LEONEN, J.:
WHEREFORE, in light of all the foregoing, the petition is GRANTED. The writ of sequestration, dated May 9, 1986 (No. 86-0089) against "all assets, properties, records and documents of AUTONOMOUS DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION", and the writ of sequestration, dated June 6, 1986 (No. 86-0126) against the shares of stocks of ECJ AND SONS AGRICULTURAL ENTERPRISES, INC., BALETE RANCH, INC., CHRISTENSEN PLANTATION, INC., METROPLEX COMMODITIES, INC., LUCENA OIL FACTORY, INC. and PCY OIL MANUFACTURING, INC. are declared void and are hereby LIFTED.The Sandiganbayan found that with Civil Case No. 0033 filed on July 31, 1987, a judicial action was properly instituted within the six-month period.[21] It explained that despite ECJ and Sons, et al. not being included in Civil Case No. 0033, this Court, in Republic v. Sandiganbayan (First Division),[22] has ruled that the failure to implead firms was a mere technical defect that could be corrected at any stage of the proceedings.[23] In any case, it noted, the firms were subsequently impleaded in Civil Case No. 0033.[24]
SO ORDERED.[20] (Emphasis in the original)
b. that defendant Eduardo M. [Cojuangco], Jr. and his fronts, nominees and dummies, including but not limited to, Anchor Insurance Brokerage Corporation, Archipelago Finance Leasing Corporation, Autonomous Development Corporation, Balete Ranch, Inc., Cagayan De Oro Oil Co., Inc., Christensen Plantation Co., ECJ and Sons Agricultural Enterprises, Inc., Granexport Manufacturing Corporation, Iligan Coconut Industries, Inc., Legaspi Oil Co., Inc., Lucena Oil Co., Inc., Lucena Oil Factory, Inc., Metroplex Commodities, Inc., PCY Oil Manufacturing Corporation, Jesus M. Pineda, Narciso M. Pineda, San Pablo Manufacturing Corporation, Southern Luzon Coconut Oil Mills, United Janitorial & Manpower Services Corporation and Danilo S. Ursua, have not legally and validly obtained title over the subject UCPB shares; andResolving these motions, the Sandiganbayan rendered a July 11, 2003 Partial Summary Judgment,[31] holding among others that:
c. that the government is the lawful and true owner of the subject UCPB shares registered in the names of defendant Eduardo M. Cojuangco, Jr. and the entities and persons, above-enumerated, for the benefit of all coconut farmers, and commanding that said ownership be entered in the books of UCPB and that new stock certificates in the name of the government be issued.[30] (Citations omitted)
4. The UCPB shares of stock of the alleged fronts, nominees and dummies of defendant Eduardo. M. Cojuangco, Jr. which form part of the 72.2% shares of the FUB/UCPB paid for by the PCA with public funds later charged to coconut levy funds, particularly the CCSF, belong to the plaintiff Republic of the Philippines as their true and beneficial owner.[32] (Emphasis supplied)On November 27, 2012, this Court affirmed but modified the Partial Summary Judgment in Cojuangco, Jr. v. Republic[33] The dispositive portion reads:
WHEREFORE, Part C of the appealed Partial Summary Judgment in Sandiganbayan Civil Case No. 0033-A is AFFIRMED with modification. As MODIFIED, the dispositive portion in Part C of the Sandiganbayan's Partial Summary Judgment in Civil Case No. 0033-A, shall read as follows:Meanwhile, upon reconsideration, the Sandiganbayan reversed its June 9, 2011 Decision and reinstated the sequestration orders in a December 21, 2012 Resolution.[35] Its dispositive portion reads:C. Re: MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT (RE: EDUARDO M. COJUANGCO, JR.) dated September 18, 2002 filed by Plaintiff.1. Sec. 1 of P.D. No. 755 did not validate the Agreement between PCA and defendant Eduardo M. Cojuangco, Jr. dated May 25, 1975 nor did it give the Agreement the binding force of a law because of the non-publication of the said Agreement.Accordingly, the instant petition is hereby DENIED.
2. The Agreement between PCA and defendant Eduardo M. Cojuangco, Jr. dated May 25, 1975 is a valid contract for having the requisite consideration under Article 1318 of the Civil Code.
3. The transfer by PCA to defendant Eduardo M. Cojuangco, Jr. of 14,400 shares of stock of FUB (later UCPB) from the "Option Shares" and the additional FUB shares subscribed and paid by PCA, consisting ofa. Fifteen Thousand Eight Hundred Eighty-Four (15,884) shares out of the authorized but unissued shares of the bank, subscribed and paid by PCA;is declared unconstitutional, hence null and void.
b. Sixty Four Thousand Nine Hundred Eighty (64,980) shares of the increased capital stock subscribed and paid by PCA; and
c. Stock dividends declared pursuant to paragraph 5 and paragraph 11 (iv) (d) of the PCA-Cojuangco Agreement dated May 25, 1975 or the so-called "Cojuangco-UCPB shares"
4. The above-mentioned shares of stock of the FUBI/UCPB transferred to defendant Cojuangco are hereby declared conclusively owned by the Republic of the Philippines to be used only for the benefit of all coconut farmers and for the development of the coconut industry, and ordered reconveyed to the Government.
5. The UCPB shares of stock of the alleged fronts, nominees and dummies of defendant Eduardo M. Cojuangco, Jr. which form part of the 72.2% shares of the FUB/UCPB paid for by the PCA with public funds later charged to the coconut levy funds, particularly the CCSF, belong to the plaintiff Republic of the Philippines as their true and beneficial owner.
Costs against petitioner Cojuangco.
SO ORDERED.[34] (Emphasis in the original)
WHEREFORE, in light of all the foregoing, respondent PCGG's Motion for Reconsideration, dated July 5, 2011, is GRANTED. Accordingly, Writ of Sequestration Order No. 86 0089, dated May 9, 1986, and Writ of Sequestration Order No. 86-0216, dated June 6, 1986, are hereby RESTORED.The Sandiganbayan applied this Court's Decision in Republic v. COCOFED[37] and the modified Partial Summary Judgment in Cojuangco, Jr..[38] It held that the United Coconut Planters Bank shares held by ECJ and Sons, et al. were part of the ill-gotten properties in Civil Case No. 0033-A.[39]
SO ORDERED.[36] (Emphasis in the original)
SECTION 8. The sequestration of the property of any person, natural or juridical, engaged in subversive activities against the Government and its duly constituted authorities, is hereby authorized, in accordance with implementing rules and regulations as may be issued by the Secretary of National Defense.Executive Order No. 1, series of 1986, created the Presidential Commission on Good Government, which was tasked to recover ill-gotten wealth accumulated by "former President Ferdinand E. Marcos, his immediate family, relatives, subordinates and close associates, whether located in the Philippines or abroad."[68]
As used herein, the term "sequester" and "sequestration" shall mean the seizure of private property or assets in the hands of any person or entity in order to prevent the utilization, transfer or conveyance of the same for purposes inimical to national security, or when necessary to protect the interest of the Government or any of its instrumentalities. It shall include the taking over and assumption of the management, control and operation of the private property or assets seized.[67]
SECTION 2. The [Presidential Commission on Good Government] shall be charged with the task of assisting the President in regard to the following matters:Likewise, Proclamation No. 3, the 1986 Provisional Constitution, mandated the president to prioritize, among others, measures to "[r]ecover ill gotten properties amassed by the leaders and supporters of the previous regime and protect the interest of the people through orders of sequestration or freezing of assets of accounts[.]"[69](a) The recovery of all ill-gotten wealth accumulated by former President Ferdinand E. Marcos, his immediate family, relatives, subordinates and close associates, whether located in the Philippines or abroad, including the takeover or sequestration of all business enterprises and entities owned or controlled by them, during his administration, directly or through nominees, by taking undue advantage of their public office and/or using their powers, authority, influence, connections or relationship. (Emphasis supplied)
By the clear terms of the law, the power of the PCGG to sequester property claimed to be ''ill-gotten" means to place or cause to be placed under its possession or control said property, or any building or office wherein any such property and any records pertaining thereto may be found, including "business enterprises and entities," - for the purpose of preventing the destruction, concealment or dissipation of, and otherwise conserving and preserving, the same - until it can be determined through appropriate judicial proceedings, whether the property was in truth "illgotten," i.e., acquired through or as a result of improper or illegal use of or the conversion of funds belonging to the Government or any of its branches, instrumentalities, enterprises, banks or financial institutions, or by taking undue advantage of official position, authority, relationship, connection or influence, resulting in unjust enrichment of the ostensible owner and grave damage and. prejudice to the State. And this, too, is the sense in which the term is commonly understood in other jurisdictions.[73]A sequestration order is premised on a prima facie case[74] that the properties sought to be sequestered were ill-gotten wealth, based on evidence presented when the writ of sequestration was issued.[75]
One thing is certain, and should be stated at the outset: the PCGG cannot exercise acts of dominion over property sequestered, frozen or provisionally taken over. As already earlier stressed with no little insistence, the act of sequestration; freezing or provisional takeover of property does not import or bring about a divestment of title over said property; does not make the PCGG the owner thereof. In relation to the property sequestered, frozen or provisionally taken over, the PCGG is a conservator, not an owner. Therefore, it can not perform acts of strict ownership; and this is specially true in the situations contemplated by the sequestration rules where, unlike cases of receivership, for example, no court exercises effective supervision or can upon due application and hearing, grant authority for the performance of acts of dominion.[76]Where the properties sequestered are stock shares, acts of ownership, among which is the right to vote those shares, may only be exercised by the conservator if it is proved that: first, there is prima facie evidence that the shares are ill-gotten; and second, if there is an imminent danger of their dissipation:
At the outset, it is necessary to restate the general rule that the registered owner of the shares of a corporation exercises the right and the privilege of voting. This principle applies even to shares that are sequestered by the government, over which the PCGG as a mere conservator cannot, as a general rule, exercise acts of dominion. On the other hand; it is authorized to vote these sequestered shares registered in the names of private persons and acquired with allegedly ill-gotten wealth, if it is able to satisfy the two-tiered test devised by the Court in Cojuangco v. Calpo and PCGG v. Cojuangco Jr., as follows:If a sequestration order is lifted, it does not mean that the sequestered properties are not ill-gotten, but only that the government may not act as the properties' conservator.[78]
(1) Is there prima facie evidence showing that the said shares are illgotten and thus belong to the State?
(2) Is there an imminent danger of dissipation, thus necessitating their continued sequestration and voting by the PCGG, while the main issue is pending with the Sandiganbayan?
....
From the foregoing general principle, the Court in Baseco v. PCGG (hereinafter "Baseco") and Cojuangco Jr. v. Roxas ("Cojuangco-Roxas") has provided two clear "public character" exceptions under which the government is granted the authority to vote the shares:
(1) Where government shares are taken over by private persons or entities who/which registered them in their own names, and
(2) Where the capitalization or shares that were acquired with public funds somehow landed in private hands.
The exceptions are based on the common-sense principle that legal fiction must yield to truth; that public property registered in the names of non-owners is affected with trust relations; and that the prima facie beneficial owner should be given the privilege of enjoying the rights flowing from the prima facie fact of ownership.[77]
If the public character of the UCPB sequestered shares works to dispense with the determination of whether or not they are prima facie ill gotten for purposes of establishing the government's right to vote these shares, then, by parity of reasoning, such a requirement becomes unnecessary too in testing the validity of the subject sequestration orders and the shares' sequestration. To the Court's mind, the judicial declaration as to the public character of the UCPB sequestered shares has settled all issues surrounding the strength and legitimacy of the sequestration orders, including the non-observance of the two-commissioner rule. After all, this rule is obviously intended to assure a collegial determination of the existence of a prima facie case, which still boils down to the issue of the prima facie ill-gotten nature of the sequestered shares.[84] (Citation omitted)The Sandiganbayan's reliance on COCOFED is erroneous. In COCOFED, this Court found that the prima facie public character of the sequestered shares was subject to the Sandiganbayan's final judgment in the pending cases. Its finding was limited only to determine who may vote these shares:
In sum, we hold that the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion in grossly contradicting and effectively reversing existing jurisprudence, and in depriving the government of its right to vote the sequestered UCPB shares which are prima facie public in character.COCOFED did not settle all questions on the sequestration of petitioners' shares of stock, considering it only made a prima facie finding to resolve a particular issue. Otherwise, persons who did not participate in COCOFED, such as petitioners, would forever be precluded from raising other pertinent defenses and having the opportunity to contest whether the sequestration of their particular shares was valid, which they have the right to do.[86] Had respondent timely invoked COCOFED in the Sandiganbayan when the Decision was promulgated in 2011, then the decade-long proceedings in this case could have been foreclosed. Yet, it did not.
In making this ruling, we are in no way preempting the proceedings the Sandiganbayan may conduct or the final judgment it may promulgate in Civil Case Nos. 0033-A, 0033-B and 0033-F. Our determination here is merely prima facie, and should not bar the anti-graft court from making a final ruling, after proper trial and hearing, on the issues and prayers in the said civil cases, particularly in reference to the ownership of the subject shares.
We also lay down the caveat that, in declaring the coco levy funds to be prima facie public in character, we are not ruling in any final manner on their classification - whether they are general or trust or special funds - since such classification is not at issue here. Suffice it to say that the public nature of the coco levy funds is decreed by the Court only for the purpose of determining the right to vote the shares, pending the final outcome of the said civil cases.
Neither are we resolving in the present case the question of whether the shares held by Respondent Cojuangco are, as he claims, the result of private enterprise. This factual matter should also be taken up in the final decision in the cited cases that are pending in the court a quo. Again suffice it to say that the only issue settled here is the right of PCGG to vote the sequestered shares, pending the final outcome of said cases.[85] (Emphasis supplied)
As regards the sequestered corporations, the complaints in the actions thus brought all alleged that said entities were either the instruments or conduits for personal aggrandizement or the acquisition of ill-gotten wealth, or were the depositaries, or were themselves the fruits, of ill-gotten wealth. In other words, they were organized so that they could be used for improper, illegal and anomalous availment of financial or other advantage; or were formed or being operated or manipulated by public officers sub rosa, or by private individuals, with the use of public funds or property or assets otherwise illegally acquired; or in breach of public trust or violation of fiduciary duty; or in the case of existing firms, that their stock had been purchased by or for public officers and their relatives, friends, and associates, with the use of public funds or illegally acquired money, or in violation of law or fiduciary duty, etc. Elsewise stated, following the classic pattern of a money-laundering operation, they were either sham, "shell" or "dummy" corporations serving as fraudulent devices or conduits for private gain of public officers and employees; or companies from which stock had been acquired, or firms into which capital had been infused, or shares of stock purchased, with the use of illegally acquired assets, and which therefore constituted the res; the thing or object treated of in the action.[89]As narrated in Republic v. Sandiganbayan (First Division), petitioners were among the 242 corporations in which Eduardo Cojuangco, Jr. held shares of stock "allegedly constituting illegally acquired assets," as part of Civil Case No. 0033.[90] Thus:
And as to corporations organized with ill-gotten wealth, but are not themselves guilty of misappropriation, fraud or other illicit conduct - in other words, the companies themselves are the object or thing involved in the action; the res thereof - there is no need to implead them either. Indeed, their impleading is not proper on the strength alone of their having been formed with ill-gotten funds, absent any other particular wrongdoing on their part. The judgment may simply be directed against the shares of stock shown to have been issued in consideration of ill-gotten wealth.In any case, they may be impleaded at any time during the pendency of the proceedings:
Such showing of having been formed with, or having received ill-gotten funds, however strong or convincing, does not, without more, warrant identifying the corporations in question with the persons who formed or made use of them to give the color or appearance of lawful, innocent acquisition to illegally amassed wealth - at the least, not so as place on the Government the onus of impleading the former together with the latter in actions to recover such wealth. Distinguished, in terms of juridical personality and legal culpability from their erring members or stockholders; said corporations are not themselves guilty of the sins of the latter, of the embezzlement, asportation, etc., that gave rise to the Government's cause of action for recovery; their creation or organization was merely the result of their members' (or stockholders') manipulations and maneuvers to conceal the illegal origins of the assets or monies invested therein. In this light, they are simply the res in the actions for the recovery of illegally acquired wealth, and there is, in principle, no cause of action against them and no ground to implead them as defendants in said actions.
The Government thus, not to be faulted for not making such corporations defendants in the actions referred to. It is even conceivable that had this been attempted, motions to dismiss would have lain to frustrate such attempts.[91] (Emphasis in the original)
Even in those cases where it might reasonably be argued that the failure of the Government to implead the sequestered corporations as defendants is indeed a procedural aberration, as where said firms were allegedly used, and actively cooperated with the defendants, as instruments or conduits for conversion of public funds or property or illicit or fraudulent obtention of favored Government contracts, etc., slight reflection would nevertheless lead to the conclusion that the defect is not fatal but one correctible under applicable adjective rules - e.g., Section 10, Rule 5 of the Rules of Court [specifying the remedy of amendment during trial to authorize or to conform to the evidence 52]; Section 1, Rule 20 [governing amendments before trial], in relation to the rule respecting the omission of so-called necessary or indispensable parties, set out in Section 11, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court. It is relevant in this context to advert to the old, familiar doctrines that the omission to implead such parties "is a mere technical defect which can be cured at any stage of the proceedings even after judgment"; and that, particularly in the case of indispensable parties, since their presence and participation is essential to the very life of the action, for without them no judgment may be rendered, amendments of the complaint in order to implead them should be freely allowed, even on appeal, in fact even after rendition of judgment by this Court, where if appears that the complaint otherwise indicates their identity and character as such indispensable parties.[92] (Citations omitted)Here, as the Sandiganbayan observed, the Complaint in Civil Case No. 0033-A was subsequently amended to implead petitioners,[93] an act sanctioned by Republic v. Sandiganbayan (First Division). Thus, petitioners cannot claim that they are not bound by the proceedings in Civil Case No. 0033-A, specifically all incidents relating to the Partial Summary Judgment.
5. The UCPB shares of stock of the alleged fronts, nominees and dummies of defendant Eduardo M. Cojuangco, Jr. which form part of the 72.2% shares of the FUB/UCPB paid for by the PCA with public funds later charged to the coconut levy funds, particularly the CCSF, belong to the plaintiff Republic of the Philippines as their true and beneficial owner.[94]Petitioners are among the "alleged fronts, nominees and dummies of defendant Eduardo M. Cojuangco, Jr."[95] Thus, the shares of stock they held are covered by Cojuangco, Jr. This Court's final and executory findings on the ownership of the shares cannot be overturned by a certificate issued by a bank official, especially one that was neither presented during trial nor formally offered in evidence. As the Sandiganbayan discussed:
Petitioners contend that the phrase "which form part of the 72.2% shares of the FUB/UCPB" is a qualification for the "shares of stock of the alleged fronts, nominees and dummies of defendant Eduardo M. Cojuangco, Jr." to come within the ambit "belong to the plaintiff Republic of the Philippines as their true and beneficial owner". Thus, the Republic still has to prove that petitioners really form part of that 72.2%. With the Certification from UCPB's Corporate Secretary, petitioners further contend that their shares of stock were in actuality component of the 27.8% which did not originate from the coco levy funds.However, the Sandiganbayan erred in restoring the writs of sequestration. Cojuangco, Jr., whose entry of judgment was ordered on July 9, 2013, settled the issue on the ownership of the United Coconut Planters Bank shares covered by those writs.[97] This rendered the writs functus officio.[98]
The Court is not persuaded. To the Court's mind, the phrase ["]which form part of the 72.2% shares of the FUB/UCPB" is just a "modifier" that describes that these fronts, nominees and dummies are included as part of the 72.2%.
The Court cannot consider the Certification made by the alleged UCPB Secretary Ildefonso Jimenez as it was not presented during the trial and formally offered in evidence. Its standing cannot be equated with the COCOFED DECISION, the Partial Summary Judgment, dated July 1, 2003, and the COJUANGCO DECISION, which the Court took into consideration without the PCGG having mentioned them at the first instance. The Certification is a hearsay evidence which cannot be given probative weight. On the other hand, by the nature of its functions, the Court may take judicial notice of these Supreme Court decisions. The Court cannot be prevented from relying on jurisprudence or decisions of the Supreme Court just because it was not pleaded.
....
Moreover, it is observed that at the earlier part of these proceedings, petitioners were not categorical or certain on their claim that they belong to the 27.8% of the UCPB shares. They simply alleged that the remaining 27.8% may be assumed to have been registered and owned by other stockholders not parties in the agreements involved in Civil Case No. 0033-A, and not covered by the Partial Summary Judgment. It was only upon the reversal of the Court's June 9, 2011 Decision that petitioners took a firmer stand on such declaration.[96]
[4] Id. at 147.
Stockholder Number of Shares ECJ and Sons Agricultural Enterprises 54,678,043 Balete Ranc, Inc. 14,736,584 Christensen Plantation, Inc. 9,165,360 Autonomous Development Corp. 705,227 Metroplex Commodities, Inc. 7,020,000 Lucena Oil Factory, Inc. 6,890,000 PCY Oil Manufacturing Corp. 6,890,000 Total 100,085,214