CAGUIOA, J:
WHEREFORE, premises considered,judgment is hereby rendered finding accused BENJAMIN T. DE LEON ACQUITTED of Violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 on the ground of REASONABLE DOUBT for failure of the prosecution to prove the presence of all the elements for the crime charged.The METC, however, found petitioner civilly liable to respondent, and ordered him to pay the latter: (1) the face value of RCBC Check No. 0201234 dated August 25, 2006, in the amount of P436,800.00, with legal interest of 6% per annum from date of last demand which was on November 3, 2006 until full payment thereof; (2) the sum of P30,000.00 by way of attorney's fees plus P2,000.00 per court appearance; and (3) cost of suit.[13]
That as and by way of civil liability, accused is hereby ordered to pay private complainant:SO ORDERED.[12]
- The face value of the RCBC Check No. 0201234 dated August 25, 2006, in the amount of Four Hundred Thirty Six Thousand Eight Hundred Pesos (Php436,800.00), with legal interest of 6% per annum from date of last demand which was on November 3, 2006 until such time the whole obligation shall have been fully paid;
- The sum of Thirty Thousand Pesos (Php30,000.00) by way of attorney's fees plus Two Thousand Pesos (Php2,000.00) per Court appearance; and
- Cost of suit.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the present appeal is DISMISSED for lack of merit. The judgment appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED with modifications and should read as follows:It upheld the METC's acquittal of petitioner, and likewise affirmed its finding of civil liability, only modifying the same with respect to the rate of legal interest imposed and the reckoning date of said legal interest.[21] It found that pursuant to the Supreme Court's ruling in the case of Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,[22] the applicable legal interest rate is 12% per annum, since the case falls under those that involve loans or forbearance of money, goods, or credits. It further found that since the prosecution failed to prove when petitioner actually received the notice of dishonor, it was most prudent to reckon the date of interests from the time petitioner was considered to be in default, i.e., from judicial demand, or the filing of the Information on October 3, 2007.[23]WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered finding accused BENJAMIN T. DE LEON ACQUITTED of Violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 on the ground of REASONABLE DOUBT for failure of the prosecution to prove the presence of all the elements for the crime charged.
That as and by way of civil liability, accused is hereby ordered to pay private complainant:SO ORDERED.
- The face value of the RCBC Check No. 0201234 dated August 25, 2006, in the amount of Four Hundred Thirty Six Thousand Eight Hundred Pesos (Php436,800.00), with legal interest of 12% per annum from date of judicial demand on October 3, 2007 until such time the whole obligation shall have been fully paid;
- The sum of Thirty Thousand Pesos (Php30,000.00) by way of attorney's fees plus Two Thousand Pesos (Php2,000.00) per Court appearance; and
- Cost of suit.
The rest of the trial court's decision stays.[20]
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. The Regional Trial Court Judgment dated February 23, 2015 in Criminal Case No. QZN-13-03749 is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION that the amount of Four Hundred Thirty Six Thousand Eight Hundred Pesos (Php436,800,00) due to private respondent Roqson Industrial Sales, Inc. from petitioner Benjamin T. De Leon, Jr. shall earn interest of 12% per annum from October 3, 2007 up to June 30, 2013, and interest of 6% per annum shall be applied from July 1, 2013 until full payment.[29]The CA ruled that with the more recent ruling in Nacar v. Gallery Frames,[30] the amount of P436,800.00 due to respondent from petitioner by way of civil liability shall earn interest of 12% per annum from October 3, 2007 up to June 30, 2013, and thereafter earn the interest of 6% per annum from July 1, 2013 until full payment.[31]
After a careful evaluation of the prosecution's evidence, both documentary and testimonial, the court believes and so rule[s] that all the elements of violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 were not established beyond reasonable doubt.This acquittal precludes the finding of civil liability on the part of petitioner ex delicto. Consequently, any civil liability that survives the acquittal of petitioner in the instant case must therefore be rooted on some other source of obligation, and must be imputed to the party that factually owes it. Of particular guidance are the sources of obligation, which are outlined in Article 1157 of the Civil Code, thus:
x x x x
3. THE ELEMENT THAT ACCUSED KNEW OF THE INSUFFICIENCY OF FUNDS WAS NOT PROVEN.
To prove that accused knew of the insufficiency of funds, the prosecution must prove that accused Benjamin T. De Leon actually received the notice of dishonor personally. The prosecution presented the demand letter dated September 15, 2006 marked as exhibit "C" as one of the proof that accused received such notice of dishonor. However, upon closer examination, said documentary evidence was just a mere reminder of the unpaid obligations of the accused. This was not the notice of dishonor as contemplated by B.P. 22.
The prosecution then presented Exhibit "F." This time, the Court observed that it failed to show that accused personally or his authorized agent received the notice that the check he (accused) issued had been dishonored. Given the accused['s] denial of receipt of the demand letter, it behooved the prosecution to present proof that the demand letter was indeed sent through registered mail and that the same was received by accused. This, the prosecution miserably failed to do.
The prosecution merely presented a copy of the demand letter, together with the Registry Return Receipt, allegedly sent to accused. However, there was no attempt to authenticate or identify the signature on the registry return receipt. Receipts for registered letters and return receipts do not by themselves prove receipt; they must be properly authenticated to serve as proof of receipt of the letter, claimed to be a notice of dishonor. To be sure, the presentation of the registry card with an unauthenticated signature, does not meet the required proof beyond reasonable doubt that petitioner received such notice. It is not enough for the prosecution to prove that a notice of dishonor was sent to the drawer of the check. The prosecution must also prove actual receipt of said notice, because the fact of service provided for in the law is reckoned from receipt of such notice of dishonor by the drawee of the check. The burden of proving notice rests upon the party asserting its existence. Ordinarily, preponderance of evidence is sufficient to prove notice. In criminal cases, however, the quantum of proof required is proof beyond reasonable doubt. Hence, for B.P. Blg. 22 cases, there should be clear proof of notice. The failure of the prosecution to prove the receipt of petitioner of the requisite notice of dishonor and that he was given at least five (5) banking days within which to settle his account constitutes sufficient ground for his acquittal.
x x x x
Thus to create the prima facie presumption that the issuer knew of the reason for the dishonor of the checks, it must be shown that he received the notice of dishonor and after the required period of time thereafter, failed to satisfy the amount on the checks or make arrangement for its payment. Since the accused himself did not actually receive the notice of dishonor, then he should not be liable under the first paragraph of Section 1 of B.P. 22, that he knew at the presentment of the check that it was not sufficiently funded. This element of knowledge of the insufficiency of funds was not proven by the prosecution beyond reasonable doubt.[48]
Article 1156. An obligation is a juridical necessity to give, to do or not to do.Of import as well is the rule on civil liability vis-à-vis criminal actions as provided in Article 29 of the Civil Code:
Article 1157. Obligations arise from:(1) Law;
(2) Contracts;
(3) Quasi-contracts;
(4) Acts or omissions punished by law; and
(5) Quasi-delicts.
Article 29. When the accused in a criminal prosecution is acquitted on the ground that his guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt, a civil action for damages for the same act or omission may be instituted.Relatedly, Article 1161 of the Civil Code further provides for the regulations on civil obligations arising from criminal offenses:
Such action requires only a preponderance of evidence. Upon motion of the defendant, the court may require the plaintiff to file a bond to answer for damages in case the complaint should be found to be malicious.
If in a criminal case the judgment of acquittal is based upon reasonable doubt, the court shall so declare. In the absence of any declaration to that effect, it may be inferred from the text of the decision whether or not the acquittal is due to that ground.
Article 1161. Civil obligations arising from criminal offenses shall be governed by the penal laws, subject to the provisions of article 2177, and of the pertinent provisions of Chapter 2, Preliminary Title, on Human Relations, and of Title XVIII of this Book, regulating damages.Stated differently, in case of a criminal conviction, the basis of civil liability is the criminal liability itself. This is predicated on the rule provided for in Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code[49] that every person liable for a felony is also civilly liable, which in tum rests on the premise that a crime has both the criminal as well as the civil aspect.[50] On the other hand, in the event of an acquittal, there is no criminal liability to speak of, as well as no civil obligation arising from acts or omissions punished by law or delicts. With criminal absolution, Article 29 contemplates an "act or omission" from which liability may arise based on the other sources of obligations which are independent of the delict. Since the civil liability that may remain to be attributable in this case cannot rise from a delict since none was found by the lower courts, the only remaining possible source under the facts is the purchase contract, which was entered into by RB Freight and respondent. This applicable source of obligation hereby dictates the nature of the same and the party that may be held liable therefor.
While the CA acquitted Chiok on the ground that the prosecution's evidence on his alleged misappropriation of Chua's money did not meet the quantum of proof beyond reasonable doubt, we hold that the monetary transaction between Chua and Chiok was proven by preponderance of evidence.Similarly, in the case of Lumantas v. Calapiz, Jr.,[53] which involved an eight-year-old boy who suffered from a damaged urethra immediately after undergoing both appendectomy and circumcision with therein accused, the attending physician, the Court held that although the latter was acquitted of the charge of serious physical injuries due to the prosecution's failure to show the required standard of care to be observed in the private complainant's procedures, it nevertheless ruled that since the injury sustained was on the occasion of or incidental to the medical procedure which the accused therein performed, the accused, though acquitted, was still civilly liable, viz.:
Chua presented in evidence a bank deposit slip dated June 9, 1995 to Chiok's Far East Bank, Annapolis account in the amount of P7,100,000.00. She also testified that she delivered to him in cash the amount of P2,463,900.00. Chiok's admission that he issued the interbank checks in the total amount of P9,563,900.00 to Chua, albeit claiming that it was "for safekeeping purposes only" and to assure her that she will be paid back her investment, corroborates Chua's evidence. In any event, as found by the appellate court, Chiok admitted that he received from Chua the amount of "P7.9" million in June 1995 and for (sic) "P1.6" million at an earlier time. It is on this basis that the CA found Chiok civilly liable in the amount of P9,500,000.00 only.
However, we find that during the direct and cross-examination of Chiok on September 15, 1997 and October 13, 1997, the reference to "P9.5" million is the amount in issue, which is the whole of P9,563,900.00.[52]
The petitioner's contention that he could not be held civilly liable because there was no proof of his negligence deserves scant consideration. The failure of the Prosecution to prove his criminal negligence with moral certainty did not forbid a finding against him that there was preponderant evidence of his negligence to hold him civilly liable. With the RTC and the CA both finding that Hanz had sustained the injurious trauma from the hands of the petitioner on the occasion of or incidental to the circumcision, and that the trauma could have been avoided, the Court must concur with their uniform findings. In that regard, the Court need not analyze and weigh again the evidence considered in the proceedings a quo. The Court, by virtue of its not being a trier of facts, should now accord the highest respect to the factual findings of the trial court as affirmed by the CA in the absence of a clear showing by the petitioner that such findings were tainted with arbitrariness, capriciousness or palpable error.[54]Finally, helpful is the case of Manantan v. Court of Appeals[55] which involved a driver who was charged with the crime of homicide through reckless imprudence resulting from a vehicular accident where he allegedly sideswept a passenger jeepney, which killed one of its passengers. The Court there held that even though the accused was acquitted of the crime charged since the records did not fully support a finding of negligence, he was nonetheless held civilly liable by virtue of the fact that on preponderance of evidence, his negligence was likely, thus:
Our law recognizes two kinds of acquittal, with different effects on the civil liability of the accused. First is an acquittal on the ground that the accused is not the author of the act or omission complained of This instance closes the door to civil liability, for a person who has been found to be not the perpetrator of any act or omission cannot and can never be held liable for such act or omission. There being no delict, civil liability ex delicto is out of the question, and the civil action, if any, which may be instituted must be based on grounds other than the delict complained of. This is the situation contemplated in Rule 111 of the Rules of Court. The second instance is an acquittal based on reasonable doubt on the guilt of the accused. In this case, even if the guilt of the accused has not been satisfactorily established, he is not exempt from civil liability which may be proved by preponderance of evidence only.[56]The Rules of Court requires that in case of an acquittal, the judgment shall state "whether the evidence of the prosecution absolutely failed to prove the guilt of the accused or merely failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. In either case, the judgment shall determine if the act or omission from which the civil liability might arise did not exist."[57]
Private respondents counter that a closer look at the trial court's judgment shows that the judgment of acquittal did not clearly and categorically declare the non-existence of petitioner's negligence or imprudence. Hence, they argue that his acquittal must be deemed based on reasonable doubt, allowing Article 29 of the Civil Code to come into play.The aforementioned cases illustrate how in cases where the civil liability survives an acquittal based on reasonable doubt, the Court found civil liability based on other sources of obligation other than ex delicto, i.e., contract as the source of liability in the estafa case of Chiok v. People, and tort or quasi-delict in the cases of Lumantas v. Calapiz, Jr. and Manantan v. Court of Appeals. It is therefore clear that although an acquittal on reasonable doubt does not necessarily extinguish civil liability, it also does not mean that the civil liability of the acquitted nonetheless automatically survives. Instead, care must still be taken in determining whether a civil liability persists as traced back to another source of obligation under Article 1157 of the Civil Code.
Our scrutiny of the lower court's decision in Criminal Case No. 066 supports the conclusion of the appellate court that the acquittal was based on reasonable doubt; hence, petitioner's civil liability was not extinguished by his discharge. We note the trial court's declaration that did not discount the possibility that "the accused was really negligent." However, it found that "a hypothesis inconsistent with the negligence of the accused presented itself before the Court" and since said "hypothesis is consistent with the record x x x the Court's mind cannot rest on a verdict of conviction." The foregoing clearly shows that petitioner's acquittal was predicated on the conclusion that his guilt had not been established with moral certainty. Stated differently, it is an acquittal based on reasonable doubt and a suit to enforce civil liability for the same act or omission lies.[58]
Mr. Crisostomo,More, on October 14, 2006, it was RB Freight's Board of Directors which wrote respondent communicating its rejection of the latter's counter-proposal on the payment scheme. It was also RB Freight, not petitioner, who made a request to respondent for a "debt moratorium."[61]
This is in response to your letter dated 15 September 2006 regarding our outstanding amount payable in the amount of PESOS four hundred thirty-six thousand eight hundred pesos (PHP436,800.00).
Thank you very much for bearing with us but in as much as we wanted to pay you soonest, we are not in a position to pay you immediately because our loan application is still in process.
To show our good faith and our intention to pay our obligation to you we would like to propose the following payment scheme:Thank you for your kind attention and hoping that you grant above request.
- Assignment of a certain real estate prope1ty valued approximately at PHP 2.5 Million to cover our obligation;
- Four (4) Installment Payment Plan payable weekly beginning 06 October 06, as follows:
x x x x- Pay 2% monthly interest computed on the diminishing balance;
- Upon full payment, the security or assigned property will be released, accordingly.
Very truly yours,
(signed)
Mean Ramos
Administrative
Manager[60]
Section 29. Liability of accommodation party. — An accommodation party is one who has signed the instrument as maker, drawer, acceptor, or indorser, without receiving value therefor, and for the purpose of lending his name to some other person. Such a person is liable on the instrument to a holder for value, notwithstanding such holder, at the time of taking the instrument, knew him to be only an accommodation party.The American Law Institute on Surety and Guaranty outlines the role of an accommodation party, thus:
x x x Suretyship relationships are often created by the use of negotiable instruments. Frequently, the secondary obligor is an indorser of an instrument of which the principal obligor is the maker, or the secondary obligor and principal obligor are comakers. Occasionally, the secondary obligor will be the maker of a note that the principal obligor indorses or the secondary obligor will be the acceptor of a draft drawn by the principal obligor. When both the secondary obligor and the principal obligor are parties to the instrument, the secondary obligor is an "accommodation party" to the instrument.[62]In other words, for one to be deemed an accommodation party and held liable to fulfill the outstanding obligation of the accommodated party, the person must not only sign an instrument and not receive value therefor, but the person must have done the same for the purpose of lending his or her name for the credit of the accommodated party.
Consequently, to be considered an accommodation party, a person must (1) be a party to the instrument, signing as maker, drawer, acceptor, or indorser, (2) not receive value therefor, and (3) sign for the purpose of lending his name for the credit of some other person.In other words, despite the clear demonstration of the corporate nature of the debt in question, petitioner nevertheless remains personally civilly liable for the face value of the dishonored check in question because his act of issuing his personal check was the overt act of accommodation of RB Freight's outstanding balance, and made him the accommodation party of the latter within the contemplation of Section 29 of the NIL. Stated differently, although petitioner's civil liability may no longer be ex delicto by virtue of his acquittal, he nonetheless remains civilly liable since his obligation can be traced back to the law as his source of obligation, specifically Section 29 of the NIL.
Based on the foregoing requisites, it is not a valid defense that the accommodation party did not receive any valuable consideration when he executed the instrument. From the standpoint of contract law, he differs from the ordinary concept of a debtor therein in the sense that he has not received any valuable consideration for the instrument he signs. Nevertheless, he is liable to a holder for value as if the contract was not for accommodation, in whatever capacity such accommodation party signed the instrument, whether primarily or secondarily. Thus, it has been held that in lending his name to the accommodated party, the accommodation party is in effect a surety for the latter.[65]
The defense is made to the action that the defendants never received the value of the promissory notes. It is, of course, fundamental that an instrument given without consideration does not create any obligation at law or in equity in favor of the payee. However, to fasten liability upon an accommodation maker, it is not necessary that any consideration should move to him. The consideration which supports the promise of the accommodation maker is that parted with by the person taking the note and received by the person accommodated. (5 Uniform Laws, Annotated, pp. 140 et seq.; Clark vs. Sellner [1921], 42 Phil., 384; First National Bank of Hancock vs. Johnson [1903], 133 Mich., 700; 103 Am. St. Rep., 468; Marling vs. Jones [1909], 138 Wis., 82; 131 Am. St. Rep., 996; Schoenwetter vs. Schoenwetter [1916], 164 Wis., 131.)Furthermore, if the respondent has, during the pendency of this Decision, already successfully recovered from RB Freight the payment of the face value of the dishonored check in question, petitioner may offer as a defense against a second payment of the face value of the check in question the proscription against double recovery as provided for in Article 1161 in relation to Article 2177 of the Civil Code, thus:
While perhaps unnecessary to this decision, it may properly be remarked that when the accommodation parties make payment to the holder of the notes, they have the right to sue the accommodated party for reimbursement, since the relation between them is in effect that of principal and sureties, the accommodation parties being the sureties.[67]
Article 2177. Responsibility for fault or negligence under the preceding article is entirely separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from negligence under the Penal Code. But the plaintiff cannot recover damages twice for the same act or omission of the defendant.To the Court's mind, a double recovery for the same face value of the dishonored check would be neither fair nor right, but would only allow for unjust enrichment on the part of the respondent. Such a fallout is farthest from the intendments of the law, which dictate that all manners of retribution and recompense must still remain circumscribed by the elementary notions of justice and fair play. For although the law may be deemed harsh and unflinching with its straightforward ascription of civil liability to an accommodation party for a corporate debt, it cannot be faulted as unjust since it is not blind to the realities of each case, and affords the right of recourse to parties to ensure no failure of justice.