809 Phil. 24
LEONEN, J.:
Section 36. Damages. - Any victim of violence under this Act shall be entitled to actual, compensatory, moral and exemplary damages.Rule V, Section 35 of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of the Anti-VAWC Law[45] states that when a criminal action is also available and is resorted to, "[t]he civil action for damages is deemed instituted with the criminal action, unless an independent civil action for damages is filed."
Republic Act No. 9262 allows for the issuance of three (3) kinds of protection orders: a Barangay Protection Order, a Temporary Protection Order, and a Permanent Protection Order. A Barangay Protection Order is issued by a Punong Barangay or by a Barangay Kagawad.[49] Temporary protection orders and permanent protection orders are judicial issuances obtained through trial courts.[50]
(a) Prohibition of the respondent from threatening to commit or committing, personally or through another, any of the acts mentioned in Section 5 of this Act; (b) Prohibition of the respondent from harassing, annoying, telephoning, contacting or otherwise communicating with the petitioner, directly or indirectly; (c) Removal and exclusion of the respondent from the residence of the petitioner, regardless of ownership of the residence, either temporarily for the purpose of protecting the petitioner, or permanently where no property rights are violated, and, if respondent must remove personal effects from the residence, the court shall direct a law enforcement agent to accompany the respondent to the residence, remain there until respondent has gathered his things and escort respondent from the residence; (d) Directing the respondent to stay away from petitioner and any designated family or household member at a distance specified by the court, and to stay away from the residence, school, place of employment, or any specified place frequented by the petitioner and any designated family or household member; (e) Directing lawful possession and use by petitioner of an automobile and other essential personal effects, regardless of ownership, and directing the appropriate law enforcement officer to accompany the petitioner to the residence of the parties to ensure that the petitioner is safely restored to the possession of the automobile and other essential personal effects, or to supervise the petitioner's or respondent's removal of personal belongings; (f) Granting a temporary or permanent custody of a child/ children to the petitioner; (g) Directing the respondent to provide support to the woman and/or her child if entitled to legal support. Notwithstanding other laws to the contrary, the court shall order an appropriate percentage of the income or salary of the respondent to be withheld regularly by the respondent's employer for the same to be automatically remitted directly to the woman. Failure to remit and/or withhold or any delay in the remittance of support to the woman and/or her child without justifiable cause shall render the respondent or his employer liable for indirect contempt of court; (h) Prohibition of the respondent from any use or possession of any firearm or deadly weapon and order him to surrender the same to the court for appropriate disposition by the court, including revocation of license and disqualification to apply for any license to use or possess a firearm. If the offender is a law enforcement agent, the court shall order the offender to surrender his firearm and shall direct the appropriate authority to investigate on the offender and take appropriate action on the matter; (i) Restitution for actual damages caused by the violence inflicted, including, but not limited to, property damage, medical expenses, childcare expenses and loss of income; (j) Directing the DSWD or any appropriate agency to provide petitioner temporary shelter and other social services that the petitioner may need; and (k) Provision of such other forms of relief as the court deems necessary to protect and provide for the safety of the petitioner and any designated family or household member, provided petitioner and any designated family or household member consents to such relief.[48]
Section 9. Who May File Petition for Protection Orders. - A petition for protection order may be filed by any of the following:As is clear from this enumeration, a petition for the issuance of protection order is not limited to the alleged victim herself. The victim's mother - as is the case with respondent Mendenilla - is explicitly given the capacity to apply for a protection order for the benefit of her child. By this clear statutory provision, Mendenilla had the requisite personality to file a petition for the issuance of a protection order in favor of Maria Sheila.
(a) the offended party; (b) parents or guardians of the offended party; (c) ascendants, descendants or collateral relatives within the fourth civil degree of consanguinity or affinity; (d) officers or social workers of the DSWD or social workers of local government units (LGUs); (e) police officers, preferably those in charge of women and children's desks; (f) Punong Barangay or Barangay Kagawad; (g) lawyer, counselor, therapist or healthcare provider of the petitioner; (h) at least two (2) concerned responsible citizens of the city or municipality where the violence against women and their children occurred and who has personal knowledge of the offense committed. (Emphasis supplied)
Section 8. Who may file petition. — A petition for protection order may be filed by any of the following:Section 33 of A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC reads:
(a) The offended party; (b) Parents or guardians of the offended party; (c) Ascendants, descendants or collateral relatives of the offended party within the fourth civil degree of consanguinity or affinity; (d) Officers or social workers of the Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD) or social workers of local government units (LGUs); (e) Police officers, preferably those in charge of women and children's desks; (f) Punong Barangay or Barangay Kagawad; (g) lawyer, counselor, therapist or healthcare provider of the petitioner; or (h) At least two concerned, responsible citizens of the place where the violence against women and their children occurred and who have personal knowledge of the offense committed.
The filing of a petition for protection order by the offended party suspends the right of all other authorized parties to file similar petitions. A petition filed by the offended party after the filing of a similar petition by an authorized party shall not be dismissed but shall be consolidated with the petition filed earlier. (Emphasis supplied)
Section 33. When petition may proceed separately from or be deemed instituted with criminal action. — (a) An offended party may file a petition for protection order ahead of a criminal action arising from the same act. The same shall proceed separately from the criminal action and shall require only a preponderance of evidence. Upon motion of the petitioner, the court may consolidate the petition with the criminal action.Petitioner proceeds to argue that Mendenilla's filing of a separate petition supposedly anchored on the same factual premises, and seeking the same reliefs as those of the criminal complaint filed by Maria Sheila is an act of forum-shopping. He, therefore, claims that Mendenilla's petition should have been dismissed.
(b) Where the offended party chooses to file a criminal action, the petition for protection order is deemed instituted with the criminal action, unless the offended party reserves the right to institute it separately. (Emphasis supplied)
Top Rate Construction & General Services, Inc. v. Paxton Development Corporation explained that:Encinas v. Agustin[60] explained how a ruling in an investigative exercise - such as fact-finding investigations and preliminary investigation - could not be the basis of res judicata, or of forum shopping. Its exhaustive and extensive discussion is worth quoting at length:Forum shopping is committed by a party who institutes two or more suits in different courts, either simultaneously or successively, in order to ask the courts to rule on the same or related causes or to grant the same or substantially the same reliefs, on the supposition that one or the other court would make a favorable disposition or increase a party's chances of obtaining a favorable decision or action.Jurisprudence has recognized that forum, shopping can be committed in several ways:
....(1) filing multiple cases based on the same cause of action and with the same prayer, the previous case not having been resolved yet (where the ground for dismissal is litis pendentia); (2) filing multiple cases based on the same cause of action and the same prayer, the previous case having been finally resolved (where the ground for dismissal is res judicata); and (3) filing multiple cases based on the same cause of action but with different prayers (splitting of causes of action, where the ground for dismissal is also either litis pendentia or res judicata). (Emphasis in the original)The test for determining forum shopping is settled. In Yap v. Chua, et al.:
....To determine whether a party violated the rule against forum shopping, the most important factor to ask is whether the elements of litis pendentia are present, or whether a final judgment in one case will amount to res judicata in another; otherwise stated, the test for determining forum shopping is whether in the two (or more) cases pending, there is identity of parties, rights or causes of action, and reliefs sought.For its part, litis pendentia "refers to that situation wherein another action is pending between the same parties for the same cause of action, such that the second action becomes unnecessary and vexatious." For litis pendentia to exist, three (3) requisites must concur:The requisites of litis pendentia are: (a) the identity of parties, or at least such as representing the same interests in both actions; (b) the identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts; and (c) the identity of the two cases such that judgment in one, regardless of which party is successful, would amount to res judicata in the other.On the other hand, res judicata or prior judgment bars a subsequent case when the following requisites are satisfied:(1) the former judgment is final; (2) it is rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; (3) it is a judgment or an order on the merits; (4) there is — between the first and the second actions — identity of parties, of subject matter, and of causes of action.[59] (Citations omitted)
[W]e rule that the dismissal of the BFP Complaint does not constitute res judicata in relation to the CSCRO Complaint. Thus, there is no forum-shopping on the part of respondents.Although the prosecutor's dismissal of a criminal complaint does not give rise to res judicata vis-a-vis subsequent civil and quasi-judicial proceedings, neither does it engender double jeopardy - so-called "res judicata in prison grey" — should the alleged perpetrator's criminal liability still be subsequently pursued. In Trinidad v. Marcelo:[62]
....
In order that res judicata may bar the institution of a subsequent action, the following requisites must concur: (a) the former judgment must be final; (b) it must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; (c) it must be a judgment on the merits; and (d) there must be between the first and the second actions (i) identity of parties, (ii) identity of subject matter, and (iii) identity of cause of action.
A judgment may be considered as one rendered on the merits "when it determines the rights and liabilities of the parties based on the disclosed facts, irrespective of formal, technical or dilatory objections;" or when the judgment is rendered "after a determination of which party is right, as distinguished from a judgment rendered upon some preliminary or formal or merely technical point."
In this case, there is no "judgment on the merits" in contemplation of the definition above. The dismissal of the BFP Complaint in the Resolution dated 05 July 2005 was the result of a fact-finding investigation for purposes of determining whether a formal charge for an administrative offense should be filed. Hence, no rights and liabilities of parties were determined therein with finality.
The [Court of Appeals] was correct in ruling that the doctrine of res judicata applies only to judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings, and not to the exercise of administrative powers. Administrative powers here refer to those purely administrative in nature, as opposed to administrative proceedings that take on a quasi-judicial character.
In administrative law, a quasi-judicial proceeding involves (a) taking and evaluating evidence; (b) determining facts based upon the evidence presented; and (c) rendering an order or decision supported by the facts proved. The exercise of quasi-judicial functions involves a determination, with respect to the matter in controversy, of what the law is; what the legal rights and obligations of the contending parties are; and based thereon and the facts obtaining, the adjudication of the respective rights and obligations of the parties ...
....
The Court has laid down the test for determining whether an administrative body is exercising judicial or merely investigatory functions: adjudication signifies the exercise of the power and authority to adjudicate upon the rights and obligations of the parties. Hence, if the only purpose of an investigation is to evaluate the evidence submitted to an agency based on the facts and circumstances presented to it, and if the agency is not authorized to make a final pronouncement affecting the parties, then there is an absence of judicial discretion and judgment.
In this case, an analysis of the proceedings before the BFP yields the conclusion that they were purely administrative in nature and constituted a fact-finding investigation for purposes of determining whether a formal charge for an administrative offense should be filed against petitioner.
....
The proceedings before the BFP were merely investigative, aimed at determining the existence of facts for the purpose of deciding whether to proceed with an administrative action. This process can be likened to a public prosecutor's preliminary investigation, which entails a determination of whether there is probable cause to believe that the accused is guilty, and whether a crime has been committed.
The ruling of this Court in Bautista v. Court of Appeals is analogously applicable to the case at bar. In that case, we ruled that the preliminary investigation conducted by a public prosecutor was merely inquisitorial and was definitely not a quasi-judicial proceeding:A closer scrutiny will show that preliminary investigation is very different from other quasi-judicial proceedings. A quasi-judicial body has been defined as "an organ of government other than a court and other than a legislature which affects the rights of private parties through either adjudication or rule-making."This principle is further highlighted in MERALCO v. Atilano, in which this Court clearly reiterated that a public prosecutor, in conducting a preliminary investigation, is not exercising a quasi-judicial function. In a preliminary investigation, the public prosecutor inspects the records and premises, investigates the activities of persons or entities coming under the formers' jurisdiction, or secures or requires the disclosure of information by means of accounts, records, reports, statements, testimony of witnesses, and production of documents. In contrast, judicial adjudication signifies the exercise of power and authority to adjudicate upon the rights and obligations of concerned parties, viz.:
....
On the other hand, the prosecutor in a preliminary investigation does not determine the guilt or innocence of the accused. He does not exercise adjudication nor rule-making functions. Preliminary investigation is merely inquisitorial, and is often the only means of discovering the persons who may be reasonably charged with a crime and to enable the fiscal to prepare his complaint or information. It is not a trial of the case on the merits and has no purpose except that of determining whether a crime has been committed and whether there is probable cause to believe that the accused is guilty thereof. While the fiscal makes that determination, he cannot be said to be acting as a quasi-court, for it is the courts, ultimately, that pass judgment on the accused, not the fiscal. (Emphases supplied)This is reiterated in our ruling in Spouses Balangauan v. Court of Appeals, Special Nineteenth Division, Cebu City, where we pointed out that a preliminary investigation is not a quasi-judicial proceeding, and the DOJ is not a quasi-judicial agency exercising a quasi-judicial function when it reviews the findings of a public prosecutor regarding the presence of probable cause. A quasi-judicial agency performs adjudicatory functions when its awards determine the rights of parties, and its decisions have the same effect as a judgment of a court. [This] is not the case when a public prosecutor conducts a preliminary investigation to determine probable cause to file an information against a person charged with a criminal offense, or when the Secretary of Justice [reviews] the former's order[s] or resolutions on determination of probable cause.
In Odchigue-Bondoc, we ruled that when the public prosecutor conducts preliminary investigation, he thereby exercises investigative or inquisitorial powers. Investigative or inquisitorial powers include the powers of an administrative body to inspect the records and premises, and investigate the activities of persons or entities coming under his jurisdiction, or to secure, or to require the disclosure of information by means of accounts, records, reports, statements, testimony of witnesses, and production of documents. This power is distinguished from judicial adjudication which signifies the exercise of power and authority to adjudicate upon the rights and obligations of concerned parties. Indeed, it is the exercise of investigatory powers which sets a public prosecutor apart from the court. (Emphasis supplied)[61] (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)
Petitioner's arguments — that res judicata applies since the Office of the Ombudsman twice found no sufficient basis to indict him in similar cases earlier filed against him, and that the Agan cases cannot be a supervening event or evidence per se to warrant a reinvestigation on the same set of facts and circumstances — do not lie.Likewise, in Jamaca v. People:[64]
Res judicata is a doctrine of civil law and thus has no bearing on criminal proceedings.
But even if petitioner's argument were to be expanded to contemplate "res judicata in prison grey" or the criminal law concept of double jeopardy, this Court still finds it inapplicable to bar the reinvestigation conducted by the Office of the Ombudsman. For the dismissal of a case during preliminary investigation does not constitute double jeopardy, preliminary investigation not being part of the trial.[63] (Citations omitted)
It should be borne in mind that for a claim of double jeopardy to prosper, petitioner has to prove that a first jeopardy has attached prior to the second. As stated in Braza v. Sandiganbayan, "[t]he first jeopardy attaches only (a) after a valid indictment; (b) before a competent court; (c) after arraignment; (d) when a valid plea has been entered; and (e) when the accused was acquitted or convicted, or the case was dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent." In this case, the complaint before the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for the Military was dismissed as early as the preliminary investigation stage, thus, there was as yet, no indictment to speak of. No complaint or Information has been brought before a competent court. Hence, none of the aforementioned events has transpired for the first jeopardy to have attached.As deftly noted both by Judge Giron-Dizon and the Court of Appeals, it was not within the prosecutor's competence to issue or to direct the issuance of a protection order. Assistant City Prosecutor Odronia could not have adjudicated the parties' rights and obligation. That is, he was not in a position to rule on Maria Sheila's right to be protected or on petitioner's duty to desist from acts of violence:
In Vincoy v. Court of Appeals, which is closely analogous to the present case, the private complainant therein initially filed a complaint with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Pasay City, but said office dismissed the complaint. Private complainant then re-filed the complaint with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Pasig City. The Office of the Prosecutor of Pasig City found probable cause and filed the Information against the accused therein. In said case, the Court categorically held that:The dismissal of a similar complaint . . . filed by [private complainant] before the City Prosecutor's Office of Pasay City will not exculpate the petitioner. The case cannot bar petitioner's prosecution. It is settled that the dismissal of a case during its preliminary investigation does not constitute double jeopardy since a preliminary investigation is not part of the trial and is not the occasion for the full and exhaustive display of the parties' evidence but only such as may engender a well-grounded belief that an offense has been committed and accused is probably guilty thereof. For this reason, it cannot be considered equivalent to a judicial pronouncement of acquittal.[65] (Citations omitted)
Another allegation in the omnibus motion ... is that, plaintiff is engaged in forum-shopping which merits the dismissal of the petition because there is a pending criminal complaint for violation of R.A. 9262 with the City Prosecutor's Office of Makati City, which is docketed as I.S. No. 05E-6413 and handled by Asst. City Prosecutor [Romel Odronia]. The said criminal complaint involves the same parties and the same issue.Failing in the most basic requisites of forum shopping — there not having been an actual or potential final judgment on the merits rendered by a competent court in the course of criminal proceedings - petitioner's allegations regarding respondent Mendenilla's alleged lack of personality to file suit and forum shopping must fail.
The Court is not persuaded. Granting arguendo that violation of R.A. 9262 is included in the criminal complaint; the Asst. City Prosecutor is devoid of power to issue a Temporary Protection Order. Consequently, the aggrieved party in R.A. 9262 would have no other immediate recourse but to file a TPO before the court.[66]
Section 6. Service in person on defendant. - Whenever practicable, the summons shall be served by handing a copy thereof to the defendant in person, or, if he refuses to receive and sign for it, by tendering it to him.Rule 14, Section 6 recognizes two (2) alternative ways through which personal service may be effected: first, by actually handing summons to the defendant, which presupposes the defendant's willingness to accept the summons; and second, by mere tender, if the defendant refuses to accept.
Section 7. Substituted service. - If, for justifiable causes, the defendant cannot be served within a reasonable time as provided in the preceding section, service may be effected (a) by leaving copies of the summons at the defendant's residence with some person of suitable age and discretion then residing therein, or (b) by leaving the copies at defendant's office or regular place of business with some competent person in charge thereof.In the case of residents who are temporarily not in the Philippines, another alternative means for serving summons is through extraterritorial service. Rule 14, Section 16 states:
Section 16. Residents temporarily out of the Philippines. — When any action is commenced against a defendant who ordinarily resides within the Philippines, but who is temporarily out of it, service may, by leave of court, be also effected out of the Philippines, as under the preceding section.The preceding Section 15 spells out the terms of extraterritorial service:
Section 15. Extraterritorial service. — When the defendant does not reside and is not found in the Philippines, and the action affects the personal status of the plaintiff or relates to, or the subject of which is, property within the Philippines, in which the defendant has or claims a lien or interest, actual or contingent, or in which the relief demanded consists, wholly or in part, in excluding the defendant from any interest therein, or the property of the defendant has been attached within the Philippines, service may, by leave of court, be effected out of the Philippines by personal service as under Section 6; or by publication in a newspaper of general circulation in such places and for such time as the court may order, in which case a copy of the summons and order of the court shall be sent by registered mail to the last known address of the defendant, or in any other manner the court may deem sufficient. Any order granting such leave shall specify a reasonable time, which shall not be less than sixty (60) days after notice, within which the defendant must answer.
This brings us to the question of procedural due process. Substituted service . . . upon a temporarily absent resident, it has been held, is wholly adequate to meet the requirements of due process. The constitutional requirement of due process exacts that the service be such as may be reasonably expected to give the notice desired. Once the service provided by the rules reasonably accomplishes that end, the requirement of justice is answered; the traditional notions of fair play are satisfied; due process is served.We see no reason for holding as ineffectual the substituted service of summons, which was recounted in the Sheriff's Report dated September 8, 2005.
....
Chief Justice Moran shares this view. Commenting on Section 18, Rule 14, he states: "Since the defendant is residing in the Philippines, jurisdiction over his person may be acquired by Philippine courts by substituted service of summons under section 8. But extraterritorial service is allowed also by leave of court according to the above provision [Section 18]." Justice Martin regards the word "residence" in Section 8 as "the place where the person named in the summons is living at the time when the service is made, even though he may be temporarily out of the state at the time."
This construction is but fair. It is in accord with substantial justice. The burden on a plaintiff is not to be enlarged with a restrictive construction as desired by defendant here. Under the rules, a plaintiff, in the initial stage of suit, is merely required to know the defendant's "dwelling house or residence" or his "office or regular place of business" — and no more. He is not asked to investigate where a resident defendant actually is, at the precise moment of filing suit. Once defendant's dwelling house or residence or office or regular place of business is known, he can expect valid service of summons to be made on "some person of suitable age and discretion then residing" in defendant's dwelling house or residence, or on "some competent person in charge" of his office or regular place of business. By the terms of the law, plaintiff is not even duty-bound to see to it that the person upon whom service was actually made delivers the summons to defendant or informs him about it. The law presumes that for him.
It is immaterial then that defendant does not in fact receive actual notice. This will not affect the validity of the service. Accordingly, the defendant may be charged by a judgment in personam as a result of legal proceedings upon a method of service which is not personal, "which in fact may not become actual notice to him," and which may be accomplished in his lawful absence from the country. For, the rules do not require that papers be served on defendant personally or a showing that the papers were delivered to defendant by the person with whom they were left.
Reasons for the views just expressed are not wanting. A man temporarily absent from this country leaves a definite place of residence, a dwelling where he lives, a local base, so to speak, to which any inquiry about him may be directed and where he is bound to return. Where one temporarily absents himself, he leaves his affairs in the hands of one who may be reasonably expected to act in his place and stead; to do all that is necessary to protect his interests; and to communicate with him from time to time any incident of importance that may affect him or his business or his affairs. It is usual for such a man to leave at his home or with his business associates information as to where he may be contacted in the event a question that affects him crops up. If he does not do what is expected of him, and a case comes up in court against him, he cannot in justice raise his voice and say that he is not subject to the processes of our courts. He cannot stop a suit from being filed against him upon a claim that he cannot be summoned at his dwelling house or residence or his office or regular place of business.
Not that he cannot be reached within a reasonable time to enable him to contest a suit against him. There are now advanced facilities of communication. Long distance telephone calls and cablegrams make it easy for one he left behind to communicate with him.
In the light of the foregoing, we find ourselves unwilling to concede that substituted service ... may be down-graded as an ineffective means to bring temporarily absent residents within the reach of our courts.[77] (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)
(a) | Causing physical harm to the woman or her child; |
(b) | Threatening to cause the woman or her child physical harm; |
(c) | Attempting to cause the woman or her child physical harm; |
(d) | Placing the woman or her child in fear of imminent physical harm; |
(e) | Attempting to compel or compelling the woman or her child to engage in conduct which the woman or her child has the right to desist from or to desist from conduct which the woman or her child has the right to engage in, or attempting to restrict or restricting the woman's or her child's freedom of movement or conduct by force or threat of force, physical or other harm or threat of physical or other harm, or intimidation directed against the woman or her child. This shall include, but not limited to, the following acts committed with the purpose or effect of controlling or restricting the woman's or her child's movement or conduct: |
(1) | Threatening to deprive or actually depriving the woman or her child of custody or access to her/his family; |
(2) | Depriving or threatening to deprive the woman or her children of financial support legally due her or her family, or deliberately providing the woman's children insufficient financial support; |
(3) | Depriving or threatening to deprive the woman or her child of a legal right; |
(4) | Preventing the woman in engaging in any legitimate profession, occupation, business or activity or controlling the victim's own money or properties, or solely controlling the conjugal or common money, or properties; |
(f) | Inflicting or threatening to inflict physical harm on oneself for the purpose of controlling her actions or decisions; |
(g) | Causing or attempting to cause the woman or her child to engage in any sexual activity which does not constitute rape, by force or threat of force, physical harm, or through intimidation directed against the woman or her child or her/his immediate family; |
(h) | Engaging in purposeful, knowing, or reckless conduct, personally or through another that alarms or causes substantial emotional or psychological distress to the woman or her child. This shall include, but not be limited to, the following acts: |
(1) | Stalking or following the woman or her child in public or private places; |
(2) | Peering in the window or lingering outside the residence of the woman or her child; |
(3) | Entering or remaining in the dwelling or on the property of the woman or her child against her/his will; |
(4) | Destroying the property and personal belongings or inflicting harm to animals or pets of the woman or her child; and |
(5) | Engaging in any form of harassment or violence; |
(i) | Causing mental or emotional anguish, public ridicule or humiliation to the woman or her child, including, but not limited to, repeated verbal and emotional abuse, and denial of financial support or custody of minor children or denial of access to the woman's child/children. |
(a) | Prohibition of the respondent from threatening to commit or committing, personally or through another, any of the acts mentioned in Section 5 of this Act; |
(b) | Prohibition of the respondent from harassing, annoying, telephoning, contacting or otherwise communicating with the petitioner, directly or indirectly; |
(c) | Removal and exclusion of the respondent from the residence of the petitioner, regardless of ownership of the residence, either temporarily for the purpose of protecting the petitioner, or permanently where no property rights are violated, and, if respondent must remove personal effects from the residence, the court shall direct a law enforcement agent to accompany the respondent to the residence, remain there until respondent has gathered his things and escort respondent from the residence; |
(d) | Directing the respondent to stay away from petitioner and any designated family or household member at a distance specified by the court, and to stay away from the residence, school, place of employment, or any specified place frequented by the petitioner and any designated family or household member; |
(e) | Directing lawful possession and use by petitioner of an automobile and other essential personal effects, regardless of ownership, and directing the appropriate law enforcement officer to accompany the petitioner to the residence of the parties to ensure that the petitioner is safely restored to the possession of the automobile and other essential personal effects, or to supervise the petitioner's or respondent's removal of personal belongings; |
(f) | Granting a temporary or permanent custody of a child/children to the petitioner; |
(g) | Directing the respondent to provide support to the woman and/or her child if entitled to legal support. Notwithstanding other laws to the contrary, the court shall order an appropriate percentage of the income or salary of the respondent to be withheld regularly by the respondent's employer and for the same to be automatically remitted directly to the woman. Failure to remit and/or withhold or any delay in the remittance of support to the woman and/or her child without justifiable cause shall render the respondent or his employer liable for indirect contempt of court; |
(h) | Prohibition of the respondent from any use or possession of any firearm or deadly weapon and order him to surrender the same to the court for appropriate disposition by the court, including revocation of license and disqualification to apply for any license to use or possess a firearm. If the offender is a law enforcement agent, the court shall order the offender to surrender his firearm and shall direct the appropriate authority to investigate on the offender and take appropriate action on the matter; |
(i) | Restitution for actual damages caused by the violence inflicted, including, but not limited to, property damage, medical expenses, childcare expenses and loss of income; |
(j) | Directing the DSWD or any appropriate agency to provide petitioner temporary shelter and other social services that the petitioner may need; and |
(k) | Provision of such other forms of relief as the court deems necessary to protect and provide for the safety of the petitioner and any designated family or household member, provided petitioner and any designated family or household member consents to such relief. |
A. | "Physical violence" refers to acts that include bodily or physical harm; |
B. | "Sexual violence" refers to an act which is sexual in nature, committed against a woman or her child. It includes, but is not limited to: |
a) | rape, sexual harassment, acts of lasciviousness, treating a woman or her child as a sex object, making demeaning and sexually suggestive remarks, physically attacking the sexual parts of the victim's body, forcing her/him to watch obscene publications and indecent shows or forcing the woman or her child to do indecent acts and/or make films thereof, forcing the wife and mistress/lover to live in the conjugal home or sleep together in the same room with the abuser; |
b) | acts causing or attempting to cause the victim to engage in any sexual activity by force, threat of force, physical or other harm or threat of physical or other harm or coercion; |
c) | Prostituting the woman or her child. |
C. | "Psychological violence" refers to acts or omissions causing or likely to cause mental or emotional ' suffering of the victim such as but not limited to intimidation, harassment, stalking, damage to property, public ridicule or humiliation, repeated verbal abuse and marital infidelity. It includes causing or allowing the victim to witness the physical, sexual or psychological abuse of a member of the family to which the victim belongs, or to witness pornography in any form or to witness abusive injury to pets or to unlawful or unwanted deprivation of the right to custody and/or visitation of common children. |
D. | "Economic abuse" refers to acts that make or attempt to make a woman financially dependent which includes, but is not limited to the following: |
1. | withdrawal of financial support or preventing the victim from engaging in any legitimate profession, occupation, business or activity, except in cases wherein the other spouse/partner objects on valid, serious and moral grounds as defined in Article 73 of the Family Code; |
2. | deprivation or threat of deprivation of financial resources and the right to the use and enjoyment of the conjugal, community or property owned in common; |
3. | destroying household property; |
4. | controlling the victim's own money or properties or solely controlling the conjugal money or properties. |
(a) | Causing physical harm to the woman or her child; | |
(b) | Threatening to cause the woman or her child physical harm; | |
(c) | Attempting to cause the woman or her child physical harm; | |
(d) | Placing the woman or her child in fear of imminent physical harm; | |
(e) | Attempting to compel or compelling the woman or her child to engage in conduct which the woman or her child has the right to desist from or to desist from conduct which the woman or her child has the right to engage in, or attempting to restrict or restricting the woman's or her child's freedom of movement or conduct by force or threat of force, physical or other harm or threat of physical or other harm, or intimidation directed against the woman or her child. This shall include, but not limited to, the following acts committed with the purpose or effect of controlling or restricting the woman's or her child's movement or conduct: | |
(1) | Threatening to deprive or actually depriving the woman or her child of custody or access to her/his family; | |
(2) | Depriving or threatening to deprive the woman or her children of financial support legally due her or her family, or deliberately providing the woman's children insufficient financial support; | |
(3) | Depriving or threatening to deprive the woman or her child of a legal right; | |
(4) | Preventing the woman in engaging in any legitimate profession, occupation, business or activity or controlling the victim's own money or properties, or solely controlling the conjugal or common money, or properties; | |
(f) | Inflicting or threatening to inflict physical harm on oneself for the purpose of controlling her actions or decisions; | |
(g) | Causing or attempting to cause the woman or her child to engage in any sexual activity which does not constitute rape, by force or threat of force, physical harm, or through intimidation directed against the woman or her child or her/his immediate family; | |
(h) | Engaging in purposeful, knowing, or reckless conduct, personally or through another, that alarms or causes substantial emotional or psychological distress to the woman or her child. This shall include, but not be limited to, the following acts: | |
(1) | Stalking or following the woman or her child in public or private places; | |
(2) | Peering in the window or lingering outside the residence of the woman or her child; | |
(3) | Entering or remaining in the dwelling or on the property of the woman or her child against her/his will; | |
(4) | Destroying the property and personal belongings or inflicting harm to animals or pets of the woman or her child; and | |
(5) | Engaging in any form of harassment or violence; | |
(i) | Causing mental or emotional anguish, public ridicule or humiliation to the woman or her child, including, but not limited to, repeated verbal and emotional abuse, and denial of financial support or custody of minor children or denial of access to the woman's child/children. |