763 PHIL. 328
PERALTA,* J.:
Private respondent bank admitted that the aforementioned loans were paid by Agusan Institute of Technology except for the 7th, 8th and 11th loans. Petitioners failed to religiously pay said loans as they became due and demandable, hence, private respondent bank was forced to file for an application for Extra-judicial Foreclosure of Real Estate Mortgage and Chattel Mortgage on December 28, 2000.
Date the Loan
was Granted Principal AmountMarch 19, 1996 Agusan Institute of Technology (owned by petitioners) was granted an Interim Financjng Loan. P 8,000,000.00March 25, 1996 Agusan Institute of Technology was granted a second Interim Financing Loan. 2,000.000.00March 27, 1996 Agusan Institute of Technology was granted a third Interim Financing Loan. 1,500,000.00July 17, 1996 Rogelio Lim was granted a commercial loan. 300,000.00October 20, 1996 Rogelio Lim was granted a second commercial loan. 1,300,000.00October 31, 1996 Rogelio Lim was granted a fourth commercial loan. 60,000.00February 5, 1997 Agusan Institute of Technology was granted a loan the entire proceeds of which was used to pay off the three Interim Financing Loans. 9,512,400.00February 5, 1997 Agusan Institute of Technology was granted a loan. 1,987,600.00July 20, 1997 Agusan Institute of Technology was granted another loan. 3,400,000.00April 19, 1999 Agusan Institute of Technology was granted a loan. 45,000.00June 30, 1999 Agusan Institute of Technology was granted a loan. 10,100,000.00
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the defendant Bank and against the plaintiff Agusan Institute of Technology, declaring, directing and ordering the following:Dissatisfied, petitioners appealed to the CA.
a) The dismissal of the instant complaint.
b) The plaintiff Agusan Institute of Technology (AIT) as represented by Dr. Shirley T. Lim to pay defendant Bank the following:c) Attorney's fees in the amount of 10% of the outstanding obligations.
- The outstanding balance of the 7th loan (P9,512,400.00) which as of May 23, 2005 amounts to P20,213,240.55 until fully paid.
- The outstanding balance of the 8th loan (P1,987,600.00) which amounts to P3,742,841.63 as of May 23, 2005 until fully paid.
- The outstanding balance of the 11th loan (P10,100,000.00) which amounts to P46,569,275.26 as of May 23, 2005 until fully paid.
d) Litigation expenses in the amount of P30,000.00.
e) Exemplary damages in the amount of P50,000.00.
f) The writ of preliminary injunction is hereby ordered lifted and of no force and effect.
SO ORDERED.[4]
In essence, at issue is whether or not the CA, in denying petitioners' application for a writ of preliminary injunction, committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.I THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN ISSUING THE JULY 2, 2009 RESOLUTION WHICH DENIED PETITIONERS' APPLCIATION FOR THE ISSUANCE OF TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER, DESPITE THE FACT THAT PETITIONERS HAVE SHOWN THEIR CLEAR ENTITLEMENT TO THE ISSUANCE OF INJUNCTIVE RELIEF.II THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN ISSUING THE SEPTEMBER 30, 2009 RESOLUTION WHICH DENIED PETITIONERS' MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OF THE RESOLUTION DATED JULY 2, 2009 DENYING PETITIONERS' APPLICATION FOR THE ISSUANCE OF INJUNCTIVE RELIEF, AND IN NOT ACTING ON THE MERITS ON PETITIONERS' SUPPLEMENTAL TO THE MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION, DESPITE THE FACT THAT PETITIONERS HAVE CLEARLY SHOWN THAT GREAT AND IRREPARABLE INJURY WOULD BE COMMITTED AGAINST THEM IF THEIR PLEA FOR INJUNCTIVE RELIEF WOULD NOT BE ISSUED IN THEIR FAVOR AND THAT PETITIONERS RAISED COGENT GROUNDS IN THEIR SUPPLEMENTAL MOTION.[6]
Section 5. Preliminary injunction not granted without notice; exception. - No preliminary injunction shall be granted without hearing and prior notice to the party or person sought to be enjoined. If it shall appear from facts shown by affidavits or by verified application that great or irreparable injury would result to the applicant before the matter can be heard on notice, the court to which the application for preliminary injunction was made, may issue a temporary restraining order to be effective only for a period of twenty (20) days from service on the party or person sought to be enjoined, except as herein provided. Within the said twenty-day period, the court must order said party or person to show cause, at a specified time and place, why the injunction should not be granted, determine within the same period whether or not the preliminary injunction shall be granted, and accordingly issue the corresponding order.From the foregoing, it is clear that to be entitled to an injunctive writ, the applicant must show that there exists a right to be protected which is directly threatened by an act sought to be enjoined. Furthermore, there must be a showing that the invasion of the right is material and substantial, and that there is an urgent and paramount necessity for the writ to prevent serious damage.[7]
However, and subject to the provisions of the preceding sections, if the matter is of extreme urgency and the applicant will suffer grave injustice and irreparable injury, the executive judge of a multiple-sala court or the presiding judge of a single sala court may issue ex parte a temporary restraining order effective for only seventy-two (72) hours from issuance but he shall immediately comply with the provisions of the next preceding section as to service of summons and the documents to be served therewith. Thereafter, within the aforesaid seventy-two (72) hours, the judge before whom the case is pending shall conduct a summary hearing to determine whether the temporary restraining order shall be extended until the application for preliminary injunction can be heard. In no case shall the total period of effectivity of the temporary restraining order exceed twenty (20) days, including the original seventy-two hours provide herein.
In the event that the application for preliminary injunction is denied or not resolved within the said period, the temporary restraining order is deemed, automatically vacated. The effectivity of a temporary restraining order is not extendible without need of any judicial declaration to that effect and no court shall have authority to extend or renew the same on the same ground for which it was issued.
However, if issued by the Court of Appeals or a member thereof, the temporary restraining order shall be effective for sixty (60) days from service on the party or person sought to be enjoined. A restraining order issued by the Supreme Court or a member thereof shall be effective until further orders.
[I]njunctive relief is resorted to only when there is a pressing necessity to avoid injurious consequences that cannot be redressed under any standard of compensation. The controlling reason for the existence of the judicial power to issue the writ of injuction i's that the court may thereby prevent a threatened or continuous injury to some of the parties before their claims can be thoroughly investigated and advisedly adjudicated. A writ of preliminary injunction is an extraordinary event and is the strong arm of equity, or a transcendent remedy. It is granted only to protect actual and existing substantial rights. Without actual and existing rights on the part of the applicant, and in the absence of facts bringing the matter within the conditions for its issuance, the ancillary writ must be struck down for being issued in grave abuse of discretion. Thus, injunction will not issue to protect a right not in esse, which is merely contingent, and which may never arise, or to restrain an act which does not give rise to a cause of action.[11]Worth noting also is the fact that the grant or denial of a writ of preliminary injunction in a pending case rests on the sound discretion of the court taking cognizance of the case, since the assessment and evaluation of evidence towards that end involves findings of fact left to the said court for its conclusive determination. Hence, the exercise of judicial discretion by a court in injunctive matters must not be interfered with, except when there is grave abuse of discretion.[12]