708 Phil. 386
MENDOZA, J.:
WHEREFORE, after a detailed consideration of the totality of evidence presented by both parties, this Court hereby holds, as follows:a. The complaints of plaintiffs in Civil Cases Nos. 80-17 and BCV 81-18 are hereby DISMISSED.No pronouncement as to costs.
b) The Transfer Certificates of Title in the name of plaintiffs, that is, TCT Nos. 88467, 88468, 104248 and 104249, as well as the title of Spouses Solis, TCT No. 94389, are hereby CANCELLED on account of their spurious nature.
c) The validity of the title of defendant B.E. San Diego is hereby UPHELD.
SO ORDERED.[5]
- Civil Case BCV-80-17 entitled “Lorenzana Food Corporation vs. B.E. San Diego, Inc., et al.”
- Civil Case BCV-81-18 entitled “Jimmy Chua Chi Leong and Albert Chua vs. B.E. San Diego, Inc.”
- Civil Case BCV-83-79 entitled “B.E. San Diego, Inc. vs. Eduardo Solis.”
The objects of the controversy are several portions of a large tract of land located in the municipality of Bacoor, Cavite. The large tract of land is claimed to be originally owned by one Juan Cuenca y Francisco, who had it surveyed way back in 1911. The land itself is traversed by railroad tracks dividing the land into two (2) parcels. On February 21, 1922, Juan Cuenca was issued Original Certificate of Title No. 1020 (Exhibit "H") covering the two parcels, designated as Lots 1 and 2. Original Certificate of Title No. 1020 was later reconstituted as O.C.T. No. (1020) RO-9, containing the technical descriptions of Lots 1 and 2.
On April 14, 1928, a separate original certificate of title for Lot 1, referring to the parcel north of the railroad tracks, was issued to Juan Cuenca as O.C.T. No. (1898) RO-58 (Exhibit "Z"). Lot 1 itself was divided into thirteen (13) parcels, eleven (11) of which were described therein as situated in the barrios of Talaba, Zapote, and Malicsi, while two (2) parcels were situated in the poblacion of Bacoor, Cavite.
Upon the demise of Juan Cuenca, an action for partition of his properties was filed by Jose Cuenca, one of the surviving heirs. On February 21, 1969, a project of partition was approved by the Land Registration Commission (Exhibit "EEE"), and on April 10, 1969, the court ordered the Register of Deeds of the Province of Cavite to issue individual titles for twelve (12) parcels of Lot 2 (Exhibit "GG). Three (3) parcels thereof: Lot 2-A, 2-K, and 2- L, were titled (T.C.T. Nos. 35963, 35973 and 35974, respectively) and registered in the name of Juan Cuenca (Exhibits "K", "TTT-1" and "TTT-2") on April 21, 1969. All three titles stated that the lands covered therein were originally registered as O.C.T. No. RO-9 on February 21, 1922 (Exhibits "K", "G" and "H").
Lot 2-A of Juan Cuenca was later subdivided into seven (7) lots in 1969. Of these seven subdivided parcels, one parcel (Lot 2-A-3) was adjudicated to his heir, Pura Cuenca, who was issued Transfer Certificate of Title No. 41505 on February 24, 1970 (Exhibit "L). The said T.C.T. No. 41505 stated that the land covered therein was originally registered as Original Certificate of Title No. 1898 on April 14, 1928, and Transfer Certificate of Title No. RO-58-I was cancelled by virtue thereof. One other parcel (Lot 2-A-4) was adjudicated to another heir, Ladislaw Cuenca, who was issued Transfer Certificate of Title No. 41506 (Annex "M") on February 24, 1970. Likewise, T.C.T. No. 41506 stated that the land covered therein was originally registered as Original Certificate of Title No. 1898 on April 14, 1928, and that T.C.T. No. RO-58-I was cancelled by virtue thereof.
We interpose at this point the observation that although the transfer certificates of title issued to Pura and Ladislaw Cuenca stated that the lands covered therein were originally registered as O.C.T. No. 1898, hence, referring to Lot 1 located at the northern portion of Juan Cuenca's large tract of land, the technical description appearing in said transfer certificates of title were taken or lifted from O.C.T. No. (1020) RO-9 covering Lot 2, referring to the southern portion of the original tract of land.
In the meantime, Lots 2-K and 2-L (T.C.T. Nos. 35973 and 35974) in the name of Juan Cuenca, were consolidated and, in turn, were subdivided into eight (8) lots. Lot 4 was adjudicated to Pura Cuenca, who was issued T.C.T. No. 41498 (Exhibit "TTT-5") on February 24, 1970. Lot 3 was adjudicated to Ladislaw Cuenca, who was issued T.C.T. No. 41497 (Exhibit "TTT-4") on the same date. Lot 6 was adjudicated to Jose Cuenca, who was issued T.C.T. No. 41501 with the inscription therein that the land covered by said titles were originally registered as O.C.T. No. 1898 on April 14, 1928, and that T.C.T. No. RO-58-I was cancelled thereby, referring to Lot 1 of the original tract. However, the technical descriptions inscribed therein were lifted from O.C.T. No. (1020) RO-9 covering Lot 2 of the original tract of land.
Upon the deaths of Pura and Ladislaw Cuenca, the administrators of their respective testate estates were given authority by the court to dispose of some parcels of land. Lot 2-A-3 of Pura Cuenca covered by T.C.T. No. 41505, and Lot 2-A-4 of Ladislaw[a] Cuenca covered by T.C.T. No. 41506, were eventually sold to herein appellee Lorenzana Food Corporation on February 4, 1977 (Annexes, "OOO", "CCC" and "UU-1"). Transfer Certificate of Title No. 41505 was cancelled by T.C.T. No. 88468 issued to, and registered in favor of, Lorenzana Food Corporation (Annex "D"). Transfer Certificate of Title No. 41506 was cancelled by T.C.T. No. 88467 (Exhibit "2") on February 18, 1977. Both T.C.T. Nos. 88467 and 88468 also stated that the lands covered therein were originally registered as O.C.T. No. 1898, but contained portions of the technical description appearing in O.C.T. No. (1020) RO-9.
On the other hand, Lot 3 of the consolidated Lots 2-K and 2-L, as part of the testate estate of Ladislaw Cuenca, was sold to herein appellee Jimmy Chua Chi Leong. Transfer Certificate of Title No. 104248 (Exhibit "A") was issued to and registered in his name on May 9, 1979, cancelling T.C.T. No. 41497. Lot 4, being part of the testate estate of Pura Cuenca, was sold to Albert Chua, who was issued T.C.T. No. T-104249 on May 9, 1979 (Exhibit "B"), cancelling T.C.T. No. 41498. Lot 6 was sold by Jose Cuenca to Eduardo Solis, who was issued T.C.T. No. T-94389, cancelling T.C.T. No. T-41501. Common to the titles of Jimmy Chua Ching Leong, Albert Chua and Eduardo Solis is the inscription that the lands covered therein were originally registered as O.C.T. No. 1898 on April 14, 1928.
Another common feature of all these succeeding titles is the description that the property therein described is situated in the barrio of Talaba, Bacoor, Cavite. Looking back, the records show that the original tract of land owned by Juan Cuenca was bounded on the north by Calle Real de Talaba, on the south and southeast by Sapa Niog, and on the west, by Calle Niog. As mentioned earlier, the land was divided into two (2) by the railroad tracks running from and going to east and west. The area located north of the railroad tracks, bordering Calle Real de Talaba was later titled as O.C.T. (1898) 50-58, said parcel straddling the barrios of Talaba, Zapote and Milicsi, as well as the poblacion proper.
On the other hand, the portion located south of the railroad tracks was designated as Lot 2. Traversing this land is what used to be a national road, now called the Aguinaldo Highway, linking Tagaytay City to Metro Manila. This parcel was later titled as O.C.T. No. (1020) RO-9. The sub-divided parcels aforementioned, by their technical descriptions are located at the south to southeast portions of Lot 2, bounded on the south, by Sapa Niog and Calle Niog on the west. Nevertheless, the said parcels were described as situated in the barrio of Talaba.
The controversy arose when herein appellees learned that the same parcels were being claimed by herein appellant, B.E. San Diego, Incorporated. B.E. San Diego's claim was based on two (2) titles registered in its name. The first parcel was covered under T.C.T. No. T-17621 (Annex "C") issued on March 2, 1966, which originated from O.C.T. No. 0-490 registered on December 22, 1965. The said title described "a parcel of land Plan Psu-211245, pursuant to L.R.C. Case No. N-467, (LRC) Record No. N-27923, situated in the Barrio of Niog, Municipality of Bacoor." The second parcel was titled under O.C.T. No. 0-644, registered on January 5, 1967, pursuant to LRC Case No. N-557, (LRC) Record No. N-30647, describing "a parcel of land (Lot 1, Plan Psu-223920), situated in Barrio of Niog" (Exhibit "9").
All parties resolutely seeking to enforce their respective claims over the subject properties, three (3) civil suits for quieting of title were filed before the Regional Trial Court of Bacoor, Cavite, Branch XIX. The first case, docketed as BCV-80-17 was filed by Lorenzana Food Corporation versus B.E. San Diego, Incorporated, and other defendants. The second civil case, BCV-81-18, was filed by Jimmy Chua Chi Leong and Albert Chua, also against B.E. San Diego, Inc., et al., as defendants. The last case, BCV-83-79 was filed by B.E. San Diego, Inc., against spouses Eduardo and Gloria Solis, as defendants.
In Civil Case No. BCV-80-17, Lorenzana Food Corporation claimed exclusive ownership over the two (2) parcels covered by T.C.T. Nos. 88467 and 88468, issued to it on February 18, 1977. Lorenzana Food Corporation alleged that it took immediate possession of the said property and even contracted to prepare the land for development. It is alleged that it was only years later that Lorenzana Food Corporation learned that B.E. San Diego, Inc. was claiming ownership over portions of the said parcels by virtue of O.C.T. No. 0-644. It is Lorenzana Food Corporation's contention that the O.C.T. No. 0-644, in B.E. San Diego's name is null and void because Lorenzana Food Corporation's title emanated from an O.C.T. issued more than thirty-nine (39) years prior to the issuance of B.E. San Diego's original certificate of title.
In answer, B.E. San Diego countered that it and its predecessors-in-interest have been in the open continuous and adverse possession in concept of owner of the subject property for more than fifty (50) years prior to Lorenzana Food Corporation's purchase of the two (2) parcels. It also argued that Original Certificate of Title No. 0-644 was not null and void since it was issued upon application and proper proceedings in (LRC) Case No. N-557 and N-30647, before the then Court of First Instance of Cavite. Pursuant to its issuance, the said property was declared by B.E. San Diego for tax purposes (Exhibits "Q" and "5-F") since June 22, 1966.
B.E. San Diego claims it bought the subject property from Teodora Dominguez on February 6, 1966 (Exhibit "5-D") and the absolute deed of sale was submitted in (LRC) Case No. N-577. It was further argued that Lorenzana Food Corporation was erroneously claiming the subject property because Lorenzana's titled property is described to be located in Barrio Talaba, while B.E. San Diego's property is situated in Barrio Niog. Denying that Lorenzana Food Corporation's predecessor-in-interest had been in possession of the subject property, B.E. San Diego claimed that in 1979, by force, intimidation, threat, stealth, and strategy, Lorenzana Food Corporation entered and occupied the subject property, despite barbed wire fencing with warning signs, and security guards posted by B.E. San Diego.
In Civil Case No. BCV-81-18, plaintiffs Jimmy Chua Chi Leong and Albert Chua claim ownership over the parcels they respectively purchased from the heirs of Juan Cuenca, as evidenced by Transfer Certificates of Titles Nos. T-104248 and T-104249, issued on January 20 and 30, 1979, respectively. B.E. San Diego, for its part, claimed the property by virtue of Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-17621 issued on March 2, 1966, which cancelled Original Certificate of Title No. 0-490 originally issued to Teodora Dominguez, who sold the same property to B.E. San Diego. Again, B.E. San Diego argued that, as appearing in their respective titles, Jimmy Chua Chi Leong's and Albert Chua's properties were located in Barrio Talaba while that of B.E. San Diego was located in Barrio Niog.
The last case, BCV-83-79 was initiated by B.E. San Diego against the Solis spouses who, according to the former, unlawfully entered a portion of its property titled under Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-17621. The Solis spouses, meanwhile, claim the said portion by virtue of their Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-94389, issued pursuant to their purchase of said portion from Jose Cuenca.[8]
Proceeding in the light of the foregoing evidence, the Court finds that the three lots of San Diego which are presently covered by O.C.T. No. 0-644 and TCT No. T-17621, are within Lot 2, Psu-2075 and overlapped the lots in question of Lorenzana, Chua and Solis. The fact that it appears in the titles of San Diego that its lots are situated in Niog, and not in Talaba, cannot prevail over the findings in the verification surveys conducted by the Bureau of Lands. Aside from this, these two barrios are adjoining and that the land described in plan Psu-2075 of Cuenca is bounded by Calle Real de Talaba and Calle Niog and Sapa Niog.
Since the titles of Lorenzana, Chua and Solis emanated from the title of Juan Cuenca y Francisco issued on February 21, 1922, these titles should prevail over O.C.T. No. 0-644 issued on January 5, 1967 and O.C.T. No. 0-490 allegedly issued on December 22, 1965, not to mention the fact that the authenticity of O.C.T. No. 0-490 of Teodora Dominguez predecessor-in-interest of San Diego, is questionable, for the original thereof appears to be registered under the name of Antonio Sentero. The rule is well-settled that a decree ordering the registration of a particular parcel of land is a bar to a future application for registration covering or affecting said lot (Legarda vs. Saleeby, 31 Phil 590). Thus, where two certificates of title are issued to different persons covering the same land in whole or in part, the earlier in date must prevail as between original parties and in case of successive registration where more than one certificate is issued over the land, the person holding under the prior certificate is entitled to the land against the person who rely on the second certificate (De Villa vs. Trinidad, L-24918, March 20, 1968, 22 SCRA 1167, Gatioon vs. Gaffud, L-21953, March 28, 1969, 27 SCRA 769).[10]x x x x
- The trial court erred in finding that the three lots of the appellant are within and overlapped the lots in question of the appellees.
- The trial court erred in declaring “null and void” and ordering the cancellation of appellant’s titles and ordering to pay appellees sums of money, attorney’s fees and costs.
- The trial court erred in not ordering judgment for the appellant.[11]
First – In this case, where there is a so-called “overlapping” or “overlaying” of titles, the best evidence are the certificates of title themselves. While the titles of all the contending parties, at first blush, seem to have been regularly issued, a closer examination bares the peculiar common defects in the titles of the appellees. These defects are:a. The appellees’ titles are annotated with the inscription that the land described therein was originally registered under OCT No. 1898, but the technical descriptions found therein were lifted from OCT No. (1020) RO-9.
b. The appellees’ titles state that the properties are located in the barrio of Talaba when the properties described therein are situated in the Barrio of Niog.
On the other hand, the appellant’s titles show no defect. x x xx x x x x x x x x x x x
Thus, even though the appellees can trace their titles as having been originally registered on February 21, 1922, the succeeding titles, issued on February 24, 1970, were all defective. Why no effort was exerted to correct the alleged “clerical errors” on the part of the appellees’ predecessors-in-interest, has not been explained. x x x
Second – Not only were the appellants’ titles not blemished by any defect and were regularly issued, its valid title was coupled with open, adverse and continuous possession of the subject property. x x x
Besides, the land possessed by the appellant is, as described in its titles, in the barrio of Niog. On the other hand, the appellees’ titles describe their properties as located in the barrio of Talaba, but the land they claim is located in Barrio Niog. The appellant is where it should be, as decreed in its titles. The appellees are claiming properties that are not in the location stated in their respective titles.x x x x x x x x x x x x
Third – the lower court largely relied on the testimony and recommendation of the Bureau of Lands surveyor who was ordered to conduct a verification survey. The surveyor’s report declared that the appellant’s property overlapped those of the appellees. Upon questioning, however, the same surveyor admitted that his verification survey was just based on the technical descriptions appearing in the opposing parties’ titles. x x x
The Bureau of Lands’ verification and recommendation, therefore, does not prove that only the appellees have the right to claim the property, to the exclusion of others. The survey did not even pretend to resolve the issue of whether or not the titles issued to the appellees were perfect or defective. x x x[17]
- The Honorable Court of Appeals committed reversible error of law and grave abuse of discretion in reversing the decision of the lower court to uphold the validity of the land titles of private respondent in spite of the fact that these were issued some forty-six (46) years later than the titles of petitioners and their predecessors-in-interest.
- The Honorable Court of Appeals committed reversible error of law and grave abuse of discretion in giving more significance to the annotation than the technical description in identifying the lots in dispute.
- The Honorable Court of Appeals committed reversible erroneous conclusion of facts, amounting to reversible error of law and grave abuse of discretion in holding in its resolution denying petitioners’ motion for reconsideration that petitioners failed to make proper correction of their titles.
- The Honorable Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion when it failed to pass judgment on the liabilities of the estates of Pura Cuenca and Ladislao Cuenca, predecessors-in-interest (sellers) of the petitioners.
Petitioners now assail the correctness of the factual bases of our Decision, i.e., that their titles facially contain irregularities while the titles of private respondent are unblemished. They also deny that Barrios Talaba and Niog are one and a half kilometers away from each other.
To prove their claim, petitioners have attached the following documents:The general rule is that no party is allowed a second motion for reconsideration of a final order or judgment. After the promulgation of our Decision, however, petitioners alleged new facts and submitted pertinent documents putting in doubt the correctness of our factual findings and legal conclusions. We cannot be insensitive to these allegations for this Court is committed to render justice on the basis of the truth.
(1) certified true copies of the titles of Juan Cuenca, petitioners and private respondents; (2) a historical study of how San Diego acquired its titles (OCT No. 0-490 and OCT No. 0-644) and a certification dated August 29, 1994 from the Register of Deeds that the original of OCT No. 0-490 in the name of Teodora Dominguez, San Diego’s predecessor, did not exist in the Registry file and did not form part of their records; (3) a statement that OCT No. 0-491 (not OCT No. 490) in the name of Teodora Dominguez now exists in the records of the Register of Deeds of Cavite with a true copy of said OCT No. 0-491 certified on February 24, 1995; (4) a certification and sketch from the Land Registration Authority that the lot described in the alleged OCT No. 0-490 of Teodora Dominguez sits upon and encroaches on the National Highway (Aguinaldo Highway); (5) survey, sketch plans and certifications from the Land Registration Authority indicating that the land in OCT No. 0-644 of San Diego overlaps with the land covered by OCT No. 1020 (RO-9) of Juan Cuenca; (6) flow charts tracing the subdivision and partition of Cuenca’s land into the present parcels of land purchased by petitioners from the heirs of Cuenca himself; the partitions were made with approval of the court; (7) a historical outline and graphic study of the transactions over Cuenca’s land which shows how petitioners came to purchase their lots; (8) a factual representation that OCT No. 1020 (RO-9), Cuenca’s title, and OCT No. 1898 (RO-58) inscribed in petitioners’ titles cover different parcels of land; and that OCT No. 1898 is not the same as OCT Nos. 0-644 and 0-490 of San Diego; (9) a certification by the Municipal Planning and Development Coordinator of Bacoor, Cavite that Barrio Niog and Barrio Talaba are actually adjacent to each other; (10) order dated January 26, 1981 of the Court of First Instance, Branch 5, Bacoor, Cavite, decreeing the correction of the Chuas’ transfer certificates of title. The court declared that the certification in the face of the Chuas’ titles was an error and, therefore, ordered its amendment to reflect the true fact that the titles were derived from OCT No. 1020 (RO-9) of Cuenca “originally registered on the 21st day of February, in the year nineteen hundred and twenty two x x x” not OCT 1898 as originally inscribed therein. Per annotation in the second page of the Chuas’ titles, the order of the Court was recorded and the correction duly made on January 29, 1981 prior to the institution by the Chuas of Civil Case No. BCV-81-18 against San Diego.
Pursuant to this postulate, this Court has held time and again that rules of procedure are but mere tools designed to facilitate the attainment of justice. They are not the end in themselves. Under extreme circumstances, we have suspended the rules and excepted a particular case from their operation to respond to the higher interests of justice. In the cases at bar, the location of the contested lots, the number of people affected and the impact of the litigation on the peace of the community justify its reopening to give all the parties full opportunity to prove their claims.[19]
I Whether or not there is overlapping of titles of the petitioners with those of the private respondent; and
II Whether or not the apparent defective transfer certificates of title of the petitioners, allegedly coming from Original Certificate of Title No. 1020, can withstand the rigors of legal scrutiny.
WHEREFORE, after a detailed consideration of the totality of evidence presented by both parties, this Court hereby holds, as follows:a. The complaints of plaintiffs in Civil Cases Nos. 80-17 and BCV 81-18 are hereby DISMISSED.No pronouncement as to costs.
d) The Transfer Certificates of Title in the name of plaintiffs, that is, TCT Nos. 88467, 88468, 104248 and 104249, as well as the title of Spouses Solis, TCT No. 94389, are hereby CANCELLED on account of their spurious nature.
e) The validity of the title of defendant B.E. San Diego is hereby UPHELD.
SO ORDERED.[20]
ASSIGNMENT OF ERRORS I
The Honorable Court of Appeals committed reversible error of law, erroneous conclusion of facts and grave abuse of discretion when it upheld the validity of the titles of San Diego considering that the said titles cover tracts of land that ha[ve] been previously registered and titled under the name Juan Cuenca y Francisco.II
The Honorable Court of Appeals committed reversible error of law and grave abuse of discretion in ruling that the two titles of San Diego are unblemished by any defect.III
The Honorable Court of Appeals committed reversible erroneous conclusion of facts amounting to grave abuse of discretion in holding [that] OCT 1898 RO-58 is a separate title for Lot-1 of OCT 1020 RO-9 that was issued on April 14, 1928.IV
The Honorable Court of Appeals committed reversible erroneous conclusion of facts, amounting to reversible error of law and grave abuse of discretion, in holding that the titles of the petitioners originated from O.C.T. 1898 RO-58.V
The Honorable Court of Appeals committed reversible error of law and grave abuse of discretion in holding that the titles of the petitioners are defective because the technical description of the land stated therein came from OCT 1020 RO-9 and not from OCT 1898 RO-58.VI
The Honorable Court of Appeals committed reversible error of law and grave abuse of discretion in holding that the correction made on the titles of Jimmy Chua and Albert Chua are null and void.
A
The Court of Appeals grievously committed a reversible error in ruling that petitioner failed to establish a better right to the subject properties even after petitioner was able to trace its title from one issued prior to the title relied upon by respondent.1. Petitioner established the identity of the Subject Properties and that they are overlapped by the property described in respondent’s OCT No. O-644.
2. Petitioner clearly established its ownership of the Subject Properties.B
The Court of Appeals grievously committed a reversible error in ruling that respondent’s title rests on solid support despite the latter’s failure to establish how it acquired ownership over the property covered by OCT No. O-644.C
The Court of Appeals grievously committed a reversible error when it relied upon a superficial comparison of the respective certificates of title of the parties in concluding that respondent had superior title to the subject properties.1. The presence or absence of errors on the face of the certificates of title is irrelevant in an action for quieting of title.
2. In ruling that there was no overlapping of titles in this case, the Court of Appeals disregarded the principle that it is the description of the boundaries of a property that is essential for its identification.
3. The errors in petitioner’s certificates of title that were highlighted in the Assailed Decision were adequately explained.D
Petitioner is an innocent purchaser for value entitled to protection under the law.
- They were annotated with the inscription that the land described therein was originally registered under OCT No. 1898, but the technical descriptions found therein were lifted from OCT No. (1020) RO-9;
- The inscriptions on the petitioners’ titles state that the properties are located in Barrio Talaba when the properties described therein are situated in Barrio Niog;
The appellees (petitioners) argue, however, that the annotations appearing in their respective titles are mere clerical errors and that the technical descriptions contained therein should prevail. This argument, however, cannot find application to the case at bar because the opposing parties have in their possession titles referring to the same property, and whose technical descriptions pertain to the said property. The appellees’ claim that it is the annotations in their titles that are erroneous is not supported by the evidence. On the contrary, their admission that the original titles of their predecessors-in-interest were reconstituted casts doubts on the appellees’ claim that the technical description should prevail over the annotations.
Our conclusion that the appellees’ titles are defective is bolstered by the fact that the titles of their predecessors-in-interest were already defective, as a result of the partition of the property. As narrated in the foregoing facts, pursuant to a partition of the estate of Juan Cuenca, separate titles were issued to the heirs Pura, Ladislawa and Jose Cuenca. One parcel adjudicated to Pura Cuenca covered by TCT No. 41505 was issued on February 24, 1970 (Annex “L”). This title was defective in the manner already mentioned, that is, the annotation states that the origin of the said transfer certificate of title was O.C.T. No. 1898, but the technical description was lifted from O.C.T. (1020) RO-9. Another parcel, adjudicated to Ladislawa Cuenca was covered by T.C.T. No. 41506 (Annex “M”). This, title, likewise, contained the same defect. These two parcels were eventually sold to appellee Lorenzana Food Corporation and the defect was carried over to the new titles issued to it.
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 41498 issued to Pura Cuenca (Exhibit “TTT-5”) covering still another parcel also carried the same defect. This parcel was later sold to appellee Albert Chua, and his new title, in turn, continued to contain the same defect. Moreover, TCT No. 41437 (Exhibit “TTT-4”), covering a parcel adjudicated to Ladiswala Cuenca, was also defective. When sold to appellee Jimmy Chua Chi Leong, the new title issued to him also carried the same defect. The last subject parcel was adjudicated to Jose Cuenca, whose TCT No. 41501 was also defective. Accordingly, the new title issued to the appellee spouses Solis, who bought said parcel, was also defective.
Thus, even though the appellees can trace their titles as having been originally registered on February 21, 1922, the succeeding titles, issued on February 24, 1970, were all defective. Why no effort was exerted to correct the alleged “clerical errors” on the part of the appellees’ predecessors-in-interest, has not been explained. The uncorrected defects in the appellees’ titles have brought about this present controversy.
Notwithstanding, the appellant’s (respondent) O.C.T. No. 0-644 and T.C.T. No. T-17621 were issued way before the defective titles were issued to Pura, Ladislawa and Jose Cuenca. And more so, the appellant’s titles were issued and registered long before the appellees purchased the subject parcels from the Cuencas. As against the perfect and regularly issued titles of the appellant, the appellees’ belated and defective titles must give way.[42]
Sec. 108. Amendment and alteration of certificates. — No erasure, alteration, or amendment shall be made upon the registration book after the entry of a certificate of title or of a memorandum thereon and the attestation of the same by the Register of Deeds, except by order of the proper Court of First Instance. A registered owner or other person having an interest in registered property, or, in proper cases, the Register of Deeds with the approval of the Commissioner of Land Registration, may apply by petition to the court upon the ground that the registered interests of any description, whether vested, contingent, expectant or inchoate appearing on the certificate, have terminated and ceased; or that [a] new interest not appearing upon the certificate have arisen or been created; or that an omission or error was made in entering a certificate or any memorandum thereon, or on any duplicate certificate; or that the name of any person on the certificate has been changed; or that the registered owner has married, or, if registered as married, that the marriage has been terminated and no right or interest of heirs or creditors will thereby be affected; or that a corporation which owned registered land and has been dissolved has not conveyed the same within three years after its dissolution; or upon any other reasonable ground; and the court may hear and determine the petition after notice to all parties in interest, and may order the entry or cancellation of a new certificate, x x x. [Emphases supplied]
Atty Bernardo: Q After you purchased this property did you take possession thereof? A Yes, sir. Q Did any person disturb your property? A Yes, sir. By Atty. Bernardo (To the witness) Q Did you come to know who is that person? A Yes, sir. Q Who? A The men of Bartolome San Diego, sir. Q Did you come to know why they disturb your possession? A Yes, sir. Q What? A Because they claimed that they are also the owner of the lot, sir. Q After knowing that Bartolome E. San Diego is claiming to be the owner of your lot, what did you do? A I went to my attorney and he instructed me also to locate for the original title from where this lot came from. (TSN, pp. 15-16, July 19, 1983)[45]
Petitioners would minimize the import of the defects in their titles by describing them as "clerical." The plea does not persuade for the self-contradictions in petitioners' titles infract their integrity. Errors that relate to the lots' mother title, their technical descriptions and their locations cannot be dismissed as clerical and harmless in character. With these errors, the titles of the petitioners do not deserve the sanctity given to torrens title. These errors precisely created and cast the cloud of doubt over petitioners' titles and precipitated the case at bench.[48]
To be sure, these defects were judicially admitted by the petitioners. They attached their defective titles to their complaints in the trial court. As aforestated, their titles showed on their very face that they covered lots located in Barrio Talaba, municipality of Bacoor whereas the lots of private respondent are in Barrio Niog of the same municipality. The two barrios are one and a half kilometers away from each other. Likewise, the face of their titles show that they emanated from OCT No. 1898 or from Lot 1 constituting the northern portion of Juan Cuenca's property before its subdivision. Nonetheless, the technical descriptions of the lots appearing in their titles were lifted from OCT No. (1020) RO-9 or from Lot 2 forming the southern portion of Juan Cuenca's land. No less than petitioners' witness, Eng. Venezuela, confirmed these blatant defects when he testified, thus:BY ATTY. VASQUEZ: (to the witness)
Q You said you referred to these titles in connection with your verification?
WITNESS:
A Yes, sir.
Q Now, I presume you also saw the matters stated in the second paragraph of the first page of the titles, I am referring . . . particularly to the fact that as stated in both of these titles, this land was originally registered on April 14, 1928 as Original Certificate of Title 1898 pursuant to Decree No. 338259 LRC Record No. 29214, did you notice those?
WITNESS:
A I noticed that, sir.
x x x
BY ATTY. VASQUEZ: (To the witness)
Q In the report that you submitted to this Court on your verification survey, we find in paragraph 8, No, paragraph 4, subparagraph f, the following statement which I read, "THAT AS PER TECHNICAL DESCRIPTIONS APPEARING ON TCT NO. 88467 AND TCT NO. 88468 REGISTERED IN THE NAME OF. . . . . . LORENZANA FOOD CORPORATION, THE PROPERTY FALLS IN THE BARRIO OF NIOG, BACOOR, CAVITE," CONTRADICTING TO THE LOCATION STATED IN THE TITLE WHICH IS BARRIO TALABA, I READ FURTHER, "IT MAY BE DUE TO THE FACT THAT SAID TITLE ORIGINATED FROM ORIGINAL CERTIFICATE NO TITLE NO. 1898 DECREED UNDER NO. 338259 WHICH IS ACTUALLY LOCATED IN BARRIO TALABA, BACOOR, CAVITE.
MY QUESTION IS, BARRIO TALABA AND BARRIO NIOG ARE DIFFERENT BARRIOS?
WITNESS:
A YES, SIR.
Q And you have apparently noticed that the statement contained in the second paragraph of the title of plaintiff stating that the land supposed to be covered by said titles is derived from OCT No. 1898?
A Yes, sir.
Q Are we to understand that the land covered by OCT No. 1898 is not the same land covered by the titles of the Lorenzana?
x x x
A In a sense it is not actually, the title OCT 1898 is located on northern portion of OCT No. 1020, in fact I made here a working sheet showing the titles, the one Original Certificate of Title 1020 and Original Certificate .... of Title 1898 and I have here a sketch plan of the positions. x x x.
x x x
BY ATTY. VASQUEZ: (To the witness)
Q You [are] mentioned OCT No. 1898 and OCT No. 1020, you will tell the Court of these two (2) titles cover different parcels of land?
WITNESS:
A As per my sketch sheet plan, Original Certificate of Title No. 1020 is located at the southern portion of the Original of Title No. 1898, meaning to say that they are far apart from each other.
Q Now, this technical description that you utilized to plot the land described in the title or titles of the plaintiff, which title did you use, 1898 or 1020?
A I just followed the title as issued, as ordered by the Court.
I based my verification based on the title as required by the Court.
Q THE QUESTION IS, ACCORDING TO YOU .... VERIFICATION, THE LAND BEING CLAIMED BY THE PLAINTIFF, IS IT COVERED BY 1898 OR 1020?
WITNESS:
A WELL, IT IS ALREADY CLEAR ON THE TITLE THAT IT WAS TAKEN FROM OCT 1898.
Q I will not argue to that fact that the title of Lorenzana was taken from 1898 but I am asking you the plotting of the technical description as described on the title of the plaintiff is referring to a land covered by original certificate of title 1898 or 1020?
A It is very clear on my plan that the two (2) titles of Lorenzana happened to fall to Original Certificate of Title No. 1020.
Q IN OTHER WORDS, IF WE GO BY THE TITLE, IT WOULD APPEAR THAT THIS TITLE OF THE LORENZANAS WAS DERIVED FROM 1898 BUT THE TECHNICAL DESCRIPTION ..... WAS FROM ANOTHER TITLE SPECIFICALLY 1020?
WITNESS:
A YES, SIR, BY USING THE TECHNICAL DESCRIPTION (pp. 34-35, 37-40, 41-43, tsn, 12-9-80, bold letters supplied).
His attempt to reconcile the defects and inconsistencies appearing on the faces of petitioners' titles did not impress the respondent court and neither are we. His opinion lacks authoritativeness for his verification survey was not made on the land itself. It was a mere table survey based on the defective titles themselves.[53] [Emphasis supplied]
A common characteristic shared by all the foregoing documents is that they are not exactly “newly discovered evidence” as plaintiffs’ claim they are. By their nature, all of them could have been previously obtained and presented by plaintiffs at the hearings before the lower court. For plaintiffs’ failure to present these documents there is no one else to blame but themselves. It appears that they did not exert their best efforts to get hold of evidence which was already available, or at the very least, obtainable, to buttress their claim. To allow the presentation of evidence on a piece-meal basis, thereby needlessly causing a delay in the resolution of the case would be anathema to the purpose of delivering justice.[55]
In a last swing against the disputed Decision, petitioners contend that the respondent court committed grave abuse of discretion when it failed to pass judgment on the liabilities of the estates of Pura Cuenca and Ladislaw Cuenca, their predecessors-in-interest. The contention deserves scant attention. The records show that the trial court dismissed petitioners' Complaint against the Estates of Pura Cuenca and Ladislaw Cuenca in Civil Case Nos. BCV-80-17 and BCV-81-18. They alleged that the said Estates breached their warranties as sellers of the subject lots. Petitioners Lorenzana Food Corporation as well as Jimmy Chua Chi Leong and Albert Chua did not appeal the dismissal of their Complaints against these Estates. The dismissal has become final and petitioners cannot resurrect the Estates' alleged liability in this petition for review on certiorari.[56]