fact, they seemed to have evaded this issue. Coupled in considering the relevant months in the year 1951, months which are too close to shield [petitioners] from Section 118, this court can only conclude that even if it is to presume the genuineness of the deed of sale, the conveyance is void as it falls within the period of five (5) years. Thus, the title obtained by the vendee-Juan Binayug, is also null and void ab initio. So also, where a homestead was sold during the prohibitory period of five years and upon the expiration of said period a new deed of sale was executed[,] such as a mere reproduction of the previous one, it was held that the latter deed of sale was invalid as the prior deed which intended to ratify. For the purpose of declaring such sale null and void, neither laches nor prescription can operate for the action is imprescriptible.[14] (Citations omitted.)
This court is convinced that [petitioners] firmly believe in good faith that the land is theirs when they took over from their parents. It however agonizes over the fact that the law is against them as their forebears’ ignorance of the law has finally caught them. Of course all [is not] lost. Even [if] we are to declare the sale as invalid, they can recover the price on the basis of the cited jurisprudence. Considering that the sale was consummated in 1951, it is beyond the sphere of competence of anybody to know the price. The court will then grant a reasonable amount of P100,000 for the Thirty-Three Thousand Four-hundred Five (33,405) square meters of land.[15]
WHEREFORE, premises considered, Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-106394 issued in the name of Juan Binayug is declared null and void and is hereby ordered cancelled. Original Certificate of Title No. P-311 in the name of Gerardo Ugaddan is declared still subsisting and valid. The Register of Deeds of the Province of Cagayan is hereby directed to cause the necessary annotations thereof. [Respondents are] hereby ordered to pay [petitioners] P100,000.00 as payment for the price of lots. For lack of merit, the claim for other damages is hereby dismissed.[16]
THE HONORABLE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT BRANCH IV OF TUGUEGARAO CITY GRAVELY ERRED IN APPLYING THE PROVISION OF SECTION 118 OF THE PUBLIC LAND ACT INSTEAD OF APPLYING THE PROVISION OF SECTION 124 OF THE SAME LAW.[17]
Section 124. Any acquisition, conveyance, alienation, transfer, or other contract made or executed in violation of any of the provisions of Sections one hundred and eighteen, one hundred and twenty, one hundred and twenty-one, one hundred and twenty-two, and one hundred and twenty-three of this Act shall be unlawful and null and void from its execution and shall produce the effect of annulling and cancelling the grant, title, patent or permit originally issued, recognized or confirmed, actually or presumptively, and cause the reversion of the property and its improvement to the State.
The principles thus invoked by [the Church, et al.] are correct and cannot be disputed. They are recognized not only by our law but by our jurisprudence. Section 124 of the Public Land Act indeed provides that any acquisition, conveyance or transfer executed in violation of any of its provisions shall be null and void and shall produce the effect of annulling and cancelling the grant or patent and cause the reversion of the property to the State, and the principle of pari delicto has been applied by this Court in a number of cases wherein the parties to a transaction have proven to be guilty of having effected the transaction with knowledge of the cause of its invalidity. But we doubt if these principles can now be invoked considering the philosophy and the policy behind the approval of the Public Land Act. The principle underlying pari delicto as known here and in the United States is not absolute in its application. It recognizes certain exceptions one of them being when its enforcement or application runs counter to an avowed fundamental policy or to public interest. As stated by us in the Rellosa case, “This doctrine is subject to one important limitation, namely, “whenever public policy is considered advanced by allowing either party to sue for relief against the transaction.”
The case under consideration comes within the exception above adverted to. Here [De Los Santos] desires to nullify a transaction which was done in violation of the law. Ordinarily the principle of pari delicto would apply to her because her predecessor-in-interest has carried out the sale with the presumed knowledge of its illegality, but because the subject of the transaction is a piece of public land, public policy requires that she, as heir, be not prevented from re-acquiring it because it was given by law to her family for her home and cultivation. This is the policy on which our homestead law is predicated. This right cannot be waived. “It is not within the competence of any citizen to barter away what public policy by law seeks to preserve”. We are, therefore, constrained to hold that [De Los Santos] can maintain the present action it being in furtherance of this fundamental aim of our homestead law.
As regards the contention that because the immediate effect of the nullification of the sale is the reversion of the property to the State[, De Los Santos] is not the proper party to institute it but the State itself, that is a point which we do not have, and do not propose, to decide. That is a matter between the State and the Grantee of the homestead, or his heirs. What is important to consider now is who of the parties is the better entitled to the possession of the land while the government does not take steps to assert its title to the homestead. Upon annulment of the sale, the purchaser’s claim is reduced to the purchase price and its interest. As against the vendor or his heirs, the purchaser is no more entitled to keep the land than any intruder. Such is the situation of the [the Church, et al.]. Their right to remain in possession of the land is no better than that of [De Los Santos] and, therefore, they should not be allowed to remain in it to the prejudice of [De Los Santos] during and until the government takes steps toward its reversion to the State.[26] (Emphases supplied, citations omitted.)