880 Phil. 417
LAZARO-JAVIER, J.:
That sometime on November 14, 2012, in the xxxxxxxxxxx Province of North Cotabato, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said child in conflict with the law, acting with discernment, with lewd design, by means of force, threat and intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously insert his finger into the genitalia of [AAA][5] who is 11 years old, against her will, which act does not only debases, degrades and demeans the intrinsic worth and dignity of [AAA] as a child but [is] also prejudicial to her growth and development.When arraigned, petitioner pleaded not guilty.[7]
CONTRARY TO LAW.[6]
WHEREFORE, based [on] the forgoing disquisitions, this court finds the accused guilty of the crime as charged beyond reasonable doubt and he is hereby sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of prision correctional as minimum to [eight] (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as maximum.The trial court gave full credence to complainant's testimony. It noted that complainant was just eleven (11) years old at the time the crime was committed., hence, the only subject of inquiry is whether "carnal knowledge" in fact took place. It similarly noted that complainant never faltered in her testimony even when she was subjected to a grueling cross-examination by the defense. Her testimony was not only consistent and straightforward, it was further supported by Dr. Ureta's findings.
The accused is further directed to pay the victim the sum of P30,000.00 as civil indemnity; P30,000.00 as moral damages, and P30,000.00 as exemplary damages. The period of preventive detention of the accused is counted in his favor. Cost de Officio.[16]
WHEREFORE, [the] foregoing premises considered, the appeal is DENIED. The Decision dated 06 July 2018 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 23, 12th Judicial Region, Kidapawan City in Crim. Case No. 1737-2013 in convicting the appellant of the crime charged is herebyThe Court of Appeals found petitioner guilty of rape by sexual assault. It affirmed the trial court's assessment of complainant's credibility as there was no showing that the trial court's factual findings were tainted with arbitrariness or oversight. It disregarded the defense's claim that complainant's account of what happened during and after the alleged incident was contrary to human experience. It emphasized that a child victim cannot be expected to behave and react as an adult.
AFFIRMED in that accused-appellant BBB is GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Rape by Sexual Assault under paragraph 2, Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code and is sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of prision correctional [sic] in its medium period, as minimum, to eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor in its medium period, as maximum.
Accused-appellant is ORDERED to pay the private complainant the amounts of P30,000.00 as civil indemnity, P30,000.00 as moral damages, and P30,000.00 as exemplary damages. The amounts of damages awarded shall have an interest of six percent (6%) per annum from the date of finality of judgment until fully paid.
The case against the accused-appellant shall be REMANDED to the trial court for appropriate disposition in accordance with Section 51 of Republic Act No. 9344.
SO ORDERED.[18]
Nevertheless, since based on the findings of the doctor, the hymen of the victim was intact, it can be gleaned that the accused has not committed the crime of rape [through] sexual assault but merely acts of lasciviousness. Although the charged [sic] was rape by sexual assault under Article 266-A second paragraph, the accused can still be convicted of the crime of acts of lasciviousness under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code in relation to Title III, Section 5(b) of R.A. 7610.But in the fallo, the trial court pronounced petitioner guilty of the crime, as charged, to wit:
Under the variance doctrine embodied in Section 4, in relation to Section 5, Rule 120 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure and affirmed by settled jurisprudence, even though the crime charged against the accused was for rape through carnal knowledge, he can be convicted of the crime of acts of lasciviousness without violating any of his constitutional rights because said crime is included in the crime of rape.[25]
WHEREFORE, based [on] the forgoing disquisitions, this court finds the accused guilty of the crimes as charged beyond reasonable doubt and he is hereby sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of prision correctional as minimum to [eight] (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as maximum.It is settled that where there is a conflict between the dispositive part and the opinion of the court contained in the text or body of the decision, the former must prevail over the latter on the theory that the dispositive portion is the final order, while the opinion is merely a statement ordering nothing.[27] Florentino v. Rivera[28] ordains:
The accused is further directed to pay the victim the sum of P30,000.00 as civil indemnity; P30,000.00 as moral damages, and P30,000.00 as exemplary damages. The period of preventive detention of the accused is counted in his favor. Cost de Officio.[26]
It is settled rule that "the operative part in every decision is the dispositive portion or the fallo, and where there is conflict between the fallo and the body of the decision, the fallo controls. This rule rests on the theory that the fallo is the final order while the opinion in the body is merely a statement, ordering nothing." We expounded on the underlying reason behind this rule in Republic v. Nolasco where, reiterating the earlier pronouncements made in Contreras v. Felix, we said:On appeal, the Court of Appeals disagreed with the trial court's factual conclusion in the body of the latter's decision, thus:More to the point is another well-recognized doctrine that the final judgment of the court as rendered in the judgment of the court irrespective of all seemingly contrary statements in the decision. "A judgment must be distinguished from an opinion. The latter is the informal expression of the views of the court and cannot prevail against its final order or decision. While the two may be combined in one instrument, the opinion forms no part of the judgment. So, ... there is a distinction between the findings and conclusions of a court and its Judgment. While they may constitute its decision and amount to the rendition of a judgment, they are not the judgment itself. They amount to nothing more than an order for judgment, which must, of course, be distinguished from the judgment." (1 Freeman on Judgments, p. 6). At the root of the doctrine that the premises must yield to the conclusion is perhaps, side by side with the needs of writing finis to litigations, the recognition of the truth that "the trained intuition of the judge continually leads him to right results for which he is puzzled to give unimpeachable legal reasons." "It is an everyday experience of those who study judicial decisions that the results are usually sound, whether the reasoning from which the results purport to flow is sound or not." (The Theory of Judicial Decision, Pound, 36 Harv. Law Review, pp. 9, 51). It is not infrequent that the grounds of a decision fail to reflect the exact views of the court, especially those of concurring justices in a collegiate court. We often encounter in judicial decisions, lapses, findings, loose statements and generalities which do not bear on the issues or are apparently opposed to the otherwise sound and considered result reached by the court as expressed in the dispositive part, so called, of the decision.Succinctly stated, "where there is a conflict between the dispositive portion of the decision and the body thereof, the dispositive portion controls irrespective of what appears in the body of the decision." While the body of the decision, order or resolution might create some ambiguity in the manner the court's reasoning preponderates, it is the dispositive portion thereof that finally invests rights upon the parties, sets conditions for the exercise of those rights, and imposes the corresponding duties or obligations.
More emphatically, Light Rail Transit Authority v. Court of Appeals declares that "it is the dispositive part of the judgment that actually settles and declares the rights and obligations of the parties, finally, definitively, and authoritatively, notwithstanding the existence of inconsistent statements in the body that may tend to confuse." In this regard, it must be borne in mind "that execution must conform to that ordained or decreed in the dispositive part of the decision; consequently, where the order of execution is not in harmony with and exceeds the judgment which gives it life, the order has pro-tanto no validity."
However, this Court disagrees with the RTC in holding that since per Dr. Ureta's findings, the hymen of the victim was intact, appellant cannot be said to have committed the crime of rape by sexual assault but only acts of lasciviousness. It bears emphasizing that a broken hymen is not an element of the crime charged against the appellant.[29]
and eventually made the following disposition, thus:WHEREFORE, [the] foregoing premises considered, the appeal is DENIED. The Decision dated 06 July 2018 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 23, 12th Judicial Region, Kidapawan City in Crim. Case No. 1737-2013 in convicting the appellant of the crime charged is hereby AFFIRMED in that accused-appellant BBB is GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Rape by Sexual Assault under paragraph 2, Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code and is sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of prision correctional [sic] in its medium period, as minimum, to eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor in its medium period, as maximum.
Udang attempts to raise doubt in his conviction because the judge who penned the trial court decision, Judge Mordeno, was not the judge who heard the parties and their witnesses during trial. For Udang, Judge Mordeno was in no position to rule on the credibility of the witnesses, specifically, of AAA, not having observed the manner by which the witnesses testified.So must it be.
Ideally, the same trial judge should preside over all the stages of the proceedings, especially in cases where the conviction or acquittal of the accused mainly relies on the credibility of the witnesses. The trial judge enjoys the opportunity to observe, first hand, "the aids for an accurate determination" of the credibility of a witness "such as the witness' deportment and manner of testifying, the witness' furtive glance, blush of conscious shame, hesitation, flippant or sneering tone, calmness, sigh, or the scant or full realization of an oath."
However, inevitable circumstances - the judge's death, retirement, resignation, transfer, or removal from office - may intervene during the pendency of the case. An example is the present case, where the trial judge who heard the witnesses, Judge Francisco D. Calingin (Judge Calingin), compulsorily retired pending trial. Judge Calingin was then replaced by Judge Mordeno, who proceeded with hearing the other witnesses and writing the decision. Udang's argument cannot be accepted as this would mean that every case where the judge had to be replaced pending decision would have to be refiled and retried so that the judge who hears the witnesses testify and the judge who writes the decision would be the same. What Udang proposes is impracticable.xxx xxx xxx
Applying the foregoing, the trial court decision convicting Udang is valid, regardless of the fact that the judge who heard the witnesses and the judge who wrote the decision are different. With no showing of any irregularity in the transcript of records, it is presumed to be a "complete, authentic record of everything that transpire[d] during the trial." sufficient for Judge Mordeno to have evaluated the credibility of the witnesses, specifically, of AAA. (Emphasis supplied)
(a) By inserting his penis into another person's mouth or anal orifice; or(3) That the act of sexual assault is accomplished under any of the following circumstances:
(b) By inserting any instrument or object into the genital or anal orifice of another person;
(a) By using force and intimidation;All three (3) elements were proved here. Consider (a) petitioner committed a sexual act on complainant; (b) by inserting his finger into complainant's vagina; and (c) complainant was only eleven (11) years old at that time.
(b) When the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; or
(c) By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority; or
(d) When the woman is under 12 years of age or demented. (Emphasis supplied)
He invited her inside the house and his classmate left them and he had a chance to be alone and there he sexually molested her because he observed that she did not refused [sic] what they did and kissed her lips. He admitted during the time the incident happened that what they did is wrong.All told, the Court of Appeals did not err when it rendered a verdict of conviction against petitioner for rape by sexual assault.
Article 266-A. Rape. When and How Committed. - Rape is committed:Petitioner argues it was grave error for the Court of Appeals to impose on him the stiffer penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium period under RA 7610 instead of the lighter penalty of prision mayor prescribed under the Revised Penal Code considering he was also a minor at the time of the incident.xxx xxx xxx
2) By any person who, under any of the circumstances mentioned in paragraph 1 hereof, shall commit an act of sexual assault by inserting his penis into another person's mouth or anal orifice, or any instrument or object, into the genital or anal orifice of another person.
Article 266-B. Penalty. - Rape under paragraph 1 of the next preceding article shall be punished by reclusion perpetua.xxx xxx xxx
Rape under paragraph 2 of the next preceding article shall be punished by prision mayor.
RA 7610, on the other hand, provides:
Section 5. Child Prostitution and Other Sexual Abuse. - Children, whether male or female, who for money, profit, or any other consideration or due to the coercion or influence of any adult, syndicate or group, indulge in sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct, are deemed to be children exploited in prostitution and other sexual abuse.
The penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium period to reclusion perpetua shall be imposed upon the following:xxx xxx xxx
(b) Those who commit the act of sexual intercourse of lascivious conduct with a child exploited in prostitution or subject to other sexual abuse; Provided, That when the victims is under twelve (12) years of age, the perpetrators shall be prosecuted under Article 335, paragraph 3, for rape and Article 336 of Act No. 3815, as amended, the Revised Penal Code, for rape or lascivious conduct, as the case may be: Provided, That the penalty for lascivious conduct when the victim is under twelve (12) years of age shall be reclusion temporal in its medium period; and
Section 5. Child Prostitution and Other Sexual Abuse. - Children, whether male or female, who for money, profit, or any other consideration or due to the coercion or influence of any adult, syndicate or group, indulge in sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct, are deemed to be children exploited in prostitution and other sexual abuse. (Emphasis supplied)
Caballo v. People[41] elucidated on the offenders covered by this provision, viz.:
The second element, i.e., that the act is performed with a child exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse, is likewise present. As succinctly explained in People v. Larin:In People v. Deliola,[42] accused Deliola had carnal knowledge of his niece AAA. At that time, AAA was only eleven (11) years old like complainant herein. Deliola, on the other hand, was fifteen (15) years old, the same age as herein petitioner. Deliola was charged with and found guilty of qualified statutory rape under 266-A and 266-B of the Revised Penal Code and not under RA 7610.A child is deemed exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse, when the child indulges in sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct (a) for money, profit, or any other consideration; or (b) under the coercion or influence of any adult, syndicate or group...It must be noted that the law covers not only a situation in which a child is abused for profit, but also one in which a child, through coercion or intimidation, engages in lascivious conduct.We reiterated this ruling in Amployo v. People:Thus, a child is deemed subjected to other sexual abuse when the child indulges in lascivious conduct under the coercion or influence of any adult. In this case, Cristina was sexually abused because she was coerced or intimidated by petitioner to indulge in a lascivious conduct, x x x (Emphasis supplied)
... As we observed in People v. Larin, Section 5 of Rep. Act No. 7610 does not merely cover a situation of a child being abused for profit, but also one in which a child engages in any lascivious conduct through coercion or intimidation...
(1) The judgment shall be in proportion to the gravity of the offense, and shall consider the circumstances and the best interest of the child, the rights of the victim, and the needs of society in line with the demands of balanced and restorative justice.Verily, therefore, being only fifteen (15) years and eight (8) months old when he committed the crime he was charged with and found guilty of, petitioner should be penalized under Article 266-A (2) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by RA 8353, viz.:
(2) Restrictions on the personal liberty of the child shall be limited to the minimum, x x x[43]
1) xxxxSince the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority applies to petitioner, the penalty next lower in degree should be imposed, i.e., prision correctional.[44]
2) By any person who, under any of the circumstances mentioned in paragraph 1 hereof, shall commit an act of sexual assault by inserting his penis into another person's mouth or anal orifice, or any instrument or object, into the genital or anal orifice of another person. (Emphasis supplied)
Although it is acknowledged that accused-appellant was qualified for suspension of sentence when he committed the crime, Section 40 of R.A. 9344 provides that the same extends only until the child in conflict with the law reaches the maximum age of twenty-one (21) years old. Nevertheless, in extending the application of RA No. 9344 to give meaning to the legislative intent of the said law, we ruled in People v. Jacinto, as cited in People v. Ancajas, that the promotion of the welfare of a child in conflict with the law should extend even to one who has exceeded the age limit of twenty-one (21) years, so long as he/she committed the crime when he/she was still a child. The offender shall be entitled to the right to restoration, rehabilitation and reintegration in order that he/she may be given the chance to live a normal life and become a productive member of the community. Thus, accused-appellant is ordered to serve his sentence, in lieu of confinement in a regular penal institution, in an agricultural camp and other training facilities, in accordance with Section 51 of R.A. 9344.[49] (Emphasis supplied)More, the total period which petitioner initially served from his arrest on August 29, 2013 up till he got released on bail on October 13, 2014[50] shall be credited in his favor.
(1) P30,000.00 as civil indemnity;All monetary awards shall earn six percent (6%) interest per annum from finality of this decision until fully paid.
(2) P30,000.00 as moral damages; and
(3) P30,000.00 as exemplary damages.